I cant see how you avoid solipsism.

If all that is, is your perceptions, then other people are just your perceptions. — Banno

There's a distinction between the perception and the cause of the perception. My perception of this wooden, light-brown, medium-sized desk is caused by something external to the system being used to model it. That doesn't mean that the external cause is 'a desk', in fact it's very unlikely to be a wooden, light-brown, medium-sized desk, as we know for a fact that much of that perception was simply made up by my prior expectation of what I would see. Solipsism (if I've understood the position properly) would have there be no self-consistent external cause, that's not the same as simply claiming that whatever it is, it's not directly our perceptions.

There's a distinction between the perception and the cause of the perception. — Isaac

Well, yes, provided that one admits there being things which are not perceptions - not phenomena. But if all there is, is phenomena - then those phenomena have no cause.

So then both solipsism and phenomenalism would have "no self-consistent external cause"...

It depends, perhaps, on what one sees as the negation of "there is no noumenal reality".

That's one view; that all that is, is phenomena, and that these phenomena, without cause, have certain limits. The alternate is to suppose that there may well be a cause, but that what that cause is, is unknowable.

The alternate is to suppose that there may well be a cause, but that what that cause is, is unknowable. — Banno

Yes, I think it's just unreasonable to assume there's no external cause (by 'external' here I mean external to the system doing the modelling, outside it's Markov Blanket). Phenomenologically, it feels like there are strong parameters restricting the models which work, one would have to have a very good reason for assuming an internal cause of those, and no such reason has been forthcoming - hence the assumption of an external cause seems warranted.

The trouble is with the words 'real' and 'exists'. What we use them for is to generate agreement about perceptions, not their causes. It's the table I call real, not the cause of my perception of the table. So what I seem to mean by 'real' is some perception I expect (or demand, even!) is relatively invariant between me and you, and everyone else. Hence a claim that table's aren't 'real' seems to be the fairly uncontroversial claim that these perceptions are not that invariant after-all, or not as invariant as we thought. I suppose once this (still fairly new) concept of the huge role perception priors pay in the product of those perceptions (the perceptive features), then the word 'real' will be used slightly differently (a wider parameter of invariability) and saying that perceptions aren't 'real' will sound a bit silly. Right now it still has impact though. Or at least, It seems to.

The trouble is with the words 'real' and 'exists'. — Isaac

Have you seen the analysis from Austin I've used on this - must've spoken of it in your presence?

"Real " and "exists" get their worth form the things wiht which they are contrasted - it's real, not a forgery. It's real, not a mirage; it exists, it's not fiction.

Have you seen the analysis from Austin I've used on this - must've spoken of it in your presence? — Banno

Probably, but I may have forgotten.

"Real " and "exists" get their worth form the things wiht which they are contrasted - it's real, not a forgery. It's real, not a mirage; it exists, it's not fiction. — Banno

I think that's kind of what I was saying...bout an invariance we expect or demand agreement on? A fiction, or a forgery, lack certain invariant properties. A fictional table won't hold my cup up.

The issue, for me, comes when the full list of those properties includes matters which modern cognitive sciences are showing us might not be so invariant after all. A 'real' table holds my cup, but is it's colour also 'real', it's edges, it's structure... these properties seem to (often) get included in the use of 'real', which, if we take your meanings, they should not be. much of you perception of the table is a fiction, you made it up, no less than you might make up a unicorn. In fact you use much the same brain regions to do both.

Not very interesting outside of the realm of cognitive science though perhaps...

Not very interesting outside of the realm of cognitive science though perhaps... — Isaac

Ought to add, this is why I've never got into phenomenology, despite the obvious overlap in views. It doesn't seem to me to be a very fruitful area for philosophy in those terms. I like the impact perceptive uncertainty has on matters like belief, I don't think it has much useful to do when it comes to ontology.

Refute it? Anyone who thinks themselves the only thing in existence is mad; I see them. — Banno

Of course, from a practical point of view a solipsist would be insane (and has anybody ever really been a solipsist?), but there's no way to refute solipsism logically, you can't prove to a hypothetical solipsist that you aren't just a figment of their imagination or part of their dream, and so you can't prove to them that you see them.

A 'real' table holds my cup, but is it's colour also 'real', it's edges, it's structure... — Isaac

...well, yes; these are its real colours, not the colours it might have under funny lights. That's it's real edge, not the edge of the glass tabletop. That's it's real structure; it looks like wood but it is plastic.

much of you perception of the table is a fiction, you made it up, — Isaac

I don't quite agree with this inference - that because it is madeup it is not real... That's a real unicorn; it doesn't have wings!

