I think that I have understood what you've been trying to say, but the point is that I disagree. You think that it is impossible for one to be mistaken about one's perceptions, but I think that to perceive, by itself is essentially an act of interpretation, and like any other act of interpretation, it is possible that one could be wrong in such an act.

I admit that there is a mode of argument on this subject which claims that an interpretation is never right or wrong, it is always purely subjective, and the rightness or wrongness of an interpretation is something imposed by a further judgement. But who would make that judgement, God? And this may be what you are arguing, but I think if we follow this principle, it leaves us with no principles to assume any objective knowledge, without referring to God, as all knowledge involves interpretation. I think we are better off to assume that inherent within any act of interpretation is a judgement of correct, and the interpretation is produced based on this judgement. An interpretation consists of choosing from possibilities, so there is some sort of inherent judgement of correctness. But then we need to accept that this judgement may be mistaken.

So your example of the twinkling star does really address the problem, because it doesn't deal with the issue of person who doesn't perceive the way that one should perceive. If I have bad eyes, and do not see the stars as twinkling, which does happen because my eye sight is bad, and then I put on my glasses, and see them twinkling, am I not correct to say that I was mistaken in my perception, before I put on my glasses?

to perceive, by itself is essentially an act of interpretation, and like any other act of interpretation, it is possible that one could be wrong in such an act. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree that the perception is an act of interpretation. The perception comes before the judgement. Step 1: I perceive the stars twinkling. Step 2: I interpret that stars twinkle. Step 2 has the potential to be incorrect because, as you say, it is an act of interpretation. But step 1 cannot be incorrect. It is a simple fact. If I am incorrect about the interpretation, the fact remains that I perceive the stars twinkling.

If I have bad eyes, and do not see the stars as twinkling, which does happen because my eye sight is bad, and then I put on my glasses, and see them twinkling, am I not correct to say that I was mistaken in my perception, before I put on my glasses? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you were not mistaken in the perception. Only in the interpretation, if you did such a thing afterwards.

I admit that there is a mode of argument on this subject which claims that an interpretation is never right or wrong, it is always purely subjective, and the rightness or wrongness of an interpretation is something imposed by a further judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see what you mean, but this is not what I am arguing, so we can drop this. Let's stay on the ground of "common sense".

I disagree that the perception is an act of interpretation. The perception comes before the judgement. Step 1: I perceive the stars twinkling. Step 2: I interpret that stars twinkle. Step 2 has the potential to be incorrect because, as you say, it is an act of interpretation. But step 1 cannot be incorrect. It is a simple fact. If I am incorrect about the interpretation, the fact remains that I perceive the stars twinkling. — Samuel Lacrampe

The point though, is that Step 1 does not have to occur as the described Step 1, "I perceive the stars twinkling". One might perceive twinkling stars, one might perceive stars that are not twinkling, another might not see any stars at all. So the perception, which you are referring to as Step 1, is itself an interpretation of what is really out there, because we can see what's out there in many different ways. The fact that you can revisit the perception in your memory, and reinterpret, giving it another description if you like, is irrelevant to the fact that it already is an interpretation, as a perception.

Let's stay on the ground of "common sense". — Samuel Lacrampe

So, referring to common sense then, how do you account for these differences of perception, if perception itself is not an act of interpretation? Three people are looking at the night sky. One sees stars twinkling, another see stars not twinkling, and the other doesn't see any stars. I think that they each see something different, because the act of seeing is an act of interpreting what's out there, and a person could be mistaken in this act. You think that the act of seeing is not an act of interpretation, and that a person cannot be wrong in the act of perception, but how do you account for these differences?

If I understand correctly, we at least agree that space is part of the physical. And we previously agreed that my syllogism works for things as colours and shapes. But how can we have colours and shapes without space? For us to perceive or even imagine colours and shapes, these must occupy an area (2D space). IE, shrink the area down to zero, and we can no longer perceive these colours and shapes. Thus space is an essential attribute of colours and shapes. Let's recap:
-Colours and shapes exist in the real world (as proven by the syllogism).
-Space is essential for the colours and shapes to exist, therefore space exists.
-Space is part of the physical world (if I understand your definition correctly), therefore the physical world exists, at least the portion of the physical that includes space.

