The arbitrariness of it?

Your proposed alternative "No evil but finite good" is explained away by the all-loving god wanting what's best for us, and a net infinite good is better than a net finite good.

Why have "bad" (not really bad if infinitely made up for) at all? The religions have a multitude of answers, from god testing our faith to it being a consequence of free will. If these reasons fail, an all-loving god has to pick or allow either (a) no finite bad to be cancelled out by the good (b) finite bad that is cancelled out by the good, and as there is no reason to prefer "a" or "b", god acts completely reasonably in picking at random or letting what will be, be. — Down The Rabbit Hole

It's complicated, huh? :kiss:

... (a) no finite bad to be cancelled out by the good (b) finite bad that is cancelled out by the good, and as there is no reason to prefer "a" or "b", god acts completely reasonably in picking at random or letting what will be, be. — Down The Rabbit Hole

If you take (b) and delete the bad you get (b+), which is better than (b), thus God could never choose (b).

You accept that good can make up for the bad? — Down The Rabbit Hole

That is the very thing I am disagreeing with.

The idea of an infinite reward after death simply does not make up for living a life of absurd and cruel suffering. Mortal life remains absurd, cruel, and incompatible with a God. Perhaps the afterlife is different, but who cares? I have a life to live now, and it's not related to an after life.

Bit inductive. How much good can you really do during a 100 billion year heat death followed by hawking radiation. By the exact same logic infinite/long infinity = 0 meaning God doesn't exist according to your system. I mean technically .000...001

Why have "bad" (not really bad if infinitely made up for) at all? The religions have a multitude of answers, from god testing our faith to it being a consequence of free will. If these reasons fail, an all-loving god has to pick or allow either (a) no finite bad to be cancelled out by the good (b) finite bad that is cancelled out by the good, and as there is no reason to prefer "a" or "b", god acts completely reasonably in picking at random or letting what will be, be. — Down The Rabbit Hole

If you take (b) and delete the bad you get (b+), which is better than (b), thus God could never choose (b). — SolarWind

Why is "b+" better than "b"?

You accept that good can make up for the bad? — Down The Rabbit Hole

That is the very thing I am disagreeing with. — Moliere

A better life can't make up for all the hard work in getting there?

Bit inductive. How much good can you really do during a 100 billion year heat death followed by hawking radiation. By the exact same logic infinite/long infinity = 0 meaning God doesn't exist according to your system. I mean technically .000...001 — Cheshire

God and heaven exists outside of this universe, so they say.

God and heaven exists outside of this universe, so they say. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Nah, God is usually just the executive function being confused by the inner dialectic for an external master. Really, it sits and passively facilitates communication. Notice, how everyone is always in agreement with what they think God wants them to do? There might also be some emergent mind of the universe, but that experience is pretty distinct. Either case. Inside the world.

Why is "b+" better than "b"? — Down The Rabbit Hole

If you have a sum of positive and negative numbers and you change the negative numbers to zero, the sum grows. Simple mathematics.

A better life can't make up for all the hard work in getting there? — Down The Rabbit Hole

I am of the opinion that untreated leukemia in children, as an example, leading to excruciatingly painful deaths for what are clearly innocent people to all people of right mind simply does not make sense in a world where there is a God who can stop that from happening, even if there's a cookie at the end of the pain.

In short, if there's a God, he's one sick fuck.

Blaise Pascal's argument? Employing decision theory, I presume? If so, do you accept the reductio? If we allow decision theory to extend to infinite utilities, then no matter what we do it will result in equal utility (i.e., all utilities cash out at infinite). If we plot out the utilities in a column with infinite values as if such values are quantifiable (as if infinity represents an actual number), then any probability we enter into the decision table would be equal. For example, if we are presented with two probabilistic options with infinite values: either option 1, an infinite value with a 99% probability; or option 2, an infinite value with a .000001% probability. Since 99% of infinity = infinity and .000001% of infinity = infinity, then each option becomes pragmatically equal. To provide a more concrete example, this would mean that any utility with a finite value would be equivalent to any disutility with a likewise finite value. Stepping on a stonefish once a day for each day you have been alive would be equivalent to enjoying your favorite beverages any time you wish throughout your life, for instance.

