Yes, I do think he had an organic disease. His use of methal hydrate might have been an abuse for him though which could have weakened his mind. He might not have known he got syphillis and might have thought it was a consequence of his actions. He was either insane, saintly, or evil because what he said was unusually blunt yet profound at the same time

Do you mean chloral hydrate? It's addictive.

Yes

16

Nietzsche explains that an ascendant people have a bloodthirsty god, full of anger, revenge, and violence.

Only when they lose hope of ever becoming free do they embrace a loving god.

Interesting idea, but it's not historical.

He had syphilis, which is neurologically devastating. — frank

The new thinking is that he had a slow growing brain tumor.

“ A study of medical records has found that, far from suffering a sexually transmitted disease that drove him mad, Nietzsche almost certainly died of brain cancer.

The doctor who carried out the study claims that the universally accepted story of Nietzsche having caught syphilis from prostitutes was concocted after World War II by Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum, an academic who was one of Nietzsche's most vociferous critics. It was then adopted as fact by intellectuals who were keen to demolish the reputation of Nietzsche, whose idea of a "superman" was used to underpin Nazism.”

https://www.smh.com.au/world/nietzsche-died-of-brain-cancer-20030506-gdgprc.html?js-chunk-not-found-refresh=true

https://www.smh.com.au/world/nietzsche-died-of-brain-cancer-20030506-gdgprc.html?js-chunk-not-found-refresh=true

That's interesting, but we need a different source. Two of Dr Sax's books have been criticized for inaccurate information, misrepresentation, and distortion.

That's interesting, but we need a different source. Two of Dr Sax's books have been criticized for inaccurate information, misrepresentation, and distortion. — frank

I keep a slice of Nietzsche’s brain in my wallet, and it looks tumory to me.

If you roll it up into a ball, you'll find that it bounces (if you've kept it chloral hydrated).

If you roll it up into a ball, you'll find that it bounces (if you've kept it chloral hydrated). — frank

I gave it to the kid at the 7-11 by mistake instead of my debit card. He asked me why I was giving him Nietzsche’s brain. I apologized profusely. Fortunately it turns out they honor it there. I even got a free Slurpee.

Fortunately it turns out they honor it there. I even got a free Slurpee. — Joshs

Which flavor?

17

As it turns out, the disintegration of a people turns their god into a cosmopolitan.

"...just what is the significance of such a metamorphosis? what does such a reduction of the godhead imply?-To be sure, the "kingdom of God" has thus grown larger. Formerly he had only his own people, his "chosen" people. But since then he has gone wandering, like his people themselves, into foreign parts; he has given up settling down quietly anywhere; finally he has come to feel at home everywhere, and is the great cosmopolitan-until now he has the "great majority" on his side, and half the earth. But this god of the "great majority," this democrat among gods, has not become a proud heathen god: on the contrary, he remains a Jew, he remains a god in a corner, a god of all the dark nooks and crevices, of all the noisesome quarters of the world! . . . His earthly kingdom, now as always, is a kingdom of the underworld, a [subterranean] kingdom, a ghetto kingdom.... And he himself is so pale, so weak, so decadent.... "

This god is homeless, so has no nationalism at all.

Had to skim the part about Buddhism because it was utterly ridiculous.

24

N has something to say about Jews:

"The Jews are the most remarkable people in the history of the world, for when they were confronted with the question, to be or not to be, they chose, with perfectly unearthly deliberation, to be at any price: this, price involved a radical falsification of all nature, of all naturalness, of all reality, of the whole inner world, as well as of the outer. They put themselves against all those conditions under which, hitherto, a people had been able to live, or had even been permitted to live; out of themselves they evolved an idea which stood in direct opposition to natural conditions-one by one they distorted religion, civilization, morality, history and psychology until each became a contradiction of its natural significance."

And then:

"Precisely for this reason the Jews are the most fateful people in the history of the world: their influence has so falsified the reasoning of mankind in this matter that today the Christian can cherish anti-Semitism without realizing that it is no more than the final consequence ofJudaism."

So why is this? N explains, basically, that Jews demonstrated great vitality in becoming the great teachers of a brand of nihilism.

Therefore they contradict the very teaching they offer. In other words, they didn't lay down and die 2000 years ago.

So anti-semitism is a consequence of Judaism.

25

N says that the early on, the Hebrews had a relatively easy relationship with nature when their god was an image of victory and justice.

When they fell into a long run of bad luck, their prophets reenvisioned their relationship with YHWH. They were now out of favor with God. This explained their unfortunate circumstances. This put them at odds with the world around them and even at odds with themselves. The angst of the sinner was upon them. They were screw-ups. They were bungled, and botched.

