Would it really make any sense if there were an object that no one saw as being red but some scientist told us was actually red? What would we then call that object that looked red but actually wasn't? My suggestion is that we call it "red." Surely we mean by "red" that it looks to our eyes as red.

Let us suppose we live in a color blind community and we see blue where the non-color blind see red. We are later informed by the outside community that there is this red color we didn't know about and what we've been calling blue often isn't blue, but it's red. I would suggest that as long as the outsiders remain outside our community, we will correctly be calling all such objects blue, despite that they're really not.

You don't see them — Metaphysician Undercover

So I said. :-}

isn't it objective fact that seeing is interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. Hence my argument, which you seem to evade.

What colour is the wind? — JJJJS

Blew.

The strawberries therefore appear red and we can even explain why but they aren't red. — Benkei

"the desert appeared to have an oasis and we even know why but there wasn't an oasis." — Benkei

I'm willing to say: "oops, I was wrong to interpret that as red" and you continue to maintain it's red.

By that token the sun still revolves around the earth and the illusionary oasis is really there. The latter with deadly consequences. — Benkei

Yes, yes, and yes. I agree with this.

No, because that only tells us the wavelength of the light that is emitted/reflected by the object; it doesn't tell us anything about the object's appearance, and when I talk about the strawberries being red, I'm talking about their appearance. — Michael

There's some irony here, because you're doing a similar thing to that which you criticise. One could just reply to you that that only tells us about appearance, and doesn't tell us anything about the object. You criticise others for what you claim is an equivocation, yet, once again, you do a similar thing by equating the meaning of "appearance" and "being". When I talk about being, I talk about being. Surely it would be clearer to distinguish between what something is and how it appears, rather than conflate the two. You are critical of the naive realist, yet I think you make a similar error: looks red, we call it red, so it is red. But it isn't.

Would it really make any sense if there were an object that no one saw as being red but some scientist told us was actually red? — Hanover

Yes.

For example, if we were all wearing glasses which made it appear blue, and we were all ignorant about the fact that it is red (because we never knew in the first place or because of memory loss) other than the scientist. Or maybe even the scientist is not aware of that fact, and is attempting to state a falsehood, but ends up stating a truth.

Or if the object was secured in the same position within a room set up to create an optical illusion in which it appears blue, but it is in fact red like the scientist says, despite the fact that anyone entering the room sees it as blue.

What would we then call that object that looked red but actually wasn't? — Hanover

We can call it whatever we like, but it is just an object that looks red.

Let us suppose we live in a color blind community and we see blue where the non-color blind see red. We are later informed by the outside community that there is this red color we didn't know about and what we've been calling blue often isn't blue, but it's red. I would suggest that as long as the outsiders remain outside our community, we will correctly be calling all such objects blue, despite that they're really not. — Hanover

Correctness is about what it really is or really isn't. Appropriate is what it would be to call all such objects blue within a community in which that is the norm. It'd be appropriate, but nevertheless incorrect.

I think you make a similar error: looks red, we call it red, so it is red. But it isn't. — Chief Owl Sapientia

Again, your criticism only works if the "red" in "it appears red" means/refers to the same thing as the red in "it isn't red". But you haven't provided an account of what this meaning/referent is. If, to use Benkei's suggestion, it means/refers to light with a particular wavelength, then the claim "it appears red" doesn't work, because when I say "I see red strawberries" I'm not saying anything about light of a particular wavelength (either explicitly or implicitly).

You criticise others for what you claim is an equivocation, yet, once again, you do a similar thing by equating the meaning of "appearance" and "being". — Chief Owl Sapientia

There's no distinction between something appearing tasting when I eat it and that something being tasty, so your continued assertion that appearance and reality are necessarily distinct doesn't work. There can be a distinction, but it isn't a given. In some cases, that thing being X just is that the perception of that thing has quality X.

My claim is that if the "red" in "it is red" means/refers to the same thing as the "red" in "it appears red" then that it is red just is that it appears red. Conversely, if that it is red is not just that it appears red then the "red" in "it is red" doesn't means/refer to the same thing as the "red" in "it appears red", but then there's no prima facie reason to claim that the red appearance is an error, and so to claim that it is would be to equivocate: "if it appears red₁ but it isn't red₂ then the appearance is an error" is a non sequitur if the two instances of "red" mean/refer to different things.

can you just zoom in on the pixel?

