Can't choose parents, can't choose parents circumstances, can't choose your physical characteristics, potential for illness or disease, etc. One cannot choose the hand one is dealt. One can make the best of it, or not. The choice is theirs. — MikeF

Yes, the throwness of existence.. discussed much in Existentialism: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thrownness

"Why be thrown into anything at all?" is the question or rather, "Why throw anybody into anything at all?".. Once you answer this, you have some justifications to do.. My point was that "Most people would want this.." isn't just "Okay, cool, let's wash our hands as we have a winner of a justification here!". See what I'm getting at?

"Justification" is besides the point for 'a priori biological programming'. Ethical concern begins with natality which, therefore, perpetually raises the question of "justifying" whether one has prevented increasing and reduced the misery of offspring or one has not.

"Justification" is besides the point for 'a priori biological programming'. — 180 Proof

Can you explain this? Presumably we know where babies come from and can prevent it. I'm not trying to be sarcastic or anything, but just countering the idea that procreation (not even saying sex) is so determined. The brain-states involved in "Wanting X" isn't necessarily the same as immediate physical gratification. Wanting X (Like "Sally wants a baby") is a very deliberate and personality-contingent-based thing (similar to "Sally wants a new house").

Ethical concern begins with natality which, therefore, perpetually raises the question of "justifying" whether one has prevented increasing and reduced the misery of offspring or one has not. — 180 Proof

I'd like to know how you are using the word "natality" here and pairing it with misery of offspring.

Species breed – reproduce (biology 101). Natality, in that sentence, means a viable birth.

Species breed – reproduce (biology 101). Natality, in that sentence, means viably at birth. — 180 Proof

Oh but c'mon, we know that humans aren't just reflexively breeding and thus room for debate in the first place.

Well this is news to population geneticists and actuaries! Explain why we still exist after two hundred-odd millennia if, as a species, h. sapiens in the aggregate isn't "just reflexively breeding".

Well this is news to population geneticists and actuaries! Explain why we still exist after two hundred-odd millennia if, as a species, h. sapiens in the aggregate isn't "just reflexively breeding". — 180 Proof

Asserting that humans tend to breed doesn't address this above:

Can you explain this? Presumably we know where babies come from and can prevent it. I'm not trying to be sarcastic or anything, but just countering the idea that procreation (not even saying sex) is so determined. The brain-states involved in "Wanting X" isn't necessarily the same as immediate physical gratification. Wanting X (Like "Sally wants a baby") is a very deliberate and personality-contingent-based thing (similar to "Sally wants a new house"). — schopenhauer1

Your question makes sense only if humans are individual organisms that can act unconstrained (though not wholly detrrmined by) by their species biology. And we can't. Biology 101. Thus, antinatality is mostly a pathological aberration like clinical depression or Tourett Syndrome; where it's a deliberate stance, such as in my case, it's (mostly) a matter of moral luck when one achieves it.

Explain why we still exist after two hundred-odd millennia if, as a species, h. sapiens in the aggregate isn't "just reflexively breeding". — 180 Proof

Perhaps the people who choose to have children have some damn good reasons for doing so that the rest of us just isn't privy to.
Perhaps there is some deep wisdom in "going with the flow" that those who are outside the flow just cannot comprehend.

You cannot select the option for no option. — schopenhauer1

If I take this seriously (not just as a trick question simply setting its own rules), literally (to mean what it is saying), as: a claim about how options work, how working with options works, what it means to choose between them, when we are free and when constrained, what context makes something an option, a choice, I feel it misses that, ordinarily, selecting no option is just part of what a choice involves. Depending what the options are (for whose judgment, under what authority, i.e., how optional), and, more importantly, why we are being given options, what is our goal? on this, and more, choosing no option may be the best option, or we can be in a place where there is no option, as when we have no choice (which can be an excuse).

But this could be said to try to capture the sense that, even if we do not choose an option, if we do nothing, we may still be subject to judgment. Now to ask if it is just when we are forced to make choices, I feel we would mostly say no (I'm sure there are), but whether it is just to be held responsible for the options we choose, even responsible for not choosing, is a matter of our being answerable to the other, which I would say we would almost always see as at least a possibility (except perhaps the personal, secret). Of course, judgment on options on a menu are different than those which reflect who you are and/or what someone else might think of you/do to you. We could say unjust judgment here ranges from rude to guilty without proof. We may not have consented to be answerable, or at least to you. The judgment may be moralized; decided before the choice. But injustice may also be done by the chooser even in not choosing, if only to oneself.

