If you cannot put one statement together with another I cannot help you. — Fooloso4

Well, why don't you put the two statements together and show us how to do it?

So, this is one statement:

"On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest"

What is the other statement that by putting it together with the first, would in your opinion amount to saying that "the Forms are hypothesis"?

I am not going to play this endless game with you any longer.

I think it is you who are playing a game of hide-and-seek by refusing to answer legitimate questions. How do you propose to have a conversation when you refuse to explain what you are trying to say and on what basis?

My feeling is that you are grossly mistaken. Socrates does not say that the Forms are "hypothesis".

The truth of the matter is that Socrates does use hypotheses, but not to show that what he is looking for is a hypothesis.

In fact, he uses geometry (see also Meno) as an analogy or model for how hypotheses may be used to solve a problem.

Similarly, he uses hypotheses to show that virtue or the good ultimately derives from wisdom, not that wisdom is a "hypothesis".

This is why you are unable to show where Socrates says "Forms are hypotheses" or which two statements of his you think can be combined to arrive at that conclusion.

SO if they are not a hypothesis, what are they?

Socrates’ human wisdom ignorance is grounded in his knowledge belief in God... — Fooloso4

Corrections were necessary...

Agrippa's trilemma argument:

1. All arguments are one of the following:
a) Infinite regress: each premise requires an argument and the premises of the argument requires another ad infinitum.
b) Circular: The conclusion appears in the premises.
c) Axiomatic: We accept sans justification the truth of the premises.
2. None of a), b), or c) are acceptable
Ergo,
3. Sound arguments don't exist — TheMadFool

Hey Mad!

Interesting post that the above was included within. I've a question though regarding what's quoted above. What reasons are there for believing 2., and how can we do that much without rendering the entire line of thinking as untenable, and/or self-defeating? In addition, how does 3 follow from 1 and 2?

I said this:

Socrates’ human wisdom is grounded in his knowledge of his ignorance, that he does not know anything noble and good. (Apology 21d) — Fooloso4

But nothing about knowledge of God. I don't think belief in God fits either. As I have said, he replaces the myths of the gods with myths of the Good.

SO if they are not a hypothesis, what are they? — Banno

Plato gives no detailed or scientific definition because they are said to be metaphysical realities. But they are a type of eternal universals, “ideal forms” (eidea) or “patterns” (paradeigmata) after which all objects of the world are fashioned.

If the Forms were “hypotheses”, then ultimate reality itself would be not a reality but a hypothesis which is absurd.

The dialogues suggest that the Forms can be experienced, so, clearly they are not hypotheses.

Using the geometry analogy mentioned by Socrates, a hypothesis is a provisional thesis intended to show how a particular concept may be formulated philosophically, not to show that it is a hypothesis.

I suppose the confusion comes from the similarity of Greek eidos and idea with English idea, i.e., some kind of vague belief or fancy. The Greek terms mean much more than "mental idea" or "thought", which is why "Form" is often used as a technical term to refer to what is meant in the dialogues.

Theory of Forms

Agrippa's trilemma argument:

1. All arguments are one of the following:
a) Infinite regress: each premise requires an argument and the premises of the argument requires another ad infinitum.
b) Circular: The conclusion appears in the premises.
c) Axiomatic: We accept sans justification the truth of the premises.
2. None of a), b), or c) are acceptable
Ergo,
3. Sound arguments don't exist
— TheMadFool

Hey Mad!

Interesting post that the above was included within. I've a question though regarding what's quoted above. What reasons are there for believing 2., and how can we do that much without rendering the entire line of thinking as untenable, and/or self-defeating? In addition, how does 3 follow from 1 and 2? — creativesoul

To put it succinctly, if you decide to reject Agrippa's trilemma argument, Agrippa's trilemma argument is sound (infinite regress, circularity, axiomatization don't matter). If Agrippa's trilemma is sound then there are no good arguments for the reasons that every argument is an infinote regress or circular or axiomatic. That puts you in a tight spot, no? Rejecting Agrippa's trilemma means accepting it and the rather disturbing conclusion that's entailed.

However, accepting Agrippa's trilemma argument itself is problematic because that means Agrippa's trilemma argument isn't sound and its conclusion that no sound arguments exist is unjustified.