Do we share at least the fundamental logical rules of inference with these beings, who perceive so differently? — Mersi

Well no. How to compare human logic with something else's logic? Since that "else" would be totally different? For me it's like trying to compare apples with oranges.

Logic of course depends on our experiences and our environment.It's the "data" used by logic. And sure played crucial role as human mind to learn to practice that "analyzing method". The ability to seek the truth with the most appropriate way in all kind of circumstances. For me is kind of simple:different creatures, different way of experiences, different logic.

these are its real colours, not the colours it might have under funny lights. That's it's real edge, not the edge of the glass tabletop. That's it's real structure; it looks like wood but it is plastic. — Banno

The point is that these are all assumptions we make, we don't (usually) actually check them out. Our models (in this case the visual cortex) will give us these data points not as a result of incoming sensations, but as a result of assumptions about what they're likely to be. They're guesses, acts of imagination, just like your unicorn. The only difference is they're good guesses, based on prior experience.

much of you perception of the table is a fiction, you made it up, — Isaac

I don't quite agree with this inference - that because it is madeup it is not real... That's a real unicorn; it doesn't have wings! — Banno

But this is just the word 'real' doing what all words do, changing it's meaning in context. We might ask "are unicorns real?", if someone said "no, they're made up" we wouldn't have the least trouble understanding them, would we? Surely we oughtn't get ourselves tied up in what words 'really' mean.

The important thing about what we discover is it's implications for our thinking. The discovery that much of our perception is actually 'made up' (as opposed to being directly caused by sensation, in real-time) gives a new insight into what other factors (other than sensations in real-time) might be influencing those guesses. A framework of naive direct realism does not allow for such investigation, so seems somewhat impoverished.

"different creatures, different ways of experiences, different logic"

Do these creatures see the whole world different? Or is a circle still a circle even for them?

But this is just the word 'real' doing what all words do — Isaac

Oh, yes, you're right. Problems arise when this is take to be how things are; the error, for example, of thinking that there is no table, only a perception-of-table. That's the sort of trick words can play; thinking that phenomenology is physics.

thinking that phenomenology is physics. — Banno

But saying the opposite "there is a table" is what's mistaking phenomenology for physics, surely? Physics doesn't have anything answering to 'table' in it's models. A 'table' is human construct, a label we put on some particular collection of atoms (which itself is just model borrowed from physics). We phenomenologically experience a 'table', but the physics (or in my case the neuroscience) doesn't support the idea that therefore there is such a thing, external to our mental models.

There's something. That seems like a very reasonable assumption, consistent with the science on the matter. But it's simply not true to say that there is a table because you see a table. I'd go as far as to say that we flat out know that to be false. Your world (that of tables, cups etc) is 90% made up, at any given time, entirely phenomena, no substance.

Of course you can, at any time, corroborate your perception. You can touch the edge, watch what happens when you put a cup on it, see what happens when a friend puts a cup on it...build up your evidence. But...

a) most of the time you simply don't bother, which leaves, unrefuted, the notion that most of your world is phenomena, most of the time.

and

b) your checking is biased. You check with the assumption that it is a table, you're looking to confirm your prior, not update it. That's simply the least energy expended (which is what this system is all about)

Obviously though, since declaring something 'real' and 'exists' are themselves human social endeavours, I think there's perfectly good uses of both terms which refer to that other joint social endeavour - categorising stuff. I don't object, therefore, to the use of direct realism, only to its reach. Cognitive science is also a human social endeavour.

Physics doesn't have anything answering to 'table' in it's models. — Isaac

Of course it does. A 'table' is human construct, a label we put on some particular collection of atoms. Hence it is as real as those atoms.

And those atoms are, if we take you seriously, themselves a label we put on some particular collection.

Have you Philosophical Investigations §48 at hand? It's were he criticises the notion of simples he had developed in the Tractatus. What is to count as a simple depends on the activity in which one is engaged; tables and atoms are equally valid starting points, with the choice dependent on avoiding misunderstandings in a particular case.

What is real, what exists, is what serves to allay misunderstanding. Tables when you are having coffee, wood when you are doing carpentry, atoms when you are doing chemistry. What has primacy is dependent on what one is doing.

