Here's another way to think about my story's reliance on our instinct for self-preservation.

Do people who find themselves to be alive feel wronged by their parents? Overwhelmingly the answer is no, but there are obviously problems with that. Some, perhaps many, might feel that way sometimes, and that's a reminder that feelings are tied to specific events, to specific circumstances. People can have something like a feeling that is present across varying circumstances, but we tend to reach for different words there, something like "attitude" or maybe "outlook" or "mindset", though the latter have a more cognitive ring to me, more to do with expectations than affect.

I find it plausible that we experience our own instinct for self-preservation largely as an attitude that life is fundamentally a good thing. There are of course extreme experiences when we just want it to stop, and those powerful feelings might trump the general attitude. There's a sort of corollary too, that we may generally have a pretty negative and sour affect but if we find ourselves suddenly in danger (car skidding off the road, that sort of thing) then our instinct for self-preservation will come roaring back as a feeling, a powerful desire not to die in this moment.

Antinatalism is the claim that a person brought into being has thereby been wronged. Their being wronged might be accompanied by an attitude that they have or have not been wronged, or, more fleetingly, feelings that they have or have not been wronged. In other words, sometimes the antinatalist claim will align with the purported victim's own feelings or attitudes, and sometimes it won't.

To start with, then, we need to clarify in what sense someone may have been wronged without feeling that they have been wronged. That's certainly possible, but I'm not sure the usual cases are much help. For example, if you steal from me but I don't know it, sure, I've been wronged and don't feel that I have been. But that's a matter of knowledge; if I knew, I would feel wronged. Being alive isn't like that: we know perfectly well that we are, and, past a certain age, we know perfectly well how we came to be. I haven't been able to think of an example that's more like the wrong life is supposed to be.

Now for the wrong done. Is the wrong intermittent? That is, am I wronged by my parents only at the moments in my life when I am suffering? Taking that option, we could focus on whether, in those moments of suffering, I have feelings of having been wronged by my parents for bringing me into being. (And then, if those feelings are absent, we have to have ready an account of that, along the lines suggested in the previous paragraph.)

Another option is that the wrong is something like exposure to risk of suffering; in that case, the risk is persistent from the beginning of your life until its end, and you are wronged in this sense every moment you are alive, whether you are suffering at the moment or not. An analogy for this sort of wrong leaps to mind, that of a general who sends troops on a mission based on a preposterously faulty idea. The troops may come to no harm, through luck or their own ability, but they will still feel wronged; they will resent having had to run that risk because of someone else's folly. Here again, we need an account of why people mostly do not feel wronged as the troops sent on this mission do.

The conception of the wrong done can be strengthened, it seems, by noting that not only are you exposed to risk every moment of your life, but it's a near certainty you won't always escape harm. How should we think of the wrong done here? It's not clear to me. We have, in the first take, actual harmful events; we have, in the second, unjustified risking of harm. This third seems more about establishing culpability: if our general knew a certain sort of mission was risky and sent the troops out not once, when they might have gotten lucky, but over and over and over again, people might feel he was "tempting fate", relying on a faulty view of the chances of no one coming to harm. I'm not sure we even need that calculus here, because there's no question about whether the parents are culpable. (It might have some point if we take parents as a group, and stipulate that some of their offspring will be unlucky, and so on. Not clear then who we take to be the moral agent; when I suffer should I blame all parents, as a group, rather than mine?)

What's the point of all this? Twofold. On the one hand, insofar as I incline to any theory of morality, it's based in the moral sentiments, but I don't want to make too much of that, because I don't have much of a theory. On the other hand, most successful moral arguments succeed precisely by arousing the moral sentiments. It's no good telling someone that they should think something is wrong that they don't; you change their view by showing it to them in such a way that they feel it is wrong. (And obviously there's just as little point in telling people how they should feel.) I think this is what you are attempting with your favorite analogy lately, the "forced game": you want to elicit from your audience a feeling that placing someone in such a situation is wrong.

I don't think "optimism bias" is any help here. If it's real, it only explains why people think their lives have been, and will be, overall better than they actually have been and will be. But that's a cognitive issue. If people in moments of suffering, do not feel wronged by their parents, optimism bias doesn't explain that; if they do not feel wronged all the time because they are constantly at risk of being harmed, optimism bias doesn't explain that; and if you fail to arouse the moral sentiments of your audience, to feel that children have been wronged simply by being brought into being, optimism bias doesn't explain that either.

It's difficult to keep this discussion distinct from the antinatalism discussions elsewhere. I'm trying to avoid critiquing arguments in favor of antinatalism, and focus on why it's unpersuasive. Maybe this post makes it clearer how closely connected I think our experience of moral life is to what we find persuasive in moral discussion.

(As philosophers, we'll always be tempted to believe that the class "persuasive" can be identified with the class "coherent and logical", though we know perfectly well that it cannot. I am going to make an effort to connect any criticism I have of antinatalism's coherence to the goal of moral suasion as described above.)

What AN ultimately does is question the project of life itself, and this is scary itself. But it's not much more than Buddhism, just taken to a practical level. — schopenhauer1

I've been waiting for you to mention Buddhism.

The resemblance between AN and Buddhism is very limited and merely superficial. You formulate that idea nicely -- "What AN ultimately does is question the project of life itself". So does Buddhism. But Buddhism goes about it very differently than AN, and most importantly, Buddhism proposes a way out of suffering -- while alive. Also, the reason why a category of Buddhist practitioners doesn't engage in sex (and thus doesn't produce children) is not motivated by the desire to not cause an injustice to potential future beings, but out of a general committment to not indulge in sensual pleasures. In contrast, AN still pursue sensual pleasures; in fact, they see the whole point of life in them.

It's difficult to keep this discussion distinct from the antinatalism discussions elsewhere. I'm trying to avoid critiquing arguments in favor of antinatalism, and focus on why it's unpersuasive. Maybe this post makes it clearer how closely connected I think our experience of moral life is to what we find persuasive in moral discussion. — Srap Tasmaner

In some ways, antinatalism is, basically, a stunted Buddhism, or even more a stunted Jainism. Both of these religions question the project of life itself and seek or propose an end to it, on account of suffering.

Antinatalism is putting forward some ideas that can, to some extent, be found in those religions, but antinatalism does away with most of the other ideas and practices of those religions. This is one of the reasons why antinatalism has such a poor persuasive power. It doesn't have its own metaphysics, nor much of a system of ethics, except for that one aspect of not brining new people into the world. Their idea of not bringing new people into this world kind of "floats in the air", only loosely connected to some ideas of injustice, suffering, hardship, but without any concrete underpinnings -- which, however, a theory would need to have if it successfully wants to go against the flow of life as it is usually lived (the way Buddhism and Jainism go against this flow).

Again: Define "suffering". — baker

The general AN position is against 'suffering' which we all understand (no need to redefine the word). — I like sushi

Actually, not having a precise definition of "suffering" is part of the problem. Often, it's understood so broadly that it becomes a meaningless term.