All this boils down to,

1. If there are good arguments then there are no good arguments [the first paragraph]
2. If there are no good arguments then there are good arguments [second paragraph]
3. If there are good arguments then there are good arguments [1, 2 HS]
4. Either there are no good arguments or there are good arguments [3 Imp]
5. Either there are good arguments or there are no good arguments [4 Comm]

Statement 5, generalizable as p v ~p (tautology), is a skeptic's calling card. p v ~p is another way of expressing one's doubt regarding any proposition p, is it p OR is it ~p. The skeptic has undermined the dogmatist while at the same time solidified faer epistemic stance viz. We don't know.

Note that, assuming I'm a skeptic, this whole post itself being an argument refutes itself - Agrippa would frown on it because his trilemma argument specifically forbids argumentation. Is there a way out for the skeptic? There is - remember I'm working within the dogmatist system i.e. I'm assuming dogmatism is true every time I argue. Agrippa's trilemma argument and this post, itself an argument, demonstrates that dogmatism has an Achilles' heel, it's self-contradictory, it self-destructs as it were.

It's a chain reaction with each element in it flip-flopping between its affirmation and negation.

A = accept Agrippa's trilemma argument
G = there are good arguments

Dogmatist:
1. ~A -> G -> A -> ~G -> ~A -> G ->...ad nauseum
2. A -> ~G -> ~A -> G -> A -> ~G -> ad nauseum

Skeptic:
1. A v ~A. No further comment!

As you can see, accepting/rejecting Agrippa's trilemma is what a dogmatist would do. Everything hinges on this plain and simple truth!

A further comment:

1. (A v ~A) -> (A & ~A) [premise]
2. A v ~A [assume for reductio ad absurdum]
3. A & ~A [1, 2 MP]
4. ~(A v ~A) [2, 3 reductio ad absurdum]

In classical logic, statement 4 eventually simplifies to the contradiction A & ~A but surely the skeptic doesn't want to claim such a thing.

What's happened here?

1. A leads to a contradiction. Not!
2. ~A leads to a contradiction. Not!
3. A & A is a contradiction. Not!
4. ~(A v ~A) leads to a contradiction. Not!

This is Nagarjuna's tetralemma, the catuskoti (the four corners)! This is skepticism's Buddhist connection!

Since A is G phrased differently and G is knowledge written differently and knowledge is nothing more than a justified, true proposition, P, Agrippa's trilemma becomes,

1. P. Not!
2. Not P. Not!
3. P and Not P. Not!
4. Neither P nor Not P. Not!

All of the above either lead to or is a contradiction. Ergo, all must be negated!

This is the general form of Nagarjuna's tetralemma!

The Greek trilemma has given birth to a Buddhist tetralemma!

Hmmm I'm asking where they sit in whatever argument you think Soc is presented in order to conclude that here are such things... Are they assumed, an observation, a conclusion...?

If they are experienced then we know what they are by observation...?

Well, as already stated, the difficulty arises from an incorrect or incomplete grasp of Greek or Platonic terminology.

The world is generally admitted to exist. If we philosophize about the world, that doesn’t mean that the world is just philosophy or philosophizing, right?

Similarly, perception is generally admitted to exist. If we hypothesize about what it is or how it comes about, it doesn’t mean that perception itself is mere hypothesis.

Now we know that the world exists because we perceive it through our faculties of sensory perception, such as sight.

By sight we mean seeing physical objects. But if we analyze the objects of sight, what we actually see is color, shape, size, distance (between different objects and between objects and ourselves as the perceiving agent), etc.

Color, shape, size, etc., are universals held in common by all objects of sight. They are things we see, not hypotheses. The Forms are similar to these universals though also different in that they are prior to the particulars.

The Ancient Greek word for “see” is eidon which is the same as Latin video, “I see”. Greek το εἶδος to eidos literally means “the seen”, “that which is seen”, or “visible form”, hence English “Form”.

So, Greek “idea” is not the same as English “idea”, it is something that is actually there and that we can see.

If we arrange what we see in ascending order we have:

1. Physical object.
2. Mental object perceived internally.
3. Properties that make up the mental object.
4. Eternal, unchanging “Forms” to which the properties belong.

English “idea” is what we perceive mentally and think about in discursive thought (dianoia).
Platonic “Idea” (“Form”) is what we see in a kind of non-discursive, intuitive perception (noesis) or contemplation.

Similarly, English “theory” is just a mental construct. Greek θεωρία, theoria, is much more than that. It is “contemplation” as in observing something that is seen.