Moreover, its also important to specify which kind of infinity you are operating with here: actual or potential? We have already explored the logical absurdity with regards to actual infinite values. If not sold just yet, then just imagine two infinite sets of units (A and B). If each set contains an actual infinite amount of units, then both sets are exactly the same size if and only if every unit of set (A) can meet one to one correspondence with every unit of set (B) insomuch that no unit of set (B) remains uncorrelated. This means that a set containing every natural number (A) would be equal to a set containing only the squares of every natural number (B) since both sets are beginningless (actual infinite sets), thus have equal units. However, intuitively, since one of them (B) is a proper subset of the other (A), it appears to be smaller than the other.

Although set (B), being a proper subset of set (A), appears to be smaller than set (A), they are actually equivalent to one another. This is because the units in an actual infinite exist simultaneously, eternally, and with no causal or temporal beginning or end. This is analogous to a clock with an (actual) infinite amount of segments that exist simultaneously, endlessly and beginninglessly. Whereas a potential infinite is a temporal series of events containing a finite quantity of segments which are consistent with causality. This is analogous to a clock with a finite amount of segments being divided by half over a (potentially) infinite duration of time. Potential infinites are simply a non-terminating process of sequential addition or subtraction with each sequence rendering a finite result in a finite amount of steps, and thus such sets are quantitatively limited.

Still we are admittedly left with the intuitive assumption begging the question that a set always has more segments than its proper subsets even if the sets are infinite. Infinites simply do not work the same as real numbers and therefore decision theory renders incoherency, so it seems.

If you have a sum of positive and negative numbers and you change the negative numbers to zero, the sum grows. Simple mathematics. — SolarWind

Grows to more than infinity?

-10 + infinite good = infinite good
-157 + infinite good = infinite good
-258958 + infinite good = infinite good
-999999999999999 + infinite good = ..... — Down The Rabbit Hole

I am of the opinion that untreated leukemia in children, as an example, leading to excruciatingly painful deaths for what are clearly innocent people to all people of right mind simply does not make sense in a world where there is a God who can stop that from happening, even if there's a cookie at the end of the pain. — Moliere

It does seem intuitive that a good-god would not allow this, but the logic and math show otherwise.

As long as you accept that good can make up for the bad, for example a better life can make up for all the hard work in getting there, it's just a question of how much, and the infinite good of the afterlife will always make up for any finite suffering.

Grow to more than infinity?

-10 + infinite good = infinite good
-157 + infinite good = infinite good
-258958 + infinite good = infinite good
-999999999999999 + infinite good = ..... — Down The Rabbit Hole

This infinity is never reached because it is only a potential infinity. We cannot be in the moment of "infinity" and therefore never have experienced infinite happiness.

As long as you accept that good can make up for the bad, for example a better life can make up for all the hard work in getting there, it's just a question of how much, and the infinite good of the afterlife will always make up for any finite suffering. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Not even close. In fact, if I accept your criteria, there is literally no limit to the amount of evil a being could commit while you're still calling the being omnibenevolent:

-999999999999999 + infinite good = ..... — Down The Rabbit Hole

-10^15 + infinite = ...
-10^15 - 1 + infinite = ...
...
-1 + 2 + -1 + 2 + -1 + 2 + ... = ...

And it's absurd. An all truthful being apparently can tell lies using this formula. An all spotless being can have spots. An all x being can have arbitrarily large non-x. No mathematician would accept this. All x doesn't mean an infinite amount of x; it means there is no non-x.

We don't have logic and math here supporting your theory; we simply have a confused poster distracting himself with a sum into thinking that things he concede exists don't. If Johnny has four apples, and you give him an infinite number of oranges, Johnny still has four apples.

-10 + infinite good = infinite good
-157 + infinite good = infinite good
-258958 + infinite good = infinite good
-999999999999999 + infinite good = ..... — Down The Rabbit Hole

=
all good, except for those 10 times = not all good
all good, except for those 157 times = not all good
all good, except for those 258958 times = not all good
all good, except for those 999999999999999 times = not all good

...As long as you accept that good can make up for the bad... — Down The Rabbit Hole

I do not.

It is similar to Pascal's Wager as far as the impact of adding infinities.

