I don't feel pain. I'm a zombie, remember? I merely process the data received from my nerve endings and make the appropriate facial expressions and such.A self-driving car can't feel pain. I assume you can. — RogueAI
To what? There isn't anything to which it is like something. That's the thing I deny. There's no 'I' (a thing with an identity say) that's being me.What's that like? — Marchesk
Yeah, that's the real problem here. If qualia are epiphenomenal, how can we talk about them? — InPitzotl
This phrase sounds suspicious. There's a me, but there's no I being me?There's no 'I' (a thing with an identity say) that's being me. — noAxioms
Indeed, if one with qualia can talk about it, it isn't epiphenomenal. Those of us without the qualia might talk about it because we hear the rest of you talking about it and know no better.My brain hurts now. I'll admit to having difficulties with the p-zombie argument when it comes time for the zombies to talk about consciousness.
— Marchesk
Yeah, that's the real problem here. If qualia are epiphenomenal, how can we talk about them? — InPitzotl
Well, not pretending anything. Chalmers claims a conscious experience that does not supervene logically on the physical. I don't have that since what I do isn't a logical contradiction like that. So I can only presume Chalmers (and the rest of you non-zombies) has a conscious experience that is fundamentally different than me just "receiving data that could be interpreted as pain", as it was put in T2. I might use the word pain, not because I (like the other zombies) am lying, but because we've been provided with no other vocabulary to describe it.Are you pretending for the thread, or do you actually think you're a p-zombie? — RogueAI
'Pain' seems to be a word reserved to describe the experience of had by the experiencer of a human. It would be a lie to say that I feel pain, in the context of this topic, so lacking an experiencer, I cannot by definition feel pain any more than can a robot with damage sensors. Again, I may use the word in casual conversation (outside the context of this topic) not because I'm lying, but because I lack alternative vocabulary to describe what the pure physical automaton does, something which by your definition cannot feel pain since it lacks this experiencer of it.So you don't feel pain? — Marchesk
This is a better question. The 'me' is like the robot, the thermostat', the automaton. These things, in common language, have a sort of legal identity, but not an identity which holds up to close scrutiny such as Parfit demonstrates. The "I" on the other hand refers to the experiencer of a conscious thing, something which gives it a true identity that doesn't supervene on the physical. My 'me' doesn't appear to have that. It seems inconsistent that something with an identity can be paired with something without one. The bijunction between the two doesn't work without a series of premises which I find totally implausible.There's no 'I' (a thing with an identity say) that's being me.
— noAxioms
This phrase sounds suspicious. There's a me, but there's no I being me? — InPitzotl
No, that's the legal 'me' doing that. Any toaster has one of those. Any automaton can type a similar response in a thread such as this.Also, there's definitely an "I" there. Something typed an entire grammatically correct, if not coherent, response in this thread with a unified theme conveying some particular form of skepticism to zombies.
I cry foul here. Imagine a believer of the classical elements telling you that he just fetched a pail of water from the well. When you ask the guy what water is, he explains that it is the element that is cold and wet. Analogously, you object... there is no "water"; for "water" refers to an element that is cold and wet, and we don't have such things. The problem is, the guy did in fact fetch the stuff from the well. This I believe is your error.The "I" on the other hand refers to the experiencer of a conscious thing, something which gives it a true identity that doesn't supervene on the physical. — noAxioms
I've no idea what you mean by legal me, but the ostensive I to which humans refer is not something a toaster has. I can't comment on the automaton... the term's too flexible.No, that's the legal 'me' doing that. Any toaster has one of those. Any automaton can type a similar response in a thread such as this. — noAxioms
'Pain' seems to be a word reserved to describe the experience of had by the experiencer of a human. It would be a lie to say that I feel pain, in the context of this topic, so lacking an experiencer, I cannot by definition feel pain any more than can a robot with damage sensors. Again, I may use the word in casual conversation (outside the context of this topic) not because I'm lying, but because I lack alternative vocabulary to describe what the pure physical automaton does, something which by your definition cannot feel pain since it lacks this experiencer of it. — noAxioms
Pain' seems to be a word reserved to describe the experience of had by the experiencer of a human. It would be a lie to say that I feel pain, in the context of this topic, so lacking an experiencer, I cannot by definition feel pain any more than can a robot with damage sensors. Again, I may use the word in casual conversation (outside the context of this topic) not because I'm lying, but because I lack alternative vocabulary to describe what the pure physical automaton does, something which by your definition cannot feel pain since it lacks this experiencer of it. — noAxioms
