Knowing all the physical facts about the brain states of people having experience x (e.g., seeing red) won't lead to knowing what experience x is like (e.g., what it's like to see red). — RogueAI

But even if we grant that, is it an argument against some sort of naturalism or physicalism? Is there no difference between the brains of people who have read about swimming and people who have done it and know how to swim? That seems crazy, doesn't it? And only people who have done it know what it's like to swim. Knowing what it's like is a function of memory, isn't it?

But even if we grant that, is it an argument against some sort of naturalism or physicalism? Is there no difference between the brains of people who have read about swimming and people who have done it and know how to swim? That seems crazy, doesn't it? And only people who have done it know what it's like to swim. Knowing what it's like is a function of memory, isn't it? — Srap Tasmaner

It's an argument against the kind of physicalism that claims that everything is physical. If everything is physical, then a complete physical description of something should be necessary and sufficient to define it. Would a purely physical definition of pain work? Or would it be incomplete by virtue of the fact it doesn't mention how pain feels? I think purely physical descriptions of experiences are lacking in a obvious way: the salient aspect of pain isn't that it involves nerves and brain states x,y,z, it's that pain hurts. It feels bad. If purely physical descriptions of phenomena are not complete descriptions of said phenomena, that's a big problem for physicalism.

the salient aspect of pain isn't that it involves nerves and brain states x,y,z, it's that pain hurts. It feels bad. — RogueAI

That sounds to me like you're saying it's painful to be in pain. Were you hoping to say something more than that?

As Manuel pointed out, the experiment supports property dualism, with or without some sort of unspecified monism underneath.

I don't see why science couldn't proceed from there: a methodological property dualism?

If everything is physical, then a complete physical description of something should be necessary and sufficient to define it. — RogueAI

Why? It doesn't seem to follow at all. Why would it be the case that if everything is physical we can describe it? What is it about being physical which makes something describable?

Why? It doesn't seem to follow at all. Why would it be the case that if everything is physical we can describe it? What is it about being physical which makes something describable? — Isaac

Physical is a description of the world. It's saying the world is fundamentally made up of X and nothing else. So if the physical can't describe something, then that something is being left out of the picture, which means the justification for saying the world is physical is flawed.

It's important to distinguish our map of the world from the world itself.

It's saying the world is fundamentally made up of X and nothing else. — Marchesk

Right.

if the physical can't describe something, then that something is being left out of the picture — Marchesk

OK. So what's wrong with the entirely physical description I gave?

Learning about colours causes changes in the parietal-temporal-occipital region, the hippocampus, the frontal cortex... Seeing colours causes changes in the V4 and VO1 regions. — Isaac

Obviously because those changes are not color sensations.

Obviously because those changes are not color sensations. — Marchesk

Why not?

Why not? — Isaac

Because the description does not include them. I'm talking about physical descriptions. The reality is whatever it is such that brain activity can be conscious.

.

Rocks don't have strongly emergent properties like color sensation. — Marchesk

Why would that change the fact that we don't expect the contents to be there in the description.

A description of a rock doesn't include a rock either. What has that to do with what the rock's made of? — Isaac

Rocks don't have strongly emergent properties like color sensation.

Weird thing happened to my reply. It's above.

Strongly emergent properties are a problem for physicalism. It means something entirely new comes into existence. Something not logically entailed by it's description.

Strongly emergent properties are a problem for physicalism. It means something entirely new comes into existence. — Marchesk

Yeah, I can see that, but claiming colour sensations are strongly emergent is still begging the question. It's the matter the thought experiment is meant to show. It's obviously going to do that if you assume it at the outset.

Skepticism always wins. It can't be killed. We just tend to move on from it (or ride past it unmolested as Schopenhauer put it). — frank

Perhaps it can't be killed, but I think it can be challenged in new ways. For instance, we can refuse to accept the lonely-experience-hole of the self as fundamental (or at least see to what degree it's constructed by training.) 'The soul is the prison of the body.' The so-called soul is singular perhaps only because the body is (grasped as) singular.

For instance, we can refuse to accept the lonely-experience-hole of the self as fundamental — hanaH

Likewise we can reject the crowded-impersonal-world as fundamental. Reject to your heart's content.

Does anyone think they can describe "what it's like to see a red patch" or "what it's like to be in pain" in non-physical terms?

Does anyone think they can describe "what it's like to see a red patch" or "what it's like to be in pain" in non-physical terms? — Srap Tasmaner

That's just a way of saying that seeing red and feeling pain are subjective, to distinguish from the behavioral meanings of detecting reflectance or acting as if a body part is potentially being harmed.

That sounds to me like you're saying it's painful to be in pain. Were you hoping to say something more than that? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm saying that a purely physical description of pain is incomplete. The mental aspect of pain (that it hurts) is far more relevant to people than the fact that nerves are involved. Wouldn't you agree?

I'm saying that a purely physical description of pain is incomplete. — RogueAI

Is a purely physical description of a photon complete?

Is a purely physical description of a photon complete? — InPitzotl

Are photons conscious?

Are photons conscious? — Marchesk

:up:

The mental aspect of pain (that it hurts) — RogueAI

You said that before. Do you mean something besides "pain is painful"?

That's just a way of saying that seeing red and feeling pain are subjective — Marchesk

Well you're demanding a physical description right? How does it go when you avail yourself of the non-physical? Should be easy as pie now, shouldn't it?

Well you're demanding a physical description right? How does it go when you avail yourself of the non-physical? Should be easy as pie now, shouldn't it? — Srap Tasmaner

We already have words for sensations, dreams, imaginations, hallucinations, etc.

Are photons conscious? — Marchesk

I'll say no. Will you answer my question now?

So you don't need to describe pain because we already have the word "pain"?

You said that before. Do you mean something besides "pain is painful"? — Srap Tasmaner

Pain hurts. Do you agree? If you want to say pain is painful, I'm fine with that. When you unpack that, you're going to get something like: pain feels bad. So then, any definition of pain has to mention the fact that pain hurts/feels bad/is painful, otherwise it's incomplete. Agreed?

I'll say no. Will you answer my question now? — InPitzotl

A physical description of photons would suffice if physical stuff actually exists. If idealism is true, however, describing photons as physical things that exist independent of mind(s) would be false. A physical description of photons can only work if A) idealism isn't the case and B) they're not conscious.