Either way it's nice to see people thinking about stuff like this even if some of it makes almost no sense to me and what I say makes almost no sense to them

It's interesting for me to see what people say on this topic. I have some background in Early Buddhism, so it's easy to for me to think about suffering, but I can now better appreciate people who don't have such a background and how they approach the problem of suffering.

Everyone knows what it is to suffer and that doesn't need 'defining'.

; in fact, they see the whole point of life in them. — baker

That has nothing to do with AN.. And the resemblance to Buddhism is the life is suffering aspect. Agreed about the solution to the problem. The AN does not usually need karma, reincarnation or similar ideas, unless some kind of metaphor (which just makes it a Western version something similar to cause/effect/contingency). Buddhism, like Pessimism sees the system suffering of desire.. Schopenhauer had some great parallels he mentions in The World as Will and Representation. You should read passages from Book 4. The 8 fold path and such is interesting, but no such prescription except wholesale asceticism, compassion, and aesthetic contemplation is offered by Schop and I believe he thought that only certain character-types will be able to endure the path of asceticism.

I find it plausible that we experience our own instinct for self-preservation largely as an attitude that life is fundamentally a good thing. There are of course extreme experiences when we just want it to stop, — Srap Tasmaner

This seems like you are aiming for why people don't commit suicide.. An AN would argue that the threshold for starting someone else's suffering (whether or not a certain predominant attitude towards life prevails) is wrong. The attitude of the person doesn't make the starting of someone else's suffering thus good. Still goes back to the happy slave in an unjust situation.

sometimes the antinatalist claim will align with the purported victim's own feelings or attitudes, and sometimes it won't. — Srap Tasmaner

Happy slave.. If I punch you now, and you get enlightenment from it later, that would be crass utilitarian thinking.. Another way to think about it, is I shouldn't punch people, whatever their later feeling on it is. It is wrong to cause suffering, period (when you don't have to in the first place.. no one existed to need the suffering).

Another option is that the wrong is something like exposure to risk of suffering; in that case, the risk is persistent from the beginning of your life until its end, and you are wronged in this sense every moment you are alive, whether you are suffering at the moment or not. — Srap Tasmaner

Exactly! Now that is closer to the AN view.

What's the point of all this? Twofold. On the one hand, insofar as I incline to any theory of morality, it's based in the moral sentiments, but I don't want to make too much of that, because I don't have much of a theory. On the other hand, most successful moral arguments succeed precisely by arousing the moral sentiments. It's no good telling someone that they should think something is wrong that they don't; you change their view by showing it to them in such a way that they feel it is wrong. (And obviously there's just as little point in telling people how they should feel.) I think this is what you are attempting with your favorite analogy lately, the "forced game": you want to elicit from your audience a feeling that placing someone in such a situation is wrong. — Srap Tasmaner

Can moral sentiments be misleading if they lead to bad conclusions? I think you were closer when it comes to cognitive bias, which you seem to dismiss. It is not applying justice in an unbiased way. It is not just to cause X negative experience onto someone else UNLESS it is the time honored practice of Y. Do you see how that could be biased? Every other kind of harm is always justified when the person is born, so it's after the fact (schooling, vaccines, punishment for violating something, etc.). Not so in this case. It would seem in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else".. But it gets clouded in this case because, because, becuase, why?

Well, you say self-preservation. Self-preservation would be dealing with the self, this is dealing with another, so it's not quite that. I would say it's the sadness of not being able to do X activities related to procreation.. But also because it makes people sad that there would be no X, Y, Z in their future. That seems dystopian.

There is also a political agenda at play. People want to see the way of life they lived (with minor adjustments for future improvements perhaps) carried out. The injustice is, when it has to be carried out, by someone else. Why should they perpetuate your need to see a political agenda enacted in the world?

I have some background in Early Buddhism, so it's easy to for me to think about suffering, but I can now better appreciate people who don't have such a background and how they approach the problem of suffering. — baker

What do you mean 'some background'. You were brought up as a buddhist? How does that make it easier to think about suffering?

Still goes back to the happy slave in an unjust situation. — schopenhauer1

You claim that the happiness of the person in the position doesn't have much to do with the justice or injustice of imposing that position. So, what's your definition of an unjust position, without reference to what the person in the position thinks of their position? Is it unjust above a certain number of work hours a week? A certain difficulty of work? What's your standard?

It would seem in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else" — schopenhauer1

What does "unnecessary" mean here? What is "necessary harm"? I thought an example of "necessary harm" is when it prevents an even larger harm on the person in question (what's what I remember your definition was), but you contradict that here:

If I punch you now, and you get enlightenment from it later, that would be crass utilitarian thinking.. Another way to think about it, is I shouldn't punch people, whatever their later feeling on it is. It is wrong to cause suffering, period — schopenhauer1

Wouldn't sending kids to school also fall under this umbrella of wrong impositions then?

Can moral sentiments be misleading if they lead to bad conclusions? — schopenhauer1

I don't think of the moral sentiments as just a matter of the individual's reaction --- it's more like language: each of us speaks an idiolect, sure, but collectively, in the aggregate, those overlapping idiolects define a speech community, and the practice and intuitions about usage of each of us also carries some authority. There's no Correct English; there's only what English speakers by and large think is correct, and what they say. Each can speak, to some degree, for the entire community on correctness of usage, even though now and then they will disagree. And that authority comes not just from knowledge but from the fact that the practice of each us determines, in part, what counts as correct English.

As morals go, it's plain that there are differences among individuals, and between communities, but if you think of humanity in the whole as your moral community, then these are just idiolects and dialects. There are commonalities across communities and traditions as well, and they are considerable. I look for the basis of morality in what people feel is praiseworthy and blameworthy, what fills them with admiration, what they resent or find repulsive. I don't see any firmer ground for morality than that.

Happy slave. — schopenhauer1

That's an interesting example, and it's apparently pretty important to your view, so maybe we should spend some time on that. I'll just note, to start with, that my case doesn't rest on every individual slave feeling wronged by his master. It is true that slavery has been a common practice throughout the bulk of human history, in a variety of forms; but the fact that all of the modern world officially disapproves of slavery doesn't support either of us more than the other. If you compare, say, ancient attitudes toward slavery and modern ones, the fact of change shows that human beings can be brought, en masse, to finding slavery repellent. There's room for you to think of yourself as one of the first abolitionists, if you like, but it doesn't undermine my view of the task you face, to move us to find life itself repugnant, as we find slavery repugnant, and hold blameworthy those who place another in that situation.

I shouldn't punch people, whatever their later feeling on it is. It is wrong to cause suffering, period — schopenhauer1

But of course you can't mean this. A boxer does not feel wronged when their opponent punches them, even if it hurts. On the other hand, if you punch me after the bell has wrung and I've dropped my guard, I will feel wronged. There's an issue of consent here, which is important to your case as well. But there is a further counterexample: sometimes young men are in the habit of playfully punching each other on the bicep, and it's supposed to hurt, just not much. Whether anyone consents to that isn't quite clear. What is clear is that there will be cases where the punched party does not feel wronged, but cases, if the punch was in anger and hard enough to raise a bruise, where they might. Intention matters as well, and plays almost no role in your account of our being wronged by our parents. If someone takes a swing at your buddy, who's standing next to you at a drunken party, but hits you instead, do you feel wronged? Maybe, maybe not. If you feel very wronged and pull a knife, those around you will (one hopes) try to de-escalate the situation by getting you to feel differently about it -- he's just drunk, he didn't mean it, you're not even bleeding, it's just a party, shit happens. None of that is a denial of the bare facts that A caused harm to B, but it's an invitation to see it in a different light so that you feel differently about it.