Compare that to the following. In a flash you think you see a cat. You look again, it turns out to be a dog. The first appearance was false. You seem to claim there a qualitative difference with colour. I disagree.

Also, you're mistaken when you think no light with wavelengths for the colour red are present in the picture. They are in the gray pixels. When your brain "corrects" for the blue, the gray is interpreted as red. It's still gray though, which you'll see by zooming in. We don't even need instruments to establish the mistake.

Of course, there's a multitude of tricks with colour and light possible. If I have a yellow banana and I put it on a dark blue blanket, the yellow will appear more vibrant. That's partly the contrast but also the juxtaposition of colours. Nothing changed about the banana though and I don't see any basis to assume the yellowness of a banana is context dependent but I see every reason to conclude our eyes and brains are simply not very accurate in establishing colours. Which is why I'll take the spectrometer any day over your subjectivity.

None of what you say there addresses my points.

If the "red" in "it appears red" means/refers to something different to the "red" in "it isn't red" then to claim that the appearance is an error is a non sequitur.

If the "red" in "it appears red" means/refers to the same thing as the "red" in "it isn't red" and if it means/refers to light with a wavelength of ~620–740nm then the claim "it appears red" is suspect (and I'd say false).

If the "red" in "it appears red" means/refers to the same thing as the "red" in "it isn't red" and if it means/refers to a particular qualia then either the claim "it isn't red" means "it doesn't appear red", which makes for the claim "it appears red but isn't red" to be a contradiction, or the claim "it isn't red" is correct insofar as it would be category error to claim that an external object is red.

You seem to be committing the mistake made in my first point. You're equivocating on two different meanings of "red".

I think you make a similar error: looks red, we call it red, so it is red. But it isn't. — Chief Owl Sapientia

Again, your criticism only works if the "red" in "it appears red" means/refers to the same thing as the red in "it isn't red". But you haven't provided an account of what this meaning/referent is. If, to use Benkei's suggestion, it means/refers to light with a particular wavelength, then the claim "it appears red" doesn't work, because when I say "I see red strawberries" I'm not saying anything about light of a particular wavelength (either explicitly or implicitly). — Michael

My criticism works because it doesn't follow from how something looks and what something is called that that's what it is. This is so obvious that it shouldn't have to be demonstrated by example.

When I say that the strawberries appear red, I mean that they appear the colour that strawberries normally appear: red. But they're not red. If there was no difference between appearing red and being red, then they'd be red. But there is, and they're not.

When you say you see red strawberries, you're not saying anything about the strawberries, you're saying something about how they appear, so you shouldn't say that the strawberries are red, you should just say that they appear red.

But you keep making this fallacious equivalence of appearance and reality, and then you make the misleading claim that they are red, even though they are not.

There's no distinction between something appearing tasting when I eat it and that something being tasty, so your continued assertion that appearance and reality are necessarily distinct doesn't work. There can be a distinction, but it isn't a given. In some cases, that thing being X just is that the perception of that thing has quality X. — Michael

The distinction is necessary to speak clearly and truthfully. Your use of language is common but misleading. To get to the truth of the matter, it is better to discuss things more clearly. This is metaphysics, not casual discourse. More precision is required. If you really want to talk about being, then you should make this important distinction. It's fine to say that a Big Mac is tasty in the context of McDonald's, but this discussion is not between two people having a casual chit chat in McDonald's, it is a serious discussion about the metaphysics of perception on a philosophy forum.

It's still gray though, which you'll see by zooming in. We don't even need instruments to establish the mistake. — Benkei

And this kind of thing is even more obvious if we go back to Michael's own example about the appearance of Johnny Depp on TV. No matter how you look at the image on the screen, it ain't Johnny Depp. It's an image on a TV screen made of pixels. You can see the pixels more clearly if you look close enough. Does it look like Johnny Depp? Yes. Do we call it Johnny Depp? Yes. Is it Johnny Depp? No. Is Johnny Depp an image on a TV screen made of pixels? No, obviously not. He's a walking talking human being.

The proper distinction between appropriateness and correctness is important in philosophy. It's appropriate in other, more casual contexts to say that you saw Johnny Depp on TV, but strictly speaking that is not correct.