I will say that we are born into a world of already-existing options, history, judgments, freedoms, consequences. There is no option out of this other than to abandon human responsibility entirely (which is all too human).

I feel it misses that, ordinarily, selecting no option is just part of what a choice involves. — Antony Nickles

But your birth could never have been a choice you made. Is it just that that choice is made for you. There was no choice to opt out, and here is something more important possibly than any other decision and you could never have made it for yourself.

It brings up another question: Just because all choices X are due to the condition of being born B- does having choices X as a consequence of B, justify B which itself was a condition that did not even allow for choice? Is simply having the ability to make choices X override the first (possible) injustice of B (never having a choice for the whole course of life itself, which granted have subsequent choices one can make)?

But your birth could never have been a choice you made. Is it just that that choice is made for you. There was no choice to opt out, and here is something more important possibly than any other decision and you could never have made it for yourself.

It brings up another question, just because all choices X are due to the condition of being born B. Does having choices X as a consequence of B, justify B which itself was a condition that did not even allow for choice? Is simply having the ability to make choices X override the first (possible) injustice of B (never having a choice for the whole course of life itself, which granted have subsequent choices one can make)? — schopenhauer1

Categorically, Kant would say; Grammatically, Wittgenstein would say: something you have no say in is simply not a choice. Can not BE a choice, considered as a part of a moral action, nor as part of what in our lives anyone would call or recognize as a choice--none of why it is a choice apply: there is no responsibility, there are no options, I have no authority, no one can rightly accuse me of the act (or not being able to act). There is force, oppression, servitude, etc., any number of things that make it so there is no possibility of it being a choice, including any number of fantasy situations which you want to create, say, I am completely paralyzed and no one knows, the entire world does not register my acts or speech, including "not being born".

Thus, your imposition (and continuing) idea of causality is manufactured as a backwards version of the part that responsibility plays in choice. If we take you seriously, the condition of being alive makes you responsible, as anyone is, but your choices are not caused by your birth. You are in the condition of answering for yourself (even if you do not choose); you may want to abdicate that responsibility, but then are you alive? are you (being) human?

Thus, your imposition (and continuing) idea of causality is manufactured as a backwards version of the part that responsibility plays in choice. If we take you seriously, the condition of being alive makes you responsible, as anyone is, but your choices are not caused by your birth. You are in the condition of answering for yourself (even if you do not choose); you may want to abdicate that responsibility, but then are you alive? are you (being) human? — Antony Nickles

The conditions of having choice (as any other condition, PERIOD), is from being born, so not sure about that underlined emphasis there. However, I get what you are saying, one may be what some existentialists refer to as being inauthentic by abdicating choice to social pressures, habits, unthinking roles, etc. And indeed one has made a subconscious choice to abdicate, if one is doing that..

However, this post-birth choice condition X, is not what I am referring to.. I am referring to the act made by the person's progenitors to create them...Was it just to make the decision to procreate for someone else who could not opt out of the choice? One is born, and has no choice in this. One can never decide to opt out (and suicide is NOT the same as not wanting it in the first place).

So here's my big takeaway... While people often refer to the ability to have choices as some sort of freedom and justice, the very condition for having these choices, (life itself) is glaringly NOT a choice. An injustice (perhaps) that one can NEVER have the choice for birth prior to birth (de facto part of reality), but just because this IS the case does not mean this fact is GOOD or JUST for the person who by the law of causality, could NEVER have the choice. So people change the debate to choices after birth and glaringly skip over the biggest choice that can never be made at all, one's own BIRTH.

The conditions of having choice (as any other condition, PERIOD), is from being born, so not sure about that underlined emphasis there — schopenhauer1

You are mixing together "condition" and "causality". We would say birth puts us in a condition, or position, but not that it determines or forces anything (or whatever you imagine causality to do).

