It's very clear. I cannot make it clearer. There are some whose capacity for understanding is exceeded by the ideas it expresses. There's nothing I can do about that as the problem is their end not mine.
I suggest reading it with a view to agreeing with it. It's much harder to understand a view if you assume it is false at the outset.

What are you on about? What u turn?

You're not paying attention... let's back up. Here is what you said:

If I write you a note saying "The cat is on the mat" is the note telling you that the cat is on the mat? No. I am. By means of the note. The note is telling you nothing. I am telling you something by means of the note. — Bartricks

So let me phrase it this way. If a scale produces the symbol "250", is the display telling me that I weigh 250? Apparently, no, something else is by means of the display. The display tells me nothing. The something else is telling me my weight by means of the display.

What pray tell, Bartricks, could that something else be?

First, they're designed. — Bartricks

Sure, the scale is designed. But the designer is not telling me I weigh 250. So, sorry, no. It's not the designer of the scale.

Second, I have not denied that one can acquire true beliefs from bot-created faculties. — Bartricks

Okay, great. But how does that work, given "notes" (the display showing 250) don't tell me things?

Third, you are using the scales - or 'scales' if we suppose them to be a flukey product of blind natural forces - to acquire information about your weight. — Bartricks

Not always; in this case I am, but (I tell you no lie) my cat quite often steps onto the scales spontaneously. It's an inside joke with my s.o.; when I say, "our cat weighs 15", my s.o. immediately knows the real underlying meaning is simply that the cat stepped onto the digital scales again. I seriously doubt my cat is interested in weighing anything when doing so. Nevertheless, that 15 still represents the weight of my cat.

I mean, let's imagine that, ...You have acquired a true belief about your weight, but you have not been told it. — Bartricks

Nevertheless, when that display simply shows "15" when my cat is on it, that represents the weight of my cat. Or let me phrase it this way... the "15" that shows up on the digital scale is not being used by an agent to tell me what my cat weighs. But it still nevertheless represents the weight of my cat.

As to your second point, so you think the clouds are agents? — Bartricks

No.

I have not, note, assumed that natural forces cannot create agents. — Bartricks

You have assumed blind natural forces cannot produce awareness. Agents have awareness.

The machine is designed to tell your weight. How is that a counterexample? I am arguing that your faculties need to have been designed to tell you about the world if you are to be told about the world via them. And you are trying to challenge that with a weighing machine that is designed to give you information about your weight?!? How on earth does that work, Anscombe?

Is it just me or did Bartrick slip a conclusion into the first premise? The word "then" seems to be a tip off. I think a reset or restatement of some sort might clear up some issues. There is still the question of agency or evolution that needs an answer. Can't be both and it should be answered first.

I am arguing that your faculties need to have been designed to tell you about the world if you are to be told about the world via them. — Bartricks

Yes, you're begging the question. We'll get to that later.

Meanwhile, you wrote this:

If I write you a note saying "The cat is on the mat" is the note telling you that the cat is on the mat? No. I am. By means of the note. The note is telling you nothing. I am telling you something by means of the note. — Bartricks

The note in this case is "15". It was produced when my cat stepped onto the scale. But apparently it cannot tell me anything. Nevertheless, 15 represents the weight of my cat.

And you are trying to challenge that with a weighing machine that is designed to give you information about your weight?!? — Bartricks

No. I am challenging your messed up notions of semantics here. I quoted the same exact quote where you messed it up in this thread.

So here's the question again. What is this thing that is telling me my cat weighs 15? According to you, that display isn't telling me what my cat weighs. So what is?

oh I am begging the question am I - riiiight.

When I write you a note, the note isn't telling you anything. It doesn't have a little mouth or desires that you know things.

I am telling you something via the note. The note is not telling you anything.

Language is in the hands of idiots and so we are permitted to say 'the note told me the cat was on the mat'. But it didn't.

We must talk with the vulgar, but think with refined, as Berkeley would say.

Thoughts don't think. Desires don't desire. And communications don't communicate.

And weighing machines don't talk to you.

When I write you a note, the note isn't telling you anything. It doesn't have a little mouth or desires that you know things. — Bartricks

And yet, the scale produces the symbols 15; and those symbols represent the weight of my cat. So apparently all those things the scale isn't doing, and doesn't have, don't have anything to do with the symbols representing the weight of my cat, since 15 does in fact represent the weight of my cat.

it doesn't represent the weight of your cat, for the reasons just given (stop begging the question). You acquire a true belief about your cat's weight, that's all. And if you are not a philosopher you will also say that it told you your cat's weight. But it didn't, because it doesn't 'tell'you anything. When it says 'good morning' it's not greeting you.

