It's only good to prevent suffering if there's someone existing to benefit from that prevention. — Benkei

I have to disagree.


An example

When planning a statue portraying American rock star Bruce Springsteen, the statue does not exist at the moment of planning. Were the statue project to become successful, however, the statue is the object of the action (or one of them). The statue existed as an object, even if not as an actual and existing one, as early as the brainstorming and planning stage. The participants and executors of the statue project can be justly seen as actors responsible for the execution and act of acquiring the statue. The situation is fully analogous to that of knowingly having a child. It is true that the individual does not exist at the moment of conception. The individual also does not exist without the act of conception. Therefore, even though the act of conception is the reason or one of the crucial reasons as to why an individual, fulfilling the requirements of a person, will later be born, this person does not exist at the time of the act – in fact, not even as a potential person (R.M. Hare).

Can we therefore talk about "true causation"? (Note: if we cannot talk about "true causation", the oft-mentioned concern about future generations and, above all, the moral claim to do something for a better life for the yet unborn future generations – actions to be taken to preserve the Earth in a more viable state, perhaps – is completely absurd.) My argument is that R.M. Hare’s viewpoint is unfounded.The object of the action is a potentially forthcoming person, in similar manner to sperm and an egg cell. Even though it is a fact that, unlike the egg cell and the sperm that exist at the moment of executing the act – the attempt to have a child – this person does not exist nor will s/he perhaps ever exist (the conception may not be successful, a miscarriage may take place, or other complications may prevent childbirth), the act is to be assessed in connection with the object of the act (the forthcoming human being) and the potential person.  However, as the person materializes, the individuals behind the act of conception hold central roles in the creation chain of the person. These individuals are therefore, in both good and bad, responsible for the emergence of a certain person.

Again, you are misunderstanding me. If a potential parent exists, whereby the consequent is a new person who suffers, the rule is in play- prevent said suffering. How is that a reductio? — schopenhauer1

If existence was nothing but suffering, then your point regarding the undesirability of creating new life would stand. In that case existence would still be only the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for suffering (just as it is the necessary condition for anything at all), because it would be the terrible contingent conditions that come with that imagined wholly bad existence that cause the suffering, not existence per se (since conditions can always change).

But existence is not nothing but suffering, therefore your point fails; because there is no adequate calculus with which to accurately measure suffering against happiness. Some lives may contain more suffering than joy and others more joy than suffering,

Personally, given the impending problems humanity faces, I wouldn't want to be responsible for bringing a child into this world; and I've always more or less felt that way (and hence had no children); but that is just me, and I don't seek to universalize what I see as a personal attitude. So all I am disagreeing with is what I see as your unjustified proselytizing.

If existence was nothing but suffering, then your point regarding the undesirability of creating new life would stand. — Janus

But is that true? There is unnecessary suffering caused to another. Why do benefits even play a factor in this? That is all you need to know. If I kidnap you to play a game, then that is wrong. The game of life I see as no different. You have to work to survive, find this or that to occupy time and to get comfortable, and to navigate the world, all the while getting impinged upon from all sorts of contingent harms (e.g. pandemics). So I disagree with this one off the bat.

But existence is not nothing but suffering, therefore your point fails; because there is no adequate calculus with which to accurately measure suffering against happiness. Some lives may contain more suffering than joy and others more joy than suffering, — Janus

Well, that is actually something I was going to bring up. What calculus would sufficiently be considered the threshold as "too much".. I had an argument with another poster on this...

If I needed to wake a sleeping lifeguard to save a drowning child's life, and I nudge the lifeguard to wake him, but I wanted to save the child, I don't believe I have gone beyond the threshold of "overlooking the lifeguard's autonomy/dignity" in saving the child.

What happens if after doing calculus for greatest good outcomes, I realized if I kidnapped the lifeguard and made him teach classes on lifeguard training, that actually created the most good. The outcome here doesn't matter. At this point, I have violated the threshold of autonomy/dignity of the lifeguard. Procreation, I believe, falls in this "violated the threshold" mark on the front of "causing unnecessary suffering to another" and "violating the autonomy to another" so if these things are valued, then it should give pause to just go ahead and procreate simply because there are good things in life.