For the math to get you there you do first have to accept that "good" can make up for the "bad". I gave the example of a good life making up for the hard work in getting there, and hypothetical examples can demonstrate this even better, such as millions of pounds making up for a pinch on the arm.

Once it is accepted that the "good" can make up for the "bad" it's just about getting enough "good" to make up for the "bad" of life. Infinity will always do the job.

The afterlife is a potential infinite, as it progresses towards infinity rather than the infinity actually existing.

This infinity is never reached because it is only a potential infinity. We cannot be in the moment of "infinity" and therefore never have experienced infinite happiness. — SolarWind

All that matters is the good goes on forever.

And it's absurd. An all truthful being apparently can tell lies using this formula. An all spotless being can have spots. An all x being can have arbitrarily large non-x. No mathematician would accept this. All x doesn't mean an infinite amount of x; it means there is no non-x.

We don't have logic and math here supporting your theory; we simply have a confused poster distracting himself with a sum into thinking that things he concede exists don't. If Johnny has four apples, and you give him an infinite number of oranges, Johnny still has four apples. — InPitzotl

You are effectively saying things are intrinsically bad. I think when most people give standard examples of The Problem of Evil, they are talking about the practical badness as opposed to a technical "badness".

You are effectively saying things are intrinsically bad — Down The Rabbit Hole

Nope. Reread my posts. I'm abstracting out what bad means greatly. "Puppy murder" and "puppy births" are essentially metasyntactic variables.

I'm not relying on any sort of evil being intrinsic. The POE abstractly is simply what Epicurus was talking about in that translated quote I gave earlier, which I'll repeat here:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? — Epicurus

I'm directly replying to your notion that the logic and the math supports you. Your logic and math is given in the first post. Evil here is simply being treated as a thing that comes in units; Johnny's 4 apples is your 157 evils as in this:

-157 + infinite good = infinite good — Down The Rabbit Hole

Good here is being treated per your op as another thing that also comes in units; Johnny's infinite oranges (as in that same equation). You're so called logic and math is the absurdity that because:
-4 + infinity = infinity
...it follows that Johnny has no apples. And it obviously does not follow that Johnny has no apples.

Is this not your logic and math?

I think when most people give standard examples of The Problem of Evil, they are talking about the practical badness as opposed to a technical "badness". — Down The Rabbit Hole

Googling for "practical badness" and "technical badness" gives me 287 hits. I'm 99% sure these are personal terms you just made up. Care to define them?

As for "most people", it doesn't stick. There are a lot of people in this thread who think you're in the wrong. Epicurus's presentation of the POE is canonical and sounds nothing like what you are describing. We're discussing the problem Epicurus raised over 2 millennia ago.

To summarize
...insofar as your presentation of the POE:

-157 + infinite good = infinite good — Down The Rabbit Hole

...does not map to what Epicurus is talking about:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? — Epicurus

...it is not talking about the problem of evil.

As for those 157 anythings-in-your-157-term-in-your-equation-in-your-op, each of those things is an Epicurusian "evil", as in "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?".

↪SolarWind

< This infinity is never reached because it is only a potential infinity. We cannot be in the moment of "infinity" and therefore never have experienced infinite happiness.> — SolarWind

All that matters is the good goes on forever. — Down The Rabbit Hole

If you suffer 1 year and are happy for 9 years, then you have 10% suffering.

If you suffer for 1 year and are happy for 99 years, then you have 1% suffering.

If you suffer for 1 year and are happy for 999 years, then you have 0.1% suffering.

It never becomes 0, only in the limit.

But if you have never suffered, it is always 0%.

I think it's perfectly benevolent to allow harm that for all practical purposes will not have existed. The subject of the harm will have the same net experience as those that would not have been subjected to any harm. — Down The Rabbit Hole

That is because you are not an omnibenevolent being. An all benevolent and omniscient being would not round the numbers. Zero evil is the only thing an all benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent being could tolerate.

The only way the problem of evil makes sense is if God is limited in some way.

If you suffer 1 year and are happy for 9 years, then you have 10% suffering.

If you suffer for 1 year and are happy for 99 years, then you have 1% suffering.

If you suffer for 1 year and are happy for 999 years, then you have 0.1% suffering.

It never becomes 0, only in the limit.

