Does it matter? The important distinction is between appearance and reality. Whether "red" means the same thing in each instance, or whether in one instance it means something different but related to the other, my point stands: the two phrases are not equivalent in meaning. You can replace "red" with X in both instances, or with an X1 in one instance and an X2 in the other, and my point still stands. The key words are those I pointed out: "appears" and "is". — Sapientia

Of course it matters.

If they mean/refer to the same thing and the "red" in "X appears red" refers to a type of appearance then either "X is red" and "X appears red" mean the same thing or "X is red" claims that having an appearance is a perception-independent thing such that something can have an appearance even when it isn't being seen or that something can have one type of appearance but appear a different way, neither of which make sense and so make for "X is red" to be a category error.

Or they mean/refer to the same thing and the "red" in "X is red" refers to something like having a surface that reflects light with a wavelength of ~620–740nm and so to say that X appears red is to say that X appears to have a surface that reflects light with a wavelength of ~620–740nm, which I would think is an inaccurate/nonsensical interpretation.

Or they mean/refer to different things and so the "but" in "X appears red but isn't red" is potentially misleading given that there's no a priori reason that appearing red₁ and not being red₂ is in some sense a conflict. You might as well just say "X appears red and isn't red" which is just to say "X has a red appearance and doesn't reflect light with a wavelength of ~620–740nm.

Silly geese. Go look up a blue strawberry, and then a green one. Why don't they look red? Why don't unripe green and white blotchy ones look red?

The sneaky thing about the image is just that the red has been removed, rather than replaced, or coloured in. Like just removing an image leaves a silhouette, or the impression of its absence. Because all of the red has been removed, rather than covered up, or replaced, it's still obvious that they're really red. This is the interplay between precepts and concepts. From the bottom up of precepts, there's no red, but from the top down of concepts, we recognize the form of red, even by its silhouette, as it were.

"X is red" and "X appears red" don't mean the same thing. End of. — Sapientia

Sure they do. End of.

Of course it matters. — Michael

It matters in general, but I question the relevance to my point.

If they mean/refer to the same thing and the "red" in "X appears red" refers to a type of appearance then either "X is red" and "X appears red" mean the same thing or "X is red" claims that having an appearance is a perception-independent thing such that something can have an appearance even when it isn't being seen or that something can have one type of appearance but appear a different way, neither of which make sense and so make for "X is red" to be a category error. — Michael

The former isn't a valid option, and you've denied conflating them in that way. "X is red" and "X appears red" don't mean the same thing. End of.

And the statement in question is: "X appears red, but X is not red". That only commits one to what X is not, and leaves open the question of what X is. I'm saying that it isn't necessarily how it appears. If you deny that, you run into problems. Do you really want to defend full blown idealism, where there's no distinction between appearance and reality?

Sure they do. End of. — Michael

Then go back and address my prior criticism: here.

By the way, I accidentally posted my unfinished reply. I didn't mean to do that, since I had more to say. I deleted it and re-posted.

And the statement in question is: "X appears red, but X is not red". That only commits one to what X is not, and leaves open the question of what X is. I'm saying that it isn't necessarily how it appears. If you deny that, you run into problems. Do you really want to defend full blown idealism, where there's no distinction between appearance and reality? — Sapientia

The point is that if the "red" in "X appears red" doesn't mean/refer to the same thing as the "red" in "X is not red" then there's no necessary conflict here. You might being saying something like "X appears red but X isn't a chicken".

So if there's to actually be a conflict – if it appearing red is an error, given that it isn't red – then it must be that the "red" in "X appears red" means/refers to the same thing as the "red" in "X is not red". And that's where I believe your distinction between appearing red and being red falls apart, given that the thing referred to by "red" in "X appears red" just is a type of appearance (qualia), and not some mind-independent property of external stimuli (e.g. having a surface that reflects a certain wavelength of light).

The point is that if the "red" in "X appears red" doesn't mean/refer to the same thing as the "red" in "X is not red" then there's no necessary conflict here. You might being saying something like "X appears red but X isn't a chicken".

