"4.023...The proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding" — Antony Nickles

What do you think this means? The statement continues:

so that one can actually see from the proposition how everything stands logically if it is true. One can draw inferences from a false proposition.

Whether a proposition is true or false is determined by reality, by what is the case, a state of affairs, the facts.

But he is not stating the "structure of the world" (a priori or otherwise), he is dictating the terms for the structure of language. — Antony Nickles

The structure of language is also the structure of the world:

What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, that is, the form of reality. (2.18)

"The world is the totality of facts, not of things." (1.1; Ogden) — Antony Nickles

The point is that the underlying structure of the world is logical rather than physical.

He goes on to say:

A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things) (2.01).

The sense of "reality" is created by Witt's imposed criteria of logic. — Antony Nickles

It is not imposed criteria, logic is what he took to be the underlying structure of language and the world.

But this sense of truth is a phantasm. As he will say later in PI — Antony Nickles

The passage from PI is not about the truth of propositions about the world, it is about sensations.

For once! :grin:

I see. Maybe then you have to look up the word confusion. Well, I'll make it easier: "Uncertainty about what is happening, intended, or required", "a situation of panic or disorder, the state of being bewildered or unclear in one's mind about something", "a situation of panic or disorder" (Ofxord LEXICO). Did I "look" I was in any of these states? :gasp: :worry: :yikes:

see. Maybe then you have to look up the word confusion. Well, I'll make it easier: "Uncertainty about what is happening, intended, or required", "a situation of panic or disorder, the state of being bewildered or unclear in one's mind about something", "a situation of panic or disorder" (Ofxord LEXICO). Did I "look" I was in any of these states? :gasp: :worry: :yikes: — Alkis Piskas

Well, the lesson is that sentences also carry emotions, not just meanings. What was radiating from the OP was a sense of confusion and panic. I stepped in to rescue you, as anyone would for the person drowning into the river of philosophy of language limited and shadowed by presence of the unfathomable universe.

For once! :grin: — Alkis Piskas

You were right, you were always right!

However, Wittgenstein is limiting the term "my world" to only that part which can be described in language. — RussellA

Yep. That's what it says in the very first line...

1. The world is everything that is the case.

General methodology question. I get the point is to arrive at a new frame of reference that supports some set of conclusions. Wouldn't this guarantee the near impossibility that some one reads it and realizes that its in error; supposing the mental backflip is always mandatory. If I always made sure people saw the world exactly as I did, before telling them what I think no one would ever be in disagreement. But, this just creates an illusion of truth brought on by manufactured consensus.

This exchange leads nowhere ... So, let's drop it, OK?

This exchange leads nowhere. Let's drop it, OK?

You were right, you were always right! — TheMadFool

Thanks. (I'm not sure though about "always". I hope it is not ironic!)

You were right, you were always right!
— TheMadFool
Thanks. (I'm not sure though about "always". I hope it is not ironic!) — Alkis Piskas

Well, I wasn't as right as I thought I was.

OK

What we know we must be able to tell — Socrates

What is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know. — St. Augustine

Kind courtesy of Daniel Bonevac.

"4.023...The proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding, and therefore one can actually see in the proposition all the logical features possessed by reality if it is true. One can draw conclusions from a false proposition."

Whether a proposition is true or false is determined by reality, by what is the case, a state of affairs, the facts. — Fooloso4

I'm not arguing that the TLP is logically inconsistent. Or arguing that language does not work (at all) by correspondence or representation, but that, if a proposition is simply true or false, we only see the features that are logical. The structure of truth and falsity determines the extent of our world.

The structure of language is also the structure of the world:

What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, that is, the form of reality. (2.18) — Fooloso4

Again, I don't disagree that the world has form. It's just that in the TLP Witt is limiting the breadth of the world to what meets a certain criteria of logic. But to watch him write only what he knows to be absolutely true with such knowing restraint; you can feel his reaching but also never stepping beyond that discipline, so every statement captures his mind frame perfectly.

The sense of "reality" is created by Witt's imposed criteria of logic.
— Antony Nickles

It is not imposed criteria, logic is what he took to be the underlying structure of language and the world. — Fooloso4

Imposed is too intentional; expected, desired; "what he took to be", not that it was something other than what he took it for, but that was all he took; narrowing our world to only a logic that could allay our fear of uncertainty.