But if you have never suffered, it is always 0%. — SolarWind

My case is built upon the premise that the good can make up for the "bad". The suffering for all intents and purposes will not exist.

That is because you are not an omnibenevolent being. An all benevolent and omniscient being would not round the numbers. Zero evil is the only thing an all benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent being could tolerate.

The only way the problem of evil makes sense is if God is limited in some way. — Philosophim

My case is built upon the premise that the good will infinitely make up for the "bad". Thus the "bad" won't really be bad for those experiencing it.

Are you saying the good cannot make up for the bad? Or are you making the same point as @InPitzotl that even if the "bad" can be made up for it still technically exists?

I'm pretty sure I understand what you're saying - that even if the bad is made up for, it still technically exists?

I think where we disagree is you would call things bad or evil even if the subjects that experience them are not left worse off in the grand scheme of things?

This is what I mean by practical badness, badness that leaves the subjects that experience it worse off, as opposed to technical badness, a "badness" that is made up for.

I think where we disagree is you would call things bad or evil even if the subjects that experience them are not left worse off in the grand scheme of things? — Down The Rabbit Hole

Almost. It's not quite a matter of what I personally would consider bad or evil; this is more what the problem is. The whole point of the problem of evil is to resolve why there are evils in the world at all, given that this is evident, and given that there's a being alleged to have the three omni's.

I think where we disagree is you would call things bad or evil even if the subjects that experience them are not left worse off in the grand scheme of things? — Down The Rabbit Hole

This doesn't make sense.

-157 + infinite good = infinite good — Down The Rabbit Hole

Analogously here, evil is negative. Good is positive. The sum is positive, and that's what you're arguing. But to say that the 157 here isn't evil is analogous to saying that the term there is positive, because the sum is infinite. That makes no sense to me; what gives? Even in your form, those 157 thingies are surely things that have to be made up for, right? Given this model, is this not correct?:

-157 + 156 = -1 = slight evil
-157 + 157 = 0 = neutral
-157 + 158 = 1 = slight good

I don't see how you can say that the evil is "made up for" and also that the evil "doesn't exist", and claim that you're using logic and math here.

This is what I mean by practical badness, badness that leaves the subjects that experience it worse off, as opposed to technical badness, a "badness" that is made up for. — Down The Rabbit Hole

It's not convincing to me. This logic wouldn't work with raw mathematical concepts. I can't just say that -157 is "practially negative" because the sum -157 + 156 is negative, but -157 is "technically negative" because the sum -157 + 158 = 1 is positive. I see no difference in the -157 in the two equations; -157 is -157 is -157, and it's negative.

My case is built upon the premise that the good will infinitely make up for the "bad". Thus the "bad" won't really be bad for those experiencing it.

Are you saying the good cannot make up for the bad? Or are you making the same point as InPitzotl that even if the "bad" can be made up for it still technically exists? — Down The Rabbit Hole

What I'm trying to point out, is it does not solve the problem of evil. I think I understand where you are coming from. You may be under the impression that if there is evil, God cannot exist. That's not the problem. The problem is an omniscient, omnibenevolent, all powerful God cannot exist.

But lets break down the technicalities to something simple. Imagine that a God existed that could do anything. If it were as good as possible, and we could quantify "goodness", it would create a world in which the greatest amount of goodness could exist. Some people claim that there is a God that can do literally anything and is also perfectly good. The fact that evil exists, is the problem of evil for a God that can do anything.

Your argument does not get around the philosophical problem of evil, because God is introducing some evil, even if there is infinite goodness afterward. A being which could do anything, and is perfectly good, would not allow even the slightest bit of evil in the world. Before you say, "Well maybe God has to for greater good," we already established that this particular God could do ANYTHING. Meaning there is not rule or need for evil to exist at all for the greatest good to be, because God doesn't follow any rules.

The problem of evil is really more a lesson about being careful with your definitions. Definitions that are broad and without limit will run into problems in philosophy. If a God exists, that God may be more powerful than we can comprehend but it cannot do everything. The problem of evil is a contradiction to be learned from, not to be solved.