Some lives may contain more suffering than joy and others more joy than suffering, — Janus

And who are you to be the decider for someone else? If you guess wrong? Doesn't matter?

Personally, given the impending problems humanity faces, I wouldn't want to be responsible for bringing a child into this world — Janus

Makes sense.

So all I am disagreeing with is what I see as your unjustified proselytizing. — Janus

See what I said to Unenlightened here for this canard:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/521502

Well, that is actually something I was going to bring up. What calculus would sufficiently be considered the threshold as "too much".. I had an argument with another poster on this... — schopenhauer1

As I said, no calculus is possible, so

And who are you to be the decider for someone else? If you guess wrong? Doesn't matter? — schopenhauer1

I wouldn't presume to be able to decide whether a potential life will have a greater portion of joy than suffering.

On balance I would say my life has has a greater proportion of joy and I certainly have no regrets at having existed. If, per impossible, I could have been present to advise my parents whether or not to conceive me, then I would advise them to go ahead.

The point is that there is no calculus of joy and suffering such that anyone could make a fully informed decision whether or not to have children, so it must come down to personal feeling.

We know what your feeling is, which is fair enough for you, but you are not rationally, or in any other way, justified in attempting to universalize your personal feelings on the matter.

Nice explanation rebutting Benkei's causation objection.

The point is that there is no calculus of joy and suffering such that anyone could make a fully informed decision whether or not to have children, so it must come down to personal feeling. — Janus

Must it? Again, if you kidnapped the lifeguard because you feel it brings about a greater good, or even worse, because it makes you feel good, is that justified?

We know what your feeling is, which is fair enough for you, but you are not rationally, or in any other way, justified in attempting to universalize your personal feelings on the matter. — Janus

But you do get the irony, right? If my "feeling on the matter" is followed, no "one" gets hurt. The other one, does cause substantial harm, by definition of causation of the conditions of said suffering in the first place.

Anyways, why am I not "justified" to persuade people on a logical reason to not do X action? Why are you singling out this one as not rational when this is certainly justified for many other political/ethical ideas? Seems like special pleading. Also, am I "forcing" anything on people or just presenting a case? And if you want to say that anything counts as force, then we get all sorts of absurd conclusions.

Anyways, why am I not "justified" to persuade people on a logical reason to not do X action? — schopenhauer1

Because it is not a logical, merely an emotional, reason, given that your premise (feeling) that life is overall more suffering than joy, cannot be substantiated.

Because it is not a logical, merely an emotional, reason, given that your premise (feeling) that life is overall more suffering than joy, cannot be substantiated. — Janus

So any premise can't be substantiated then because at the end of the day, it is up to the person who follows the ethical framework. However, if the premises are shown to be quite sound and the logic follows, then it is logical overall. But your claim can be made at any ethical framework. Ironically, it is partly based on that freedom to choose and not be chosen for, that antinatalism is based which strengthens its argument, being the very ethic for choosing an action or ethic is founded on it too.

Why is it sound? Because though it's contrary to current views, it is based off quite ordinary intuitions about not substantially forcing situations on others and creating unnecessary harm. The logic follows from there by the asymmetry of not being obligated to create good for someone else, while still being obligated to prevent harm- in other words, negative ethics (deontological or utilitarian).

I don't see any reason to reject life on the basis that it involves some suffering. How much suffering would it need to involve in order to warrant rejection? If it was nothing but suffering it would warrant rejection. How about 90%? 80%? 70 %?

It seems that anything substantially more than 50% suffering could plausibly be argued to be grounds for rejection of life. But since no percentage can be established even in relation to an individual life, much less all of human life, then it seems there cannot be rational grounds for general rejection of life.

I don't see any reason to reject life on the basis that it involves some suffering. How much suffering would it need to involve in order to warrant rejection? If it was nothing but suffering it would warrant rejection. How about 90%? 80%? 70 %? — Janus

Being that all conditions of suffering are created from the conditions of birth itself, I would say it's pretty substantial. It literally foists the game of life on another. I would say anything less than a paradise, honestly. Even if you didn't agree with that standard, this particular world isn't even close.