Brain activity that triggers the vocalization of the expression "I am conscious." There's nothing special about those words. "I am conscious" is no more an indicator of consciousness than "one plus one equals two." They're just sounds that can result from mechanical operations. — Michael
Slightly more analytical, the guy has a bad theory of water. When asked to describe what water is, the guy would give you an intensional definition of water that is based on the bad theory. It's proper to correct the guy and to say that there is no such thing as he described in this case; however, the guy is also ostensively using the term... the stuff in the well is an example of what he means by water. His bad theory doesn't make the stuff in the well not exist. So the guy is in a sense wrong about what water is, but is not wrong to have the concept of water. The stuff the guy goes out to fetch from the well really is there. — InPitzotl
I am pretty sure you're at least one step behind, not ahead, of the post you just replied to.An eliminativist about personal identity could hold the phlogiston as a counterexample. — SophistiCat
This is clumsily phrased. Phlogiston theory is a theory about combustion. It was replaced by oxidation theory, a better theory about combustion. We dropped the notion of phlogiston, but not the notion of combustion.But the preferred solution, at least in the case of the phlogiston, was not to come up with a better theory of the phlogiston, but to drop the stuff altogether as part of a better theory that accounts for the manifest reality of heat transfer. — SophistiCat
I am pretty sure you're at least one step behind, not ahead, of the post you just replied to. — InPitzotl
This is clumsily phrased. Phlogiston theory is a theory about combustion. It was replaced by oxidation theory, a better theory about combustion. We dropped the notion of phlogiston, but not the notion of combustion. — InPitzotl
This comment would perhaps at least make sense to me had it been attached to a comment of mine about pain and "data which could be interpreted as pain", but you've chosen to reference a comment about different kinds of identity for two very different things (a car and its driver say).The "I" on the other hand refers to the experiencer of a conscious thing, something which gives it a true identity that doesn't supervene on the physical.
— noAxioms
I cry foul here. Imagine a believer of the classical elements telling you that he just fetched a pail of water from the well. When you ask the guy what water is, he explains that it is the element that is cold and wet. Analogously, you object... there is no "water"; for "water" refers to an element that is cold and wet, and we don't have such things. The problem is, the guy did in fact fetch the stuff from the well. This I believe is your error. — InPitzotl
Bad analogy. In the case in question, nobody is ostensively using a term. You can't point to your subjective feeling of warmth and assert the toaster with thermostat doesn't feel anything analogous. Sure, it's a different mechanism, but not demonstrably fundamentally different.Slightly more analytical, the guy has a bad theory of water. When asked to describe what water is, the guy would give you an intensional definition of water that is based on the bad theory. It's proper to correct the guy and to say that there is no such thing as he described in this case; however, the guy is also ostensively using the term... the stuff in the well is an example of what he means by water.
No, wrong to have the concept of water since the term 'water' is not in fact being ostensively used. Perhaps not wrong, since there may be water in his well, but I detect none in mine and he cannot show me the water in his.So the guy is in a sense wrong about what water is, but is not wrong to have the concept of water.
I think so.You're objecting to an intensional definition of "I".
Legal identtiy: There is a rock placed at X, and you move it to a new location Y. Is it the same rock, or merely a different arrangement of matter in the universe with only language suggesting a binding between the prior arrangement and the later one? Is that toaster under your arm the same toaster as was stolen from me a moment ago, or a different one to which I have no claim? I shake a rope sending a wave down its length. Is the wave I created the same wave that reaches the other end despite not involving motion of a single bit of the original perturbed material? That's what I call legal identity, and has nothing to do specifically with life forms. It seems mostly language based, not based on anything physical, and it doesn't always work. A cell divides by mitosis. Which is the original cell? Language has no obvious answer and physics doesn't care.No, that's the legal 'me' doing that. Any toaster has one of those. Any automaton can type a similar response in a thread such as this.
— noAxioms
I've no idea what you mean by legal me
This seems to be an example of the privileged language mentioned above. What I see as the 'bad theory' asserts privileged status to humans, raising them above a mere physical arrangement of matter, and assigns language reserved only for objects with this privileged status. I'm denying the status, and thus sit in the group with the toaster, forbidden to use the sacred language. My son has one of those 'hey google' devices sitting on its table, and it might reply to a query with "I cannot find that song" or some such. But such usage seems to refer to the legal identity (something I don't deny) and not to "I, the experiencer of the device" which neither the toaster nor the physical arrangement of matter referred to as 'noAxioms'.but the ostensive I to which humans refer is not something a toaster has.