You claim that the happiness of the person in the position doesn't have much to do with the justice or injustice of imposing that position. So, what's your definition of an unjust position, without reference to what the person in the position thinks of their position? Is it unjust above a certain number of work hours a week? A certain difficulty of work? What's your standard? — khaled

If snapping fingers was equal to today's situation, then certainly that would count.. Are there aspects of the world you would not have wanted to be the case, or are you just doing what is necessary? Of course we de facto do what's necessary.. We must follow the rules. Can you make your own rules? Can you have designed it from the first place nd then played it, tweak it, reverse it? Of course not. Then it's not just..
I can't give you a complete list, but I can give you a sufficient one:
1) Can't create your own rule for the game..
2) We can judge the game (unlike say an animal that kind of just lives out the game).. Our layer of rationalization/language etc. allows judgement etc.
3)

It is not applying justice in an unbiased way. It is not just to cause X negative experience onto someone else UNLESS it is the time honored practice of Y. Do you see how that could be biased? Every other kind of harm is always justified when the person is born, so it's after the fact (schooling, vaccines, punishment for violating something, etc.). Not so in this case. It would seem in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else".. But it gets clouded in this case because, because, becuase, why? — schopenhauer1

What does "unnecessary" mean here? What is "necessary harm"? I thought an example of "necessary harm" is when it prevents an even larger harm on the person in question (what's what I remember your definition was), but you contradict that here: — khaled

Right, but I am talking more about the idea that anything is justified if somehow your feelings about it lead to a positive experience (whether you know it or not). So, sure maybe putting you in crutches makes you feel enlightened down the line, doesn't mean I should put you in crutches.. I am just showing cases where it is clear that ones personal feelings don't align with the injustice.

We must follow the rules. Can you make your own rules? Can you have designed it from the first place nd then played it, tweak it, reverse it? Of course not. Then it's not just.. — schopenhauer1

Not a very good standard considering this is also the case in the utopia and you find it ok to impose life there.

1) Can't create your own rule for the game..
2) We can judge the game (unlike say an animal that kind of just lives out the game).. Our layer of rationalization/language etc. allows judgement etc. — schopenhauer1

These are both true in a utopia and IRL, so the real difference maker must be (3)

Every other kind of harm is always justified when the person is born, so it's after the fact (schooling, vaccines, punishment for violating something, etc.). Not so in this case. — schopenhauer1

But I'm just confused what (3) actually means. This bit seems to just be begging the question. "Impositions are fine after you're born, but if it's before you're born they're not fine". Isn't that exactly what we're debating?

That's very inconsistent for your line of argument. You try to find ethical "rules" that people abide by, that they don't abide by in the case of having children, for no justifiable reason, hence showing an inconsistency, like here for example:

in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else" — schopenhauer1

It's also what I'm trying to do to you, show an inconsistency in beliefs which I believe is there. But point is, this:

Every other kind of harm is always justified when the person is born, so it's after the fact (schooling, vaccines, punishment for violating something, etc.). Not so in this case. — schopenhauer1

Separates the "laws for imposing" into two categories. "Laws of imposing after you're born" and "laws of imposing before you're born". This completely destroys your project. You are trying to show that people's "laws of imposing" would preclude birth if applied rigorously. By separating it into two categories you open the door for someone to say: "Every other kind of harm needs justification when the person is born. Not so in this case. Since the person is not born, no justification is needed to do something that could harm them, so yes I am justified in genetically modifyin ma kid to be blind!" With exactly as much validity as your claim above.

Right, but I am talking more about the idea that anything is justified if somehow your feelings about it lead to a positive experience (whether you know it or not). — schopenhauer1

Important question is: What about cases where you know that they'll appreciate the imposition later down the line? In other words, it's not what you feel about it, but what they feel about it. Supposedly neither of these matter when it comes to whether or not an imposition is wrong (happy slave and all) so again I ask the question (this is probably the 10th or so time):

So, what's your definition of an unjust position, without reference to what the person in the position thinks of their position? Is it unjust above a certain number of work hours a week? A certain difficulty of work? What's your standard? — khaled

And you still haven't actually explained what you mean by "unnecessary". I get what you were doing with the original quote, I'm asking for clarification on what you mean by "unnecessary".

So just to be extra clear, if you respond to nothing else:

What is "unnecessary suffering" as opposed to "necessary suffering"?
What is an "unjust position" as opposed to a "just position"?

What about cases where you know that they'll appreciate the imposition later down the line? — khaled

That was more or less the starting point for this discussion, not with a claim that we know it for a fact in the case before us, but that we assume it and it's reasonable to assume it.

; in fact, they see the whole point of life in them.
— baker

That has nothing to do with AN.. — schopenhauer1

Did you not speak of pursuing other pleasures, apart from having children?

And the resemblance to Buddhism is the life is suffering aspect. Agreed about the solution to the problem.

The AN does not usually need karma, reincarnation or similar ideas,

Which is why antinatalism is so impotent. ha.

unless some kind of metaphor (which just makes it a Western version something similar to cause/effect/contingency). Buddhism, like Pessimism sees the system suffering of desire.. Schopenhauer had some great parallels he mentions in The World as Will and Representation. You should read passages from Book 4. The 8 fold path and such is interesting, but no such prescription except wholesale asceticism, compassion, and aesthetic contemplation is offered by Schop and I believe he thought that only certain character-types will be able to endure the path of asceticism.

Yes, character-types like these:

What do you mean 'some background'. You were brought up as a buddhist? How does that make it easier to think about suffering? — I like sushi

I've been around Buddhism in one way or another for more than twenty years. I've studied some of the Pali Suttas, and I can find my way around Theravada doctrine, and also in roundabout other Buddhist schools.

Especially in the context of Early Buddhism, it is often said that the Buddha taught only one thing: Suffering and the end of suffering. With all this talk about suffering, one becomes comfortable enough to think and talk about it.

Nihilists and buddhists have a lot in common.

Not a very good standard considering this is also the case in the utopia and you find it ok to impose life there. — khaled

The main argument is thus:

in no other case would people's moral sentiment simply say, "Cause unnecessary suffering for someone else" — schopenhauer1

What is "unnecessary suffering" as opposed to "necessary suffering"? — khaled

Unnecessary is not ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms, but simply causing harm to someone for no reason other than you want to see an outcome take place.

What is an "unjust position" as opposed to a "just position"? — khaled

Unjust = not based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair. In this case, making someone else play a game they had no hand in creating, cannot escape from without dire consequences, etc. I see life, what is already setup from historical contingency, and specifically in this thread, the economic aspect of it, as unjust to make others play.

