I found what you have written about as interesting because I have often wondered about whether we can really say that the self exists. I have come across some Buddhist accounts which certainly challenge the idea of the self. I think that this is connected to the nature of impermanence, especially that of ego consciousness.

However, Descartes saw his own identification of the 'I' as evidence for the self, and most of us do have a sense of continuity of a self throughout our life experiences. But, we can question the nature of this self. It may be more of a construct perhaps, in establishing personal identity.

I have come across some Buddhist accounts which certainly challenge the idea of the self — Jack Cummins

This is the sticking point I believe. I should've thought about it earlier. I recall someone saying quite a few years ago that Descartes' didn't quite get to proving the existence of a self i.e. the "I" in "I think therefore, I am" isn't what most people would call a self and is, according to the objectors, best described as only a thinking thing. The reasons (for the objection) were, if memory serves, drawn from Buddhist sources, specifically the notion of Anattā. If not, they should have.

On the flip side, in the Cotard delusion, it isn't clear whether the person experiencing is referring to a self with the same meaning as used by those who objected to Descartes' argument or whether it refers to a thinking thing. If the latter, then the Cotard delusion taken with Descartes' cogito argument would amount to a frank contradiction.

Having said something, one has expressed a distinction that makes a difference.

Descartes' "I exist" is, at best, a tautology; he concludes only what his conclusion already necessarily presupposes. Saying "I exist", therefore, doesn't actually say anything.

Cotard's "I do not exist", a delusion, is a pathology; otherwise, as a statement (rather than a feeling) it's a performative contradiction, which says nothing.

In other words, the latter cannot be said and the former need not be said: neither expresses a distinction that makes a difference.

Having said something, one has expressed a distinction that makes a difference.

Descartes' "I exist" is, at best, a tautology; he concludes only what his conclusion already necessarily presupposes. Saying "I exist", therefore, doesn't actually say anything.

Cotard's "I do not exist", a delusion, is a pathology; otherwise, as a statement (rather than a feeling) it's a performative contradiction, which says nothing.

In other words, the latter cannot be said and the former need not be said: neither expresses a distinction that makes a difference. — 180 Proof

:up: Will get back to you if I think of something interesting but don't hold your breath. :lol:

I believe that the biggest danger is that when we are thinking about the self, whether in terms of Cotard's view or in other ones , to start thinking of the self as an entity as if it is in a box or a container.

I believe that the biggest danger is that when we are thinking about the self — Jack Cummins

Why, may I ask?

:smirk: Gotcha (vide Thomas Metzinger re:
phenomenal self modeling).

I am probably not speaking of some kind of danger, as if we are going to come to harm through such thinking in such a way. I am speaking more of a 'philosophical danger' if such a concept makes sense.

Nevertheless, it can't be denied that people with Cotard delusion present a direct challenge to Descartes' cogito, ergo sum argument. Here's Descartes, confidently asserting, "I exist" and there's patients with Cotard delusion insisting, as — TheMadFool

Why is someone's illogical refusal to accept a logical conclusion a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the conclusion?

Descartes' "I exist" is, at best, a tautology; he concludes only what his conclusion already necessarily presupposes. Saying "I exist", therefore, doesn't actually say anything. — 180 Proof

A tautology does say something. It defines.

A tautology does say something. It defines. — Hanover

No. It merely repeats itself.

A bachelor is an unmarried man. Identity.

A bachelor is a bachelor. Tautology.

The latter does not convey any information; the former is a definition of the first term by the second.

From your link:

People are thus what Metzinger calls naïve realists, who believe they are perceiving reality directly when in actuality they are only perceiving representations of reality. The data structures and transport mechanisms of the data are "transparent" so that people can introspect on their representations of perceptions, but cannot introspect on the data or mechanisms themselves — Wikipedia

The user illusion is the illusion created for the user by a human–computer interface, for example the visual metaphor of a desktop used in many graphical user interfaces. The phrase originated at Xerox PARC.[1]

Some philosophers of mind have argued that consciousness is a form of user illusion. This notion is explored by Tor Nørretranders in his 1991 Danish book Mærk verden, issued in a 1998 English edition as The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size. — Wikipedia

Dennett says that only a theory that explained conscious events in terms of unconscious events could explain consciousness at all: "To explain is to explain away". — Wikipedia

Mind weighing in.

Why is someone's illogical refusal to accept a logical conclusion a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the conclusion? — Hanover

I considered that possibility but it doesn't add up. In my humble opinion, just as Descartes reasoned to the conclusion "I exist", those who suffer from Cotard delusion also reason to the conclusion "I don't exist." How good the reasons are is a different story perhaps worth looking into.