So if there's to actually be a conflict – if it appearing red is an error, given that it isn't red – then it must be that the "X" in "X appears red" means/refers to the same thing as the "red" in "X is not red". And that's where I believe your distinction between appearing red and being red falls apart, given that the thing referred to by "red" in "X appears red" just is a type of appearance, and not some mind-independent property of external stimulation. — Michael

Okay, let's say that it's the same meaning. It still makes sense to say that X appears red, but X isn't red. It's just saying that X isn't how it appears. If your philosophy can't handle that, then there's a problem with your philosophy.

Okay, let's say that it's the same meaning. It still makes sense to say that X appears red, but X isn't red. It's just saying that X isn't how it appears. If your philosophy can't handle that, then there's a problem with your philosophy. — Sapientia

Saying that it isn't how it appears with respect to its colour is like saying that it isn't how it appears with respect to its taste. If it tastes sweet to you then it really is sweet, and if it looks red to you then it really is red. The how it appears is a feature of the appearance itself and not a property that external stimuli have on their own. Your philosophy sounds like naive realism, where things are said to look like what they look like to us even when they're not being looked at, or taste like what they taste like to us even when they're not being tasted, which is nonsensical (even if a fiction that we ordinarily engage in).

So given that the thing referred to by "red" in "X appears red" is an appearance-property (e.g. qualia), and given that we're assuming that the "red" in "X appears red" means/refers to the same thing as the "red" in "X is not red", it must be either that "X is not red" is a category error or that "X appears red but X is not red" is a contradiction.

The only recourse is to accept that the "red" in "X appears red" means/refers to something different to the "red" in "X is not red", in which case there's no (a priori) conflict/error in appearing red₁ but not being red₂.

Anyway, I have definitely demonstrated the power of poetry.

Strawberries are of course green, until they get the urge to be eaten, which is the plant's way of getting the kids to move out. Their power over the human mind is itself poetic, and far more mysterious than that of grey pixels. But as well as fruiting, they also send out runners and so are both mobile and potentially immortal. No wonder they manipulate us with such ease.

Saying that it isn't how it appears with respect to its colour is like saying that it isn't how it appears with respect to its taste. — Michael

Sure, if there are taste illusions or errors, just as there are optical illusions or errors.

If it tastes sweet to you then it really is sweet, and if it looks red to you then it really is red. — Michael

That really doesn't follow without a mistaken hidden premise.

The how it appears is a feature of the appearance itself and not a property that external stimuli have on their own. — Michael

That doesn't sound too different to what I've been saying. There is no necessary connection between how it appears and what it is, such that how it appears is what it is. It may appear red, but that doesn't mean that it is red. That it appears red means nothing other than that it appears red.

Your philosophy sounds like naive realism, where things are said to look like what they look like to us even when they're not being looked at, which is nonsensical. — Michael

No, I'm allowing for that possibility, but my position here is closer to indirect realism. Your philosophy sounds like naive idealism, which faces the same problem as naive realism.

It may appear red, but that doesn't mean that it is red. That it appears red means nothing other than that it appears red. — Sapientia

Again, unless all instances of "red" here mean/refer to the same thing, this is no different in kind to saying "it may appear red, but that doesn't mean that it is a chicken".

And if they do mean/refer to the same thing, then to say that it isn't red even though it appears red is nonsensical, given that the "red" in "X appears red" refers to a property that only appearances have, and not some perception-independent property that perception-independent stimuli have.

No, I'm allowing for that possibility, but my position here is closer to indirect realism. Your philosophy sounds like naive idealism, which faces the same problem as naive realism.

I'm accepting the existence of perception-independent stimuli that are causally covariant with our perception, so I'm not arguing for idealism. What I'm rejecting is the claim that the word "red" in "X appears red" refers to some perception-independent property that perception-independent stimuli have.

Again, unless all instances of "red" here mean/refer to the same thing, this is no different in kind to saying "it may appear red, but that doesn't mean that it is a chicken".