So here's my big takeaway — schopenhauer1

You appear to be attempting to critique an imagined situation where people somehow see this unremarkable (everyday) event as an actual consideration (in what is unclear) and then "change the debate" and "glaringly skip over" a fact that sheds almost no light on either the concept of choice or the human condition.

If you actually wanted to make the case, say: how parents are responsible for the choice they make in bringing a child into the world, this world, their inadequate world, and the possible justifications and qualifications, this is currently not that discussion.

You are mixing together "condition" and "causality". We would say birth puts us in a condition, or position, but not that it determines or forces anything (or whatever you imagine causality to do). — Antony Nickles

Agreed, so no I'm not.

If you actually wanted to make the case, say: how parents are responsible for the choice they make in bringing a child into the world, this world, their inadequate world, and the possible justifications and qualifications, this is currently not that discussion. — Antony Nickles

That's the discussion I'm trying to have, but I am trying to connect it with the idea that:
Another person has made a decision for you. You had no decision to opt out. Every birth is a "never can opt out situation". How is that a just thing?

That's the discussion I'm trying to have — schopenhauer1

Well we are definitely backing into this, and I still don't think we understand the subject we are actually talking about. The way I was taught to do philosophy is from the ground up, not setting conclusions, or terms, or conditions first. Now, I use examples, even imagined ones, but they have to be in the service of a claim to show something, not just a demand that it must mean something to us. As I said before, if we are talking about the concept of choosing, there are much better examples that tell us more about how that works. I would also think that if we were looking at how having no choice impacts justice, I would go with other examples also.

But if we are actually talking about how justice would function in terms of bringing a child into the world, I would think it is backwards to insist on highlighting the child's lack of choice, rather then simply starting with the parent's responsibility for bringing the child into this world--let's even call it: the willful act of forcing the child to come here, now. Does that exclude the fact that the child does not have a choice? To say it a different way, isn't the fact, that the child has no choice, already, in a sense, in there? and that specifically pointing it out adds, nothing? It, as it were, is not a moral consideration itself, but only a mere fact of the situation--part of what creates the context. Or maybe it is better to say that in a situation of responsibility, one upon which we can be judged (even later by the baby), there are particular moral considerations. Is this one of them? Not: the state of the world, our finances, the possibility of passing on an illness, that the baby may resent what is seen as a selfish act given our simple desire for a baby compared to the eventual impact on them, etc? A category of consideration for what it would mean to be just in this case seems to be: weighing having the child against our situation (including our desires and opinions). That someone asks the parents (or they ask themselves) "Why would you want to bring a child into this world?" Taking into consideration all that and more, if we say to the parents "But the baby has no choice!", what difference would it make? i.e., why say that?

You cannot select the option for no option. Is this just? — schopenhauer1

Well yes, according to you:

You're wasting typing by repeatedly pointing out that "life is an unconsented imposition". So are many things you find ok. We are now arguing about whether it is bad enough. — khaled

Right, so it is a (what you call) extent argument I am making, at this point. That is to say, starting life for someone else is sufficiently meeting a threshold that is crossed to make it a violation and thus wrong. — schopenhauer1

So yes, sometimes impositions of this nature are ok. It depends on whether or not the options given are "bad enough". This was what you said 3 months ago. As to what determines "bad enough": It's a subjective feeling according to you, and there is no objective way to determine it

We both agree that a certain amount of imposition is too much. Except you, want to convince everyone that birth does objectively fit the bill of too much imposition. How can you do that with any objectivity?
— khaled

I never claimed there was any "objectivity". You seem to ignore that. The case is made and people either find it compelling or not. — schopenhauer1

Another way of determining "bad enough" is how most people would react to the options.

It is unjust to force or coerce another to make a choice. But you cannot force or coerce another to make a choice if that other doesn’t already exist. The question arises as to who it is we’re being unjust to.

Thus, antinatality is mostly a pathological aberration like clinical depression or Tourett Syndrome; where it's a deliberate stance, such as in my case, it's (mostly) a matter of moral luck when one achieves it. — 180 Proof

:up: Hence why I consider procreation to be an act of blameless wrongdoing.

