Just a fact! :rofl: You know nothing about me. As I thought; you can't come up with the goods. It's a little sad that you feel a need to resort to such tactics, Frank. what are you trying to defend? — Janus
If you read a little about Chalmers' p-zombie argument it will become clear to you why your objections are irrelevant.
I have no interest in explaining it to you just to have you repeat your nonsense. — frank
I'm a bit lost. This is what a zombie is according to Chalmers:A computer can't tell you it's conscious? — frank
http://consc.net/zombies-on-the-web/A zombie is physically identical to a normal human being, but completely lacks conscious experience. — Chalmers
Not if a mechanical device is forbidden from using the word. If a thermostat doesn't feel warmth, then neither do I. I admit to pain being a rare one, with few devices having sensors to provide it. — noAxioms
Don't or can't? This seems awfully begging to me.Of course they are. This is why they tend to say we have these properties, but these things over here, they don't. — InPitzotl
Would it make it not the same toaster if the name got scratched off, or was never there in the first place? Despite my calling it a 'legal identity' (an old habit), I'm not talking about being able to prove the fact to a court of law. I'm talking about it actually being the toaster in question or not.if you had your name scratched onto the toaster when I stole it, it will tend to still be scratched on there unless I scratched it off.
That's not the story being pushed:We might could even say certain arrangements of physical objects have privileged status, raising them above other arrangements.
Per this assertion, the lack of privilege does not come from a defect or other difference in the physical arrangement.A zombie is physically identical to a normal human being, but completely lacks conscious experience.
— consc.net/zombies-on-the-web — InPitzotl
Not how I'm using it when I make a distinction. The "I" refers to the non-physical experiencer, the thing that gives the privilege.The "I" I accused you of having is simply a unit of theory of mind as it applies to the linguistic aspect of your posts.
Age of five eh? Does that imply you were a zombie until some sufficient age? What do you experience before then?You, OTOH, meet the requirements to apply theory of mind to as humans above the age of five regularly do.
A computer can't tell you it's conscious? — frank
While there are plenty of computers running fixed algorithms that just play pre-recorded messages (a typical phone tree for instance), a true AI isn't programmed to say any specific words. It learns them, same as you do. Its programming may have been done by another computer, probably better than would have said 'conscious programer'. Your assertions are rapidly going to be demonstrated false as capabilties improve.Only if someone conscious programs it to. — Janus
Irrelevant. This is ostensive.Don't or can't? — noAxioms
Yes.Would it make it not the same toaster if the name got scratched off — noAxioms
If you say so, but all I can talk about is what I mean by "being the same".I'm talking about it actually being the toaster in question or not. — noAxioms
That's David Chalmers' story. I'm not David.That's not the story being pushed — noAxioms
You said the toaster feels warm. It doesn't matter how you're using the word "I"... the toaster doesn't feel warm. It lacks the parts.Not how I'm using it when I make a distinction. — noAxioms
Yes; by that age, most humans learn theory of mind.Age of five eh? — noAxioms
No, it implies that you can for example pass the Sally Anne test. Theory of Mind has nothing to do with p-zombies.Does that imply you were a zombie until some sufficient age? — noAxioms
Most thermostats are not biological, and are thus not the biological equivalent of anything.Is the thermostat biologically equivalent to you? — Marchesk
Yes it is. Chalmers forbids the usage of 'feels warmth' for the zombie, and the thermostat is a zombie, lacking the added bit that is the difference between zombies and humans. So the word is forbidden, despite the fact that the thermostat measures (via physics!) temperature and reacts to it, exactly as the zombie does. The vocabulary is reserved (by proponents of the existence of the ';additional bit') for objects that have that additional supernatural bit, as evidenced by assertions of 'lies' when the zombie claims that he also feels warmth.But this isn't about what words you can and can't use if you subscribe to this or that.
Chalmers claims that the feeling of warmth can only be had by some supernatural experiencer, and since noAx is not one of those, noAx no more can feel warmth than can the thermostat. I refuse to be placed in a privileged category over it, unearned.It's about the fact that you do feel warmth.
Oooh, magic sauce!I tend to think [thermostats] are incapable of feeling warmth, although I wouldn't rule some form of panpsychism completely out.
I'm merely skeptical of this immaterial experiencer/possessor, or of the magic sauce, or however it's presented. Surely I'm not the first person on these forums skeptical of dualism.I simply don't believe you when you claim skepticism about feeling warmth just because you can't say the same for thermostats in this discussion.
I'm merely skeptical of this immaterial experiencer/possessor, or of the magic sauce, or however it's presented. Surely I'm not the first person on these forums skeptical of dualism. — noAxioms
I chose the thermostat since it is the ultimate in trivial data processing. A sensor and a single mercury switch is enough, the opposite end of the complexity spectrum compared to noAx, but fundamentally doing the same thing. — noAxioms
Your opinion is noted, but it provides negligible evidence falsifying an alternate one.User whatever terms you like, but your first person experiences of warmth, pain, color, etc. are not part of the physical descriptions of the world. — Marchesk
P-zombies it could be argued are logically possible, but not metaphysically possible — Pantagruel
The two are closely linked. For metaphysical possibility, you can just posit a god that makes it happen.
Physical possibility is trickier. That's whether it's possible in our world. — frank
The guy didn't behave the same afterwards, whereas the zombie behaves indistinguishably from a 'human' in the same situation, so it doesn't really fit the definition. — noAxioms
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.