And if they do mean/refer to the same thing, then to say that it isn't red even though it appears red is nonsensical, given that the "red" in "X appears red" refers to a property that only appearances have, and not perception-independent stimuli. — Michael

You're blaming me for a problem with your philosophy, which stems from artificially creating a logical connection between appearance and reality. That's not my problem, it's yours. This is not nonsensical. You're just making it so within your own context.

You're blaming me for a problem with your philosophy, which stems from artificially creating a logical connection between appearance and reality. That's not my problem, it's yours. — Sapientia

There's no problem with my philosophy. There's a problem with your claim that "X appears red but X isn't red" is sensible, where both instances of "red" mean/refer to the same thing. And that is your problem.

There's no problem with my philosophy. There's a problem with your claim that "X appears red but X isn't red" is sensible, where both instances of "red" mean/refer to the same thing. And that is your problem. — Michael

That's not a problem for me. It is sensible. Test it out on people, they'll agree. Things aren't always what they appear to be, whether we're talking about "red" or something similar - the denial is nonsense, whether naive realism or naive idealism.

Your own example with the picture of the strawberries shows this.

Incidentally, I happened across the same picture except on this site the strawberries look grey to me. Has anyone checked out the actual image for actual reddish actual pixels?

I'm accepting the existence of perception-independent stimuli that are causally covariant with our perception, so I'm not arguing for idealism. What I'm rejecting is the claim that the word "red" in "X appears red" refers to some perception-independent property that perception-independent stimuli have. — Michael

Then you're rejecting something I never accepted in the first place. It may well refer to some qualia sort of thing. And if so, then it'd be right to say that it appears red, but isn't red.

The problem, as I said earlier, is when you conflate "appears" and "is". I'm not sure where you currently stand on that. You seem to have accepted it, then denied it, then accepted it again. I stand by my criticism.

Yeah, I did. The only difference is that the one that was posted has the brightness increased. Colour constancy can't be right, as that's about seeing the same colour in varying lights, not seeing one when it isn't there at all. This implies that no matter what colour the strawberries really were, we'd just be basically guessing based on what colour they "normally" are, but if this were true, just any different colour strawberry should create some perceptual confusion, but it doesn't.

Saying that it isn't how it appears with respect to its colour is like saying that it isn't how it appears with respect to its taste. If it tastes sweet to you then it really is sweet, and if it looks red to you then it really is red. The how it appears is a feature of the appearance itself and not a property that external stimuli have on their own. Your philosophy sounds like naive realism, where things are said to look like what they look like to us even when they're not being looked at, or taste like what they taste like to us even when they're not being tasted, which is nonsensical (even if a fiction that we ordinarily engage in).

So given that the thing referred to by "red" in "X appears red" is an appearance-property (e.g. qualia), and given that we're assuming that the "red" in "X appears red" means/refers to the same thing as the "red" in "X is not red", it must be either that "X is not red" is a category error or that "X appears red but X is not red" is a contradiction. — Michael

It's neither. It's not a contradiction, and it's not a category error, but it is more like a category error than a contradiction. If I were to state that it doesn't have a quality like the one that I perceive, and if it in fact doesn't have such a quality, then that'd just be a true statement.

The problem, as I said earlier, is when you conflate "appears" and "is". I'm not sure where you currently stand on that. You seem to have accepted it, then denied it, then accepted it again. I stand by my criticism. — Sapientia

If the "red" in "X is red" means/refers to the same thing as the "red" in "X appears red" then either "X is red" and "X appears red" mean the same thing or "X is red" (where this is understood as saying that being red is a perception-independent property of X) is a category error.

So as I've said before, it really depends on what you mean by "red". The problem is that your account seems to conflate two different meanings, as you want for "X appears red" and "X is not red" to be consistent, and yet for the there to be a genuine conflict – for the appearance to be an error. But I can't see how making that claim makes sense unless you're a naive realist and think that qualia are perception-independent properties – which itself doesn't make sense.

I did do that with paint.net color picker first :D. They were, indeed, grayish-greenish, and as I put blue on the blank canvas it began to look red.