N sees in this rupture a seismic shift that will ultimately turn a civilization inside out, or rather outside in.

Genius.

From the preface, he describes his reader:

"He must have an inclination, born of strength, for questions that no one has the courage for; the courage for the forbidden; predestination for the labyrinth. The experience of seven solitudes. New ears for new music. New eyes for what is most distant. A new conscience for truths that have hitherto remained unheard. And the will to economize in the grand manner-to hold together his strength, his enthusiasm. . . . Reverence for self; love of self; absolute freedom of self..." — frank

This sounds like Emerson and Thoreau. Whitman talked of having the right person to tell his secrets to. Could Nietszche be asking us to become something else? to change us, rather than simply tell us something? To have us stop giving our self away for nothing?

"...the rottenness I speak of is most apparent to me precisely in those quarters where there has been most aspiration, hitherto, toward "virtue" and "godliness." — frank

-quoting Nietszche

Some prefer to see Nietszche as a continental philosopher, commenting about the state of his world (and Christianity). I read him as an analytical philosopher, reacting to Kant and Plato. His example is religion but his target is deontological morality. If you 'aspire' to a specific idea of what it is to be virtuous, you are abdicating the opportunity and responsibility to be a better you. Also a moral moment may be lost on you if you feel you are a good person because you have done what has been decided beforehand by others long ago.

A history of the "higher feelings," the "ideals of humanity"-and it is possible that I'll have to write it-would almost explain why man is so degenerate. — frank

- again, quoting Nietszche.

But he has written the history of our desire for ideals. His work is an examination by strawman of the forces at work in us to replace our human failing with righteous reasoned imperatives and forms. He is trying to get us to see the historicity of moral philosophy.

However, some misconstrue the impassioned fever of his entreaties, even hatred, as that he is against rules at all and that it is every person for themselves. Emerson is thought of this way as well--withholding charity to others (giving ourselves over). But to follow my whim (will) may be to help others, be a good citizen, go along with everyone else; my duty need not be our downfall, nor different than yours or anyone's. But Nietszche doesn't see any desperation in the quietness of our voice, so he is desperate for us, controversial, shameless, hated--a god-killer--a hyperbolic example, for us. We are the weak and ill-constituted. We pity ourselves (being "moral") rather than being our self.

I think of it as a mythical analogy (prejudiced hopefully more by the trope than in belief) written in code, where "God" is Plato's form and our weakness is our desire to relinquish our responsibility over our self to a moral theory.

If you 'aspire' to a specific idea of what it is to be virtuous, you are abdicating the opportunity and responsibility to be a better you. Also a moral moment may be lost on you if you feel you are good because you have done what has been decided beforehand by others long ago. — Antony Nickles

So you're saying that living out someone else's morality is easy, it provides an easy Good buzz.

How would you explain the alternative? That embracing authenticity comes at a price?

So you're saying that living out someone else's morality is easy, it provides an easy Good buzz. How would you explain the alternative? That embracing authenticity comes at a price? — frank

Nietszche talks of needing strength, courage, indifference, and, at least elsewhere, joy. If there is a desire in us for certainty and universality and the surety of a fixed morality knowledge, then we must resist a part of ourselves, turn away from our culture, towards our attraction. Our will is not us forcing something, but allowing our instinct and interests to guide us.

In 2 of the Antichrist, he defines good and evil this way:

"What is good?
Whatever augments the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself, in man.
What is evil?
Whatever springs from weaknes."

So he doesn't think of morality in terms of fixed rules.

If you 'aspire' to a specific idea of what it is to be virtuous, you are abdicating the opportunity and responsibility to be a better you. Also a moral moment may be lost on you if you feel you are a good person because you have done what has been decided beforehand by others long ago. — Antony Nickles

This sounds consistent with the moral perspectives of Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Levinas (and Caputo, Critchley and Sheehan) , because it still makes the idea of
god coherent. I read Nietzsche as deconstructing this thinking.

he doesn't think of morality in terms of fixed rules. — frank

But what I was saying is that he uncovered the desire for them, our weakness for an answer that doesn't involve us, our failings. But also, if you read early work like Human, all too Human, he is simply breaking down our moral framework to build it back with an eye on history and context, and acknowledging our part in our moral judgments, though later he will seemingly be simply railing on an
about the individual.

In Antichrist, hes not focusing on building morality back. He's just saying that when self condemnation becomes the prevailing vibe (as in Christianity), it's a deathly force.

I suppose this makes me want to compare Christian cultures to non-Christian ones. His critique doesn't seem to bear much on the reality.