Regarding Idealism: If we agreed that shapes and colours are things in themselves (as per the syllogism), then they exist independently of the activity of the mind. This does not refute the claim that some objects of knowledge are dependent on the mind, but it refutes the claim that all objects are. — Samuel Lacrampe

The context of what you quoted is important, and I'm not sure you've fully taken that into account. We mean different things when we each say that space is part of the physical, so for you to say that we agree is misleading. If you're just assuming your own definition or interpretation of these key terms when assessing what I've claimed, then you may end up misinterpreting my meaning.

For example, you talk of a physical world. Given my position in this discussion, that term seems inappropriate. My point was that 'physical' is just a word or a concept that we use to describe or conceive of subjects relevant to the study known as physics. That does not by any stretch entail a physical world or physical things-in-themselves which are objective and mind-independent. By space, as I hinted earlier, I mean something like what Kant meant. And by colour and shape, I mean something like Kant, or the British Empiricists before him, meant. I have no intention of conceding that colours and shapes are things in themselves or that space is mind-independent or anything of that sort before the debate has even really begun.

I don't need to answer the question of how we can have colours and shapes without space, because I haven't claimed or implied that we can.

Your argument was as follows:

1. We cannot imagine things we have not experienced in the past.
2. We perceive colours.
3. Therefore colours exist. — Samuel Lacrampe

That doesn't prove physicalism, realism, idealism, or anything of relevance. Idealists don't deny any of the above. Hume certainly wouldn't have denied any of that. It's clearly influenced by his own views, yet he didn't reach your conclusion.

I did say that the existence of colours and shapes in the real world is not the problem, but that is only if you interpret that claim in the right way, i.e. charitably in a manner consistent with idealism, e.g. they are real phenomena, and exist as part of the phenomenal aspect of the real world. I think that Berkeley, if I have understood him correctly, would also say that they are real, and that they exist in the real world, because he is a monist, rather than a dualist, and because for him, the world is both ideal and real, i.e. reality is ideal.

how do you account for these differences? — Metaphysician Undercover

These three perceptions are different but are not wrong because, prior to making an interpretation, these are mere observations. It is at this point only a passive event, and these are neither right nor wrong (if you exclude dishonesty) because no active event (interpretation or judgment) has occurred yet. Best is to give a full example in which all three persons have different perceptions, yet all have the right interpretation:

-Person 1: "I perceive the star are twinkling. But I know that this is an effect of atmosphere, and I conclude that stars in themselves don't twinkle."
-Person 2: "I perceive the stars are not twinkling. I conclude that stars in themselves don't twinkle."
-Person 3: "I don't perceive any stars. But I know I have bad eyesight and will rely on other people's sight and conclude that stars exist and in themselves don't twinkle."

All three persons are correct, because they are right in the interpretation of the perceptions, and are not lying about what they claim to perceive. Thus nobody is wrong, even though all three perceptions are different.

These three perceptions are different but are not wrong because, prior to making an interpretation, these are mere observations. — Samuel Lacrampe

How is an observation itself not an interpretation? To observe is to pay attention and take note of what is happening. But one person cannot observe the whole of reality all together. So whatever it is that is being observed, at that particular time, by that person, is what is of interest to that person. Don't you think that this, therefore, what the person takes note of (observes), is the person's interpretation of what is going on.

If a person improperly takes note of what is going on, don't you think that the person's observation is wrong?

If a single observation is wrong than every observation necessarily has to be considered wrong since skill in observing, prospective of observation, interpretation​ or ability to describe an observation, as well as the observed is constantly and continuously changing.

What is happening is that observations are changing and differing from other observations, which is impossible to avoid, as everything continuously evolves.