One could argue that, though we wouldn't classify said pixels as red that they do have red as part of their make-up, but I thought it more interesting to just take the example at its word, so to speak, and try and argue against the strong case.

If the "red" in "X is red" means/refers to the same thing as the "red" in "X appears red" then either "X is red" and "X appears red" mean the same thing or "X is red" (where this is understood as saying that being red is a perception-independent property of X) is a category error. — Michael

We're going around in circles now. That's a false dilemma. It needn't be either. And addressing "X is red" seems like a red herring. I'm not claiming anything about what X is.

So as I've said before, it really depends on what you mean by "red". — Michael

I'll just call it a quality, and mean by that something more neutral than you seem to take it to be, so as not to rule out certain possibilities without due consideration, and so as to avoid a vacuous truth.

The problem is that your account seems to conflate two different meanings, as you want for "X appears red" and "X is not red" to be consistent, and yet for the there to be a genuine conflict – for the appearance to be an error. — Michael

They are consistent, although there would be a conflict for anyone who mistakenly assumed that what appears to be red must be red - which is the controversial assumption underlying the claim which triggered my entry into this discussion, and is also something which you seemed to quite clearly indicate your agreement with at various points throughout this discussion, although you also seemed in denial at points when I've challenged this, and seem to have evaded my criticism as well as clarification of your stance.

There would not be a conflict - or a problem, as far as I can tell - if you don't make that assumption, if it appears red, and if it is not red.

I don't make that assumption, I acknowledge that possibility, and I acknowledge the distinction between appearance and reality.

I am not saying here what the Gestalt psychologists say: that the impression of white comes about in such and such a way. Rather the question is precisely: what is the impression of white, what is the meaning of this expression, what is the logic of this concept 'white'? — L. Wittgenstein, in Remarks on Colour, p 46e.

The impression of the depicted strawberries might be grey-blue, but the meaning of the expression "they look grey-blue" is the colour of the picture, not the strawberries.

The object of perception is blue pixels arranged in strawberry shapes. You see red strawberries rather than blue ones because the act of seeing inheres that transformational aspect in this case. — Baden

I thought this particular image had to do with our brains "white balancing" the image due to the cyan tint to it. An adaptation we also use when moving from indoor (yellow light) to outdoor (blue).

EDIT: the strawberries only appear red but in reality the colour red isn't present in the picture.

Agree with all that.

OK, wasn't sure what you meant with "seeing inheres that transformational aspect". Must be my English. :D

Or my phrasing. :-* As long as we don't have to do the debate again, I'm good. (Y)

EDIT: the strawberries only appear red but in reality the colour red isn't present in the picture. — Benkei

As I pointed out earlier, to define "red" as a particular range of wavelength is unacceptable, because the vast majority of instances of seeing a particular colour, are instances of a combination of different wavelengths. So the fact that a particular wavelength of light is not present, does not mean that the strawberries are not red.

Human eyes can see millions of different shades of colour. This is not because there are millions of different wavelengths between 400 and 740.

As I pointed out earlier, to define "red" as a particular range of wavelength is unacceptable, because the vast majority of instances of seeing a particular colour, are instances of a combination of different wavelengths. So the fact that a particular wavelength of light is not present, does not mean that the strawberries are not red. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. So we can stop trusting telescopes that there really are more stars in the sky than we can see with the naked eye.

There's a reason why we trust intstrumentation and why that works. You sound like the Spanish inquisition when they dealt with Copernicus. We "have" defined red as a particular wavelength and it's precisely because it is a particular wavelength that we are capable of discerning it under different lighting conditions by "filtering" out certain wavelengths of light. That this, normally useful adaptation, now plays tricks on us by making us believe the strawberries are red when they aren't, doesn't make the strawberries red, it only makes them look red.

EDIT: The mirage isn't really there, no matter how certain you are you saw it.

Human eyes can see millions of different shades of colour. This is not because there are millions of different wavelengths between 400 and 740. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good point. :) ..but then isn't also the range of wavelengths analog and dense...i.e. between two identified wavelengths there is always a third. Hence there are millions of them too.