You acquire a true belief about your cat's weight, that's all. — Bartricks

No, I acquire a justified true belief about my cat's weight.

Er, yes. A justified true belief is still a true belief. So your 'no' was incorrect. And yes, the belief is justified. Relevance? Do weight machines greet you now?

Er, yes. A justified true belief is still a true belief. So your 'no' was incorrect. — Bartricks

JTB's are TB's, but TB's aren't necessarily JTB's, so:

You acquire a true belief about your cat's weight, that's all. — Bartricks

...my no correctly refutes that wrong part.

And yes, the belief is justified. Relevance? — Bartricks

And when you step on it it emits a seed that is paper-like and has squiggles on it that look, by fluke, like'your weight is 250'. — Bartricks

The symbols "15" produced by the scale represent the weight of my cat because my cat's weighing 15 causally relates to the symbols "15" being produced on that display. The symbols "250" on your weird plant thing is unrelated to my weight being 250. So the fluke note does not represent my weight. The "15" on my digital scale by contrast does represent my cat's weight.

Do weight machines greet you now? — Bartricks

Nope. But digital scales can show representations of weights using symbols.

Material things can't make meaning unless consciousness emerges first. A book means nothing whether made by a man or not unless consciousness is immanent in the reader

Ok, what I hear you saying here is that you don't consider your idea to merit any further work. So you are in essence expressing a degree of agreement with some of your critics. This is all fine with me, I don't really have a dog in this fight.

I just thought the idea was potentially interesting and just might merit a series of rewrites, a procedure routinely deployed by most serious writers.

Thank you for your condescension. But it is fine as it is. If one is writing a discussion post one should not make it too long and dense. Thus there will be many points that require development - one leaves that to the discussion. Why don't you start your own discussion and show us how it is done.

But it is fine as it is. — Bartricks

It's fine as it is if you don't mind that few to none seem to be getting it. I'm fine with that too, so we aren't arguing.

You get it do you? This is a playground and the level of philosophical sophistication here is somewhat low. So I expect few will get it. But explaining subtle ideas to total numskulls can be surprisingly useful philosophically, as their utterly bizarre 'criticisms' can make one think in novel ways.

Ah, I see now. You are brilliant and everyone else is stupid. I must admit, that's probably the most original idea I've ever read on any philosophy forum. :-)

I do have some sympathy for your frustrations. The following theory might help?

The more insightful an idea, the smaller the audience.

At first the analysis we might give here is that the reason you don't 'know' that there is a pie in your oven is that it was just coincidental that the clouds formed those shapes and that the belief these shapes caused you to acquire was in fact true. — Bartricks

I think this counteranalysis misses two major points.

The first major one... if you tell me there's a cat on the mat using a note, assuming I trust you (why not?), there's good reason for me to connect those symbols to an actual cat being on a mat, because you are an agent, and I already know agents of the human variety (that are also good English speakers, not necessarily native) have the capability of perceiving cats, judging if they are in fact on mats, and using that information to formulate notes using the English symbols "the cat is on a mat". Likewise, I know that my digital scale is capable of responding to weight by producing symbols that represent weight (which is the entire point of why it displaying 15 conveys information about what the cat weighs, as opposed to which channel my television is tuned into, even if it is on channel 15; or how many amps my fuse box can handle, even if that is 15 amps). I do not, however, have the ability to tie the semantics of "pie is in the oven" to the writing in the sky. Even if that pie caused that writing to be in the sky, that means nothing to me; there are no sensible mechanics sufficient for me to link that writing to the existence of said pie.

But it's still true that seeing 15 on the scale conveys information to me about how much my cat weighs.

The second major point is that the logic is irrelevant to justify premise one, as has already been pointed out. Demonstrating that some E can produce x that isn't y cannot reasonably be a demonstration that E cannot produce y. "E can produce x" is a capability. "E cannot produce y" is a limitation. x not being y is nowhere close to demonstrating said capability implies said limitation.

Premise one is about the impossibility of unguided evolutionary forces giving awareness. The alleged argument for this premise is about the capability of unguided evolutionary forces providing things that don't convey information to us. What has that argument to do with that premise?

I do have some sympathy for your frustrations. — Foghorn

I am not frustrated. I already explained: arguing with numskulls can be very philosophically fruitful. (Any apparent frustration is an act).

The following theory might help?