All I have to show is THIS world is sufficiently unfair to make others play..
We can say that much of the day must be taken up by this particular game..
That it is not guaranteed that people will like all aspects of this game...
That one cannot just escape the game EASILY (see dire consequences).

You see, my case doesn't have to be X hours, of precision, only show that this game is sufficiently NOT a utopia.

Let's first make this criteria.. What to you makes a utopia.. Then we can move from there. If you don't answer that question, I am not going to move forward.

Separates the "laws for imposing" into two categories. "Laws of imposing after you're born" and "laws of imposing before you're born". This completely destroys your project. You are trying to show that people's "laws of imposing" would preclude birth if applied rigorously. By separating it into two categories you open the door for someone to say: "Every other kind of harm needs justification when the person is born. Not so in this case. Since the person is not born, no justification is needed to do something that could harm them, so yes I am justified in genetically modifyin ma kid to be blind!" With exactly as much validity as your claim above. — khaled

No no.. how do you get that from what I said? Prior to birth you can prevent harm, period. Once birth happens, you have to immediately start ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms.. You don't want to harm the person more than necessary, but to harm them in the first place, is unnecessary.

Unnecessary is not ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms, but simply causing harm to someone for no reason other than you want to see an outcome take place. — schopenhauer1

But, when you do this:

If I punch you now, and you get enlightenment from it later — schopenhauer1

That would be ameliorating greater harm with lesser harm clearly, so is this wrong or not?

Also, importantly, is this "greater harm" you're ameliorating just a general measure of utility, or must you ameliorate greater harm from the person in question with lesser harm? So would it be wrong to punch someone so that someone else gains enlightenment? Because depending on your answer this:

Prior to birth you can prevent harm, period. Once birth happens, you have to immediately start ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms — schopenhauer1

May or may not follow. If you think it's fine to harm someone to ameliorate greater harm from someone else, you can argue that having children is already ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms.

Unjust = not based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair. — schopenhauer1

This is just pushing the definition backwards. What is "morally right and fair"?

In this case, making someone else play a game they had no hand in creating, cannot escape from without dire consequences, etc. — schopenhauer1

So doing this is not morally right and fair? But this also applies to having children in a utopia, which you said you're fine with. So which is it?

All I have to show is THIS world is sufficiently unfair to make others play.. — schopenhauer1

Agreed, but I don't see where you did so. All you do is cite specific features of life, that are also present in a utopia, or in other impositions you think are fine.

Let's first make this criteria.. What to you makes a utopia.. Then we can move from there. If you don't answer that question, I am not going to move forward. — schopenhauer1

HA, nice switch. First off, I don't see how it's significant what I think counts as a utopia and what doesn't, I'm pretty sure what you mean to ask is: "What to you makes it ok to impose". Answer: "It's fine to impose something on someone when it is very likely they will find it worthwhile (among other cases that are irrelevant here)". You don't like this standard, clearly. And you try to convince me that it's bad somehow.

I don't use my standard when arguing with you, I try to get you to spell out a standard that doesn't lead to ridiculous consequences. So far, every time you've said "Life is X, and X is wrong", X is in common with utopias, or gifts, or other things you consider moral to impose, meaning X isn't a good standard for you. You did this in the last comment too:

In this case, making someone else play a game they had no hand in creating, cannot escape from without dire consequences, etc.

-You

So doing this is not morally right and fair? But this also applies to having children in a utopia, which you said you're fine with. So which is it? — khaled

And when you say "Life is too much X" you fail to show why it is. In order to do this you'd need to, for example, find an imposition that is "lighter" than life that we think is wrong to impose. Then you'd have a case for why life is too heavy of an imposition. But you haven’t done so.

That would be ameliorating greater harm with lesser harm clearly, so is this wrong or not? — khaled

You are not getting why I used that there. Stop taking it out of context. The reason I said that was that anyone can justify anything in the name of X. Crass utilitarianism isn't a good reason. An unknown "butterfly effect" good outcome that may come of it down the line, means shit in moral terms as a reason for something.

Also, importantly, is this "greater harm" you're ameliorating just a general measure of utility, or must you ameliorate greater harm from the person in question with lesser harm? So would it be wrong to punch someone so that someone else gains enlightenment? Because depending on your answer this:

Prior to birth you can prevent harm, period. Once birth happens, you have to immediately start ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms
— schopenhauer1

May or may not follow. If you think it's fine to harm someone to ameliorate greater harm from someone else, you can argue that having children is already ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms. — khaled

Right, you cannot use someone unnecessarily (see my definition).

So doing this is not morally right and fair? But this also applies to having children in a utopia, which you said you're fine with. So which is it? — khaled

Again, please define to me what is utopia. Start from there and then we can move forward. You haven't defined it.

Agreed, but I don't see where you did so. All you do is cite specific features of life, that are also present in a utopia, or in other impositions you think are fine. — khaled

Again, what is a utopia?

HA, nice switch. First off, I don't see how it's significant what I think counts as a utopia and what doesn't, I'm pretty sure what you mean to ask is: "What to you makes it ok to impose". Answer: "It's fine to impose something on someone when it is very likely they will find it worthwhile (among other cases that are irrelevant here)". You don't like this standard, clearly. And you try to convince me that it's bad somehow. — khaled

So with all of these arguments I can always use the "But you can never know" argument. You can never know if someone will find something worthwhile, or change their minds down the line, or simply have on balance not a great life. You just don't know.. But I am making the harder argument from appeals to justice, not statistical outcomes. Rather, it is unjust to impose anything unnecessarily that involves forms of unwanted, effort, annoyance, suffering, and things that you would not do otherwise if you were to create your own universe. You can call that suffering, lack of autonomy, or what not. Either way, you cannot escape unless dire consequences. Just because something is, doesn't mean it ought.

I don't use my standard when arguing with you, I try to get you to spell out a standard that doesn't lead to ridiculous consequences. So far, every time you've said "Life is X, and X is wrong", X is in common with utopias, or gifts, or other things you consider moral to impose, meaning X isn't a good standard for you. You did this in the last comment too: — khaled

But that's just the thing, you pick analogies which aren't life or in this case work. Life and work are not one long gift or utopia. If someone gave me a gift that lasted a large chunk of life or a whole lifetime, I couldn't get out of it, and it causes severe dislike, annoyance, and negative experience in general.. I wouldn't call that much of a gift, even if some positive came out of it too. Gifts shouldn't cause strife, unwanted challenges. Gifts shouldn't be something where you can't get out of it. If you gave me a gift of punches and my favorite X item. The favorite X item doesn't justify the punches.. Even worse, if you kept getting me items (items to live, to entertain myself).. but you kept punching me, but I can take your program of defending myself against your punches.. That isn't a gift either. And you still haven't defined a utopia..

I said earlier we can judge and think.. In utopia can we judge and think about what is going on? Are we always judging that it is good? No? Why not? Is it utopia subjectively, in some objective way? What? Let me know how you want to define your disanalogy to play the game.