I think where we disagree is you would call things bad or evil even if the subjects that experience them are not left worse off in the grand scheme of things? — Down The Rabbit Hole

Almost. It's not quite a matter of what I personally would consider bad or evil; this is more what the problem is. The whole point of the problem of evil is to resolve why there are evils in the world at all, given that this is evident, and given that there's a being alleged to have the three omni's. — InPitzotl

I think the Problem of Evil persists, bearing in mind the flipside - the eternal suffering in hell (which is never just punishment for finite offences), and also non-human animals that will not experience the eternal good of heaven to make up for their suffering; and many non-human animals have horrendous lives.

My OP is not meant to completely rebut The Problem of Evil, but just provide an answer to what I think is its strength. I always saw (as I think most proponents do) the strength of The Problem of Evil in showing people being left worse off - in the examples of people being tortured and ravaged by disease, alarmingly so. If the premise that the bad will be made up for is accepted, said people would not be worse off, thus The Problem of Evil is more a technical problem, which I think such defences as the Free Will Defence will have a much easier job in dealing with. I realise very few people will agree with me that the horrifying "evils" of life would be made up for, and that's what I wanted to address.

Analogously here, evil is negative. Good is positive. The sum is positive, and that's what you're arguing. But to say that the 157 here isn't evil is analogous to saying that the term there is positive, because the sum is infinite. That makes no sense to me; what gives? Even in your form, those 157 thingies are surely things that have to be made up for, right? Given this model, is this not correct?:

-157 + 156 = -1 = slight evil
-157 + 157 = 0 = neutral
-157 + 158 = 1 = slight good

I don't see how you can say that the evil is "made up for" and also that the evil "doesn't exist", and claim that you're using logic and math here. — InPitzotl

In the grand scheme of things none of it is really bad or evil as people are not left worse off. The negative numbers are needed for the math (to show the conclusion that none of the subjects would be worse off), and I use the terms "bad" and "evil" in the same spirit.

To be honest, neither of us really knows if an all-good god would care about technical "evils". Maybe it would have more sense than that?

I always saw (as I think most proponents do) the strength of The Problem of Evil in showing people being left worse off - in the examples of people being tortured and ravaged by disease, alarmingly so. — Down The Rabbit Hole

What do you mean by "proponents"... proponents of the problem of evil? I don't even know what that means.

If the premise that the bad will be made up for is accepted, said people would not be worse off — Down The Rabbit Hole

Again, it doesn't matter. Assume infinite puppy births, but one puppy murder. Why was there a puppy murder? If the gods allowed it, they are not omnibenevolent. If the gods couldn't prevent it, they are not omnipotent. If the gods didn't know, they are not omniscient. Note that the infinite puppy birth assumption here is completely irrelevant to the problem.

In the grand scheme of things none of it is really bad or evil as people are not left worse off. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Again, in your OP you explicitly have a mathematical model of how this works. Translating your above claim into its mathematical analog, you're trying to pitch to me that in the infinite sum, none of the terms are really negative, as the sum is positive. I find that mathematical translation dubious. So if your claim doesn't work in your own analog, why should anyone be compelled to agree with it?

To be honest, neither of us really knows if an all-good god would care about technical "evils". — Down The Rabbit Hole

Sorry, I don't see the honesty you're referring to. If a being has the power to prevent evil, but does not exercise that power, said being is ipso facto, definitionally, disqualified from holding the label omnibenevolent.

From my perspective, you're asking me to simultaneously forgo all qualifications I hold for the label omnibenevolent, and to apply that term anyway to a god for some reason. That ask is a non-starter. As for addressing the problem of evil, this is more reminiscent of just pretending there isn't a problem than solving it.

I always saw (as I think most proponents do) the strength of The Problem of Evil in showing people being left worse off - in the examples of people being tortured and ravaged by disease, alarmingly so. — Down The Rabbit Hole

What do you mean by "proponents"... proponents of the problem of evil? I don't even know what that means. — InPitzotl

Yes, those that advocate The Problem of Evil.

If the premise that the bad will be made up for is accepted, said people would not be worse off — Down The Rabbit Hole

Again, it doesn't matter. Assume infinite puppy births, but one puppy murder. Why was there a puppy murder? If the gods allowed it, they are not omnibenevolent. If the gods couldn't prevent it, they are not omnipotent. If the gods didn't know, they are not omniscient. Note that the infinite puppy birth assumption here is completely irrelevant to the problem. — InPitzotl

Your example of puppy births is not fair, as it suggests some gain at the expense of another. This is not the case when all those experiencing the afterlife are infinitely benefiting.