The distinction is necessary to speak clearly and truthfully. Your use of language is common but misleading. To get to the truth of the matter, it is better to discuss things more clearly. This is metaphysics, not casual discourse. More precision is required. If you really want to talk about being, then you should make this important distinction. It's fine to say that a Big Mac is tasty in the context of McDonald's, but this discussion is not between two people having a casual chit chat in McDonald's, it is a serious discussion about the metaphysics of perception on a philosophy forum. — Chief Owl Sapientia

I am trying to be precise. I'm trying to bring to light the fact that the thing referred to by "red" in "it appears red" is a property of appearances only (qualia). It doesn't refer to a certain kind of light, or an object's disposition to reflect light a certain way, or any other perception-independent thing. So if the "red" in "it is/isn't red" also refers to this appearance-property then it must be that appearing red and being red are the same thing, just as being tasty and appearing tasty are the same thing - because tastiness just is a property of taste-perception, and not some sort of property inherit in a particular arrangement of atoms (e.g. the liquorice on the table).

Or if you want to insist that being red and appearing red are different things then it must be that the "red" in "it is/isn't red" refers to something other than what the "red" in "it appears red" refers to (e.g. light of a certain kind), so it would be a non sequitur to claim that the red-appearance is an error.

I am trying to be precise. — Michael

Yet your conflation of appearance and reality hinders you in that respect, so my advice would be to stop doing that.

I'm trying to bring to light the fact that the thing referred to by "red" in "it appears red" is a property of appearances only. It doesn't refer to light, or an object's disposition to reflect light a certain way, or any other perception-independent thing. So if the "red" in "it is/isn't red" also refers to this appearance-property then it must be that appearing red and being red are the same thing. — Michael

No, you must be doing something wrong to reach that conclusion. To say that it isn't how it appears makes sense, is true, and doesn't entail that appearing red and being red are the same thing.

Or if you want to insist that being red and appearing red are different things then it must be that the "red" in "it is/isn't red" refers to something other than what the "red" in "it appears red" refers to, so it would be a non sequitur to claim that the red-appearance is an error. — Michael

They are different things, that's not up for debate. Unless whether light and dark, up and down, yes and no, scream and whisper, left and right, and so on, and so forth, are different things, is up for debate.

And it is an error because it isn't how it appears, as we are initially drawn to conclude, as demonstrated by your own example of the picture of strawberries. They appear red, but they're not red, they're grey. When we find out that they're grey, we find out that we were mistaken to think otherwise, unless we didn't think otherwise to begin with.

Can you just zoom in on the pixel? — Benkei

What he said.

These arguments of yours cannot be sound because they have false conclusions. Reductio ad absurdum: you must be doing something wrong.

Sure. So how about you get the image into paint and zoom in on that apparent red pixel until that pixel fills your screen. Then get back to me with which colour it has.

EDIT: I'd like to point out that the colour of that faux-red pixel doesn't change because of the surrounding blue, we are not "mixing" them in our perception. We're quite capable of seeing individual pixels at these resolution (1080p, just stick your nose in the screen).

The blue merely influences how we perceive it due to false signal it gives us that we ought to white balance the image for outdoor circumstances. Then our brains filter out blue from the grey, which makes the grey appear red. Taking a closer look (literally!) shows the error. — Benkei

If I understand correctly, it is not the case that there are red pixels in the composition, there are none, and that prompts the claim that there is no red in the picture. However, I understand that there are grey pixels, and the grey pixels are composed of some red. So it is not really the case that there is no red wavelength in the picture, there is, but it is hidden within the grey. When our brains filter out the blue, as you suggest, if this is really what is happening, then the blue within the grey is also being filtered out, and this brings out the red in the grey.

You admit above, that there is grey in the picture. What wavelength do you think the grey is if there is no red in it?

No. Hence my argument, which you seem to evade. — jkop

Sorry, I didn't notice any argument, perhaps you could repeat it in a way which I might be able to understand.

You said:

If you consider that the coin consists of atoms and molecules, then ask yourself why do you see it as the presence of a single, coloured, shape, instead of individual molecules, or atoms. Interpretation is inherent within seeing.

I replied: ...

I don't think you see the atoms and molecules...

The argument should be obvious: we don't see the atoms and molechules of a coin, so there is nothing to interpret as a coin prior seeing its coloured shape. Therefore, seeing precedes interpretation.