I was also contemplating on the therapeutic utility of the cogito argument on patients with Cotard delusion.

philosophical danger — Jack Cummins

Right! Reminds me of horror movies - there's always one character, usually a girl, who feels compelled to go to the room that she's been warned not to go to! I hope I'm a cat, cats have 9 lives but the problem is I don't know how many I've already used up. :smile:

No. It merely repeats itself.

A bachelor is an unmarried man. Identity.

A bachelor is a bachelor. Tautology.

The latter does not convey any information, the former is a definition of the first term by the second. — 180 Proof

The cogito is the latter. If the former, it would read, "I think, therefore I think."

Descartes is doing a little bit more than a tautology. He talking about a necessary aspect given a particular existing event. That's to say if there is an experience, there is an individual or entity aware of soemthing.

Descartes is doing a little bit more than a tautology. He talking about a necessary aspect given a particular existing event. That's to say if there is an experience, there is an individual or entity aware of soemthing — TheWillowOfDarkness

The cogito is the latter. If the former, it would read, "I think, therefore I think." — Hanover

@180 Proof

To three of you:

One common critique of the dictum is that it presupposes that there is an "I" which must be doing the thinking. According to this line of criticism, the most that Descartes was entitled to say was that "thinking is occurring", not that "I am thinking" — Wikipedia

The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard calls the phrase a tautology in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript.[48]:38–42 He argues that the cogito already presupposes the existence of "I", and therefore concluding with existence is logically trivial. Kierkegaard's argument can be made clearer if one extracts the premise "I think" into the premises "'x' thinks" and "I am that 'x'", where "x" is used as a placeholder in order to disambiguate the "I" from the thinking thing.[49] — Wikipedia

At the beginning of the second meditation, having reached what he considers to be the ultimate level of doubt—his argument from the existence of a deceiving god—Descartes examines his beliefs to see if any have survived the doubt. In his belief in his own existence, he finds that it is impossible to doubt that he exists. Even if there were a deceiving god (or an evil demon), one's belief in their own existence would be secure, for there is no way one could be deceived unless one existed in order to be deceived. — Wikipedia

My own take of whether Descartes' so-called argument is a tautology is similar in vein but to be specific I believe Descartes is committing the petitio principii fallacy (begging the question).

First, let's state his argument in the most charitable way possible:

1. Thinking
2. If thinking then, thinker
Ergo,
3. Thinker

Second, we must remember that Descartes' main assumption - the impetus if you will for the cogito argument - is radical doubt which I interpret as a method that questions the truth/certainty of every belief that one may have and if any such is doubtful, to discard it until by this method of elimination one arrives at (a) belief(s) that is true and beyond doubt. Descartes' claims that this method of doubt manages to undermine every belief except one - his own existence for, he reasons, to doubt implies a doubter and that doubter is none other than himself [cogito, ergo sum].

Also relevant is Evil Demon, its modern incarnation being brain in a vat. As per Descartes there's the possibility that world, external reality as it were, could be an illusion created by an evil demon to deceive us but then, he reasons, even if that were true, there's got to be something that's being deceived and that something is us (him). [cogito, ergo sum]

Notice here a key suppressed premise which is that for every action, there has to be an actor performing that action e.g. drinking, drinker; walking, walker; talking, talker, and so on. You get the picture. I'll make the suppressed premise explicit here:

1a. If action, actor.

This suppressed premise (1a) is required to support premise 2. If thinking then, thinker but where does he get the evidence for it? From the same reality whose reliability he doubts, the same reality he believes could be an illusion created by an evil demon (deus deceptor). That he suspects reality to be an illusion (created by an evil demon) amounts to poisoning the well of reality as it were and instantly makes any and every argument based on it utterly worthless. It would be like drawing conclusions about reality as we know it by watching (say) an Avengers movie (an illusion) - you know how that's going to end, right? In short, Descartes can't prove the suppressed premise 1a. If action, actor, using reality because he can't prove that this reality isn't an illusion.

Hence, the only reliable piece of information that's available to him, that he claims he can't doubt at all, that he can use to prove the suppressed premise 1a. If action, actor, is his own thinking but now the problem is if he infers a thinker (actor) from thinking (action), he's assuming the very thing he wants to prove (premise 2) - a petitio principii.

