Are you familiar with Kohlberg's theory of the stages of moral reasoning?

According to this theory, people at different stages of moral reasoning reason differently about issues of morality. On a metalevel, this explains the differences between people and how the same person can reason differently about the same moral issue, in different times of their life. — baker

That is interesting stuff; I remember being taught about it in psychology in high school. Many students appeared to be stuck at stage four of conventional morality - follow laws to maintain order in society.

This is where you differ from the people above. A consequent moral objectivist would either not ask about the origins of morality, or would be certain of a particular source of it. Either way, he would not struggle how to account for objective morality.
It appears that you're not a consequent moral objectivist. — baker

At the present I seem to be spending a lot of time fishing in a contradiction of sorts. Which makes my proto-position hard to articulate. The first observation is that unobserved actions are indifferent to morality. An action wasn't considered to have a moral aspect until people arrived. So, morality is something we impose on the world. But, it isn't an empty label either which implies that the morality imposed becomes something real. I believe it was Mill that noted an animal could be considered to have personhood so long as a person cared enough for it. Which seems absolutely true and indefensibility arbitrary. So, currently I'm trying to reconcile the matter. Do we create morality and then it takes on it's own existence? Or perhaps the whole of existence is aware and no event is truly unobserved.

ethicists/bio-ethicists contribute disproportionately to the policies of organizations/corporations/government, and it matters whether or not they believe in an absolute morality. — ToothyMaw

I'm sounding like a stuck record, but... why? If a firm has gone to the trouble of consulting an ethicist what difference is it going to make to the outcome whether that ethicist believes in absolute morality?

They say "most people think x is immoral", or they say "x is really, truly immoral (but most people don't think it is)".

Which do you think is going to have the most normative force with the company?

I'm sounding like a stuck record, but... why? If a firm has gone to the trouble of consulting an ethicist what difference is it going to make to the outcome whether that ethicist believes in absolute morality? — Isaac

If they believe in absolute morality then they won't simply posit that ethics is relative - which is often equivalent to permitting just about anything within the scope of different cultures having different ethical beliefs. It seems to me that unless the application of the absolute morality posited caused more net suffering - assuming a negative utilitarian stance - advising a company to do what is absolutely right would cause less suffering and therefore be sound. It is also salient to recognize that this advisement is distinct from merely saying "most people think x is immoral so therefore we ought not do it", which is relativistic.

Which do you think is going to have the most normative force with the company? — Isaac

I'm not sure which of those ethical claims would hold more normative force with a company.

If they believe in absolute morality then they won't simply posit that ethics is relative - which is often equivalent to permitting just about anything within the scope of different cultures having different ethical beliefs. — ToothyMaw

Really? It's not something I've ever encountered. I've sat on an ethics committee for a short while, permitting just about anything didn't come up, and absolute moral rightness wasn't even mentioned. The entire talk is about what people consider moral from different perspectives. What ethical committees are you thinking of where relativists say "anything goes!"?

It seems to me that unless the application of the absolute morality posited caused more net suffering - assuming a negative utilitarian stance - advising a company to do what is absolutely right would cause less suffering. — ToothyMaw

Indeed, tautologically so. And assuming a divine command theory stance - advising a company to do what is absolutely right would result in a happier God... Assuming a virtue ethical stance - advising a company to do what is more virtuous would lead to a more virtuous acting company...

But also, advising a company to do what most people think is right would result in a company doing what most people think is right...

You've not given any reason why we'd prefer either of these outcomes.

My former post doesn't totally make sense. I should have said: if there is an absolute morality and what is absolute is absolute because it causes less suffering then it would be right to advise a company to follow the course of action dictated by the absolute morality as opposed to simply saying "most people think x is immoral so therefore we ought not do it".

Indeed, tautologically so. And assuming a divine command theory stance - advising a company to do what is absolutely right would result in a happier God... Assuming a virtue ethical stance - advising a company to do what is more virtuous would lead to a more virtuous acting company... — Isaac

Yeah, I corrected myself. Sorry.

I'm sounding like a stuck record, but... why? If a firm has gone to the trouble of consulting an ethicist what difference is it going to make to the outcome whether that ethicist believes in absolute morality? — Isaac

Knowing there is a methodology to making the incorrect moral decision adds at least a theoretical check on the decisions we make. Prior to committing crimes people are known to rationalize why the immoral act is in fact momentarily permissible. So, if I'm considering stealing I am also aware that a contextual lack of apparent immorality doesn't necessarily indicate the true nature of the situation. And yet when we test all our moral theories it's by demonstrating they produce a judgement that is inconsistent with some intuitive moral theory that takes precedent.

The lesson to take away is that subjective-as-in-phenomenal doesn't have to be subjective-as-in-relative, and conversely, something doesn't have to be objective-as-in-transcendent just to be objective-as-in-universal. — Pfhorrest

Truly agree. Furthermore, the goal of utilitarian morality could be subjective, phenomenal, relative, objective, transcendent and universal; and so would morality by intent be.