It seems that anything substantially more than 50% suffering could plausibly be argued to be grounds for rejection of life. But since no percentage can be established even in relation to an individual life, much less all of human life, then it seems there cannot be rational grounds for general rejection of life. — Janus

So again, if the person kidnapped into lifeguarding school actually ended up identifying with his kidnapping and enjoyed it 50% of the time, it was thus justified? No. Forcing an X on someone unnecessarily and suffering unnecessary is never right. It is only just when mitigating a less harm for a greater harm, which can only happen for people that already exist. In other words, using people by forcing the game on them to create better outcomes for humanity would be like kidnapping the lifeguard.

I would say anything less than a paradise, honestly. — schopenhauer1

I get that that's your personal feeling, but there can be no rational basis for rejecting life unless it could be shown that suffering outweighs happiness, which is impossible to do.

if the person kidnapped into lifeguarding school actually ended up identifying with his kidnapping and enjoyed it 50% of the time, it was thus justified? No. Forcing an X on someone unnecessarily and suffering unnecessary is never right. — schopenhauer1

See, this is why you get accused of proselytising. It's not because you're 'discussing' a philosophical position, it because you keep repeating points that have already been countered without addressing that argument.

You equivocate on 'existence'

You start by positing harms and here the non-existence of the un-concieved child doesn't matter - they will exist and so one can consider the harms that will befall them. But here, the aggregate argument carries. There will be more harm by not conceiving them than there would by conceiving them (if you have a reasonable expectation that they'll mostly enjoy life).

You then switch to the dignity/will argument citing kidnapping. But here the non-existence of the un-conceived child does matter. There's no person who's dignity or will needs to be considered. We're not kidnapping someone against their will, there's no person who exists yet for their will to be considered. It's a unique situation not analogous to any other we face in life. so we have no other intuition on how to handle it that the one most people have about conception (that it's morally fine).

You've had all this explained to you before and yet you just bring it up as if you hadn't. That's why people get annoyed.

If you want to continue the discussion qua discussion, address the arguments, don't just ignore them and move on to fresh meat you hope might not spot the flaws, that just makes you seem like you're recruiting, not discussing.

All the stuff about harms has been discussed and resolved - no need to bring it up fresh as if it hadn't. If you take an aggregate harms position there's an argument that not having a child causes more harm than having one for some prospective parents. There's a threshold of autonomy/dignity above which we all cringe at considering aggregate harms (such as your kidnapped lifeguard). So harms are now completely irrelevant to the argument because it has moved on the the threshold of dignity/autonomy and its relation to conception.

You're view on this is that childbirth is like kidnapping, but you've not provided anything to support that view. Most people think childbirth does not cross the threshold of dignity/autonomy, mainly because the person whose will we'd normally consider doesn't yet exist.

You have an unusual view about this threshold. unusual views lead to unusual conclusions.

Nothing here is about the 'logic' at all, nothing about the discussion. It's all about that view. You think conception is like enough to kidnapping that your intuition about kidnapping applies to ti. Most others think conception is dissimilar enough to kidnapping that their intuition about kidnapping does not apply to it. Since conception and kidnapping are certainly dissimilar in many ways you can't show anyone to be wrong about that by necessity. There's therefore no 'argument' to be had.

These individuals are therefore, in both good and bad, responsible for the emergence of a certain person. — Antinatalist

I don't think anyone's disagreeing there (obviously parents are responsible for having their kids, who else is?). What Benkei (and I) disagree with is the asymmetry. I used to be AN and even when I was I thought the asymmetry is a load of BS.

The idea that "not having children" is a good act is absurd. It is at best neutral. If you want it to come out as "good" you run into a lot of problems. For example: "Not shooting people" is now also a good act by the same reasoning. Therefore someone who owns a gun and chooses not to shoot someone can justifiably walk up to you and say "Why observe what a paragon of virtue I am! Can you see how many people I haven't shot!". And the more guns they own and choose not to use, the better they are.

This seems absurd. Choosing to not harm someone is not in itself a good act. It should go:

Have a child:
Risk of suffering- bad, risk of pleasure- good

Don't have a child:
Prevention of suffering- neutral, prevention of pleasure- neutral

not

Don't have a child:
Prevention of suffering - good, prevention of pleasure - neutral

That's the asymmetry.