It is somewhat similar to the difference between thinking and lucid dreaming. In lucid dreaming we don’t just think about an object, we actually see it and are perfectly conscious of the fact that we see it as well as of ourselves as the seeing subject.

Edit. So, Socrates often uses hypotheses to prove the validity of a concept, not to deny it. He does this, for example, with the immortality of the soul and concludes that “it turns out that the soul is immortal” (Phaedo 114d). Socrates does not deny the Forms, he merely attempts to find ways of mentally describing or defining them.

For Plato, the Forms are indescribable, eternal realities, that are above discursive thought and can only be referred to in negative terms. For example, this is what the Symposium says about the Form of Beauty:

“It neither comes to be nor perishes, neither waxes nor wanes … nor again will the beautiful appear to him [the philosopher] like a face or hands or any other portion of the body … or piece of knowledge … but itself by itself with itself existing for ever in singularity of form” (211a ff.)

“In that state of life above all others, a man finds it truly worth while to live, as he contemplates essential beauty […] there only will it befall him, as he sees the beautiful through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue, since his contact is not with illusion but with truth” (211d – 212a).

This is not the description of a “hypothesis”, it is the description of a metaphysical reality. We can hypothesize about the Forms but we are always a few steps away from them. We can only experience them in direct metaphysical experience.

It is clear how hypotheses are used in Plato, including in the Phaedo, where Simmias says:

“The argument about recollection and learning, on the other hand, has been provided by means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance […] and I have accepted that hypothesis on both sufficient and correct grounds” (92d - e).

The hypothesis then, is a provisional thesis adopted to explore its consequences and arrive at a conclusion. Because of the metaphysical nature of the Forms, Socrates does not always come to a definitive definition or conclusion about the Forms even though he comes sufficiently close to point us in the right direction.

Philosophical language was only being developed at the time and no “scientific” definition or description was possible or, indeed, needed as the Forms were meant to ultimately be experienced through a form of perception that can be developed through mental training.

Plotinus gives a more detailed account of the Forms, but ultimately, all we can say in general philosophical terms is that the Forms stand at the threshold between indeterminate and determinate consciousness, where self-aware consciousness begins to perceive things other than itself. The Forms are the underlying patterns that consciousness uses to organize itself in order to produce determinate perception.

Whilst ordinary perception is a cognition arising from mental operations following contact with a sense-object, perception of the Forms arises from activities within consciousness (nous) itself and independently of sense-objects. Because the Forms stand at the very root of experience, at a stage where the (mental) objects and discursive thought or language related to the objects have not yet emerged, they are impossible to describe. They, nevertheless, are very real. In fact, according to Plato and other Platonists, the Forms are more real than physical reality itself. Like energy particles to physical matter, the Forms are the ultimate constituent elements of subjective experience (i.e., experience directly produced by consciousness) at both cosmic and individual level.

If they [forms] are experienced then we know what they are by observation...? — Banno

Some sort of 'pattern recognition' is fundamental for perception to occur. Forms therefore underwrite perception rather than being themselves perceived.

This kind of thinking points back to good old Collingwood's absolute presuppositions, ie axioms of thoughts... These are indeed more than mere hypotheses, they are fundamental hypotheses, and cannot be proven true or false, neither by logic nor observation.

In this case, one could perhaps summarize the Forms idea as the following absolute presupposition: "Things have recognisable yet objective shapes". Or "shapes exist objectively, as well as in my mind, and in perception I am connecting the two".

Some sort of 'pattern recognition' is fundamental for perception to occur. Forms therefore underwrite perception rather than being themselves perceived. — Olivier5

But Socrates' concern was with questions of the just, beautiful, and the good. The hypothesis is that there is the just itself, the beautiful or noble itself, and the good itself, and that with knowledge of these we can know whether in every particular case something is just. beautiful, or good.

Unless we knowledge of these things, which in the Republic is presented in the myth of transcendent experience, then the Forms remain hypothetical.

If I understand him correctly, @Banno is asking if he has had such an experience.

Unless we knowledge of these things, which in the Republic is presented in the myth of transcendent experience, then the Forms remain hypothetical. — Fooloso4

True. My point is that the forms are not just any hypothesis, they are a fundamental, absolute presupposition, which underpins his way of seeing the world and his entire world view.