In the East, it is said that many Souls wanted to visit the Creation that God had Created. And that many Souls wanted nothing to do with the Creation, and were quite content just living a Perfect Life with God. And what God did was send all Souls into the Creation, but that those who did not want to go, within them he placed the method of returning. So the Law of Karma was the way in which God enabled all Souls to explore and experience the Creation. As you sow, so shall you reap... is the basis of the Law of Karma. In wanting to visit the Creation, those Souls that wanted to explore it... created an action, and has continued to create more and more Karma. Those Souls that did not want to go, they are also burdened with a huge amount of Karma, but they have the means by which to reduce that load, and to begin to work their way back Home. Peace

Not: the state of the world, our finances, the possibility of passing on an illness, that the baby may resent what is seen as a selfish act given our simple desire for a baby compared to the eventual impact on them, etc? A category of consideration for what it would mean to be just in this case seems to be: weighing having the child against our situation (including our desires and opinions). That someone asks the parents (or they ask themselves) "Why would you want to bring a child into this world?" Taking into consideration all that and more, if we say to the parents "But the baby has no choice!", what difference would it make? i.e., why say that? — Antony Nickles

All of those are considerations too and I have discussed those at length in other discussions. I specifically want to talk about the injustice of having no choice. I think because it is a fact of the situation, doesn't mean it is a good fact to begin with. Yes, it is a truisim that procreating means the procreated have no choice. But it is the very fact that so many people have no qualms about the lack of choice that I want to examine. If someone cannot make a choice by default of not existing, yet the resultant action would lead to something affecting another person none-the-less, why does the "default of not existing, thus cannot make a choice" get a "pass" as justifiable rather than the possible injustice of "the resultant action would lead to something affecting another person none-the-less? And we are not just talking doctor visits, vaccines, chores, and schooling.. We are talking making the decision that another person must endure all of life itself. This isn't a small thing. This isn't ameliorating a greater harm with a lesser harm. This is creating someone else and they would have no choice. The irony is that often people jump to, "But once born then they can have a choice.. But the biggest choice can never be made. By the way, if you think that I am trying to make an argument to "convince" parents, I am not. I am just pointing out something that is right under our noses.

So yes, sometimes impositions of this nature are ok. It depends on whether or not the options given are "bad enough". This was what you said 3 months ago. As to what determines "bad enough": It's a subjective feeling according to you, and there is no objective way to determine it — khaled

Well I might be rethinking it and think there's a case for both kind and extent. It's just that I was accepting things like "surprise parties" as impositions, but there may need to be more context as stated here:

I can make a case similar to above that surprise parties are not analogous to not being born. Presumably, it would be a bad idea if you knew the person made it known they hate surprise parties or they can easily get a heart attack.. You do know the person presumably. However, if we go to the extent argument- the surprise is temporary, a set period of time, and is it an imposition really? That definition can be debated for the kind argument but it can also work for the extent argument that it is finite, temporary and very little in the imposition scale. — schopenhauer1

Another way of determining "bad enough" is how most people would react to the options. — khaled

So going back to the extent argument, "bad enough" for surprise parties is similar to "bad enough" for birth?

Also, with all the other things I explained, I think there are reasons other than "most people might want this" but what makes this hard to analogize to anything else is it is creating someone from scratch and then allowing the situation to be 'good or bad". A lot of times when people are already born, there is no choice except to try to make the least worst choice.

It is unjust to force or coerce another to make a choice. But you cannot force or coerce another to make a choice if that other doesn’t already exist. The question arises as to who it is we’re being unjust to. — NOS4A2

If a magician can snap his fingers and bring a person into a situation that they would not want, knowing the outcome will be a future person in harmful/unwanted situation, what say you then? Is the magician justified to make that choice for someone else?

:up: Hence why I consider procreation to be an act of blameless wrongdoing. — darthbarracuda

I can maybe agree with that. What is your own justification for that? What I don't get is wanting a child is a discursive, deliberative thought. It is not an immediate need, nor even something as compelling as pleasure or the aversion/reflex away from pain. The statement, "I want a car" and "I want a baby" are absolutely the same as far as I see. One does not have any more unconscious pull than another. The wanting of something is simply the wanting of something.

I guess you can make the case that the "heat of the moment" outweighed the thought for whether or not to have a baby, but with the ubiquity of all sorts of birth control, this isn't as big a deal either.