In the grand scheme of things none of it is really bad or evil as people are not left worse off. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Again, in your OP you explicitly have a mathematical model of how this works. Translating your above claim into its mathematical analog, you're trying to pitch to me that in the infinite sum, none of the terms are really negative, as the sum is positive. I find that mathematical translation dubious. So if your claim doesn't work in your own analog, why should anyone be compelled to agree with it? — InPitzotl

What I am saying is that an omnibenevolent being may not care about whether a particular instance should be labelled as "bad" if overall nobody experiences net-suffering. Maybe god is a consequentialist, that only cares about the result.

To be honest, neither of us really knows if an all-good god would care about technical "evils". — Down The Rabbit Hole

Sorry, I don't see the honesty you're referring to. If a being has the power to prevent evil, but does not exercise that power, said being is ipso facto, definitionally, disqualified from holding the label omnibenevolent.

From my perspective, you're asking me to simultaneously forgo all qualifications I hold for the label omnibenevolent, and to apply that term anyway to a god for some reason. That ask is a non-starter. As for addressing the problem of evil, this is more reminiscent of just pretending there isn't a problem than solving one. — InPitzotl

Maybe that's what it boils down to: you think things are bad, even if the consequences are not? Maybe it's my consequentialism clashing with your moral principles?

Yes, those that advocate The Problem of Evil. — Down The Rabbit Hole

There's a mismatch here. To advocate is to recommend or support a position. The Problem of Evil is a problem, not a position.

What I am saying is that an omnibenevolent being may not care about whether a particular instance should be labelled as "bad" if overall nobody experiences net-suffering. — Down The Rabbit Hole

What I'm trying to convey to you is that this "being", that being an English word, that you are adding the English adjective "omnibenevolent" to, does not have the "all-good" property as we human English speakers use the terms if said being allows for evil unnecessarily.

Maybe god is a consequentialist, that only cares about the result. — Down The Rabbit Hole

That's not equivalent to what you're proposing, but it doesn't work either. If God's just breaking eggs to make omelettes, the problem would be why it would be necessary to break eggs. If God doesn't care about the broken eggs, God's not omnibenevolent. If God has to break the eggs to make the omelette, God's not omnipotent.

I'm saying nothing different than this, btw: "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?"

Maybe that's what it boils down to: you think things are bad, even if the consequences are not? Maybe it's my consequentialism clashing with your moral principles? — Down The Rabbit Hole

Obviously not; see above. Maybe you're just wrong?

Yes, those that advocate The Problem of Evil. — Down The Rabbit Hole

There's a mismatch here. To advocate is to recommend or support a position. The Problem of Evil is a problem, not a position. — InPitzotl

Says you, a proponent of The Problem of Evil.

Maybe god is a consequentialist, that only cares about the result. — Down The Rabbit Hole

That's not equivalent to what you're proposing, but it doesn't work either. If God's just breaking eggs to make omelettes, the problem would be why it would be necessary to break eggs. If God doesn't care about the broken eggs, God's not omnibenevolent. If God has to break the eggs to make the omelette, God's not omnipotent. — InPitzotl

Consequentialism is defined as "the doctrine that the morality of an action is to be judged solely by its consequences". If God is a consequentialist, the broken eggs won't be bad, the omelettes are all that can be good or bad.

Maybe that's what it boils down to: you think things are bad, even if the consequences are not? Maybe it's my consequentialism clashing with your moral principles? — Down The Rabbit Hole

Obviously not; see above. Maybe you're just wrong? — InPitzotl

That's the exact disagreement we have been having: whether good or bad only apply to the consequences. I'm saying they do, you're saying they don't.

Says you, a proponent of The Problem of Evil. — Down The Rabbit Hole

That's meaningless.

Consequentialism is defined as "the doctrine that the morality of an action is to be judged solely by its consequences". — Down The Rabbit Hole

That's a fair definition. But look at it. Consequentialism is defined as a position on the morality of actions; i.e., it is dealing with moral good and moral evils.

