If, for example, we understand the general logical concept of an apple and we see a very convincing plastic fake apple in front of us, we will erroneously think it is an apple until we investigate further. No amount of logic can tell us whether the object in front of us is really an apple. — John

Depends what you mean. If you are talking about distinguishing it as a fake apple, we aren't close nought to make that observation. No amount of logic (metaphysics) will tells us this because it something we can only learn for sure by empirical experience.

In terms of meaning though, this is not true at all. We know that it is a specific apple by logic. This is not a general rule at all. We know it is that apple. And we need this to perform any empirical investigation about it. Otherwise we couldn't be talking about that apple. Logic is specific (self) rather than general (rule, constraint, pragmatic fiction).

In other worlds, the problem here isn't whether an argument is sound, it's whether there is one in there first place. With a "general logic" there are no predicate arguments to make because nothing of meaning is specified.

This is not a general rule at all. We know it is that apple. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This is just wrong; it is a general logical rule that any object, in order to be an object at all, must be that specific object and no other.

Logic is specific (self) rather than general (rule, constraint, pragmatic fiction). — TheWillowOfDarkness

Again, you have it wrong. It's not even controversial; logic consists (among other things) in general rules about what constitutes specificity.

It seems you are simply confused on this issue, Willow.

This is just wrong; it is a general logical rule that any object, in order to be an object at all, must be that specific object and no other. — John

That's not a "general rule." The specific nature of any object is not some approximation or vague allusion. It's definite. Any object, by definition, is itself.

Rather that a general rule which constrains objects, this is a definite logical truth. If we are talking about it, we aren't speaking about any particular object at all, but rather the singular logical truth of identity. Our object is one particular logical object-- identity or self.

Again, you have it wrong. It's not even controversial; logic consists (among other things) in general rules about what constitutes specificity. — John

For most metaphysics, yes. They are seen as rules which then define the world-- know the rules, then you will know the world.

Spinoza's point is this is backwards. The general can't constitute specificity because it doesn't specify anything else. The general "apple" doesn't tell us anything about a specific apple. In any case, the "general" is in fact specific and only amounts to the specific logical object. To talk about a "general apple" is really to speak about a specific logical object, the form "apple."

Logic is an expression rather than a constraint. Know the world (e.g. a specific apple) then you will know a rule (e.g. the form of apple). It doesn't work the other way. Knowing the rule (e.g. form of apple) doesn't amount to knowing about the world (e.g. a specific apple).

Any object, by definition, is itself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, precisely, that's the general rule.

The general "apple" doesn't tell us anything about a specific apple. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This is exactly what I have been saying. :s

Know the world (e.g. a specific apple) then you will know a rule (e.g. the form of apple). It doesn't work the other way. Knowing the rule (e.g. form of apple) doesn't amount to knowing about the world (e.g. a specific apple). — TheWillowOfDarkness

You can't know a specific apple, as an apple at least, until you know the "rule (e.g. the form of apple)."

Of course knowing the rule does not mean that you know anything s[specific about the world. This is exactly what I have been saying. And yet, you seem to think you are disagreeing, which is puzzling, to say the least! :-}

It's a specific logical rule--rather being defined by other objects (i.e. there being things with identity), it is itself. To say it" "general" is misunderstanding the definition of the rule as the definition of objects which express it.

The problem is not that you are saying that the "general apple" doesn't tell us about the specific, it is that you don't recognise that the specific (that apple) is distinct form the form "general apple." It's not about form telling us everything, but rather a failure to recognise the self.

You can't know a specific apple, as an apple at least, until you know the "rule (e.g. the form of apple)."

.

That's mistaken. Babies are aware of thing before the specific rule of language people around them use to talk about them. One can know about a specify thing before it's been sorted under a particular label or language category.

it is that you don't recognise that the specific (that apple) is distinct form the form "general apple." — TheWillowOfDarkness

Jesus, talk about ridiculous statements; of course I recognize that; you are talking nonsense.

That's mistaken. Babies are aware of thing before the specific rule of language people around them use to talk about them. One can know about a specify thing before it's been sorted under a particular label or language category. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Did you fail to notice the "as an apple at least". In any case you have no way of knowing exactly what babies' awarenesses of things consist in.

The fact is that you haven't presented anything coherent that actually disagrees with anything i have said, which makes this whole exchange somewhat frustrating and pointless.

It's pointing that difference is incoherent. No doubt there is a difference between the experiences in question, but that difference is worldly. It's the experience of those world people that's different, not a difference in God. And that's what makes it relevant-- it means one person knows God deeper than another, a worldly significance which makes all the difference here.

Yes one can always claim that the difference is worldly because that's how it presents before us and logically. For example, it is the same brain cells and body which is having the experience in Jesus as another person. But what is specifically alluded to in the documented life of Jesus is that he was experiencing, or was in a state of rapture. A visionary state in the world, yes, but in this instance a rapture entailing a direct intervention from an exhalted being in a divine realm. So that, as in the experience of a revelation, the person of Jesus was given access/experience of said divine realm directly. An experience not of this world and that he was in this state at all times.