So really, it is more of a cultural and personal want than a universal biological drive.. unless you want to argue that wanting anything is a drive itself, but then we are speaking about wants and not this specific wants.. Wants then can be mitigated like all other wants.. I want this Ferrari but I cannot afford it, best not try to buy it. I want X but...

Presumably, it would be a bad idea if you knew the person made it known they hate surprise parties or they can easily get a heart attack. — schopenhauer1

It is assumed that you don't similar to how you don't know if your child will hate life or love it. Also similarly, most people like life, and surprise parties, with few that don't. And for obvious reasons, you can't ask beforehand ("Hey Jeff, would you mind if we threw you a surprise party on Saturday").

However, if we go to the extent argument- the surprise is temporary, a set period of time — schopenhauer1

So is life....

and is it an imposition really? — schopenhauer1

Yes. Since you didn't consent to it for obvious reasons.

That definition can be debated for the kind argument — schopenhauer1

I don't think so. You have to show it, you can't just say "Oh you can come up with a definition that suits my view". My definition of an imposition is something that is done to you without your consent. I think this is reasonable. You think this isn't sufficient so present your definition of imposition that makes life an imposition and surprise parties not.

but it can also work for the extent argument that it is finite, temporary and very little in the imposition scale. — schopenhauer1

We are agreed on that. Except life is also finite and temporary. And you need to present a case for why it is high enough in the imposition scale objectively. Which you can't do because that's how extent arguments work.

And so far you haven't actually argued that kind arguments here are tenable with your position. You need to give a definition of imposition that includes birth but not surprise parties. Not just say one can be found.

If a magician can snap his fingers and bring a person into a situation that they would not want, knowing the outcome will be a future person in harmful/unwanted situation, what say you then? Is the magician justified to make that choice for someone else? — schopenhauer1

Depends on how bad the position is and why the magician is doing it.

Also I'm assuming you went back on this?:

I never claimed there was any "objectivity". You seem to ignore that. The case is made and people either find it compelling or not. — schopenhauer1

Yes. Since you didn't consent to it for obvious reasons. — khaled

A lot of this debate will fall on this. I am not sure I would classify it as an imposition if people like it. Presumably there are aspects of life which are harmful, and life itself can be classified as suffering from a Buddhist standpoint. If a surprise party is harmful then it is an imposition. If it is simply unexpected, I wouldn't necessarily say it's an imposition. A burden, a thing one must "endure" (not relish in). It is an inconvenience at the least and a terrible burden at most. A surprise party at its worst might be an inconvenience for someone, but then that is situational to the person.. However, with what I was saying earlier, much of life is full of burdens and inconveniences and harms etc etc. and its simply the post-facto reports that say, "Life is good" or "Good to be born", etc.

So is life.... — khaled

Okay, so the lifetime of the subject a lifetime of all such possible harms small and large vs. one temporary event within that lifetime. These are the types of things that make this non-analogous in the first place.

I don't think so. You have to show it, you can't just say "Oh you can come up with a definition that suits my view". My definition of an imposition is something that is done to you without your consent. I think this is reasonable. You think this isn't sufficient so present your definition of imposition that makes life an imposition and surprise parties not. — khaled

Yes as stated earlier, at the least inconvenience at most terrible burden and harm.

Depends on how bad the position is and why the magician is doing it. — khaled

He was trying to give the non-existent argument. If no one exists, then no one is harmed, but then this is refuted by saying, but they will be harmed. Yes people can be harmed in the future from present events and the rest.

Also I'm assuming you went back on this?:

I never claimed there was any "objectivity". You seem to ignore that. The case is made and people either find it compelling or not. — khaled

This was a meta-argument about ethical arguments. There is no way I can "prove" to you "objectively" any of my claims like pointing to something and say, "That is a chair".

I am not sure I would classify it as an imposition if people like it. — schopenhauer1

You sure? That would make life not an imposition......

If a surprise party is harmful then it is an imposition. If it is simply unexpected, I wouldn't necessarily say it's an imposition. — schopenhauer1

But you can't tell beforehand if it's an imposition or not. So now what? Is it wrong to do?

You seem to think they're not wrong to do, so I take it you think that if most people don't find a situation harmful, then it's not an imposition. Cool, so life isn't an imposition!

life itself can be classified as suffering from a Buddhist standpoint. — schopenhauer1

No Buddhist ever claimed life is suffering. The original quote is more like "Life has suffering". Not a groundbreaking discovery. "Life is suffering" is a problem not a serious philosophical position.