If God is a consequentialist, the broken eggs won't be bad, the omelettes are all that can be good or bad. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Wrong. Consequentialism would be judging the morality of an action, not a product. The action would be making an omelette. Methinks you're confusing moral evils with natural evils or "benefit" or something. (Incidentally, the problem of evil applies to both moral and natural evils).

Metaphorically, breaking eggs would be called a harm in consequentialist analysis. Producing an omelette would be a benefit. And there's still a question of why there needs to be any harm at all, which you are completely dodging. An all powerful being need not break eggs to make an omelette. So why do any eggs ever get broken? That's the problem of evil, and that's the question you're dodging, not answering.

That's the exact disagreement we have been having: whether good or bad only apply to the consequences. — Down The Rabbit Hole

No, the exact disagreement we have is whether or not you solved the problem of evil. "Good" and "bad", being just words, can be redefined to be anything you like, but defining away a problem is not solving it.

There's a mismatch here. To advocate is to recommend or support a position. The Problem of Evil is a problem, not a position. — InPitzotl

Says you, a proponent of The Problem of Evil. — Down The Rabbit Hole

That's meaningless. — InPitzotl

It means it's no surprise that you insist The Problem of Evil is (as a matter of fact) a problem as opposed to leaving it more humbly as an argument that there is a problem.

Consequentialism is defined as "the doctrine that the morality of an action is to be judged solely by its consequences". — Down The Rabbit Hole

That's a fair definition. But look at it. Consequentialism is defined as a position on the morality of actions; i.e., it is dealing with moral good and moral evils. — InPitzotl

The point is consequentialist rights and wrongs are wholly contingent on the results. If the result is not bad neither is anything in the process.

If God is a consequentialist, the broken eggs won't be bad, the omelettes are all that can be good or bad. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Wrong. Consequentialism would be judging the morality of an action, not a product. The action would be making an omelette. Methinks you're confusing moral evils with natural evils or "benefit" or something. (Incidentally, the problem of evil applies to both moral and natural evils).

Metaphorically, breaking eggs would be called a harm in consequentialist analysis. Producing an omelette would be a benefit. And there's still a question of why there needs to be any harm at all, which you are completely dodging. An all powerful being need not break eggs to make an omelette. So why do any eggs ever get broken? That's the problem of evil, and that's the question you're dodging, not answering. — InPitzotl

The broken eggs would only be bad if the omelette is bad. It doesn't make sense for a consequentialist God to avoid creating harm or intervene to stop harm, if overall it is not bad.

No, the exact disagreement we have is whether or not you solved the problem of evil. "Good" and "bad", being just words, can be redefined to be anything you like, but defining away a problem is not solving it. — InPitzotl

The fact we disagree on what should be labelled good and bad, for example due to our different moral foundations, goes to my point that we shouldn't presume what God would deem good and bad.

It means it's no surprise that you insist The Problem of Evil is (as a matter of fact) a problem as opposed to leaving it more humbly as an argument that there is a problem. — Down The Rabbit Hole

What are you talking about? The argument that there is a problem is the problem of evil. Incidentally, if there's a definition of humility, I'm pretty sure it applies no more to the random internet guy that solved a 2000+ year old problem by not solving it than it does to the other random internet guy that doesn't buy this because he hasn't heard a real solution.

The point is consequentialist rights and wrongs are wholly contingent on the results. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Right and wrong here are moral judgments. And consequentialism generally works by judging an action as being good if it results in more benefit than harm; or bad if it results in more harm than benefit.

If the result is not bad neither is anything in the process. — Down The Rabbit Hole

That does not follow. In fact, the very fact that harm is compared to benefit in consequentialism is a recognition that harm is bad and benefit is good.

The broken eggs would only be bad if the omelette is bad. — Down The Rabbit Hole

You're advancing severe misunderstandings of consequentialism.

It doesn't make sense for a consequentialist God to avoid creating harm or intervene to stop harm, if overall it is not bad. — Down The Rabbit Hole

...if we applied this criteria to humans, nobody would ever accept it. A serial killer who kills 30 people, who works as a doctor to save 50 people, we would judge as a person who does bad things. We would be insane to call such a guy omnibenevolent. Nevertheless, overall, this person saved a net 20 lives. Your argument, however, demands I recognize those 30 murders as not being bad given that a net 20 lives were saved. This is an absurd argument.