For clarification, I'll make Descartes' argument explicit below:

1. Thinking [premise. If one defines thinking as experiencing mental phenomena, this premise is true]

1a. If action, actor [suppressed premise. Descartes' can prove this using the only reliable piece of information he has viz. that he's thinking but then he can't infer there's a thinker from thinking because that is exactly what needs to be proven (premise 2 below) - begging the question. Remember he can't rely on reality as it could be an illusion (deus deceptor)]

2. If thinking (action), thinker (actor) [from 1a above but as you can see this can't be proven]

Ergo,

3. Thinker [conclusion but the argument is now unsound as premise 2 hasn't been proven]

I think of Descartes' "I exist" as a tautology because it is a conclusion that repeats its presupposition: to say "I exist" one must exist.

to say "I exist" one must exist. — 180 Proof

Look here

Here's Descartes, confidently asserting, "I exist" and there's patients with Cotard delusion insisting, as confidently if not more so that "they don't exist."

It's a delusion. A necessary condition for uttering any sentence (esp. "I don't exist") is existence. We can quibble about what "I" means, but putting that aside, a person who claims they don't exist is wrong. The only thing that can refute Descartes is the existence of a nonexistent thinker.

The only thing that can refute Descartes is the existence of a nonexistent thinker. — RogueAI

No. Descartes' "Cogito" already refutes itself:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/539399

Tautologies don't refute themselves. The Cogito is tautological, but it's also saying something about the world: you can doubt a lot of things, but you can't doubt that you're a thinking being, which heavily implies the primacy of mind.

Tautologies lack information content. "The Cogito" looks like it's saying something but it is not. Thus, it refutes what you think it says; it doesn't even say that.

It's a strike against traditional philosophy that it needed a proof for existence. As if that wasn't axiomatic and immediately obvious and clear.
Delusions are generally conceptual confusions or metaphors about experience.

It's a delusion — RogueAI

Agreed but the question, to me, is which is the delusion? Descartes' cogito argument or Cotard "delusion"? Don't be fooled by the word "delusion" in Cotard delusion - that's not as cut-and-dried as it's made out to be for it assumes Descartes is right and that's precisely what needs to be proved.

We can quibble about what "I" means — RogueAI

This is the nub of the issue. Let's discuss the Descartes' argument and Cotard's argument and may be the truth will emerge from it.

Descartes' cogito argument (argument D)
1. Thinking is occurring
2. There's something that's thinking
3. I am that something that's thinking
Ergo,
4. I exist (as something that's thinking)


Cotard delusion argument (argument C)
1. Thinking is occurring
2. There's something that's thinking
3. I am not that something that's thinking
Ergo,
4. I don't exist (as something that's thinking)

Both arguments have two identical premises (1 & 2) but differ with respect to premise 3 and, quite obviously, the conclusion.

As is evident, premise 3 in argument D is being challenged by premise 3 in argument C.

Perhaps premise 3 in argument C can be explained in terms of an incongruence between the patient's idea of who fae is (the patient's I) and the "something that's thinking." Cotard delusion has been reported to occur after severe trauma (major vehicular accidents for example) and such patients may argue in the following way.

1. Nobody could've survived the accident I was in
2. If nobody could've survived the accident I was in then I'm dead
Ergo,
3. I'm dead
4. If I' m dead then I don't exist
Ergo,
5. I don't exist

Could Descartes' cogito argument help cure Cotard delusion? Suppose I offer Descartes' cogito argument to someone suffering from Cotard delusion. If the delusion is deeply entrenched, the patient will not accept the argument and the only way that's possible is if fae believes premise 3 in argument C which is. 3. I am not that something that's thinking, and we've circled back to where we began, is the I = that something that's thinking?

At this juncture, it seems we need to discuss the notion of "something that's thinking" (see premises 2, 3 in argument C and D). Everyone is "something that's thinking" because everyone thinks. Ergo, if I = something that's thinking, you are me, I'm you, you're Descartes, Descartes is me, so and so forth until I = everyone.

Argument E
1. I = Something that's thinking
Ergo,
2. I = Everyone
Ergo,
3. I = You
4. I'm thinking about Descartes
5. You're thinking about the woman in the red dress (homage to The Matrix) [you're not thinking about Descartes]
6. If I'm thinking about Descartes and you're not thinking about Descartes (the woman in the red dress) and I = you then, I'm/you're thinking about Descartes and I'm/you're not thinking about Descartes
7. I'm/you're thinking about Descartes and I'm/you're not thinking about Descartes [contradiction]
So,
8. I = You is false
Therefore,
9. I = Everyone is also false
Hence,
10. I = Something that's thinking too is false

Looks like, from line 10 just above, those who "suffer" from Cotard delusion are spot on (see premise 3 in argument C)

What next?