The reason I said that was that anyone can justify anything in the name of X. Crass utilitarianism isn't a good reason. — schopenhauer1

"You can harm people when it alleviates more harm" is a perfect example of crass utilitarianism.... But no, crass utilitarianism is bad because....reasons.

Right, you cannot use someone unnecessarily (see my definition). — schopenhauer1

I'll take this as a "no" you can't harm someone to ameliorate greater harm form someone else. Now you have problems with the sleeping lifeguard again. You can't wake up the sleeping lifeguard to save a drowning person by this formulation. So again, a terrible standard for you that contradicts your beliefs.

Again, please define to me what is utopia. — schopenhauer1

I already did on the other thread, but ok, here is an example of one:

A world where at the snap of your fingers (or a similarly easy activity if you're disabled) any suffering will go away. Also there is no euthanasia option, you cannot leave the game, and refusal to snap your fingers will subject you to suffering exactly as it would IRL.

Let's go with that one.

You can never know if someone will find something worthwhile, or change their minds down the line, or simply have on balance not a great life. You just don't know. — schopenhauer1

But this is a terrible argument. Because it would make surprise parties wrong (you never know, they might absolutely hate them) but they're not wrong, according to you.

You keep coming up with standards for why birth is wrong that also lead to things you think are right being wrong, and it's getting very tiring pointing them out. It would be very helpful if before you post another standard you ask yourself "Can this lead to a contradiction in my beliefs". You'll find it basically always does. Because you're just cycling between 5 or so standards, all of which contradict your beliefs.

Rather, it is unjust to impose anything unnecessarily that involves forms of unwanted, effort, annoyance, suffering, and things that you would not do otherwise if you were to create your own universe. — schopenhauer1

Literally every imposition fits this description to different extents. And you think some impositions are fine. Again, terrible standard. Sigh....

But that's just the thing, you pick analogies which aren't life or in this case work. — schopenhauer1

"Your analogies to life are not life itself", excuse me what? I assume you mean that my analogies aren't like life in any way. Prove that. Don't just state it. If any analogous imposition I come up with to life , automatically becomes not analogous when you realize you think it's ok to impose, then you're begging the question.

If someone gave me a gift that lasted a large chunk of life or a whole lifetime, I couldn't get out of it, and it causes severe dislike, annoyance, and negative experience in general.. I wouldn't call that much of a gift — schopenhauer1

Agreed. Problem is, most people would tell you that life is mostly good with the dislike, annoyance, and negative experiences being the side effect. In other words, life is not like that. You think it is, but have provided no reasoning or evidence for why it is.

"You can harm people when it alleviates more harm" is a perfect example of crass utilitarianism.... But no, crass utilitarianism is bad because....reasons. — khaled

Look at the context of what I was replying to. Otherwise stop trying to use this. It's not crass utilitarian either. It is caring for the person. As much due care is taken as you can in that case. Unfortunately, more cannot be taken because that window was gone. By NOT doing ameliorations, you are doing the opposite.

I'll take this as a "no" you can't harm someone to ameliorate greater harm form someone else. Now you have problems with the sleeping lifeguard again. You can't wake up the sleeping lifeguard to save a drowning person by this formulation. So again, a terrible standard for you that contradicts your beliefs. — khaled

No, why am I explaining this yet again? It is unnecessary to cause harm in the first place, but once born you can ameliorate greater for lesser harms. One case no suffering has to take place. The other, the person has no choice but ameliorate if you respect the person as someone worth ethical matters (aka you don't neglect them). Of course, no worry of neglect or undue care if someone isn't born in the first place, but that's the truism I am constantly reexplaining.

A world where at the snap of your fingers (or a similarly easy activity if you're disabled) any suffering will go away. Also there is no euthanasia option, you cannot leave the game, and refusal to snap your fingers will subject you to suffering exactly as it would IRL.

Let's go with that one. — khaled

But you are giving me an example, not an explanation of what makes it a utopia.

But this is a terrible argument. Because it would make surprise parties wrong (you never know, they might absolutely hate them) but they're not wrong, according to you. — khaled

I am tired of answering this disanalogy. Surprise parties aren't life. If you can't figure out why, we are done cause no use arguing with willful ignorance to make rhetorical points. You should lose this one, it's not great. I hesitate to say that because you will probably just pick a worse one cause that's what you do apparently.

You keep coming up with standards for why birth is wrong that also lead to things you think are right being wrong, and it's getting very tiring pointing them out. It would be very helpful if before you post another standard you ask yourself "Can this lead to a contradiction in my beliefs". You'll find it basically always does. Because you're just cycling between 5 or so standards, all of which contradict your beliefs. — khaled

No you pick bad analogies that you think makes the contradiction but doesn't fit the scenario. A life (or lifetime of work) is not X thing (a one time surprise party, a gift, etc). If it was that, I might agree with you and never even make an argument in the first place, because it's so trivial as to make no impetus. But it isn't trivial. You keep saying, "If it's worthwhile, it's okay to do to someone else". But this is the only thing where you can say that a lifetime worth of X negative things otherwise dire consequences happen.. There is no other real analogy to it.. This game is more like I describe. YOU have to address that at least. This "worthwhile" present is not escapable and brings with it a lifetime of X, Y, Z negative experiences. What kind of gift is that, that you know of? Your gift is a lifetime of overcoming challenges.. but don't worry, some of it you will consider "worthwhile".. Guess what? You have no other choice! There is no utopian alternative. There is only a lifetime of forced given. So I don't accept your analogies that are so dissimilar to what I am talking about.

Literally every imposition fits this description to different extents. And you think some impositions are fine. Again, terrible standard. Sigh.... — khaled

But this is more than an instance of imposition.. Which is why your crappy analogies (to try to make your one trick work) doesn't work.

"Your analogies to life are not life itself", excuse me what? I assume you mean that my analogies aren't like life in any way. Prove that. Don't just state it. If any analogous imposition I come up with to life , automatically becomes not analogous when you realize you think it's ok to impose, then you're begging the question. — khaled

No dude, because unless that gift is a literally a lifetime of a set of negative experiences that you cannot get rid of without dire consequences, your analogies are nothing. You can't try to win this argument by simply saying phrases like "prove it" when it is very clear they are so far off from each other and never even met my definitions.

Agreed. Problem is, most people would tell you that life is mostly good with the dislike, annoyance, and negative experiences being the side effect. In other words, life is not like that. You think it is, but have provided no reasoning or evidence for why it is. — khaled

I don't have to prove to you obvious things about the human condition. Life "is mostly good".. what does that even mean? But also, what standard gift ever has these kind of negative side effects? A gift in a category of one, which makes all your other examples disanalogous, as I've been saying over and over.

One case no suffering has to take place. — schopenhauer1

False. If you don't have children the people who would benefit from your children being around would be harmed. So in both cases suffering takes place. It comes down to whether or not harming someone to alleviate harm from someone else is ethical which you still haven't answered. You could easily argue that having children is necessary harm depending on how you actually answer the question....

not an explanation of what makes it a utopia — schopenhauer1

That you cannot suffer unless you choose to.