I wouldn't necessarily say it's an imposition. A burden, a thing one must "endure" (not relish in). — schopenhauer1

Again, most people relish in the burden of life. Few find it a thing they must endure.

However, with what I was saying earlier, much of life is full of burdens and inconveniences and harms etc etc. and its simply the post-facto reports that say, "Life is good" or "Good to be born", etc. — schopenhauer1

A surprise party at its worst might be an inconvenience for someone, but then that is situational to the person — schopenhauer1

How do you know if a surprise party was burdensome or not? You ask the recipient right? And each recipient will give a different answer but most will likely agree the party was good.

So it's post facto reports and so invalid when someone says "Life is good". But when the recipient of a surprise party says "This surprise party is good" we should take his word for it.

Why exactly? They're both post facto reports. Why should one be dismissed in favor of "Actually, you're wrong, life is at best an inconvenience and at worst a terrible burden and harm" while the other should be trusted?

A burden, a thing one must "endure" (not relish in). It is an inconvenience at the least and a terrible burden at most. A surprise party at its worst might be an inconvenience for someone, but then that is situational to the person. — schopenhauer1

This is an extent argument. You're saying life is "too bad" while surprise parties aren't bad enough. You are in the minority in thinking this. Yet you want to make a global statement, that having children is wrong (at least in 99% of cases) and that life is suffering despite you thinking it's fine (at least in 99% of cases). You have provided no support for this. Because extent arguments can't be true for everyone.

Not everyone is going to think that vanilla is too sweet and chocolate isn't sweet enough like you do. You telling them that they're wrong and actually both are too sweet, just doesn't apply. Your position is just as valid as theirs when it comes to this.

Okay, so the lifetime of the subject a lifetime of all such possible harms small and large vs. one temporary event within that lifetime. These are the types of things that make this non-analogous in the first place. — schopenhauer1

One is still subject to all possible harms even during a surprise party, it's not different in that sense. So the only difference is the length of the imposition.

All analogies break down at some point. However this isn't relevant. The length of the imposition shouldn't matter for what we're discussing.

Yes as stated earlier, at the least inconvenience at most terrible burden and harm. — schopenhauer1

Again, this is an extent argument. Most people wouldn't say that life is "at least an inconvenience". They would say something like "At best an incredible joy, at worst a terrible burden (leaning more towards the former)". Again, the statement you're making is your view of life, and it is the minority view. Yet you want to say that this view is true of everyone, and that their post facto evaluations should be dismissed. Yet you don't dismiss post facto evaluations when it comes to surprise parties (you don't tell people "Actually you're wrong, and surprise parties are absolutely Satanic"). Why is that?

This was a meta-argument about ethical arguments. There is no way I can "prove" to you "objectively" any of my claims — schopenhauer1

I mean objective as in: True of everybody. Do you think that having kids is wrong for everybody or at least the vast majority?

Similarly, do you think that life is "at the least inconvenience at most terrible burden and harm" for everyone? They all seem to disagree with you. But those are just fallible post facto explanations eh? Not to be trusted. Unless we are talking about surprise parties then they are to be trusted :up:

See the problem?

You seem to think they're not wrong to do, so I take it you think that if most people don't find a situation harmful, then it's not an imposition. Cool, so life isn't an imposition! — khaled

No, not at all.
1) The same may apply.. People can report one thing and experience another, but the main reason is
2) A surprise party lasts a certain duration with a set period of time. Life itself is a lifetime obviously. You cannot compare the two. And this is what you seem to do, is force me into these analogies and then try to say, "Gotcha!" and etc. I've said before, this particular analogy (and probably most others too) are not analogous to the situation of life itself, being that it is all experiences over a span of a life time.

No Buddhist ever claimed life is suffering. The original quote is more like "Life has suffering". Not a groundbreaking discovery. "Life is suffering" is a problem not a serious philosophical position. — khaled

This has too much to unpack and requires its own discussion. If you want to do that, start a new thread.

Again, most people relish in the burden of life. Few find it a thing they must endure. — khaled

Enduring and "finding it a thing they must endure" is almost the same as the experience and the report later of the experience so this is just restating what we are arguing as far as I see.

