There was a blind woman on the old pf for a while, who presumably did not see pixels, but still managed to reply to them. — unenlightened

And that is also irrelevant.

If your meaning is idiosyncratic or controversial or even simply debatable then you need to highlight that immediately or people will respond to the regular meaning. And to expect them to respond to the unqualified statement as if it were the qualified one would be to expect them to accept your meaning. — Baden

I'd say that the regular meaning is the meaning it has when we say "I see a picture of red strawberries". It's certainly not the scientific meaning that refers to having a surface that reflects light at a certain wavelength.

Every dictionary in the word will disagree with you and say the regular definition encompasses both.

Then your criticism above makes no sense. If the regular meaning encompasses both then my meaning isn't "idiosyncratic or controversial or even simply debatable".

Your meaning is exclusive. (And I'm talking about the meaning of the word "red" in general not as used in a specific context. Remember you said "to be red is just to look red". That's what I objected to not "to be red is just to look red when I'm talking about looking at red strawberries, or whatever...")

"To be red is just to look red" only when you pretend the scientific definition, which is encompassed in the regular dictionary definition, is not actually encompassed in it. Use the qualification and then fine. But that's a different statement.

Your meaning is exclusive. (And I'm talking about the meaning of the word "red" in general not as used in a specific context. Remember you said "to be red is just to look red". That's what I objected to not "to be red is just to look red when I'm talking about looking at red strawberries or whatever..." — Baden

But my claim was made in a specific context, so obviously all that matters is what "red" means in that context. That it can mean other things in other contexts is irrelevant, as explained above with the example of "chair".

And the context in which my claim was made was the one in which we see a picture of red strawberries even though the stimulus isn't light with a wavelength of ~620–740nm.

Your meaning is exclusive. — Baden

No it is the scientific definition which is exclusive. It reduces "seeing red" to a particular sort of seeing red, whereas the common understanding of seeing red includes the scientific instance as well as others.

Do you really still want to insist that when I look at a screen with no individuated pixels on it that it's nonsense for me to say "I don't see pixels, I see words". If no, we've nothing left to argue about. If yes, then all I have left to say is that that's a very unreasonable attitude. — Baden

What we say isn't always what we mean and anything can make sense given the right interpretation, so your question doesn't get to the issue. It can seem like nonsense to you or it can make sense to you, but I'm trying to go deeper than that.

If the words are not the pixels, then what are they? What's the difference between the number of pixels, which are black and a certain shape, and the words, which are black and a certain shape? There doesn't seem to be any difference at all, which, if so, would make that statement contradictory at face value. The only thing missing is the recognition of those black shapes as words, but what has that got to do with anything?

I responded to the statement at face value and so did @Sapientia. That's a legitimate way to respond to it.

No it is the scientific definition which is exclusive. It reduces "seeing red" to a particular sort of seeing red, whereas the common understanding of seeing red includes the scientific instance as well as others. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've missed the point. The regular unqualified definition of "red" includes two senses which are in certain contexts exclusive of each other (the "red" strawberries example being one).

They are different, but unless you contrive them, they are probably not exclusive.

If the words are not the pixels, then what are they? — Sapientia

If cups are not atoms, then what are they? This could go on all day...

You remember how all this started, right? A contrived example.

What we say isn't always what we mean and anything can make sense given the right interpretation, so your question doesn't get to the issue. It can seem like nonsense to you or it can make sense to you, but I'm trying to go deeper than that.

If the words are not the pixels, then what are they? What's the difference between the number of pixels, which are black and a certain shape, and the words, which are black and a certain shape? There doesn't seem to be any difference at all, which, if so, would make that statement contradictory at face value. The only thing missing is the recognition of those black shapes as words, but what has that got to do with anything? — Sapientia

Consider the example I gave earlier. When I watch TV I see Johnny Depp. Is the Johnny Depp I see the pixels, or is he the actor living in L.A.?

You remember how all this started, right? A contrived example. — Baden

Is a contrived example sufficient to demonstrate exclusivity, or is it a case of deception?

I responded to the statement at face value and so did @Sapientia. That's a legitimate way to respond to it. — Baden

So when someone says something like "it appears red but isn't red" (e.g. Sap earlier) do the two instances of "red" mean/refer to different things or the same thing?

I'm not conflating. I'm explicitly avoiding conflation by drawing a distinction between being red in the sense meant when we say "I see a picture of red strawberries" and in the scientific sense of "has a surface that reflects light at a wavelength of ~620–740 nm". — Michael

You said that "in this context", "appears" and "is" mean the same thing. But they obviously don't mean the same thing when people say things like "My body is not red, it just appears red, because you're looking at it through red tinted glasses". People don't mean to contradict themselves as if they were saying "My body is not red, it is just red" or "My body does not appear red, it just appears red".

You said that "in this context", "appears" and "is" mean the same thing. But they obviously don't mean the same thing when people say things like "My body is not red, it just appears red, because you're looking at it through red tinted glasses". People don't mean to contradict themselves as if they were saying "My body is not red, it is just red" or "My body does not appear red, it just appears red". — Sapientia

Then as I asked of Baden above, when you say "it appears red but isn't red" do the two instances of "red" mean/refer to different things or the same thing?

Let me put it another way @Sapientia: with the cup/atoms example, you've already accepted the principle that you can see the whole without seeing the parts. Why you can't see that that binds you to admit that what I and un are saying is sensible and coherent is beyond me.