Of course, from a practical point of view a solipsist would be insane... but there's no way to refute solipsism logically — Amalac

So avoiding insanity is not logical?

No, both logic and sanity are to do with consistency and coherence.

Can you prove your mind (and thoughts) isn't the only thing that exists? How?

Can you prove you are in pain? How?

What do you think proof is? What does it consist in? Something that forces agreement?

You asked me a question; therefore you believe I am here. QED.

Can you prove you are in pain? How? — Banno

No, in fact I can't even prove to you that I exist.

What do you think proof is? What does it consist in? Something that forces agreement? — Banno

I'm talking about a logical proof.

My claim is simply that there's nothing logically self-contradictory about solipsism.

You asked me a question; therefore you believe I am here. QED. — Banno

I believe it, yes, I'm not a solipsist.

But a solipsist doesn't need to assume that you exist (if that's what you imply by “being here”), they may say that when talking to you, they are talking to a figment of their imagination, and that you being here implies “here, in my mind/imagination/dream”.

Remind me, Banno, did you ever address mereological nihilism or process metaphysics? I can't recall if you think "thingness" is necessarily object based and so noumenon and phenomenon abstract onto nouns and verbs or if you permit for phenomenon to be the ontic primitive.

My claim is simply that there's nothing logically self-contradictory about solipsism. — Amalac

Look at that sentence. What is the word "my" doing there? Isn't it differentiating between your claims and those of other folk?

A solipsist making that statement would be making that differentiation while simultaneously maintaining that such a differentiation could not be made.

Isn't that a contradiction?

I can't even prove to you that I exist. — Amalac

Why would you need to? I'm answering your question. Doesn't that imply that I think you are there?

Random quotes...

The matter is not so simple, however. It is possible, and not uncommon, for concepts of a certain kind to be exemplified, but for it to be the case that, nevertheless, entities answering directly to those concepts are not included in the most economical statement of one’s ontology. This is reductionism, and it can operate in either of two ways, namely either analytical reductionism or what one might call de facto or ‘nothing but’ reductionism. In the present case, it would conform to the analytical option if the concept of substance could be analysed in terms of properties or events (e.g., ‘to be a substance =df to be a collection of properties bound together in way W’). But one might still hold that, though the concept of substance is not precisely analysable and is indispensable, substances in fact are nothing but collections of properties. This latter is the de facto option. So the existence of substances does not show that the concept is important from a philosophical perspective, or, if it has some significance, whether this is just as a necessary part of our conceptual scheme, or as an ineliminable feature of reality itself. — SEP on Substance

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#HowSubsDistThinOtheCate

Remind me, Banno, did you ever address mereological nihilism or process metaphysics? I can't recall if you think "thingness" is necessarily object based and so noumenon and phenomenon abstract onto nouns and verbs or if you permit for phenomenon to be the ontic primitive. — Ennui Elucidator

What? Again, your wordcraft renders your text incomprehensible.

My hope is that the quote and linked article provides some context.

What has primacy is dependent on what one is doing. — Banno

That's one view; that all that is, is phenomena, and that these phenomena, without cause, have certain limits. The alternate is to suppose that there may well be a cause, but that what that cause is, is unknowable. — Banno

My question relates to these quotes. You use the word "phenomena" in much the way that I thought I was using the word.

And I didn't think that invoking mereological nihilism in response to this quote was such a stretch.

It's were he criticises the notion of simples he had developed in the Tractatus. — Banno

From another random chat:

Eliminativism is often associated with Peter Unger (1979), who (previously) defended the thesis of mereological nihilism. Nihilism is the view that there are there are no composite objects (i.e., objects with proper parts); there are only mereological simples (i.e., objects with no proper parts). The nihilist thus denies the existence of statues, ships, humans, and all other macroscopic material objects. On this view, there are only atoms in the void. Since the nihilist denies the existence of statues in general, he will deny the existence of the particular statue, David. Hence, he will reject the very first premise of the original argument for coincident objects. He will also reject the second premise of that argument, since he will deny the existence of the relevant lump. (Terminological note: Unger called himself a ‘nihilist’, but his use of the term differed slightly from current usage—see van Inwagen 1990, p. 73.)