The argument should be obvious: we don't see the atoms and molechules of a coin, so there is nothing to interpret as a coin prior seeing its coloured shape. Therefore, seeing precedes interpretation. — jkop

Ok, I see you completely missed the point, so I'll explain it more clearly. You are sensing something, seeing it. You sense it as a round coloured shape, not as a bunch of molecules, or as a bunch of atoms. Since we know that it exists as molecules, and as atoms, then these are real possibilities, alternative ways, for how it could be sensed. But it is not sensed as molecules or atoms, it is sensed as a round coloured shape. Therefore the act of sensing is itself an act of interpreting what is there, bringing out one of the numerous possible ways of representing it.

If I understand correctly, it is not the case that there are red pixels in the composition, there are none, and that prompts the claim that there is no red in the picture. However, I understand that there are grey pixels, and the grey pixels are composed of some red. So it is not really the case that there is no red wavelength in the picture, there is, but it is hidden within the grey. When our brains filter out the blue, as you suggest, if this is really what is happening, then the blue within the grey is also being filtered out, and this brings out the red in the grey.

You admit above, that there is grey in the picture. What wavelength do you think the grey is if there is no red in it? — Metaphysician Undercover

Grey is like white, it consists of a lot of wavelengths including those for the colour red. And yes my first posts were inaccurate but I clarified in my post about colour and chromacity.

Since we know that it exists as molecules, and as atoms, then these are real possibilities, alternative ways, for how it could be sensed — Metaphysician Undercover

That makes no sense at all. How could the projection of an oval that you see be just an alternative way for how it could be seen? Could you see an oval with corners perhaps? Seems like relativist ideology.

The principle surely is that our interpretation via sensory perception of external stimuli must by definition inescapably involve an interplay between such stimuli and our internal neural processes and so by reduction must necessarily be subjective. If the neural process by which distinct individuals perceive a given external stimuli - ‘colour’ in this example – happen to be similar then, in terms of their resulting experience, they will share a similar interpretation and so be able to attain to a consistent (and thereby utilitarian) agreement concerning the nature of their interpretation. If however there happens to exist between individuals some relative discrepancy regarding the neural processes relevant to the interpretation of some particular external stimuli then no such agreement of interpretation will be possible.

The term, ‘Colour Blind’, for example, surely then serves merely to refer to such an interpretational discrepancy as it exists on the one hand between a numerically dominant group happening to possess a similar relevant neural process and, on the other, a minority group happening to be characterised by differing neural processes – and thus can have no meaning objectively, other than, owing to neuralogical annomalies, perhaps meaning that in practice the sub-group may be characterised by a lack of consistency of interpretation even on an individual basis.

Of course however, regarding elements as they exist intrinsically, say for example the number of molecules that comprise the table laid before us - this as opposed to our perception of its' shape which must in the case of any given observer derive from the sense of perspective produced by the location of the orbits in the scull – these do represent a set of values unrelated to the neural processes of the observer, and so constitute an objective reality.

-The same argument of course applies generally to our perception of all external stimuli.

The principle surely is that our interpretation via sensory perception of external stimuli must by definition inescapably involve an interplay between such stimuli and our internal neural processes and so by reduction must necessarily be subjective. If the neural process by which distinct individuals perceive a given external stimuli - ‘colour’ in this example – happen to be similar then, in terms of their resulting experience, they will share a similar interpretation and so be able to attain to a consistent (and thereby utilitarian) agreement concerning the nature of their interpretation. If however there happens to exist between individuals some relative discrepancy regarding the neural processes relevant to the interpretation of some particular external stimuli then no such agreement of interpretation will be possible.

The term, ‘Colour Blind’, for example, surely then serves merely to refer to such an interpretational discrepancy as it exists on the one hand between a numerically dominant group happening to possess a similar relevant neural process and, on the other, a minority group happening to be characterised by differing neural processes – and thus can have no meaning objectively, other than, owing to neuralogical annomalies, perhaps meaning that in practice the sub-group may be characterised by a lack of consistency of interpretation even on an individual basis.

Of course however, regarding elements as they exist intrinsically, say for example the number of molecules that comprise the table laid before us - as opposed to our perception of its' shape which must in the case of any given observer derive from the sense of perspective produced by the location of the orbits in the scull – these do represent a set of values unrelated to the neural processes of the observer and so constitute an objective reality.