I don't consider my position on this to be abnormally skeptical. I simply deny the non-physical experiencer, which is a fairly standard monist position. I differ from the mainstream position in that I'm willing for others to have the dual relationship (and hence all the talk about it), thus forcing me to use alternate terms to describe how I work. Most monists probably believe that every mind supervenes on the physical, not just some of them. My position explains why the zombies talk about pain when they don't actually 'feel' (privileged definition) it. They are not lying, merely drawing from the limited vocabulary available to them.How far does you skepticism go? Do you think there's a strong possibility you're the only mind in existence? — RogueAI
Not if a mechanical device is forbidden from using the word. If a thermostat doesn't feel warmth, then neither do I. I admit to pain being a rare one, with few devices having sensors to provide it.I any case, I'm confident you do feel pain, and trying to argue that you don't via some objective comparison or description doesn't change the fact that you do in fact feel pain. — Marchesk
:up:If the zombie can think it is conscious (which itself is an act of consciousness) , and this thinking is the result of brain activity, then why would consciousnesses not also be a result of brain activity? — Janus
It was not a put-down. I'm not just generically using braggart language here; you're literally one step behind. The water example is a response to the response you just gave, and it does not negate it. We did not discard the notion of water when we discarded classical elements, and there is a good reason we did not do so. That we discarded phlogiston on replacing it with a better theory, does not negate this good reason not to discard water when dropping classical element theory.I am not sure how to take this. Is this just a generic putdown, or did you mean something more specific? What am I missing? — SophistiCat
That's not quite the clumsiness I was referring to. "X is a bad theory of Y" is to be understood in the sense of X being an explanans and Y an explanandum. In this sense, phlogiston theory is not a theory of phlogiston because phlogiston is an explanans. The explanandum here is combustion; so phlogiston in this sense is a theory of combustion. When we got rid of phlogiston theory, we did get rid of phlogiston (explanans), but we did not get rid of combustion (explanandum).Well, referring to the phlogiston theory as a theory of heat heat transfer was perhaps clumsy, but you have ignored the substance of my response in favor of capitalizing on this nitpick. — SophistiCat
We did not discard the notion of water when we discarded classical elements, and there is a good reason we did not do so. That we discarded phlogiston on replacing it with a better theory, does not negate this good reason not to discard water when dropping classical element theory. — InPitzotl
Of course they are. This is why they tend to say we have these properties, but these things over here, they don't. They are ostensively pointing to the properties, and they are formulating an incomplete theory in an attempt to explain the properties they are pointing to. And I even agree it's a bad theory about what they're ostensively including.Bad analogy. In the case in question, nobody is ostensively using a term. — noAxioms
The notion that either we have an immaterial driver in the driver's seat experiencing things or the toaster feels warmth sounds like a false dichotomy to me.The only way I can parse it, it is the followers of Chalmers that are making the error you point out, where a human is privileged in being allowed to call something water/cold/wet, but anything else (a sump pump moving the stuff) doing the exact same thing is not allowed to use such privileged language (the pump moves a substance which could be interpreted as water). — noAxioms
Yes, it's the same rock...Is it the same rock, — noAxioms
...and it's probably that too. Most of the toaster's mass is in gluons. They're constantly obliterating and reforming. And the next grand TOE may even do something more weird with the ontologies.or merely a different arrangement of matter in the universe — noAxioms
Actually, yes, I can. The toaster reacts to warmth. "Legal me" reacts to warmth as well. But "legal me" also reacts to an increase in blood acidity.You can't point to your subjective feeling of warmth and assert the toaster with thermostat doesn't feel anything analogous. Sure, it's a different mechanism, but not demonstrably fundamentally different. — noAxioms
Your sales pitch here is a dud. I can play Doom on this computer. I might could even play Doom on my Keurig. But I cannot play Doom on this bottle of allergy pills.This seems to be an example of the privileged language mentioned above. What I see as the 'bad theory' asserts privileged status to humans, raising them above a mere physical arrangement of matter, and assigns language reserved only for objects with this privileged status. — noAxioms
There are particular arrangements of physical matter that come in individual "toaster"-like bodies, which are embedded in their environments and must navigate them, and which regularly participate in conversations of various sorts with other entities. "Hey google" is not one of these things. But noAxioms is one of these things.My son has one of those 'hey google' devices sitting on its table, and it might reply to a query with "I cannot find that song" or some such. — noAxioms
The argument is just about conceivability. Your question shows you've gone beyond conceiving of the P-zombie to asking why it's like that.
That's all that's needed to drive the wedge in. — frank
As I pointed out before the idea of a programmer is no part of Chalmer's philosophy. If you wanted to posit that there could be p-zombies among us, or we could even all be p-zombies, because we are living in a consciously programmed simulation, then that would not be incoherent, but just a silly idea we could have no reason to believe. — Janus
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