In 34 N emphasizes that his target includes idealism, whether subjective or objective, talking about the Christ, he says:


"If I understand anything at all about this great symbolist, it is this: that he regarded only subjective realities as realities, as "truths" -that he saw everything else, everything natural, temporal, spatial and historical, merely as signs, as materials for parables. The concept of "the Son of God" does not connote a concrete person in history, an isolated and definite individual, but an "eternal" fact, a psychological symbol set free from the concept of time."

The world when viewed from Nietzschean power game lens leaves no room for a benevolent God of the Christian kind. The weak, if only they realize how miserable their condition is, will quickly lose faith. The rich, despite the numerous occasions in their lives that may evoke the sentiment of "I'm feeling blessed", will only have to look at the condition of the weak to convince them that those are empty words. There really is no way a God, a benevolent, one can fit into all that's happening around us. Hence, I guess, Antichrist.

Another interesting observation, true or not, is the weak want to be powerful and the powerful don't want to be weak. In either case, weakness is a viewed as a problem to be solved instead of an asset that needs nurture. In one sense, the weak are, in a roundabout way, condemning their own existence which fits like a glove with Nietzsche's beliefs.

Then there's the matter of how Nietzsche seems to view life as a competition or a war. A soccer team manager will pick and choose his side has the crème de la crème. The military will only accept the healthiest of applicants. Nietzsche's views make sense in this context. No competitive enterprise can afford weakness.

Continuing with the military analogy, if life is war, imagine a band of commandos on a mission. If the mission is in progress and one of the commandos gets badly hurt, it's time for fae to say, "it's too late for me, save yourselves." These words are meant to be uttered by the weak. However, if the war is over, the mission accomplished, the commandos, exhausted or injured, would be looked after. They did have a big role to play in the success of the mission. Quite possibly, Christianity, by virtue of its emphasis on the weak, reflects the general sentiment among the people, elaborated by few people like Moses, Jesus, Mohammad, Buddha, that our "military" objectives have been completed and we can now, without any danger of jeopardizing our well-being, tend to the weak.

Cool post, thanks.

In the Antichrist, N treats a god as a sign of how people see themselves.

The issue about the weak is like:. two kids are playing in a playground, being watched by parents.

Both kids fall and stub their knees. One mom doesn't respond, so the kid gets up after crying for a while and moves on. The other mom exclaims and runs over to comfort her child.

N would say the second child has become the victim of pity. Instead of seeing injury and pain as part of life, he picks up on his mother's angst and comes to fear and condemn injury.

In conclusion, reading The Antichrist is like finding a diamond in a giant pile of excrement.

This sounds consistent with the moral perspectives of Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Levinas (and Caputo, Critchley and Sheehan) , because it still makes the idea of god coherent. I read Nietzsche as deconstructing this thinking. — Joshs

I'm not sure this is such a black-n-white fight. I don't think my descriptions of Nietzsche's critiques of deontology "still makes the idea of god coherent"? Is this to say that Nietzche's aim was to make deontology incoherent? when his work is a description of how it functions? I think it's too simplistic to say Nietszche is doing away with it or replacing it; he finds there is no "human" history or recognition of our part in the creation or our misuse of morals to judge people. If he is taking it apart, it is to see our part in it.

And without Nietszche you don't have Wittgenstein; the idea of looking at a fictitious history as a case to learn the ins-and-outs of something; the idea of the ordinariness of our concepts, that they come from a place in our lives; that our concepts are not precise and fixed...

In Antichrist, hes not focusing on building morality back. He's just saying that when self condemnation becomes the prevailing vibe (as in Christianity), it's a deathly force. — frank

I'll grant you that Neitszche gets a little one note as he progresses, but It is easy to take from him simply a critique of morality and a description/judgment of attitudes (weak, pity, power, are about our thinking, say, they are in context to our self). I offer that there is more, if you look deeper--what is he trying to get us to see about how it is, in philosophy, that we condemn ourselves ("the human") with our thinking, the creation of our morality?

I suppose this makes me want to compare Christian cultures to non-Christian ones. His critique doesn't seem to bear much on the reality. — frank

It may seem like a sociological critique, but it is analytical. He is not doing history, he's fashioning an example to show a dynamic. You could call it mythical, or fantastical. Wittgenstein will do the same (even creating surreal worlds) to contrast with the logic of our ordinary mechanisms. Plato has his parables of chariots and caves. Nietszche's contribution is in and to this history of moral philosophy, and it is not a stick of dynamite nor simply a social commentary.