The whole morality thing hinges on two things: Humans, mammals and birds are capable to feel moral; and it is helpful in the survival as a species; or the survival of the individual's derivative DNA. Everything else (aside from moral or ethics surely exists but is undefinable, and the nature of moral code) are variations on a theme.

I summarized it very nicely in two papers, both of which appear in the Ethics forum of the The Philosophy Forum. I do not describe a guidance of how to behave; I simply explain the formation and present mechanism of morality, and it allows nicely for the variations.

I strongly urge you (who ever YOU are) to read these papers. If you have a comment to make on the papers, please for god's own sake, leave the comment on those paper's forums, not here. This thread has enough exposure. My threads are ignored BIG time.

There are two versions of the same paper. One is longer, in narrative style; people complained here that it was too long and contained too much ballast, too much extraneous information. The second version is shorter and in a point form, to satisfy those who think the first version was too long.

The longer version:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10744/ethics-explained-to-smooth-out-all-wrinkles-in-current-debates-neo-darwinist-approach

The sorter version:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10903/shortened-version-of-theory-of-morality-some-objected-to-the-conversational-style-of-my-paper

Please read, enjoy, and if you feel like it, and only if you do, please leave remarks on those two threads I am pointing at in this post.

Really? It's not something I've ever encountered. I've sat on an ethics committee for a short while, permitting just about anything didn't come up, and absolute moral rightness wasn't even mentioned. The entire talk is about what people consider moral from different perspectives. What ethical committees are you thinking of where relativists say "anything goes!"? — Isaac

It is totally possible my perception is skewed - I mostly hear about people on ethics committees from people who have talked about ethics committees without being on them necessarily.

You've not given any reason why we'd prefer either of these outcomes. — Isaac

The one that causes less suffering seems best to me.

Plug your papers elsewhere please. And if no one wants to comment on your threads you should just write better OP's.

Read your essay. It would help to change the format and have an introductory paragraph. It is difficult to tell where it is going; it meanders.

I corrected myself. Sorry. — ToothyMaw

Understood.

The one that causes less suffering seems best to me. — ToothyMaw

So how is following what 'seems best to me' not precisely relativism?

Pedagogy and ideology – as I've pointed out is the business of philosophers, et al – are, in fact, significant elements of "enculturation".

So how is following what 'seems best to me' not precisely relativism? — Isaac

Oh yeah, I just assume that minimizing suffering is pretty much indisputably right, because that is how I and many people other feel. At its base I have no justification for this other than that one thought experiment by Sam Harris (I don't like the guy that much, but his thought experiment about the worst possible world makes a lot of sense to me).

"worst possible misery for everyone" he calls it.

when we test all our moral theories it's by demonstrating they produce a judgement that is inconsistent with some intuitive moral theory that takes precedent. — Cheshire

So what gives in the cade of inconsistency here, the premise or the conclusion? One of the two has to be wrong, but it's not given which. Either the moral theory is wrong because it produces a judgement that's inconsistent with some intuitive moral theory, or the intuitive moral theory is shown to be wrong because it's inconsistent with the rationally worked out answer. Doesn't seem like we've got any closer to knowing what's right. If some moral theory proved that killing some small child was the 'right' thing to do would you do it, or would you question the theory?

If some moral theory proved that killing some small child was the 'right' thing to do would you do it, or would you question the theory? — Isaac

That is similar to the two horned Euthyphro Dilemma. Either what god commands is arbitrary, or moral facts exist independently of god. Most theists won't just bite the bullet and say it is arbitrary - in fact the few theists I've proposed it to just claimed the dilemma was "ridiculous" and rejected it.

Pedagogy and ideology – asa I've pointed out as the business of philosophers, et al – are, in fact, significant elements of "enculturation". — 180 Proof

True, yes, but also products of it, no? It's not clear what role you think philosophers et al might have here. I can only think of two, each with their problems.

1. Sorting and clarifying. What is the underlying essence of what's moral, what are we talking about, the common thread? Problem being, if some moral approach 'in the wild' doesn't fit, is it the descriptive clarification that's wrong, or the aberrant moral approach that's wrong?

2. Determining what 'should' be moral. Morality, being about what we 'ought' do would seem to need to be already determined before anyone could commence working out what anything 'ought' to be.

Do you have some other role in mind?

I just assume that minimizing suffering is pretty much indisputably right, because that is how I and many people other feel — ToothyMaw

Yep. That's moral relativism.

the few theists I've proposed it to just claimed the dilemma was "ridiculous" and rejected it. — ToothyMaw

Indeed. Discussions about morality often end that way too.

Nice topic!

I firmly believe things are right or wrong apart from who does them. But, I can't account for how this could be; because every case seems to be about an observer. — Cheshire

I assume that by "apart from" you mean "independently of" and that "about an observer" you mean "depends on the observer". Right?

I would also have to assume the term "morality" with the general meaning "The extent to which an action is right or wrong". Because it can be used with other meanings too (e.g. rules/principles of right or wrong behavior, etc.)