As much as Wittgenstein expounded on the characteristics of language, he never gave a strict definition of what it to him actually is. As from Stanford Encyclopedia:

Language-games are, first, a part of a broader context termed by Wittgenstein a form of life (see below). Secondly, the concept of language-games points at the rule-governed character of language. This does not entail strict and definite systems of rules for each and every language-game, but points to the conventional nature of this sort of human activity. Still, just as we cannot give a final, essential definition of ‘game’, so we cannot find “what is common to all these activities and what makes them into language or parts of language” (PI 65).

I'd say that language in his term is rather some kind of rules, symbolic nor not, that humans perceive, understand, and apply, based on how he arranged the order of discussion in Philosophical Investigations -- language-games, rule-following, and the private language argument. Arguably our subjective world consists of the rules we perceive.

What we know we must be able to tell
— Socrates
What is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know.
— St. Augustine — TheMadFool

Cute quotes! :smile: As I understand them, they both mean that if I cannot describe something in words, it means that I don't actually know it, right? Well, as I already said, language is not the only way that an experience, a fact or knowledge in general can be comminicated. In fact, sometimes it is impossible to describe something that we know with language, including "body" language, symbols and whatever else can be called "language".

Here's another example: I know how to ride a bicycle. But however well I know my laguage, it is impossible to describe in words (or any language) what bicycle riding is to someone who has never seen a bicycle. And even if he/she knows what a bicycle is, it is totally impossible to teach him/her with just words (or other language) how to ride a bicycle. We all know this well.

Now, let someone tell me that I don't know how to ride a bicycle! :grin:
(Or that riding a bicycle is not in "my world" or that it's not true or a fact that I can ride a bicycle ... in whatever form one wants to place it.)

Bottom line: I can classify this kind of statements-quotes as only indicative, true in part or "half-truths". They cannot be used as actual truths or proofs (e.g. logical arguments in a discussion). To express a truth or present an argument as a proof, my statement and the truth it represents must always stand logically or be a provable fact.

Thank you for your response. This gives a good perspective on how Wittgenstein used the term "language". It remains to know what he exactly meant by "my world" ...

So, since it looks like you are acquainted with Wittgensttein's work, I would like to ask you the following:
1) Do you know if Wittgenstein has ever negated his principle "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world"?
2) Has he defined what exactly he meant by "my world"?

(I could of course study Wittgensttein's work myself but right now I have other priorities.)

Cute quotes! — Alkis Piskas

Not quite the response I was expecting. Anyway...

St. Augustine knows what time is but he can't put it into words. Just like what you said about how Wittgenstein seems to have committed a faux pas when he so confidently declared, "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world."

Reminds me of a philosopher who's name I forget who claims that there are ineffables that are true. I'm sorry I can't recall his proof. Google it if it seems worthwhile.

Also, I seem to have erroneously hyperfocused on a narrow band of the language spectrum - the written & spoken word - and overlooked body language (e.g. dogs), chemical language (e.g. ants), to name a few. However, each gesture, each molecule of pheromone, can be treated as a word even in these cases. In other words, there's no fundamental difference between body, chemical, written/spoken language - they all have units of meaning comparable to words.

As for bicylcing, last I recall it's the cerebellum that learns/knows how to ride a bicycle. It might seem that this knowledge can't be written down/spoken of but, in my humble opinion, the cerebrum can with ease translate the skill into a set of propositions :point: How To Ride A Bike?

That said, the gist of my posts is the reality of ineffables. This not necessarily due to a poor vocab although being thus limited/constrained could give you a feel of mystical experiences (supposedly unwordable) - how it feels like to not be able to speak/write about what one has/is experienced/experiencing.

It's just that in the TLP Witt is limiting the breadth of the world to what meets a certain criteria of logic — Antony Nickles

What needs to be understood is why he is doing this.

But to watch him write only what he knows to be absolutely true with such knowing restraint; you can feel his reaching but also never stepping beyond that discipline, so every statement captures his mind frame perfectly. — Antony Nickles

Again, you need to understand why he is attempting to draw the limits of what can be thought. He wants to point to what is beyond those limits, to what can be seen but not said.

I'm afraid I can't afford to be called "acquainted with Wittgenstein" yet. I happened to skim through some of his works recently. Therefore, I would reserve from giving improper answers to the two questions you asked. They are definitely good questions to investigate, however.