How do you know if a surprise party was burdensome or not? You ask the recipient right? And each recipient will give a different answer but most will likely agree the party was good. — khaled

Again, I don't believe this is analogous to life itself because of the vast difference in duration and the fact that one is one experience while the other is a lifetime of all experiences.

And like the "endure" and "report of endure" this suffers from the same problem, though I would agree that this particular experience would most likely fall under not suffering or being negative. I never claimed life has no good experiences.

Why exactly? They're both post facto reports. Why should one be dismissed in favor of "Actually, you're wrong, life is at best an inconvenience and at worst a terrible burden and harm" while the other should be trusted? — khaled

Technically same response as above, experience vs. report. But I would agree that a particular event of a surprise party might align the experience and report as good. Being that this is disanalogous to life itself, being that life is the sum of all experiences, this really doesn't matter though as explained above.

This is an extent argument. You're saying life is "too bad" while surprise parties aren't bad enough. You are in the minority in thinking this. Yet you want to make a global statement, that having children is wrong (at least in 99% of cases) and that life is suffering despite you thinking it's fine (at least in 99% of cases). You have provided no support for this. Because extent arguments can't be true for everyone.

Not everyone is going to think that vanilla is too sweet and chocolate isn't sweet enough like you do. You telling them that they're wrong and actually both are too sweet, just doesn't apply. Your position is just as valid as theirs when it comes to this. — khaled

Even if this was correct, one major difference is I am not forcing the ice cream on others. But see again, here you are sneaking in a dis-analogous analogy, so yeah ice cream flavors and surprise parties would make the whole thing seem pretty absurd. At least if you are going to be talking of extent, try to make an analogy of things that are daily X set of multiple experiences that are continuous and non-stop until death.. Oh wait, there's really not much to analogize to that.

One is still subject to all possible harms even during a surprise party, it's not different in that sense. So the only difference is the length of the imposition.

All analogies break down at some point. However this isn't relevant. The length of the imposition shouldn't matter for what we're discussing. — khaled

But it does, especially if we are talking about an extent argument.

Again, this is an extent argument. Most people wouldn't say that life is "at least an inconvenience". They would say something like "At best an incredible joy, at worst a terrible burden (leaning more towards the former)". Again, the statement you're making is your view of life, and it is the minority view. Yet you want to say that this view is true of everyone, and that their post facto evaluations should be dismissed. Yet you don't dismiss post facto evaluations when it comes to surprise parties (you don't tell people "Actually you're wrong, and surprise parties are absolutely Satanic"). Why is that? — khaled

Because I can probably agree that actual lived experience and reported experience are more aligned in the case of surprise parties. Again, back to the dis-analogy objection. I am simply repeating now but you are presenting the same thing.

I mean objective as in: True of everybody. Do you think that having kids is wrong for everybody or at least the vast majority? — khaled

No. I mean objective as in, I cannot make my argument "THE ARGUMENT" because it is an argument. It is not a chair. It is not the laws of gravity, etc. I can simply provide ideas. Again, it's a meta-ethics thing about where it fits into the world of phenomena. I can't recall the exact conversation, but I think it was about the "airtight" case of the argument. But no argument is going to be airtight. Things resembling this would be empirical physical phenomena, and even this can at least be questioned like Hume's Induction Problem. Ethics is dealing with the human condition and human behaviors.

However, to the point of "objectivity", you may be referring more to "universality in belief" which you seem to refer back to over and over for why antinatalism is wrong. But in an ironic way, this is yet another example of the majority not necessarily dictating what is right and wrong. Think of veganism, and other things seen as on the "fringe". Think of times when mass groups of people did things we now consider barbaric or misguided. Perhaps there are universal appeals to wrongs- things like murder and theft. But then there are things more subtle and ingrained in cultural practice. It takes different perspectives to question what is often viewed as a given.

Unless we are talking about surprise parties then they are to be trusted :up:

See the problem? — khaled

No, because as repeated over and over, the analogy is dis-analogous.

So you have a whole range of X, Y, Z, etc. options. You cannot select the option for no option. Is this just? — schopenhauer1

It's not just to limit someone's freedom like that.