The concept of absolute presupposition comes from Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics. It presents a clear, modern framework for defining and understanding metaphysics. His central idea is that at the heart and begining of any thought, of any observation, there are axioms of thoughts. Basic tenets like "Nature is one". Or "nature is dual, there's always a ying-yang somewhere". These are what some call: a deeply held belief.

You will have recognised in the above examples a monist vs dualist world view, respectively.

In the case of Plato, I think the dualist ying yang is somewhere in the interplay between form and matter. Plato's forms are more than just the shape that things take, they come from above, and from the soul. They are mentally RECOGNISABLE shapes. Both real and abstract, therefore eternal.

In phenomenology, the idea of squares, the idea of circles are treated as mental essences. Correct me if I am wrong but I think Plato saw them as both mental (soul-like) and all around him, as essences of the things themselves, that could be recognized by the soul. That's what I tried to summarize in: "Things have objective AND recognisable shapes" (recognisable by our mind/soul).

Of course this is a very crude attempt at a synthesis and there's considerable flourish and expansions and others things in Platonism, but that piece above is a basic tenet, an axiom of his thought. A starting point.

Which is the reason, I propose, why Euthyphro rejects the term "hypothesis". It's something more fundamental.

This passage of Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics may ring a bell.



Such analysis [of absolute presuppositions] may in certain cases proceed in the
following manner. If the inquirer can find a person
to experiment upon who is well trained in a certain
type of scientific work, intelligent and earnest in his devotion to it, and unaccustomed to metaphysics, let
him probe into various presuppositions that his ‘sub-
ject’ has been taught to make in the course of his
scientific education, and invite him to justify each or
alternatively to abandon it.

If the ‘inquirer’ is skilful
and the ‘subject’ the right kind of man, these invita-
tions will be contemplated with equanimity, and even
with interest, so long as relative presuppositions are
concerned. But when an absolute presupposition is
touched, the invitation will be rejected, even with a
certain degree of violence.

The rejection is a symptom that the ‘subject’, co-
operating with the work of analysis, has come to see
that the presupposition he is being asked to justify
or abandon is an absolute presupposition; and the
violence with which it is expressed is a symptom that
he feels the importance of this absolute presupposi-
tion for the kind of work to which he is devoted.
This is what in the preceding chapter I called being
‘ticklish in one’s absolute presuppositions’; and the
reader will see that this ticklishness is a sign of
intellectual health combined with a low degree of
analytical skill.

My point is that the forms are not just any hypothesis, they are a fundamental, absolute presupposition, which underpins his way of seeing the world and his entire world view. — Olivier5

I don't think they are fundamental, absolute presuppositions. I think they are part of a mythology, a salutary public or exoteric teaching. I will be posting more on this later today.

Sorry, I didn't mean to equate the concept of form with the one of presupposition.

I meant: Plato's theory of forms underpins his thought like an axiom would underpin a branch of mathematics.

I hear the bell toll and for whom it tolls.

I don't know Collingwood well enough thought to comment on absolute presuppositions. It they are individual rather than universal then I think education, specifically a liberal or liberating education is still possible, at least for some.

Plato's theory of forms underpins his thought like an axiom would underpin a branch of mathematics. — Olivier5

I have some doubts as to whether Plato's thinking is axiomatic. Using mathematical language, dialectic proceeds by way of addition and division, identifying the homogeneous and heterogeneous. I don't think this is axiomatic, for there are different ways in which we can identify things as the same or different. The Forms are a way of organizing thought and making sense of the world according to the way in which all 'x' are in some way the same and other than what is not x.

Since the dialogues often end in aporia, "what is x" remains in question. Not knowing 'x' we cannot establish the truth of whether some particular thing is or is not 'x'. We remain in the realm of opinion. But not all opinion is equal. The philosopher must determine which opinions seem most worthy of being held.

That Essay of his is available online. It has been discussed in this forum. I haven't finished it yet, but his theory of presuppositions is elegantly universal, and it helps one takes a certain critical distance with one's most basic tenets, those that underpin one's very thought. It is in fact liberating, in the way good philosophy books are.

The methodology is well described; he writes splendidly too, with much irony.

The book defines a clear and useful domain for metaphysics: the identification and discussion of absolute presuppositions. Historically it is one of many efforts to 'save' metaphysics in the face of positivism's assaults, and what Collingwood sees as the political consequences of positivism: fascism and communism. He wrote it during the war.