The more insightful an idea, the smaller the audience. — Foghorn

No, because the theory is false. I prefer this:

You are brilliant and everyone else is stupid. — Foghorn

I think you misunderstand my argument. In order to be able to perceive a world one needs to be subject to mental states with representative contents, yes?

The point of my thought experiments was to show that in order for a mental state to be said (vulgarly) to 'represent' something to be the case, there would need to be an agent who is doing the representing in question. The mental state itself does not do any representing. That's as foolish as thinking that the note I wrote on is telling you about the cat. The note is not telling you anything; I am telling you about the cat via the note.

What you are doing, it seems to me, is focussing on the fact that we can nevertheless acquire accurate and justified beliefs about the world via various mechanisms that are expressing no attitudes of an agent. And I clearly agree with that. That's not the issue. My point is that something - be it some squiggles on a piece of paper or a mental state - does not itself 'represent' anything to be the case (and pointing out that we can acquire accurate information by such means is beside the point - one can acquire accurate information from dreams, that doesn't mean one is perceiving things in them). The representing is done via them, but not by them. They have to be being used - used by an agent - for that purpose or a sufficiently closely related one before they can be said to be 'representing' something to be the case (and again, even then, this is loose talk, for the state itself does not do any representing).

So we can have two states that are introspectively indiscernible, and one can be representing something to be the case, and the other not. In order for us to be perceiving a world, our mental states - some of them - need to be representing there to be a world. It is not sufficient that they be introspectively indiscernible from such states. They need actually to be representing something to be the case. And they will not be doing this unless an agent got them to arise in us for that very purpose. If that is not the case - if our faculties have been forged by unguided natural forces - then although we will still acquire true beliefs about the world we are living in from them, we will not be perceiving the world, even though our situation would be introspectively indiscernible from what would be the case if we were.

Demonstrating that some E can produce x that isn't y cannot reasonably be a demonstration that E cannot produce y. "E can produce x" is a capability. "E cannot produce y" is a limitation. x not being y is nowhere close to demonstrating said capability implies said limitation. — InPitzotl

This I do not understand - that is, I do not understand how what you're saying here relates to anything I have argued.

The alleged argument for this premise is about the capability of unguided evolutionary forces providing things that don't convey information to us. What has that argument to do with that premise? — InPitzotl

That's just a mistaken interpretation on your part. I have not argued that blind natural forces cannot cause us to acquire true beliefs about the world. I said the precise opposite of that. They can. Obviously. The point is that they will do this by causing the beliefs in us, not by representing anything to be the case.

I should add, that if our belief forming mechanisms are also wholly the product of unguided forces, then the same would apply to our beliefs - or 'beliefs'. They would not in fact be beliefs, though we would be unable to distinguish them from the real deal.

The point is that nothing in principle stops an unguided mechanism from creating in us an accurate belief, provided we have a belief-forming mechanism already in place.

Er, yes. A justified true belief is still a true belief. So your 'no' was incorrect.
— Bartricks
JTB's are TB's, but TB's aren't necessarily JTB's, so:
You acquire a true belief about your cat's weight, that's all.
— Bartricks
...my no correctly refutes that wrong part. — InPitzotl

No, because in the scenario described all we have reason to think you have acquired is a true belief. Whether it is justified or not is left open. So, all you have shown is something I already pointed out in the OP, namely that you can acquire true beliefs by means of mechanisms that were not intended to furnish you with them - indeed, mechanisms that were not intended to furnish anyone with anything.

If there is an agent behind the world, we are it. You don't seem to have read any phenomenology and understand it. If there is a higher being, than he always had this state. We have this state actually, knowing eternally from all consciousness. But it's build on matter. People who think they are fairies are not wise

Okaaay, whatever. Buddhist.

Thinking higher thoughts (not focusing on chemicals for example) is good is it leads to character building. But nobody really knowns what "God" is so atheists can sometimes be the greatest believers of them all: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ch-DliKSGu0 — Gregory

Maybe you could take the time to explain exactly what this has to do with the discussion.

Do you know what a 'state with representative contents' is? — Bartricks

Yes.

Perception happens by means of them. — Bartricks

Are you sure about that, or is that just the information we perceive through our senses. The theory you present is, if no agent is sending us the information then we are not perceiving anything.

So it all comes down to one thing, if it is not evolution that has made it possible for us to perceive, what is the agent that is sending it to us?

Do you know what a 'state with representative contents' is?
— Bartricks

Yes.