Finally, I consider as moral action as one that makes more good than harm. For whom? Well, for the greatest number. Humans are social beings. This means that if my action can affect others, I have to consider if it will make more good or harm to them. And if I have already done it, I have to ask myself if it made more good or harm to them.

Now, let's see your questions:

1. Is it Morally wrong to destroy a beautiful painting?
2. What if no one would have ever seen it?
3. What if you painted it? — Cheshire

We can apply the definition-criterion I mentioned above (I don't want to call it "rule" or "principle") to every one of them:
1. How destroying the painting (that you value as "beautiful") could affect others?
2. I'm not sure what do you mean by "no one would have ever seen it". How can this happen? For one thing, you must be one who has seen it! :))
3. It is you who painted it, you have basically the right to do whatever you want with it. However, on a higher moral plane, if you think that it would be good --for one or the other reason-- to show it and even give it as a present to other people, e.g. family, friends, etc. wouldn't it be wrong to destroy it?

Once we are talking about art, maybe you know about the Tibetan mosaics that are created with colored sand ... Very beautiful, very detailed and big. They take quite long to finish. Yet, when the group is satisfied with the result, they just destroy them with a few sweeping movements! This has of course an explanation, but the fact is that they all agree that destroying these creations is a good and meaningful act.

Conclusion: There are universal and thus objective criteria upon which a person can act or judge his actions. It does not matter how he (for brevity) evaluates good or harm, this is always subjective. But from the moment that he believes that something is right or wrong, and acts according to those criteria, his actions are moral. "Be true to yourself", they say. Moral integrity is one of the most important things in human behavior and consciousness. The only thing one can do wrong is breaking that integrity!

Just saying I made a "poor case for objective morality" doesn't make it so.

I know. But I think moral absolutism might be possible, along with objectivity. I suppose I could arbitrarily specify that suffering is inherently bad, and then adopt a negative utilitarian position. That would lead to an absolute morality I think, even if not objective. I suppose that is more my position - but how I feel enters into me specifying that suffering is bad; I have suffered and don't like it a whole lot - like most people. Thus I think it is wrong.

Then reply to my criticisms, please. Saying I was uncharitable doesn't negate them.

My answers were qualified though: destroying the "beautiful" (says who?) "painting" is morally wrong only if that act harms someone. (In relation to rather than "the essence of".) So it's wrong if it's harmful and not wrong if it's not harmful.

Anyway, your input likewise is appreciated as well.

Pedagogue or ideologue are not "roles" for philosophers (sophists, clergy) to play? Your examples mostly belong to pedagogy.

Again, just saying so is not a "criticism" warranting, or even inviting, more of a reply than I've given.

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I suppose I could arbitrarily specify that suffering is inherently bad, and then adopt a negative utilitarian position. That would lead to an absolute morality I think, even if not objective. — ToothyMaw

Can you foresee any circumstance where the negative utilitarian position on an issue might, nonetheless feel wrong? If no, then no need for any moral thought at all, you already know what's right in any situation just by gut instinct. If yes, then what do you do? You only came up with negative utilitarianism because it's how you feel, so when it advises some course of action which clashes with how you feel in some other way, it has no greater claim to rightness.

Pedagogue or ideologue are not "roles" for philosophers (sophists, clergy) to play? Your examples mostly belong to pedagogy. — 180 Proof

Then I'm afraid I've completely missed the point of your...

Pedagogy and ideology – as I've pointed out as the business of philosophers, et al – are, in fact, significant elements of "enculturation" — 180 Proof

...any chance of an elucidation for the slow ones at the back?

Can you foresee any circumstance where the negative utilitarian position on an issue might, nonetheless feel wrong? If no, then no need for any moral thought at all, you already know what's right in any situation just by gut instinct. If yes, then what do you do? You only came up with negative utilitarianism because it's how you feel, so when it advises some course of action which clashes with how you feel in some other way, it has no greater claim to rightness. — Isaac

It does if I can actually make a case for suffering being inherently wrong. Which I really can't except for the idea of expanding my own experience to those of others - I have a preference to not suffer, and so does everyone else, so it should be avoided whenever possible, regardless of whether or not other people suffer in unique ways.

I can't think of any circumstances under which I would permit suffering if it could be avoided (or a greater amount of suffering incurred in exchange for a smaller amount).

I have a preference to not suffer, and so does everyone else, so it should be avoided whenever possible — ToothyMaw

Do you have no other preferences? What gives your preference to not suffer it's superlative status?

I can't think of any circumstances under which I would permit suffering if it could be avoided — ToothyMaw

What constitutes it not being avoidable? If you had to give up all your money to prevent someone stubbing their toe would you do so? The trouble with balancing something as nebulous as 'suffering' is that virtually everything can be framed in those terms. Do I 'suffer' when I have to give a pound to the homeless? Of course. Does god 'suffer' when we don't do as he asks? Maybe. Do people 'suffer' when we don't act virtuously. Arguably, yes. So deciding to measure 'suffering' doesn't answer any questions because the questions aren't about the measurement unit, they're about the relative quantity of it.