This game is more like I describe. YOU have to address that at least. — schopenhauer1

I think it's perfectly fine to bring in people to the game you describe and I already stated my standard clearly:

"It's fine to impose something on someone when it is very likely they will find it worthwhile (among other cases that are irrelevant here)" — khaled

Coincidentally, it is indeed very likely a child will find their life worthwhile if statistics are anything to go by. You don't like this standard. So I'm trying to follow your standard here, but you can't come up with one that's consistent with your own beliefs.

No dude, because unless that gift is a literally a lifetime of a set of negative experiences that you cannot get rid of without dire consequences, your analogies are nothing. — schopenhauer1

Ah ok, so the new standard is "it is a lifetime of negative experiences you cannot get rid of". Ok then, prove that life is a lifetime of negative experiences. What evidence do you have to support this statement?

There is a ton of evidence that shows that the majority of people enjoy their life on a balance, and find it worthwhile as well, and are very much against parting with it. What is your evidence that all these people are lying and that they're all Oscar worthy actors pretending to be happy when in fact they're miserable?

You can't try to win this argument by simply saying phrases like "prove it" when it is very clear they are so far off from each other and never even met my definitions. — schopenhauer1

Ah, I see. So having kids is wrong because life is mostly suffering. And life is mostly suffering because.... DUH it's obvious!!!!!

This is exactly as valid as someone reasoning that it's fine to have 50 children he can't provide for because life is "so obviously" pure bliss.

You can't dismiss a point of contention in an argument with "it's obvious I'm right". Especially when you provide 0 evidence for being right while there is tons of evidence showing that people don't think their life is as hellish as you describe.

I don't have to prove to you obvious things about the human condition. — schopenhauer1

"I'm right you're wrong, obviously. Yes I'm aware I'm the minority opinion here. Still I'm right you're wrong, because reasons"

What makes you think this is about the human condition and not just your condition? The majority of humans seem to disagree with your characterization of the human condition, shouldn't that cause some doubt?

Life "is mostly good".. what does that even mean? — schopenhauer1

Oh, so "life is mostly good" is very abstract and difficult to understand but:

is a literally a lifetime of a set of negative experiences — schopenhauer1

Is immediately obvious and clear.

But also, what standard gift ever has these kind of negative side effects? — schopenhauer1

Well it depends on the negative side effect, as I have a good analogy for each in vacuum. But you're asking me "What is something that's exactly like life that's not life". You know how analogies work right? They're supposed to highlight one aspect (negative effect) at a time, I obviously can't show all at once.

You cite A as the property that make an imposition bad, and A is present in having kids, so having kids is bad. I reply with a situation where A is the case, but you think the imposition is not bad. You respond by "that situation is not like life at all, life also has B!" (after realizing that "life isn't A enough!" is going nowhere and takes away objectivity from your position) So I respond with a situation where B and A are the case yet you think it's fine. You respond by "that situation is not like life at all, life also has C!" and so on. But when we examine the whole set of properties that make an imposition bad for you, they are actually pretty reasonable.

So why this clinical, bit by bit approach, where you pretend that one or two variables are the end all be all of what makes an imposition wrong? Why not just spill out the whole list? Well, because it sounds ridiculous! The whole list basically reads: "It's wrong to impose a lifetime of hellish suffering on someone" which is perfectly reasonable of course. Everyone agrees with that, but they don't think life is such hellish suffering, that's ridiculous. You realize that trying to convince them that life is hellish suffering doesn't work, so instead you try to pretend to follow some simplistic moral standard such as "Actions that are A and B are wrong". So when I show that you don't actually follow that simplistic standard, you have to revert back to the full set which is:

a lifetime worth of X negative things otherwise dire consequences happen. — schopenhauer1

is wrong to impose. That's what you see life as. Life is purely just negative experience after negative experience with the sweet release of death being the only cure. A "Sexually transmitted terminal disease" and no more as the memes would have it. But when I try to ask you what evidence you have for thinking this, you cannot provide.

So your problem is, when you cite a standard it either:

1- Contradicts your other beliefs by not being sufficiently specific in scope and resulting in things you think are right coming out wrong

2- Is unlike life and so doesn't actually say anything about childbirth.

Of course, you think it's like life, but you don't want to say this, because you know it sounds ridiculous to everyone else. So instead you prefer to have (1) be the case rather than reveal that really, the only reason you're AN, is because you find life: "a lifetime worth of X negative things otherwise dire consequences happen". Yours isn't a rational argument, it's purely emotional, as the claim that life is like this is completely unsubstantiated and there is mountains of evidence against it, yet you believe it. I find it hard to believe that comes from rational consideration.

Nihilists and buddhists have a lot in common. — I like sushi

No.

And the resemblance to Buddhism is the life is suffering aspect. Agreed about the solution to the problem. The AN does not usually need karma, reincarnation or similar ideas, unless some kind of metaphor (which just makes it a Western version something similar to cause/effect/contingency). Buddhism, like Pessimism sees the system suffering of desire.. Schopenhauer had some great parallels he mentions in The World as Will and Representation. You should read passages from Book 4. The 8 fold path and such is interesting, but no such prescription except wholesale asceticism, compassion, and aesthetic contemplation is offered by Schop and I believe he thought that only certain character-types will be able to endure the path of asceticism. — schopenhauer1

In contrast to Buddhism, AN works on the premise that death (as is understood conventionally, death of the body) is the only real solution to the problem of suffering. Consider what this tells us about AN's view of life, the universe, and everything: that life is miserable, and then you die. Antinatalism is a blatant case of bad faith.

It's because antinatalism operates out of such bad faith about existence that it isn't and cannot be persuasive.


On the other hand, Buddhism operates on the premise that despite all the misery, the universe does offer a viable path out of suffering. So Buddhism operates out of good faith.

convince me

Nihilists and buddhists have a lot in common. — I like sushi

Then list those commonalities.

It comes down to whether or not harming someone to alleviate harm from someone else is ethical which you still haven't answered. You could easily argue that having children is necessary harm depending on how you actually answer the question.... — khaled

Causing harm en toto, to alleviate your already existing suffering is what I'm against.

There is no X that suffers anything.
There is a Y that suffers something.
That does NOT mean Y gets to now have an X that will suffer something to alleviate Y suffering something. I don't see how that kind of creation of bad for someone else makes a right.
And I know you will simply go to people born to be blood donors or something like that..

Rather,
If X already suffers something
Y knows that X can be alleviated, and Y is the caretaker of X, then Y can allow a smaller suffering for the benefit of greater.
There are still contingencies like Y cannot do this for adult X, without consent, unless an immediate danger etc. It's all about respecting the dignity of the individual.

This does not give license to crass utilitarian where Y can harm X because there is a vague, unknown possible good (i.e. butterfly effect).

I think it's perfectly fine to bring in people to the game you describe and I already stated my standard clearly:

"It's fine to impose something on someone when it is very likely they will find it worthwhile (among other cases that are irrelevant here)" — khaled

Why does worthwhile trump negative experiences? Who gives you a right to start another persons condition for a set of negative experiences?