Perception happens by means of them.
— Bartricks

Are you sure about that, — Sir2u

Yes, as you would be if your first answer was correct. It is not in dispute that we perceive things by way of mental states with representative contents.

if it is not evolution that has made it possible for us to perceive, what is the agent that is sending it to us? — Sir2u

An agent. Do you mean who? Not sure. God probably.

Bartricks is saying we can know an agent is behind the world. But God is unknowable. Bartricks is saying we need to believe in God in a literal obnoxious way but people who are open to possibilities will say they are atheists and don't believe in proof of God but could possibly be true believers of whatever is beyond thought. Who can say for sure whether they are believers or not

In order to be able to perceive a world one needs to be subject to mental states with representative contents, yes? — Bartricks

If you bake that into your concept of perception, which is fair, then sure.

in order for a mental state to be said (vulgarly) to 'represent' something to be the case, there would need to be an agent who is doing the representing in question. — Bartricks

Sure.

The note is not telling you anything; I am telling you about the cat via the note. — Bartricks

This doesn't work. That you're trying to tell me about a cat isn't in question, so let's grant that immediately. But for you to succeed in your intent to inform me there is a cat via that note, you have to have written symbols on that paper that would convey that notion. Not all symbols do that; only particular symbols do that.

What you are doing, it seems to me, is focussing on the fact that we can nevertheless acquire accurate and justified beliefs — Bartricks

Well yeah, because you made a point regarding truth in the OP with respect to the sky writing (truth by fluke). But you were also talking about information being conveyed. So consider "the cat is on the mat". That's just a bunch of letters. But those letters have a meaning according to the rules of English; it's about some cat being "on" some mat. What it means for that statement to be true is for the semantic content behind those symbols to have valid referents. What it means for that statement to convey information regarding its truth to us (in the usual sense) is for those symbols to convey those semantic contents to us.

The representing is done via them, but not by them. — Bartricks

For you to convey "the cat is on the mat" to me as a true statement, it is insufficient for you to intend to tell me the same. You must also somehow be aware of the referenced cat's being on a mat.

They have to be being used - used by an agent - for that purpose or a sufficiently closely related one before they can be said to be 'representing' something to be the case (and again, even then, this is loose talk, for the state itself does not do any representing). — Bartricks

Yes, I can tell how loose it is.

So we can have two states that are introspectively indiscernible, and one can be representing something to be the case, and the other not. In order for us to be perceiving a world, our mental states - some of them - need to be representing there to be a world. — Bartricks

That's what perception does. There's an image on your retina. Something happens, and lo and behold... some mental state is formed about something that is a mental state such that you tend to have it if there were a cat there and not have it if there were no cat there. That is a mental state of "seeing a cat".

It is not sufficient that they be introspectively indiscernible from such states. They need actually to be representing something to be the case. — Bartricks

Sure; hallucinating cats isn't seeing cats.

And they will not be doing this unless an agent got them to arise in us for that very purpose. — Bartricks

There's the question begging again.

If that is not the case - if our faculties have been forged by unguided natural forces - then although we will still acquire true beliefs about the world we are living in from them, we will not be perceiving the world, even though our situation would be introspectively indiscernible from what would be the case if we were. — Bartricks

That's a difference without a meaning.

Running from hallucinated predators burns energy. Run too much, and you can't escape the real one. Hallucinated predators cannot kill you. But that real one...

Your requirement that agents make mental states represent the world is speculative. What's worse, it's one of those empty explanations... it purports to explain something it does not in fact explain. How does this agent make the mental states represent something? What is this agent doing? Supergluing the mental state of a cat to a cat? Formally pronouncing the mental state to be about a cat?

You are the one who is begging the question, not me.

First, perception goes by way of mental states with representative contents. You say you're willing to grant this, like there's an option to deny it. No, they're essential.

Second, 'conveying' information - as opposed just to acquiring a true belief - requires an information giver and an information receiver. And in the case where the sky writing - or 'writing' - is the product of blind natural forces, no information is conveyed, even though you form the true belief that there is a pie in the oven.

You then proceed to beg the question by supposing that it is somehow the squiggles that are doing the representing. No, they're not. Minds represent 'by' using squiggles to convey something to another.

That's what perception does. There's an image on your retina. Something happens, and lo and behold... some mental state is formed about something that is a mental state such that you tend to have it if there were a cat there and not have it if there were no cat there. That is a mental state of "seeing a cat". — InPitzotl

Flagrantly question begging. You need to show there to be something wrong with my case before you can just assert such things.