-The same argument of course applies generally to our perception of all external stimuli. — Robert Lockhart

So what's your answer to the title question?

-Ah yes, that!...Well, on reading it again, I think in retrospect that I have in fact answered the question - that it's all essentially a subjective matter and therefore just an arbitrary question of utility as to how we arrange a consistent agreement regarding our assignment of colour value, or any other sensorialy perceived entity for that matter - important in practice but in principle inconsequential and, paradoxically, nothing to do with objective reality! The wave length of the light reflected by an object is an objective value. The colour of that light as this is perceived by any given observer results from an interplay between that objective value and the neural network of the particular observer's brain and accordingly is a subjective experience which will vary as the neural network of the particular observer varies. - Can't say much more!

How could the projection of an oval that you see be just an alternative way for how it could be seen? — jkop

Instead of sensing the coin as one oval shaped object, it could be sensed as many individual molecules.

-Ah yes, that!...Well, on reading it again, I think in retrospect that I have in fact answered the question - that it's all essentially a subjective matter and therefore just an arbitrary question of utility as to how we arrange a consistent agreement regarding our assignment of colour value, or any other sensorially perceived entity for that matter - important in practice but in principle inconsequential and, paradoxically, nothing to do with objective reality! The wave length of the light reflected by an object is an objective value. The colour of that light as this is perceived by any given observer results from an interplay between that objective value and the neural network of the particular observer's brain and accordingly is a subjective experience which will vary as the neural network of the particular observer varies. - Can't say much more! — Robert Lockhart

I think that you can and should say more, but not more of the same. That would save me the trouble of trying to work out the implications of what you've said. Some of us here think that the depicted strawberries are grey, and some of us here think that the depicted strawberries are red. What colour do you think that they are? And what do you think about what we think? Is the former group right and the latter group wrong, or is the latter group right and the former group wrong, or are both right, or are neither right? If your answer is implicit in what you've said, I think you should make it explicit.

Instead of sensing the coin as one oval shaped object, it could be sensed as many individual molecules. — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't see them. — Metaphysician Undercover

:-}

Exactly, you don't see the individual molecules, because your sensing system is interpreting what's there as one object, not a whole bunch of objects. Get the picture?

our interpretation via sensory perception of external stimuli must by definition inescapably involve an interplay between such stimuli and our internal neural processes and so by reduction must necessarily be subjective. — Robert Lockhart

Experience is subjective, not interpretation. What could be subjective about the use of public words?

Those two statements are not inconsistent for the same reason that it is not inconsistent to say, for example, that I could go fishing, but I don't. Whether they're true or not is another matter.

. . you don't see the individual molecules, because your sensing system is interpreting what's there as one object. . . — Metaphysician Undercover

Look, Sherlock, an individual molecule is insufficient for reflecting or emitting light, it lacks electrical charge etc. We'd need a powerful microscope to identify it, because our biological sensing system cannot do it on its own; it does not identify molecules, so it has no individual molecules to interpret as one object. You must be bullshitting.

With a microscope, molecules can be "seen", so they must be reflecting or emitting some light, or electrical charge. Anyway, that's beside the point. Human beings evolved to have eyes which see the whole object, they did not evolve to have senses which are distinguishing individual molecules. So we can assume that this was a good way to interpret the things out there, it is a beneficial interpretation for survival, so we evolved this way. Don't you agree, that this must be a good way to interpret what's out there, as individual objects, so that's why we evolved to sense things in this way? Nevertheless, we can still interpret what's out there as individual molecules. We do this in science

I don't see why you would think I am bullshitting. Clearly there are individual molecules, which could be sensed, but we didn't develop the means to do this. So our eyes interpret things in that particular way.

Clearly there are individual molecules, which could be sensed, but we didn't develop the means to do this. So our eyes interpret things in that particular way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Prior to seeing something you don't know whether something is present and subject for interpretation. You don't get to sneak in knowledge of its presence and constituents just to say that seeing it as a whole would be an interpretation of, or one of many ways to interpret, its individual constituents.

Furthermore, the individual constituents of a coin are not so individual when they're bound by force into a material compound called metal. The metal has a light-reflecting surface with recognizable properties. So we see a silver oval, because that's what there is for us to see, and which we then can interpret as a coin.