Oh, so "life is mostly good" is very abstract and difficult to understand but:

is a literally a lifetime of a set of negative experiences
— schopenhauer1

Is immediately obvious and clear. — khaled

Yes actually, I can list a litany of negative experiences. But "life is mostly good" is not a litany of anything, but an overall judgement laid over everything. But again, I was looking for clarity of the statement, (is it a list of things, an attitude, a report) and if it's a report, what is it reporting on?

You cite A as the property that make an imposition bad, and A is present in having kids, so having kids is bad. I reply with a situation where A is the case, but you think the imposition is not bad. You respond by "that situation is not like life at all, life also has B!" (after realizing that "life isn't A enough!" is going nowhere and takes away objectivity from your position) So I respond with a situation where B and A are the case yet you think it's fine. You respond by "that situation is not like life at all, life also has C!" and so on. But when we examine the whole set of properties that make an imposition bad for you, they are actually pretty reasonable. — khaled

So yeah this is precisely your problem. Analogies of everything that comprises a set to only one aspect of the set doesn't work, except as a parlor trick. That's my whole contention with this line of argument. Without it though, you don't have much of a defense, and hence your constant insistence that this must be a valid reasoning. Most analogies are apples to apples.. That is one aspect to another aspect.. not a set of all aspects to one aspect. That is false analogizing.

So why this clinical, bit by bit approach, where you pretend that one or two variables are the end all be all of what makes an imposition wrong? Why not just spill out the whole list? Well, because it sounds ridiculous! The whole list basically reads: "It's wrong to impose a lifetime of hellish suffering on someone" which is perfectly reasonable of course. Everyone agrees with that, but they don't think life is such hellish suffering, that's ridiculous. You realize that trying to convince them that life is hellish suffering doesn't work, so instead you try to pretend to follow some simplistic moral standard such as "Actions that are A and B are wrong". So when I show that you don't actually follow that simplistic standard, you have to revert back to the full set which is:

a lifetime worth of X negative things otherwise dire consequences happen.
— schopenhauer1

is wrong to impose. That's what you see life as. Life is purely just negative experience after negative experience with the sweet release of death being the only cure. A "Sexually transmitted terminal disease" and no more as the memes would have it. But when I try to ask you what evidence you have for thinking this, you cannot provide.

So your problem is, when you cite a standard it either:

1- Contradicts your other beliefs by not being sufficiently specific in scope and resulting in things you think are right coming out wrong

2- Is unlike life and so doesn't actually say anything about childbirth.

Of course, you think it's like life, but you don't want to say this, because you know it sounds ridiculous to everyone else. So instead you prefer to have (1) be the case rather than reveal that really, the only reason you're AN, is because you find life: "a lifetime worth of X negative things otherwise dire consequences happen". Yours isn't a rational argument, it's purely emotional, as the claim that life is like this is completely unsubstantiated and there is mountains of evidence against it, yet you believe it. I find it hard to believe that comes from rational consideration. — khaled

So the problem with all of this is we are an animal that can judge things.. I can judge work as an X harm if it is imposed on an individual.. Other animals don't do that, you see. How is it that as a product of the natural world, I have the ability to judge a function of keeping myself alive wrong? Why do I even need evidence at all? What is going on here? Something else is going on in the human condition that doesn't just allow for, "I mostly like life". Nothing would need to be said, judged, etc.. It would just be a state of being. But we are not in that state of being. We are not in that sublime repose or way of living.

It's because antinatalism operates out of such bad faith about existence that it isn't and cannot be persuasive.


On the other hand, Buddhism operates on the premise that despite all the misery, the universe does offer a viable path out of suffering. So Buddhism operates out of good faith. — baker

Ok, so people peddle in hope-mongering. Buddhism, like all religions offer this. I can agree with that. No one likes the idea of no hope.

Why start the game for someone else to play to begin with? If nothing existed, what is wrong with nothing? Is it just that people conflate that with some sort of darkness or something and this makes them sad and anxioius?

There is no X that suffers anything.
There is a Y that suffers something.
That does NOT mean Y gets to now have an X that will suffer something to alleviate Y suffering something. — schopenhauer1

Ok. But does Z get to cause X to alleviate Y if Y>X? That's what I'm asking (for the third time).

Why does worthwhile trump negative experiences? — schopenhauer1

That's what it means by definition... You ever heard someone say "It was worthwhile and fulfilling, but I wish I never did it"? Worthwhile literally means that the negative experiences were worth it.

Definition according to google: worth the time, money, or effort spent; of value or importance.

Who gives you a right to start another persons condition for a set of negative experiences? — schopenhauer1

Will you stop? We've been over this. You're doing it again. You're highlighting one part of the list and pretending that's what you use to judge right and wrong, when it isn't, to pretend to have some form of objectivity or simple, righteous moral compass. You're fine with surprise parties even though they are another persons condition for a set of negative experiences. So stop pretending that's what classifies right and wrong for you. And now you'll protest "But Life is unlike surprise parties". Agreed. This wasn't to show that life is fine because it's like surprise parties, no no. It was to show that "This starts another persons condition for a set of negative experiences" is insufficient, and so to get you to show your ridiculous position by requiring you to use the whole list.

Yes actually, I can list a litany of negative experiences. — schopenhauer1

And I can list a litany of positive or worthwhile ones.

But again, I was looking for clarity of the statement, (is it a list of things, an attitude, a report) and if it's a report, what is it reporting on? — schopenhauer1

A report. On whether or not the project was worth it despite the pain. Or on whether or not it is mostly comprised of negative or positive experiences. Depends on who you're talking to.

So yeah this is precisely your problem. Analogies of everything that comprises a set to only one aspect of the set doesn't work, except as a parlor trick. — schopenhauer1

But it doesn't comprise only one aspect, it comprises most at the same time. But when we look at all of them combined it spells something like "Do not cause hellish suffering for a lifetime on someone else" which is perfectly reasonable, now you need to show that life will likely be hellish suffering for this or that child.

"Life is an unconsented imposition, and those are always wrong", I'll disagree with the second half, it's hard to disagree with the first.

"Life is an imposition that's difficult to escape, and those are always wrong" I'll disagree with the second half, it's hard to disagree with the first.

"Life starts the condition for harm, that's always wrong" (what you said this comment) I'll disagree with the second half, it's hard to disagree with the first.

"Life is all of the above at the same time, and that's wrong to impose" I'll disagree with the second half (utopia example), it's hard to disagree with the first.

And so we keep going until we get to:

"Life is comprised of a lifetime of hellish suffering with no escape and we're all doomed, and those are always wrong to impose" I'll disagree with the first half, it's hard to disagree with the second.

Again:

So your problem is, when you cite a standard it either:

1- Contradicts your other beliefs by not being sufficiently specific in scope and resulting in things you think are right coming out wrong

2- Is unlike life and so doesn't actually say anything about childbirth. — khaled

Why do I even need evidence at all? What is going on here? — schopenhauer1

Because you are trying to convince others that disagree with your judgement that their judgement is wrong and your is correct. You need evidence to do so. Your judgement is that life is mostly comprised of negative experiences, and that those experiences are not worth it and so do not justify existing. Basically everyone disagrees with one or both parts. You think they're wrong and want to convince them of that. You need evidence.