The idea that "not having children" is a good act is absurd. It is at best neutral. If you want it to come out as "good" you run into a lot of problems. For example: "Not shooting people" is now also a good act by the same reasoning. Therefore someone who owns a gun and chooses not to shoot someone can justifiably walk up to you and say "Why observe what a paragon of virtue I am! Can you see how many people I haven't shot!". And the more guns they own and choose not to use, the better they are.

This seems absurd. Choosing to not harm someone is not in itself a good act. It should go:

Have a child:
Risk of suffering- bad, risk of pleasure- good

Don't have a child:
Prevention of suffering- neutral, prevention of pleasure- neutral — khaled

I have to agree with you.

But if you mean having a child and not having a child are both neutral acts, then I have to disagree.

↪Antinatalist Nice explanation rebutting Benkei's causation objection. — schopenhauer1

Thank you.

@schopenhauer1

This seems right to me:

Have a child:
Risk of suffering- bad, risk of pleasure- good

Don't have a child:
Prevention of suffering- neutral, prevention of pleasure- neutral

not

Don't have a child:
Prevention of suffering - good, prevention of pleasure - neutral — khaled

As I say, if someone dies they are deprived of life's pleasure. Is it only different for the unborn because they are not someone? Because that is what @Benkei is saying.

I have to agree with you. — Antinatalist

Oh. Wasn't expecting that. Most ANs I've met swear by the asymmetry as if it was some holy scripture.

But if you mean having a child and not having a child are both neutral acts, then I have to disagree. — Antinatalist

I'd say it's situational.

Note that this:

Have a child:
Risk of suffering- bad, risk of pleasure- good

Don't have a child:
Prevention of suffering- neutral, prevention of pleasure- neutral — khaled

Only applies when you only consider the child as part of the "system". When you instead look at suffering inflicted overall it doesn't become so clear cut. Not having a child has consequences too. If the child was going to be a positive influence, you can't simply say that not having a child is purely preventative, it could also be harmful. The people the child would have helped would now be worse off.

If your child wasn't going to be a positive influence you're probably just a bad parent and shouldn't be having kids (not a personal attack, just a general statement). That's my position at least.

You start by positing harms and here the non-existence of the un-concieved child doesn't matter - they will exist and so one can consider the harms that will befall them. But here, the aggregate argument carries. There will be more harm by not conceiving them than there would by conceiving them (if you have a reasonable expectation that they'll mostly enjoy life). — Isaac

It doesn't matter. This is unacceptable to do for someone else, as what you are doing to them is like the lifeguard situation, unless you agree, the lifeguard should be kidnapped because you think it is good.

And no, I argue BOTH that unnecessary suffering/harms and dignity violated (for other people) are the two rules. They are related but separate reasons and it is a matter of degree/threshold at which it is being violated. I also admitted I had no calculus yet but that in the case of birth there was high amounts of autonomy/dignity violated and unnecessary suffering violated being that all suffering that will occur come from the act, thus the high threshold violation.

There's no person who's dignity or will needs to be considered. We're not kidnapping someone against their will, there's no person who exists yet for their will to be considered. It's a unique situation not analogous to any other we face in life. so we have no other intuition on how to handle it that the one most people have about conception (that it's morally fine). — Isaac

Yes it is supremely annoying to ME when we've discussed this. If you think you're frustrated...
Once the person is born, and the decision was made for them, that was the "force". It is a unique situation but the displacement of decision-made and consequent doesn't change the analogy. Is this not a huge decision you are making on behalf of someone else? And even though @khaled doesn't agree with my position anymore, I think he has made dozens of examples that proved this point over and over previously.

If you want to continue the discussion qua discussion, address the arguments, don't just ignore them and move on to fresh meat you hope might not spot the flaws, that just makes you seem like you're recruiting, not discussing. — Isaac

This is silly. Recruiting.. :rofl:. Yep, I find "recruits" left and right here :roll:.