'll grant you that Neitszche gets a little one note as he progresses, but It is easy to take from him simply a critique of morality and a description/judgment of attitudes. I offer that there is more, if you look deeper--what is he trying to get us to see about how it is, in philosophy, that we condemn ourselves ("the human") with our thinking, the creation of our morality? — Antony Nickles

Oh yes, I get why people say N is food for thought. Definitely.

may seem like a sociological critique, but it is analytical. He is not doing history, he's fashioning an example to show a dynamic. You could call it mythical, or fantastical. Wittgenstein will do the same (even creating surreal worlds) to contrast with the logic of our ordinary mechanisms. Plato has his parables of chariots and caves. Nietszche's contribution is in and to this history of moral philosophy, and it is not a stick of dynamite nor simply a social commentary. — Antony Nickles

The Antichrist comes across as psychology. Proto-Jungian. He wants to analyze the Savior type. He's not psychoanalyzing Jesus, but a type of idealism. He's explaining how idealism emerges out of human life.

That actually is fascinating.

without Nietszche you don't have Wittgenstein; the idea of looking at a fictitious history as a case to learn the ins-and-outs of something; the idea of the ordinariness of our concepts, that they come from a place in our lives; that our concepts are not precise and fixed... — Antony Nickles

I certainly agree with this , but I think Nietzsche went where Wittgenstein was unable to go. Witt remainded a deeply moralistic person his whole life, not in a traditional religious sense, but in a Kierkegaardian sense.

I think it's too simplistic to say Nietszche is doing away with it or replacing it; he finds there is no "human" history or recognition of our part in the creation or our misuse of morals to judge people. If he is taking it apart, it is to see our part in it. — Antony Nickles

If you substitute ‘grounding moral values’ for truth in the passages below, you arrive at my interpretation of Nietzsche’s deconstruction of morality.

“The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not fact but fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no "truth" (Nietzsche 1901/1967 Will to Power)

“…the origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation into a system of ends, are toto coelo separate; that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former ‘meaning' [Sinn] and ‘purpose' must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated.

No matter how perfectly you have understood the usefulness of any physiological organ (or legal institution, social custom, political usage, art form or religious rite), you have not yet thereby grasped how it emerged: uncomfortable and unpleasant as this may sound to more elderly ears,– for people down the ages have believed that the obvious purpose of a thing, its utility, form and shape, are its reason for existence, the eye is made to see, the hand to grasp. So people think punishment has evolved for the purpose of punishing. But every purpose and use is just a sign that the will to power has achieved mastery over something less powerful, and has impressed upon it its own idea [Sinn] of a use function; and the whole history of a ‘thing', an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations, the causes of which need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at random.” (Genealogy of Morality)

What is left of the coherence of the concept of god , the good, or morality if such values are mere contingent and relative moments in a genealogical history utterly without ultimate propose or aim , whose successive phases and eras ‘just follow and replace one another at random’?

I'm not sure this is such a black-n-white fight. — Antony Nickles

I agree with this too. I’m just declaring my support for post structuralist readings of Nietzsche ( Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida) as opposed to existential interpretations.

He had syphilis, — frank

Maybe not.

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/18575181/
"Background: Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), one of the most profound and influential modern philosophers, suffered since his very childhood from severe migraine. At 44 he had a mental breakdown ending in a dementia with total physical dependence due to stroke. From the very beginning, Nietzsche's dementia was attributed to a neurosyphilitic infection. Recently, this tentative diagnosis has become controversial.

"Objective: To use historical accounts and original materials including correspondence, biographical data and medical papers to document the clinical characteristics of Nietzsche's illness and, by using this pathography, to discuss formerly proposed diagnoses and to provide and support a new diagnostic hypothesis.

"Materials: Original letters from Friedrich Nietzsche, descriptions by relatives and friends, and medical descriptions. Original German sources were investigated. Biographical papers published in medical journals were also consulted.

"Results: Nietzsche suffered from migraine without aura which started in his childhood. In the second half of his life he suffered from a psychiatric illness with depression. During his last years, a progressive cognitive decline evolved and ended in a profound dementia with stroke. He died from pneumonia in 1900. The family history includes a possible vascular-related mental illness in his father who died from stroke at 36.

"Conclusions: Friedrich Nietzsche's disease consisted of migraine, psychiatric disturbances, cognitive decline with dementia, and stroke. Despite the prevalent opinion that neurosyphilis caused Nietzsche's illness, there is lack of evidence to support this diagnosis. Cerebral autosomal dominant arteriopathy with subcortical infarcts and leukoencephalopathy (CADASIL) accounts for all the signs and symptoms of Nietzsche's illness. This study adds new elements to the debate and controversy about Nietzsche's illness. We discuss former diagnoses, comment on the history of a diagnostic mistake, and integrate for the first time Nietzsche's medical problems. (Italics added.)