The nihilist makes two main claims, one negative and one positive. Both claims can be challenged. Let us begin with the negative thesis that there are no composite objects and no statues in particular. The most common reaction to this claim is an incredulous stare. For many, the existence of composite objects is a Moorean fact, more certain than any premise that could be used to argue against it. The nihilist may reply by pointing out that there is a sense in which statues do exist. In our original case, for example, the nihilist will say that, strictly speaking, there is no statue, but there are some simples arranged statuewise. Those simples jointly occupy a statue-shaped region of space, jointly resemble the biblical king David, and jointly sit on some simples arranged tablewise. So, loosely speaking, we can say that there is a statue of David on the table. Similarly for all talk of statues, ships, and other composite objects—wherever commonsense says that there is a composite object belonging to the kind K, the nihilist will say that there are some simples arranged K-wise and so, loosely speaking, a K. (For more details on this paraphrasing strategy, see van Inwagen 1990, chapter 10. For worries, see O’Leary-Hawthorne and Michael 1996, Uzquiano 2004b, and McGrath 2005.) This brings us to the nihilist’s positive thesis that there are material simples. This claim can also be challenged (see Sider 1993, Zimmerman 1996, and Schaffer 2003). It was once thought that chemical atoms were fundamental particles, until the discovery of protons and neutrons. And it was thought that protons and neutrons were mereological simples, until the discovery of quarks. One might think it is possible for this process goes on without limit, in which case our world would be gunky (i.e., it would have no simples as proper parts). The problem is that this possibility is inconsistent with nihilism, which seems to imply that a material world must contain material simples. — SEP on Material Constitution

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/#Eli

You know much and I little, so it is hard for me to know when I need to elaborate. Without a thousand contextualizing words, how do I ask you for your views on whether you are making a positive claim with respect to metaphysics (e.g. that something exists) and what sorts of "things" are eligible for existence on your view? I see your reference to the idea that primacy is contextual, but context hardly feels like the sort of grounding alluded to in metaphysical claims.

Is there more to the word than phenomena? I say yes. You? — Banno

If "phenomena" is descriptive of our experience and there is "more", I am trying to understand the limits, on your view, of what that more might be.

Look at that sentence. What is the word "my" doing there? Isn't it differentiating between your claims and those of other folk? — Banno

When I use it, yes, not when a solipsist does (if that implies other people exist outside their mind). When a solipsist used it, it would be to differentiate between their claims and the claims of their figments of imagination (which are also in a sense their own claims according to their belief, in which case though it's odd to talk to oneself like that, it's not logically selfcontradictory, it happens in dreams all the time).

Why would you need to? I'm answering your question. Doesn't that imply that I think you are there? — Banno

You answered my question with a question ( “Can you prove to me that you are in pain?”) I answered that not only could I not prove that to you, but also that I couldn't prove to you that I exist, and only what exists can feel pain.

I can prove to myself that I (or at least thoughts) exist through “I think, therefore I am”, but you are not logically compelled to accept that I think, unless I first prove to you that I exist, and so no argument I can give you could convince you that I exist, if you were thorough enough with your doubts.

...mereological nihilism... — Ennui Elucidator

Are you asking a question or calling me names?

All those quotes and big words already assume so much. Can you ask your question with them?

And if not, what does that say about your question?

When I use it, yes, not when a solipsist does... — Amalac

...then the solipsist must be using the words differently - playing a different game.

So have they shown that they alone exist, or just redefined "self" to include us?

Why not just conclude that the solipsist has misused the language of self and other?

I can prove to myself that I exist through “I think, therefore I am” — Amalac

What is it to have a proof here? In what way are you compelled by logic? There are those - myself amongst them - who deny that this is a cogent argument. Why are you compelled, but not others?

Are you asking a question or calling me names? — Banno

Probably calling you names. Ordinary language philosophy is amusing when it is and not when it isn’t.

@Banno

But really, philosophy is a conversation with jargon that hopefully facilitates more efficient communication. I can’t possibly ask you a 15 word question devoid of “big words” that would elicit the types of answers I am hoping for. Even with the big words, it is easy enough for us to understand them differently. And even if I hand wave at various contextualizing paragraphs, it is easy to be distracted by the limiting particulars and miss the larger idea I am trying to point to.

So you tell me how your game goes. I try to share information in reasonably sized exchanges limited to a few themes, find some commonality in language, and take some intellectual satisfaction. Either I am super bad at that or we are playing a different game.

SO if you can't ask the question succinctly and simply, is there a question? Or is the point of doing philosophy to say "Ennui Elucidator" instead of "bored speaker"?

Working out what the question is, is doing philosophy.