Not quite the response I was expecting. — TheMadFool

Sorry about that! :smile:

I forget who claims that there are ineffables that are true — TheMadFool

No problem. We don't necessarily need names ... Indeed there are.

hyperfocused on a narrow band of the language spectrum - the written & spoken word - and overlooked body language... — TheMadFool

Right.

it's the cerebellum that learns/knows how to ride a bicycle. — TheMadFool

I have no idea about the mechanics of learning these things ... I leave it to the specialists. I just want to enjoy my riding! :grin:

The gist of my posts is the reality of ineffables — TheMadFool

Yes, I got that! :smile: Indeed, the word "ineffable" fits perfectly. Pity that we can't ask Wittgenstein "What about ineffables?" :grin:

I'm afraid I can't afford to be called "acquainted with Wittgenstein" yet. I happened to skim through some of his works recently. Therefore, I would reserve from giving improper answers to the two questions you asked. — D2OTSSUMMERBUG

Fair enough!

They are definitely good questions to investigate, however. — D2OTSSUMMERBUG

Certainly there are!

1. The world is everything that is the case — Banno

1. The world is everything that is the case

As 1. "The world is everything that is the case" begins the Tracataus, it is probably especially important to understand its meaning, and I am trying to ensure that I've got hold of the right end of the stick.

The statement 1. "The world is everything that is the case" is initially confusing because Wittgenstein is using words in a way different to everyday usage and which can only be properly understood in context with the rest of the Tractatus, as others have already mentioned.

As a note, the Tractatus may be interpreted as espousing realism - the independent existence of objects, states of affairs and facts.

It seems to me that:
1) Wittgenstein's "world" is that which exists independently of any human observer, ie, the Earth and Universe in general. It therefore excludes human experiences of ethics, aesthetics, the experience of colour, the pain of a hot stove, etc. However, in common usage, the "world" would include both the human observer and the world they live in.
2) Wittgenstein's "case" has a meaning specific to the Tractatus- a fact - an existence of a state of affairs. However, in common usage we would say "it is the case that aesthetics is important"

"Tell me about something which cannot be put into words."

This raises the point as to how Wittgenstein is able to write about things that cannot be put into words.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

Bertrand Russell in his introduction to the Tractatus wrote - "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit"

As regards the exit, when Banno asks ""Tell me about something which cannot be put into words.", what appears to be a paradox is solved by the nature of language, in that the answer is simply "I cannot put into words my private experience of the colour red".

Summary

When Wittgenstein writes "the world is everything that is the case", what he means is very different from what would be meant in common usage.

The nature of language is such that it allows Wittgenstein to talk about things that, in a sense, transcend language.

Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit — RussellA

"I cannot put into words my private experience of the colour red". — RussellA

When Wittgenstein writes "the world is everything that is the case", what he means is very different from what would be meant in common usage.

The nature of language is such that it allows Wittgenstein to talk about things that, in a sense, transcend language — RussellA

And all these are what makes me believe that Wittgenstein wanted mostly to point out how language easily misleads us ,cause of its limitations! He seemed to me sometimes "playing" in purpose with language as to make it even more obvious to us.The word "world" seems be that case also here.
Good post.

language easily misleads us — dimosthenis9

TLP 1. The world is everything that is the case

It certainly is the case with Wittgenstein. As the SEP article on Wittgenstein wrote: "The Tractatus is notorious for its interpretative difficulties", of which the correct interpretation of the word " world" is one example.

For example, when Wittgenstein first uses the word "world", I am sure that only he knows what he means by it, certainly not the reader. It is not so much that he is using a private language of the kind as described in PI 243 "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language", but rather he is envisaging that the meaning that he intends the word to have will later become clear to the reader within the full context of the article.

It seems that Wittgensteins' approach is that the complete meaning of any particular word comes from its context rather than any pre-determined definition.
PI 21 - Now what is the difference between the report or statement "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?—Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language game.
PI - 22 - Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

However, there remains the problem with such a language game of the danger of circularity of meaning, in that, if the meaning of the word comes from the game and there are minimal links from the language game to an external reality, then there is the problem of how to choose between different games.

It seems that Wittgenstein does not always follow his own advice, when he writes:
TLP 4.112 - "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts"

However, there remains the problem with such a language game of the danger of circularity of meaning, in that, if the meaning of the word comes from the game and there are minimal links from the language game to an external reality, then there is the problem of how to choose between different games. — RussellA

He removes meaning.

“For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI 43)

(see SEP for more on this.)

One must be cautious in moving from the Tractatus to the Investigations. Some things change, some stay the same.

Wittgenstein's TLP 1 "The world is all that is the case" needs to be translated before it can be interpreted

As I see it, normally when reading a sentence in another language, such as "der Apfel liegt auf dem Tisch" we use a two step process. First we translate it into English "the apple is on the table" and then we interpret it (the apple is on the table).