I presume you are of the opinion that there is no such thing as this divine realm and that there cannot be such an intervention? But as I have repeatedly pointed out, in our ignorance we cannot make this assumption, although it is generally expeditious for pragmatic reasons.

I presume you are of the opinion that there is no such thing as this divine realm and that there cannot be such an intervention? — Punshhh

I think Willow is of this opinion; and generally mounts the the usual justification of 'immanentist' thinkers on this kind of point, which is that because we cannot give an explanation of how such an "intervention" would work, that we therefore deceive ourselves when we think that we can imagine it as a real possibility.

Worse than that: you misunderstand the divine. You mistake it for a mere "possibility" that might or might not be, like it was some empirical state.

The divine is necessary, not a realm or action which might or might not be, but rather a logical expression of the world. The divine realm is of the world. Meaning is not some mere possible state, defined by separation for the world. It is of the world: family, friends, traditions, rituals, belief, life, death, joy and grief etc., all the meaning, found to outside the world, but always through it. The world is where the infinite lives. It is intelligible. Not a Real possibility, but a Real necessity.

Willow I think it's time you also follow Heister's advice and my example ;)

Let him be, then — Heister Eggcart

You are right, I'll go play my flute :D — Agustino

You totally misunderstand me again. I haven't denied that the divine is manifested in life. Where else, from the point of view of life, could it manifest? The argument is over the possibility of an interventionist God, a God who is actively involved in the world but not manifested as any entity in the world except for, according to Christian doctrine, His manifestation in the form of Jesus Christ. This is not to say that I believe in, or even fully understand, the doctrine of the Incarnation, but I do accept it as a possible interpretation of the historical events of Jesus' life.

Worse than that: you misunderstand the divine. You mistake it for a mere "possibility" that might or might not be, like it was some empirical state.

From what I've said you cannot discern this, perhaps you confuse my personal stance on this with my addressing what I think we can say philosophically about the divine. I have been talking about the philosophical possibilities from the standpoint of rational minds in our predicament. So I have only been discussing what we can or can't say/determine philosophically about these subjects. The only reason that I feel justified at all in describing how I think Jesus was in communion with the divine, is from the historical record of people claiming to have had divine revelation and the descriptions of that experience. This is my evidence for the divine.

The divine is necessary, not a realm or action which might or might not be, but rather a logical expression of the world. The divine realm is of the world. Meaning is not some mere possible state, defined by separation for the world. It is of the world: family, friends, traditions, rituals, belief, life, death, joy and grief etc., all the meaning, found to outside the world, but always through it. The world is where the infinite lives. It is intelligible. Not a Real possibility, but a Real necessity.

Yes I agree, indeed I have been saying just this, in this thread. Although I realise that there is no strict philosophical basis for this position, in the absence of the historical record of revelation.

Now where you use the word "infinite" here, I use the word transcendent. I don't think it is appropriate to use the word infinite, because it has a vague meaning in the minds of the people using it. Also it is directly referencing a human intellectual invention, the mathematical infinity. Something which is inappropriate to use to describe the divine in the world, it is clunky and confusing. By using the word transcendent, I am allowing the presence in the world of both an unbounded potentiality and also an unbounded reality, both which include realities beyond our limited understanding. The word "infinity" doesn't adequately provide for these avenues of thought.

Yes it is confusing, but I do think Willow understands the idea and to a large extent agrees. But uses a less conventional way of speaking.

You mistake it for a mere "possibility" that might or might not be, like it was some empirical state. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I also want to address the misunderstanding this reflects. The Divine is referred to as a "possibility" only in relation to our knowing. Beyond that it is either a reality, or not. The existence, or better, reality, of God cannot be proven by logic. Leaving the question of the reality of God aside, the question as to whether the nature of the Real, as such,is necessary or not is a very human question, and one which, with all our intellectual resources alone, we can never answer with certainty. So, for us it is always going to be a matter of possibility; which means it is always going to be a matter of faith. The idea that the question can be answered by human logic alone is a chimera that results from following the way of intellectual hubris. It is on this basis that I have referred to Spinoza's philosophy as "naive".

you mean your penis doesn't bleed once a month and you get serious abdomen pains??

There is growing evidence, as animal studies continue, that animals can conceive of death through social experience and learning. Elephants cry actual tears, for example, when a member of their herd dies (and they even 'give it a proper burial'), and more amazingly, they can pick out the member's tusk from a pile of tusks, and ruminate over it.

What these studies increasingly show is that animals are a lot more intelligent than we give them credit for (for example a fish outperformed a chimp and a four year old human on a certain intelligence task - so the 'intelligence' line is blurring. Note that animals can't speak, but they can understand many spoken words, so speaking is not a sole measure of intelligence.

They have central brains, like us, so not all of their actions are 'pure instinct' (reactions that do not require central processing - i.e. those that preceded the development of the brain, and which, as a consequence, are still 'quicker' reactions than reactions that have passed through the brain for consideration).

Animals definitely have fear, but on their conscious level, it is far more a mechanical (instinctive) (unconscious) self-preservation mode - that is, one that bypasses the brain, and it is far less a fear of 'death' (as a concept) then of 'impending pain' (which could be based on experience - remember the Dodo's inexperience with mindlessly-cruel humans, and the apparently inability to learn from observation).