If you ask me, the only option we have to identify ourselves with the mind is to base it on thought content. In argument E, we noticed that a single individual can't think about, say, X and also not think about X. So, if I were to claim that there are two thoughts occurring at the same time viz. a thought about Descartes and a thought about a woman in a red dress (not Descartes), I could immediately infer on pain of a contradiction that there are at least two persons (I's) involved.

Taking this a step further, let's do a thought experiment. Imagine a universe U with the following setup:

1. You don't know how many persons are there in this universe.
2. The only activity possible in this universe is thinking.
3. There are only two thoughts available to wit, A and B.
4. The only information given to you is/are the thought(s) taking place in this universe.

Imagine now that you're told that at time t1, the thoughts in U are A and B (not A). You can immediately infer, on pain of contradiction, that there are at least two persons in U - one is thinking A and the other is thinking B (not A).

At another time t2, you're informed that the thought in U is A. This is insufficient to infer anything about the number of people in U: it could be that everyone (more than one) in U is thinking the same thing (A) or it could be that there's only one person thinking A.

At a different time t3, you discover that the thoughts in U are, again, A and B. From this, as before, you conclude there are at least two persons in U - one having thought A and the other thought B.

There are now two distinct sequence of thoughts:

Thought sequence P
1.A at time t1, A at time t2, B at time t3 [AAB]
2. B at time t1, A at time t2, A at time t3[BAA]

or

Thought sequence Q
1. A at time t1, A at time t2, A at time t3 [AAA]
2. B at time t1, A at time t2, B qt time t3 [BAB]


The sequence of thoughts is critical to the identity of a person (the "I" in Descartes' cogito argument) in U because uniqueness, as you can see above, is to be found in the sequence of thoughts [AAB, BAA, AAA, BAB, all unique]. What we can infer then is, either as per thought sequence P, there are at least two persons viz. AAB and BAA or as per thought sequence Q, there are, again, at least two persons viz. AAA and BAB. In short, the "I" in Descartes' cogito argument is a label for a one particular permutation (order matters) of all possible sequences of thoughts.

Firstly, such a conception for the "I" in the cogito argument seems to be a big disappointment. How comforting it is to believe the "I" = "something that thinks" for to say "I exist" then is more meaningful, more tangible, more uplifting. As just or nothing more than a sequence of thoughts, the "I" loses its luster, becomes dull, unappealing and uninteresting.

Secondly, I wish to discuss the matter of how it's possible for two persons to experience the exact same sequence of thoughts. There's no reason why you wouldn't find out that in universe U, the thoughts were: at time t1, A; at time t2, B; and at time t3, A. The sequence of thoughts would be ABA. Given this data, you wouldn't know if there was only one person thinking ABA or a gazillion persons thinking ABA since they can be duplicated precisely. In other words, because no sequence of thoughts is going to be exclusive to one person, a sequence of thoughts doesn't really provide you with a foolproof method of identifying a particular person in universe U. This means, in the simplest of terms, a sequence of thoughts also can't be the necessary foundation for Descartes' "I".


In summary, we have only two options for a referent for Descartes' "I" viz. 1. "something that's thinking" or 2. a sequence of thoughts and both don't make the cut so to speak. Ergo, in full agreement with those with Cotard "delusion", I don't exist. :chin: :chin: :chin:

The cogito wasn't supposed to be some sort of positive pinnacle. It's the ground: the place where doubt stops.

It's only a revelation to people who have their heads in the clouds.

"Ergo, if I = something that's thinking, you are me, I'm you, you're Descartes, Descartes is me, so and so forth until I = everyone."

I don't agree with that. "I" /= "something that's thinking". "Something that's thinking" is a necessary condition for the self to exist, but it's not a sufficient condition. I like the definition of the self as "this particular conscious awareness".

That's why "The Cogito" has always been useless. Nothing more doubtful than the lack of doubt (except in logic and mathematics). I've always preferred Montaigne to Descartes.

That's why "The Cogito" has always been useless. — 180 Proof

It's indubitable, whether it has any use to you or not.

A = A is "indubitable" too. Vacuous and, therefore, useless as such.

Also, besides, "the Cogito" was basically laughed out of court philosophically by Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Dewey et al.

Also, besides, "the Cogito" was basically laughed out of court philosophically by Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Dewey et al. — 180 Proof

I know what Hume said about it. Could you share how the others thought of it?

I'm pretty familiar with Schopenhauer and I don't remember his mentioning it, but it wouldn't have been a problem for his outlook.