However, with writers such as Wittgenstein, it is often the case that a three step process is needed. For example:
1) First, TLP 1 "Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist" is translated into Standard English "The world is all that is the case"
2) Then we translate the Standard English "The world is all that is the case" into common usage "the world that exists independently of any human consists of a combination of simple and unalterable objects in space and time"
3) Finally, we interpret it - (within the world that exists independently of any human observer there are objects existing in combination within space and time, where such objects are unalterable and simple, ie, having no proper parts).

Once interpreted, one can then make a comment. Such as - Wittgenstein's "objects" are logical objects rather than physical objects.

IE, even when reading the Tractatus in English, it is as much a case of translation as interpretation.

This is just you learning to read.

It's just that in the TLP Witt is limiting the breadth of the world to what meets a certain criteria of logic
— Antony Nickles

What needs to be understood is... why he is attempting to draw the limits of what can be thought. He wants to point to what is beyond those limits, to what can be seen but not said. — Fooloso4

I agree the most interesting parts are when he comes to a point where he feels something can only be, or is, shown. The question I'm attempting to answer is why he draws this line (as Kant has a reason to draw a line). I find this unspeakable structure, mirrored in the logic of the form, exhibited by propositions (4.121) and shown in their application (3.262), to be the edge of the work itself; the stepping-off point for his later work. But what is it about the limits he sees that makes them possible to go beyond?

I would say he realized two things: that the sense of "cannot" here is drawn by the criteria he has for a form of expression being "logical" only in the sense that it is a proposition that is either true or false. Anything past that is subject to dispute or disagreement and so cannot be a part of the "logical form" of what he is defining as "reality".

Also, he claims that the "logical form" "which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent". The form of representation (2.172), how things stand (4.022), the logical form (4.12), what is not expressed (3.262) all seem to refer to the implications of our language (or its negation); what criteria apply to decide how/when a particular thing is expressed, what counts as something being the form of the thing it is. We see this in asking about the application of the sign (its use) (3.262), exhibited in the form of the expression (4.121)("what we mean [imply]when we say X", Austin will say).

I would argue there is a sense where "That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language." does not exclude us from discussing the form, or sense, or the picture, or what is concealed, i.e., "What can be shown" (4.1212). Witt takes the need for us out of the equation by only considering true/false propositions--what is "said" is only that which is certain. Everything else is either nonsense or individual. "In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct...That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world." (5.62) We just do not regularly need to discuss these things because "my world" and your world are the same--for the most part our words agree with each other's lives. Only sometimes do we ask "Did you intend to do that?", "Do you know what you did?", "Why do you call this modern art; it does not appear self-referential at all?" I do not need to discuss logical propositions with you because their criteria involve neither you nor I. If I wish to make a claim about (my understanding of) the ordinary criteria for the form or standing of our shared lives (or what is concealed by it, for me, personally) than I am without the authority, justification, and necessity of the propositions of the TLP, but I am not without the ability, the possibility. And so Witt's "cannot" here is basically categorical; you can speak of these things, but you cannot say you speak with the authority and certainty of logic, and so, in that world, you do not speak at all.

I would argue there is a sense where "That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language." does not exclude us from discussing the form, or sense, or the picture, or what is concealed — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein and what cannot be said

Wittgenstein wrote in TLP 6.421 "It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental". Russell wrote in the introduction to the Tractatus "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit".

The apparent paradox of talking about subjective truths

The question is how is it possible to connect private subjective truths to a public word.

Using colour as an example of a private subjective truth. I observe an object in the world. I experience various private subjective truths about this object - (green, circular, opaque). I observe that public words are attached to this same object - "opaque, green, circular"

Several instances may be required, but using inductive reasoning about constantly conjoined events, ie, that of my private subjective truth (green) and the public word "green", I may infer that the public word "green" is linked to my private subjective truth (green).

Note that the link is between my private sensation and the public word, not between my private sensation and someone else's private sensation. IE, my private sensation of "green" may or may not be the same as someone else's private sensation of "green", even though we share the same word.

Note that there is no information within the public word "green" that describes any person's private subjective truth. However, that being said, the public word "green" can describe my private subjective truth of (green) to me.

My inference that the public word "green" is linked to my private subjective truth (green) may eventually turn out to be wrong, in that I am using inductive reasoning, but pragmatically, for the time being, it is probably good enough.

Conclusion

I can use the public word "green" to describe my private subjective truth (green) because of my inductive reasoning about constantly conjoined events.