I realize this may be a stray from the current discussion, but I found this to be a relevant thread....

How does one explain 'quantum jumping', a phenomena I am not well-versed on in the definitive manner but rather the experiential manner, to one who is not up-to-date with the modern studies of quantum mechanics/supernatural phenomena/what-have-you.

As a newbie to the philosophical community, a lifetime member of the 'metaponderings' club', and a newly attached partner to an (disappointingly) abstainer of philosophy, I have found myself not only unsuccessfully debating the possibility of comprehending AND navigating the theorized 'multi-verse', but also cornered into a position that can easily be mistaken as "stupid" due to my lack of "lower-level science to back it up."

I am what my professors consider an "unconventional student", I am unable to communicate in collegiate terms, and I am frustrated.

And guidance, terminology, and links to scholarly resources would help immensely.

Ok, I am still trying to understand your point. Do you mean something like Kant in his critique of pure reason? That is: Things-in-themselves exist independently of the subject's mind. Let's call these X. But the subject may not directly perceive X, but a modified thing. Let's called these Y. In my argument with colours, colours are Y because that is what we perceive. Thus my argument only proves that something exists, but not necessarily colours themselves, because they are Y and not X.

And if idealism does not claim that things-in-themselves don't exist, and only claims that all that we perceive is dependant on the mind, then my argument does not refute idealism. Am I correct so far?

How is an observation itself not an interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

I differentiate the two as separate events. The interpretation is caused by the observation. And an effect is separate from its cause. i.e., nothing causes itself. Thus the observation comes prior to the interpretation. It is passive (step 1) and the effect of interpretation is active (step 2). Only interpretations are subject to be right or wrong.

If a person improperly takes note of what is going on, don't you think that the person's observation is wrong? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I agree. And that is because the act of taking notes is active and fits in step 2. But the observation comes yet again prior to that.

One more example: If I feel pain in my stomach, it could be for numerous reasons that I am not certain of, because I am not an expert on the subject. I can attempt to describe the pain or guess the cause, but I could be wrong in doing either. But one thing I am certain of: I feel pain in my stomach.

What is happening is that observations are changing and differing from other observations, which is impossible to avoid, as everything continuously evolves. — Rich

In other words, Heraclitus: You could not step twice into the same river. Is that what you mean?
What about consistency in nature? All laws of physics are based on observations which are consistent every time we repeat the same experiment.

Sorry, I don't think I can personally help. I don't know much about quantum mechanics, but it sounds more like physics than metaphysics. Physics is science. Metaphysics is philosophy.

The so called Laws of Physics (whatever they may be) are some equations that provide approximate predictions of behavior of non-living matter, under certain conditions, but also susceptible to being dead wrong. Quantum mechanics is probabilistic.

One might say that nature has habits subject to constant change. This describes both living and non-living matter.

That sounds correct. I guess all physical things will disappear, given enough time; and thus change. What about eternal truths, such as the truth that "2+2=4"? We would observe this continually.

Equations and numbers are just agreed upon notation that represents observations. These can also change over time.

As for observing similarities in multiplicities, this to is a matter of agreed upon convention. 2 apples + 2 apples equals four apples, if it is agreed that the similarities in the multiplicities are close enough. Everything we call laws are really just agreements which are based upon what we are taught and learned as we evolve. There is no given.

But is it not a self-contradiction to say "everything changes"? Because this 'everything' would include this very proposition, which means that at least one thing would not change, being this proposition. And if it is a self-contradiction, then it is necessarily false by the laws of logic. Therefore, the proposition "not everything changes" is true.

There very well be attn unchanging opposite to the every changing. My guess is that it would be like sleep when not dreaming. I was once "unconscious" for several minutes. That would also be a state of consciousness when nothing is changing (from my perspective). The may be a constant flow between these two states when asleep and when awake. In Bohm's metaphysics this would be the Implicate and Explicate Orders. When in the Explicate Order, everything is changing.