The book is not without neothomist blah. Collingwood is a Christian and makes no mystery of it. I have a sympathy for neothomists because their heart is in the right place. I am a very tolerant Atheist so talks of God get me antsy only a little bit, but there's too much of it in the book I think, and it clouds Collingwood's view of the enlightenment philosophers.

That Essay of his is available online. — Olivier5

Thanks, I will take a look when I have a change. What I read many years ago was on the philosophy of history.

I have some doubts as to whether Plato's thinking is axiomatic — Fooloso4

I'm not explaining this very well. Best to read the Essay on Metaphysics.

3

There is an often overlooked puzzle at the center of Plato's Republic. It has two connected parts.

One: If Socrates’ human wisdom is his knowledge of his ignorance then why does Plato have someone who does not know tell the myth of transcendent knowledge of Forms?

Two: Who is the true philosopher?

Only someone who has had the transcendent experience of seeing the Forms can know that it is more than just a story. Socrates makes it known that he has not had this experience. (533a) So why Socrates? Why not someone who has had this transcendent knowledge? Someone divinely wise, as she would be if she has had this experience? After all, there are Platonic dialogues where a stranger rather than Socrates is the main character.

Because he knows that he does not know Socrates desires and seeks knowledge. He is a lover of what he does not possess, a lover of wisdom. He stands in stark contrast to the philosopher in the city he creates in the Republic. The philosopher-kings possess the knowledge Socrates desires.

As the city in the Republic exists only in speech and does not correspond to any actual city, the philosopher in this city exists only in speech and does not correspond to any actual philosopher.

So why did Plato have Socrates create this image? The answer has to do with the identity of the true philosopher. Socrates is the paradigmatic philosopher. What he does not know, others, namely the poets, the sophists, and the statesmen, claim they do know.

The problem is, if the philosopher cannot determine the truth then all other claims will have equal standing. The question is, who will be the educators and leaders in the actual city? Someone like Euthyphro can claim divine knowledge and someone like Thrasymachus can claim to know and teach what justice is. And so, Plato creates the mythology of Forms to take the place of the gods, and the philosophers who have true knowledge of the whole.

As the noble lie is to the city in the Republic, the mythology of transcendent knowledge is to actual cities.

Socrates plays a double role. Like the others, he is an opinion maker, but unlike the others he subjects all opinions, including his own, to critical examination. He remains firmly in the realm of opinion while giving the appearance of having transcended it. The truth is, the philosopher does not know the truth and thus must hide this truth. On the one hand, he hides it from those who are not yet prepared to live without answers, and on the other, from those who can never live without answers. And so, he provides what seems to be the truth, but is a lie, a lie that cannot be effective unless it is believed to be the truth.

The would be philosopher is drawn in and begins a spirited search for the truth. Some fall victim to misologic, disillusioned when they cannot find the answers they desire. Others believe the truth has been revealed, believing either that they have found the whole of it, or that they have not yet grasped the whole but know a part. And a few, the true philosophers, learn the art of philosophical inquiry and how to live an examined life without the illusion of knowledge.

So, Socrates is using hypotheses to solve philosophical problems, such as the problem of universals. The Forms are a type of universals, they are not “hypotheses”. — Apollodorus

THink we can stop there. You have agreed with @Fooloso4.

True. My point is that the forms are not just any hypothesis, they are a fundamental, absolute presupposition, which underpins his way of seeing the world and his entire world view. — Olivier5

Sure. Appo is perhaps being obtuse in his insistence.

You have agreed with @Fooloso4 — Banno

I don't see where Socrates says "the Forms are hypotheses". According to Plato they are realities.

"Plato's Socrates held that the world of Forms is transcendent to our own world (the world of substances) and also is the essential basis of reality ... Furthermore, he believed that true knowledge/intelligence is the ability to grasp the world of Forms with one's mind"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_forms

That's why experiencing the Forms was central to Plato's philosophy.

I don't see where Socrates says "the Forms are hypotheses". — Apollodorus

Yeah, we understand that. It's just no a substantive point.

Yes, the way Socrates and, above all, Plato saw the Forms is definitely insubstantial and immaterial, just like the Forms themselves. That was what I was trying to say.

@Banno

It looks like you are going to have to explain the difference between substantive and substantial.

:grin:

Or not.