So what did you mean when you said that a thing can appear red even if not (or vice versa)? — Michael

I mean something beyond appearance. I'm talking about the thing itself, at least inasmuch as I'm talking about what it is not. Whether it has no colour, or is a different colour, or has colour in a different sense to when we talk about how something appears - the point is, to talk of colour in the way that you and Hanover have done is problematic.

I mean something beyond appearance. I'm talking about the thing itself, at least inasmuch as I'm talking about what it is not. Whether it has no colour, or is a different colour, or has colour in a different sense to when we talk about how something appears - the point is, to define colour in the way that you and Hanover have done is problematic. — Sapientia

I'm asking you if the two instances of "red" mean/refer to different things or the same thing.

Edit: Sorry, thought you were responding to a different comment.

Indeed! And it is irrelevant that there were any pixels at all. The same meaning could be conveyed with brush strokes, finger-painting, or carved in tablets of stone. All that is relevant is the structure, not the substrate. Identical pixels, differently arranged, would convey a different meaning or no meaning. Which is why it makes sense to say that to see pixels is to see nothing; to see something is to see a structure, not pixels, but the relationships of pixels. Hence the old saw about not seeing the wood for the trees. — unenlightened

It's not irrelevant - in what I am addressing - that there were any pixels at all. No pixels, no words.

Yes, structure is relevant. That's where number and shape come in with regards to the pixels. But there can be no structure without that which is structured, so both are relevant, and you can't do away with one of them. No pixels, no structure, no words.

Meaning is irrelevant to my point here, since meaning, or what I called "recognition", can be separated from what I'm talking about when I talk about the words or those pixels, which are the same thing. The objective and the subjective can be set apart for sake of analysis.

To see pixels is, obviously, to see something, and not nothing. To see the structure of pixels is to see the pixels. And to see the structure, but not the pixels which are structured, is seemingly absurd.



Do you see a bridge, but no bricks? I see both. I see the bridge and the bricks with which it is structured. I see a brick bridge. A number of bricks structured in a certain way, in a certain shape.

I see a brick bridge. — Sapientia

Looks more like pixels to me. And what's that thing under the bridge of pixels that looks like an upside down bridge? Is it a bridge made of water? We're playing duck/rabbit aren't we?

Looks more like pixels to me. — unenlightened

>:O

You're supposed to play along! Michael already clarified this issue to Metaphysician Undercover.

And what's that thing under the bridge of pixels that looks like an upside down bridge? Is it a bridge made of water? We're playing duck/rabbit aren't we? — unenlightened

It's a reflection, as you know full well. And please don't say that it's pixels if you want this to be a serious discussion.

I see the brick bridge for what it is. I see the brick bridge as a brick bridge, and not as a duck. Perhaps you see it as a duck, but I don't care. That makes no sense to me.

If cups are not atoms, then what are they? This could go on all day... — Baden

Unless you're suggesting that atoms are visible to the naked eye and have colour and shape, then that's a false analogy.

In this case, I described what I see, and that description fits those words on the screen and those pixels on the screen. So, I ask you again, what's the difference, if any? Do you have an answer or not?

Consider the example I gave earlier. When I watch TV I see Johnny Depp. Is the Johnny Depp I see the pixels, or is he the actor living in L.A.? — Michael

You don't actually see Johnny Depp, but it's acceptable to say that you do in a typical context, and those around you will understand what you mean. You actually see an image of Johnny Depp: an image composed of pixels. So yes, you see the pixels (so composed). The closer you look, the more distinguished the pixels become.

Then as I asked of Baden above, when you say "it appears red but isn't red" do the two instances of "red" mean/refer to different things or the same thing? — Michael

Does it matter? The important distinction is between appearance and reality. Whether "red" means the same thing in each instance, or whether in one instance it means something different but related to the other, my point stands: the two phrases are not equivalent in meaning. You can replace "red" with X in both instances, or with an X¹ in one instance and an X² in the other, and my point still stands. The key words are those I pointed out: "appears" and "is".

I mean something beyond appearance. I'm talking about the thing itself, at least inasmuch as I'm talking about what it is not. Whether it has no colour, or is a different colour, or has colour in a different sense to when we talk about how something appears - the point is, to talk of colour in the way that you and Hanover have done is problematic. — Sapientia

Well, to the extent that we're dividing the world between realism and anti-realism, the only thing of significance is that we admit to seeing the same thing, regardless of what it is. That is, whether the color is "really" in the strawberries or is imposed by the mind by something the fact that we're both seeing the same thing consistently speaks to some external reality.

Further complicating things is that when I speak of colour, I speak of color.

Let me put it another way Sapientia: with the cup/atoms example, you've already accepted the principle that you can see the whole without seeing the parts. Why you can't see that that binds you to admit that what I and un are saying is sensible and coherent is beyond me. — Baden

Because they're not analogous in important respects, as I've explained. Why is that beyond you? You want me to accept a general principal based on a false analogy? I'm talking about what I can see with my naked eye. We're talking about perception in this sense, yes? So why do you keep bringing up this false analogy with atoms? I don't claim to see atoms with my naked eye. I'm trying to be impartial by sticking to the description of what I see, and then checking what that does or does not match.

Well, to the extent that we're dividing the world between realism and anti-realism, the only thing of significance is that we admit to seeing the same thing, regardless of what it is. That is, whether the color is "really" in the strawberries or is imposed by the mind by something the fact that we're both seeing the same thing consistently speaks to some external reality. — Hanover

I reckon that we can agree that we're seeing the same thing, whatever it is, and that this speaks to some external reality. But unless you've retracted your initial claim, or didn't really mean it, or meant something else, then that's where we disagree. It looks red, but it doesn't follow that it is red, unless you've got some questionable hidden premise.