All the stuff about harms has been discussed and resolved - no need to bring it up fresh as if it hadn't. If you take an aggregate harms position there's an argument that not having a child causes more harm than having one for some prospective parents. There's a threshold of autonomy/dignity above which we all cringe at considering aggregate harms (such as your kidnapped lifeguard). So harms are now completely irrelevant to the argument because it has moved on the the threshold of dignity/autonomy and its relation to conception. — Isaac

No that's the point, you can't just look at aggregate harm, as dignity/autonomy IS in the equation too. It hasn't moved, it's that both rules are in play- don't cause unnecessary harm and don't cause dignity to be violated. I used to think one was subsumed in the other, and still not sure honestly if they are just separate limiting factors on actions or one is a subsection of another.. Of course you wouldn't help me parse that out so, I won't even ask because you're not going to have a constructive conversation about something you hate so much... so don't worry about that part of it, cause it doesn't hurt the main position that both shouldn't be violated.

You're view on this is that childbirth is like kidnapping, but you've not provided anything to support that view. Most people think childbirth does not cross the threshold of dignity/autonomy, mainly because the person whose will we'd normally consider doesn't yet exist. — Isaac

Right, and I discussed how displacing the time of decision and the time of the consequence doesn't change anything about this crossing the threshold of dignity/autonomy and being analogous to kidnapping. A state of affairs that takes time to actually unfold, why would that make a difference? A bomb didn't go off now.. but will go off, well technically now, there is no bomb blowing up. Obviously that is bone-headed.

Nothing here is about the 'logic' at all, nothing about the discussion. It's all about that view. You think conception is like enough to kidnapping that your intuition about kidnapping applies to ti. Most others think conception is dissimilar enough to kidnapping that their intuition about kidnapping does not apply to it. Since conception and kidnapping are certainly dissimilar in many ways you can't show anyone to be wrong about that by necessity. There's therefore no 'argument' to be had. — Isaac

Yes, I explained how life is akin to a game.. the "game of life" of "overcoming challenges". If you do not do X, Y, Z then you will die. It's a deadly game. But just because you don't mind playing (at least at the moment we are discussing this), doesn't mean that your preference should be assumed for other people.

And I am not switching arguments but separately, the threshold for unnecessary suffering also is met being that all suffering will occur to that person who is born, and there would have been no downside for any "one" by not having them. If you start railing about the aggregate "good" for the "whole" had by having your kid (which is really presumptuous by the way), then that would indeed be violating the other rule about dignity as you are looking at outcomes other than the person the decision is being made for. That indeed is also like the kidnapping scenario.. The lifeguard would be creating the greatest amounts of good, but you are overlooking the lifeguard himself (dignity violated) for your "cause" of the "greatest good".

The idea that "not having children" is a good act is absurd. It is at best neutral. If you want it to come out as "good" you run into a lot of problems. For example: "Not shooting people" is now also a good act by the same reasoning. Therefore someone who owns a gun and chooses not to shoot someone can justifiably walk up to you and say "Why observe what a paragon of virtue I am! Can you see how many people I haven't shot!". And the more guns they own and choose not to use, the better they are.

This seems absurd. Choosing to not harm someone is not in itself agood act. It should go: — khaled

@Antinatalist too
It's not about act, it's simply the state of affairs of not being harmed/in pain/suffering/negative, etc. is in some way "good". Benatar has also stated his asymmetry can be used in any normative ethical system, so it could be deontological or utilitarian, for example.

However, I don't see it being a problem as an act either. This is more my spin on it. If you have the gun, the rule would be to not cause the the unnecessary suffering (preventing bad). It's not a strong "do this!" simply a common "don't do this!".

delete

“If you start railing about the aggregate "good" for the "whole" had by having your kid (which is really presumptuous by the way), then that would indeed be violating the other rule about dignity as you are looking at outcomes other than the person the decision is being made for. That indeed is also like the kidnapping scenario. The lifeguard would be creating the greatest amounts of good, but you are overlooking the lifeguard himself (dignity violated) for your "cause" of the "greatest good".

I am quite interested in how you would respond to this. I think your system is appealing and close to how I think, but I wanted to wait and see what others thought of this

As I say, if someone dies they are deprived of life's pleasure. Is it only different for the unborn because they are not someone? Because that is what Benkei is saying. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Yes it is different.. If someone is not born, there is no "deprivation" of pleasure. If someone is born, they are deprived when it is taken away. This is the crux of the asymmetry. Pleasure denied in respect to "non-existence" is neutral. Suffering prevented, in respect to "non-existence" is good. And as explained to Khaled, this is in respect to a state of affairs of "good" and "bad" and "neutral".