Something else is going on in the human condition that doesn't just allow for, "I mostly like life". — schopenhauer1

I thought you were struggling with what that means a second ago. Now that I see you're past your confusion before my reply is even up (showing you never struggled with what it means), this amounts to: "You're wrong, life isn't mostly good, because it just isn't"

Not very convincing I'm afraid. Again, what makes you think this is the human condition and not your condition? Despite most humans openly voicing that they like life. Do most humans fail to understand the condition they're living in, and you in your infinite wisdom have grasped it fully for everyone for all time? What's your evidence that's the case?

Ok. But does Z get to cause X to alleviate Y if Y>X? That's what I'm asking (for the third time). — khaled

First off, you discount the pain of what happens when one does NOT like aspects of the game, whether or not someone reports "The game was worthwhile". What these setbacks/negatives/pains/harms/sufferings comprise of is what it is, and it is not good. Is starting a series of these plethora of negatives upon someone else good? I think no. It is not right to do to someone whether or not they report that it was worth their while.

That's what it means by definition... You ever heard someone say "It was worthwhile and fulfilling, but I wish I never did it"? Worthwhile literally means that the negative experiences were worth it.

Definition according to google: worth the time, money, or effort spent; of value or importance. — khaled

Ok, but when in a position to not start someone else's set of harms, I just don't think post-facto justifications like "it was worthwhile" justify actually starting those set of harms for someone else. Haven't we acknowledged from previous threads, that this is one of the main dividing lines where we both will not budge? Unless one of us concedes this axiomatic point, the rest is pretty moot.

A report. On whether or not the project was worth it despite the pain. Or on whether or not it is mostly comprised of negative or positive experiences. Depends on who you're talking to. — khaled

Again, moot if we are discussing whether starting someone else's set of harms is justified in the first place. And of course this will just make you retreat to the one aspect to all aspects one-to-set disanalogy of the surprise party right? But maybe you will be more creative or just drop it, as it doesn't work.

But it doesn't comprise only one aspect, it comprises most at the same time. But when we look at all of them combined it spells something like "Do not cause hellish suffering for a lifetime on someone else" which is perfectly reasonable, now you need to show that life will likely be hellish suffering for this or that child. — khaled

I think we are weighing negative and positive much differently. To me, creating pain is more paramount than providing pleasure. No one is obliged to provide pleasure for others, but certainly preventing pain is more important (unless ameliorating, but that is post-facto dealing with consequences of putting someone into this world, not the chief arbiter of starting it wholesale for them).

I am willing to say that if the world was a legitimate utopia I wouldn't have objections. But in THIS world, it is not a utopia, because there is suffering in this world in numerous ways.. both systemic and contingent (see my profile quote for my definitions of these). Someone said earlier that we couldn't even imagine a world without these kinds of suffering. And this is true! We certainly cannot imagine it. That's why I asked about your conception. As for your snapping fingers examples, as long as you accept that pain can be considered any subjective negative state, this becomes the new bar.

So this goes back to our major difference- is it right to knowingly put someone in a position experience a lifetime set of painful experiences (when it didn't have to take place to begin with) even if post-facto they MAY say it was worthwhile? Again, I say this is not right. It is enacting a political agenda- the pain-filled program must continue, and this overrides considerations of starting pain for someone else. Again, you are not able to answer why considerations of pain are justified by worthwhile reports.

"This starts another persons condition for a set of negative experiences" is insufficient, and so to get you to show your ridiculous position by requiring you to use the whole list. — khaled

A set of negative experiences that comprises life is not a surprise party, so no, I am not letting you make that rhetorical summersault and pretend it is valid.. Sorry.

And I can list a litany of positive or worthwhile ones. — khaled

Ah, but again, another dividing line either of us are going to budge on. I think that enacting positive experiences for someone else is not a requirement, and especially so if they don't even exist. However, preventing future suffering for what will be someone who will be the recipient of this suffering is more morally relevant. Preventing unnecessary pain is just morally relevant, and creating happiness is not, especially when the possible person in question doesn't even exist to be deprived of anything. What matters is someone could have suffered, but didn't. We did not create a lifetime set of negative experiences. Who (literally) cares that a lifetime set of possible happy experiences did not ensue? And I don't think other people's pain of not seeing a political agenda of someone being born is a valid reason for thus creating the set of negative experiences.

"Life is all of the above at the same time, and that's wrong to impose" I'll disagree with the second half (utopia example), it's hard to disagree with the first. — khaled

But is it then utopia? The bar has just moved.. Hedonic treadmill, etc. You are just going to keep changing the circumstances, because the kind of utopia without suffering is hard to even conceptualize. It's almost like "just being" or "not being" or something like that.. but then if you admit to that, you wouldn't have a bunch of parlor games to play, so we can start doing variations of the current situation but in various gradations. Think about it, if your game was a utopia, subjective views of harm would not even be in the picture.. This isn't even the human condition, which I brought up towards the end of the last post, and you haven't quite put together yet where I was getting at.

"Life is comprised of a lifetime of hellish suffering with no escape and we're all doomed, and those are always wrong to impose" I'll disagree with the first half, it's hard to disagree with the second. — khaled

I mean, for some people it is actually a hellish suffering, so from the (easier) statistical point of view, we can say there are possibly enough people that experience this to not enact this for someone else.. However, I am not going to use that argument here. Rather, it is more axiomatic. That is to say "Life is comprised of a lifetime of hellish suffering with no escape and we're all doomed, and those are always wrong to impose". Again, one of our dividing lines. I don't think it has to be hellish suffering to not start for someone else.

Because you are trying to convince others that disagree with your judgement that their judgement is wrong and your is correct. You need evidence to do so. Your judgement is that life is mostly comprised of negative experiences, and that those experiences are not worth it and so do not justify existing. Basically everyone disagrees with one or both parts. You think they're wrong and want to convince them of that. You need evidence. — khaled

No, you were misreading my intent in asking that. Rather, I meant it rhetorically. Why do humans need to constantly justify their actions? The fact seems to be that we can evaluate and judge life, work, what we are doing at any given time. We don't just do things in a mode of "unthinking" but need reasons, justifications, evaluations, weighing things. This is the feature of being an animal that has evolved (with?) linguistic adaptations. We can't "just be" in the world like other animals. So there is something about being the human animal itself that in a way displaces us from the world, exiles us, in a way no other earthly creature is. The natural world has created us, but we do not seem in the same way "at home" in it in the very fact that since the start of civilizations (and probably since we've had the ability to self-evaluate and use language), we can judge the very process of living itself (or at least aspects in it) and we can judge any action as negative. We don't just experience the negative, but evaluate it, judge it, know it. We can try to pretend we can outwit ourselves, but it is really part of our psyche.. even the "overcoming" of "judging" is itself something that we have to do as an effort, not as an instinct.. So anyways, this is not tangential to the point that there is a "human condition" that is apart from perhaps the more primary/common "animal condition".