It's not about act, it's simply the state of affairs of not being harmed/in pain/suffering/negative, etc. — schopenhauer1

In that case it should be:

Don't have a child:
No suffering- neutral, No pleasure- neutral — khaled

By what standard is a state of affairs where someone is not suffering worse than one where there is someone suffering, but at the same time a state of affairs where someone is not having pleasure is just as good as one where someone is having pleasure.

If we're just talking about states of affairs, obviously being in pleasure is better than not. In that case it should be:

Don't have a child:
No suffering- good, No pleasure- bad — khaled

I don't see a way of getting an asymmetry here. If we're talking about states, they're symmetrical. If we're talking about acts, they're neutral.

It's not a strong "do this!" simply a common "don't do this!". — schopenhauer1

Sure, but that doesn't make "not doing this" good. I think there is a difference between what is moral and what is good. Sometimes something is moral but not good, as in it is a minimum requirement. "Not killing people" is definitely moral, but not enough to be called good. You're not virtuous simply because you haven't killed anyone.

perhaps another issue might be that the asymmetry seems (at least to me) to extend to infinity. As I’m sitting here typing, I can list off a million potential harmful states of affairs that aren’t happening, and saying “it’s a good thing I’m not being murdered, raped, or my house is currently on fire.” To me that sounds bizarre, and I don’t think any of that is “good.” However, I don’t think it’s totally ridiculous if someone accepted this. It does make sense, just doesn’t seem appealing

then that would indeed be violating the other rule about dignity as you are looking at outcomes other than the person the decision is being made for. — Albero

Yup. It depends on how much the harm that is being inflicted is and how much good is done by inflicting it. I doubt anyone here tends the absolutist position of never imposing on someone unjustly even if it will alleviate suffering elsewhere.

Say for example, if you could save person A from untold suffering for 30 years by giving a completely innocent person B a hearty slap, I'm pretty sure most people would find the slap at least permissible. Even though it is an unjust imposition.

My point then is that having children falls in this category of actions. It depends on how big you think the imposition is and how much you think not doing it can potentially cost. So you can't get hard AN out of a simple desire to alleviate suffering. And no one here thinks that "dignity preservation" is the end all be all either, so you can't get hard AN out of that alone (since there are exceptions where it should be violated).

My only argument against @schopenhauer1 is that his argument is not logical though he makes it seem so. He accepts that the whole preservation of dignity thing is and should be violated sometimes. As such, he can't really argue that having children is unilaterally wrong without begging the question (assuming that having children is already one of the instances where dignity violation is not acceptable). He could try to argue for that separately so as no longer to beg the question by taking a misanthropic angle, and trying to show that in most or all cases, having a child is a heavy enough burden, and doesn't alleviate enough to be considered acceptable. But he doesn't do that. So as it stands I think his argument begs the question at worst, or is insufficient at best.

perhaps another issue might be that the asymmetry seems (at least to me) to extend to infinity. As I’m sitting here typing, I can list off a million potential harmful situations that aren’t happening, and saying “it’s a good thing I’m not being murdered, raped, or my house is currently on fire.” — Albero

And I can list a million things that aren't happing that I would like to happen. "It's a bad thing that I'm not a millionaire, not tall enough, not strong enough", etc. So..... What?

Even if we accept an "asymmetry of states" where bad things not happening is good but good things not happening is not bad, what does that lead to exactly?

yeah I actually recall (though I might be wrong) that Benatar himself admits his asymmetry ALONE doesn’t lead to antinatalism, that’s why he adds that most people have bad lives and have optimism biases and all that stuff to make the arguments stronger. Never bought any of that either. Hell, there’s even been academic work done that even if we do accept some kind of asymmetry having kids can still be permissible.

Now, when you talk about Impositions, isn’t having children a bad imposition because it’s too long? Some people can live to a 100 or more

that’s why he adds that most people have bad lives and have optimism biases and all that stuff to make the arguments stronger. — Albero

Yea I never bought this one either. I don't see what sense it makes insisting that people are suffering when they keep assuring you they're not. If they're fine with it, why is it wrong to do?

But still, this doesn't change the fact that an "asymmetry of states" (even if we accept it) has no bearing whatsoever on whether or not it's right to have kids. So idk why he spent so much of his book talking about it.

By what standard is a state of affairs where someone is not suffering worse than one where there is someone suffering, but at the same time a state of affairs where someone is not having pleasure is just as good as one where someone is having pleasure. — khaled

This is in respect to non-existence and its absence. The absence of pain that could have occurred, is always good. The absence of pleasure for someone who does not exist but could, is neutral.

I do see why you find this harder to claim. His basis are intuitions like, "We don't seem to care over the absence of pleasure on a deserted planet, but we would probably empathize if there were aliens that were in tormenting pain". There is something valuable about not suffering sub species aeternatatis which is not the case for not feeling pleasure sub species aeternatatis.

So some conclusions might be:
A universe devoid of people with pain is just a "good" state of affairs.
A universe devoid of people with pleasure is just a "neutral" state of affairs.

However if it is person-dependent (because they are already born), then:
A person devoid of pain is a "good" state of affairs.
A person devoid of pleasure is a "bad" state of affairs (if the person feels "deprived" of this pleasure).

Sure, but that doesn't make "not doing this" good. I think there is a difference between what is moral and what is good. Sometimes something is moral but not good, as in it is a minimum requirement. "Not killing people" is definitely moral, but not enough to be called good. You're not virtuous simply because you haven't killed anyone. — khaled

Granted, I would make that distinction too I think. But one is the foundation, the other are some implications if one believes the foundation. For example, Benatar himself had several other asymmetries that followed from the initial asymmetry. See here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Benatar

My only argument against schopenhauer1 is that his argument is not logical though he makes it seem so. He accepts that the whole preservation of dignity thing is and should be violated sometimes. As such, he can't really argue that having children is unilaterally wrong without begging the question (assuming that having children is already one of the instances where dignity violation is not acceptable). He could try to argue for that separately so as no longer to beg the question by taking a misanthropic angle, and trying to show that in most or all cases, having a child is a heavy enough burden, and doesn't alleviate enough to be considered acceptable. But he doesn't do that. So as it stands I think his argument begs the question at worst, or is insufficient at best. — khaled

So after our conversations, I am of the idea that really unnecessary suffering and dignity are inextricably intertwined as some sort of "limits" of morality and that it is not binary but of degree and that if a threshold is reached then it becomes violated. Thus nudging the lifeguard to wake up is not to the degree of violating dignity or unnecessary suffering prevention that forcing the lifeguard into a lifetime of teaching lifeguarding lessons would be doing.

Even if we were to "know" the greatest good would come from this, the dignity threshold has been violated. In the case of procreation, even if you believed the greatest good for society is to be had from the birth, the dignity violation of violating someone's autonomy (forcing a game on them) is met. Certainly, there is a balanced calculus that has to be made regarding how much unnecessary suffering and dignity violation is happening. In most cases, an "aggregate" approach to suffering is almost always violating the dignity violation of an individual.

There are cases when one must cause harm to an individual but that is to ameliorate a greater harm with a lesser harm for that person.. Being person-contexted rather than aggregate contexted, and being that it is "necessary" to prevent further suffering for that individual, it may not be a violation.

Procreation is causing (the conditions of) unnecessary suffering for an individual, and aggregating the "use" of the individual for some "greater good" idea violates the dignity of that individual, so fails on both accounts.

So basically procreation can be:
Violating unnecessary suffering prevention: Yes
Violating dignity using people for aggregate: Yes
Violating dignity, forcing a game on them: Yes

Antinatalist too
It's not about act, it's simply the state of affairs of not being harmed/in pain/suffering/negative, etc. is in some way "good". — schopenhauer1

I understand your point. But when I´m saying that not having a child is morally neutral, I mean not having a child is a moral obligation.

Benatar has also stated his asymmetry can be used in any normative ethical system, so it could be deontological or utilitarian, for example. — schopenhauer1

My point of view slighly differs from Benatar´s.
I think his asymmetry argument has valid point of person´s moral rights and moral obligations.

If you have the gun, the rule would be to not cause the the unnecessary suffering (preventing bad). It's not a strong "do this!" simply a common "don't do this!". — schopenhauer1

I agree.