I was considering a seperate thread on Grayling's article, so as not to sideline the exegesis Sam is presenting here. He's a careful interpreter of Wittgenstein, and has produced a series of excellent threads of this sort.

So I'll do that now, out of respect for the project here.

Edit: Graylingstein

Seems to me that Sam answered you well for the scope of this thread. You were mistaken in thinking that "the only example of a hinge proposition is a mathematical proposition". Given that, it may be better if you were to let the exegesis grow rather than interject.

Or take the topic up elsewhere.

Edit:

I think that you have grossly inflated the significance of what is nothing more than a statement of the obvious. — Fooloso4

Sam's account in the post immediately before the one here quoted answers your scepticism...or at least points to the answer found in OC.

I will leave, but my claim is not that it is the only example of a hinge proposition. It is the only example in the text specifically identified as such. I did not state the point clearly, I thought it would be understood, but clarified it in my next post:

This is the only example of a hinge proposition that is given. — Fooloso4

I'll stick around long enough for you or him to provide another example identified as such in the text.

Sam's account in the post immediately before the one here quoted answers your scepticism...or at least points to the answer found in OC. — Banno

This is wrong. I could explain why but I will not interfere.

I'm not asking you to leave, I'm just saying that maybe you have something important to say, and that might be done in a different thread. You can continue making comments makes no difference to me.

Yep.

my claim is not that it is the only example of a hinge proposition. — Fooloso4

I think you are reading the text a bit too tightly.

340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition, how the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human beings have blood and call it "blood".
341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

There's three more examples, generalising the notion beyond mere mathematics. Others abound, including perhaps "Here is a hand" - that's were we seem to be heading...

Most interpetations of OC include Moore's propositions as hinge-propositions. I just don't see how you can read OC without coming to that conclusion. It seems rather obvious. I've read a good deal on this subject and it seems to be the consensus.

Indeed. Spoiler alert.

I'm going to back up a bit and try to clarify. Why is it that Wittgenstein writes OC? It's specifically in response to Moore's papers (Proof of an External World and A Defense of Common Sense).

I'm going to reference Ray Monk's book The Duty of Genius because it's probably one of the best researched books ever written on Wittgenstein's life.

"Wittgenstein's own view of scepticism remained that succinctly expressed in the Tractatus: 'Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked.' And it is in connection with this view of scepticism that he found something philosophically interesting about Moore's 'common sense propositions'. They do not give examples of 'certain knowledge', but, rather, examples of cases in which doubt is nonsensical. [This is the hallmark of a hinge-proposition.] If we could seriously doubt that Moore was holding up two hands, there would be no reason no to doubt anything else, including the trustworthiness of our senses. And in that case the whole framework in which we raise doubts and answer them would collapse: 'Certain propositions belong to my "frame of reference". If I had to give them up, I shouldn't be able to judge anything.' One such proposition might be the statement: 'That's a tree', said while standing in front of a tree:...

"The idea that there are certain judgements (among them, some of Moore's statements of common sense) that belong to our frame of reference [another hallmark of a hinge-proposition], and as such cannot sensibly be doubted, was developed by Wittgenstein in the work written during the eighteen months left of his life following his visit to the United States [referring to On Certainty] (pp. 557, 558, Duty of Genius)."

In OC 1 Wittgenstein comments that "If you do know that here is one hand, [taken from Moore's two papers] we'll grant you all the rest." So, Wittgenstein is challenging Moore's use of the word know in Moore's statement. However, keep in mind that the idea of a hinge-proposition doesn't even come up until later, he hasn't yet developed the idea, but if you read OC carefully you'll see how the idea immerges from Wittgenstein's thinking.

In OC 2 we again see one of the hallmarks of a hinge-proposition, "What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it." Doubt what? Doubt Moore's proposition, given in OC 1. In OC 4 Wittgenstein gives another example of this kind of statement, i.e., a statement like Moore's. "I know that I am a human being." In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider it's negation." Considering the negation of a hinge-proposition is a way of seeing how unclear it is to doubt the statement.

OC 6 asks, "Now can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.--For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused." The point is that we don't know what Moore claims to know in these statements, they are unusual to say the least, and Wittgenstein points this out as he tries to figure out the nature of Moore's propositions.

So, there is a reason Wittgenstein doesn't call Moore's propositions hinges, he hasn't yet developed the idea fully. In fact he dies before ever developing the idea fully.

There is a good deal of disagreement as what stands as a hinge proposition, as a review of the literature shows. Part of the problem is a lack of examples. The point I made is that 655 is the only example explicitly called a hinge proposition. This does not mean that mathematical hinges are the only hinges.

Before any of this I gave an example of what I think Wittgenstein means by a hinge proposition:

"The Earth revolves around the Sun" is a hinge proposition. — Fooloso4

Sam denies that it is.

I cited the example at 655 because Sam claims that:

What makes something a hinge is not what people accept as true or false, which are epistemological ideas, but they are concepts that lie outside our epistemological concepts of true and false, and what it means to know. — Sam26

This is not only an incontestable example of a hinge proposition, more importantly it is contrary to what Sam has claimed. It is true that 12x12=144. Or do you too deny this?

I am well aware of 340 and 341, I cited them.

A bit of personal information before I go: I have more than a passing acquaintance with this text. I did my dissertation on Wittgenstein. It is gratifying to see that in the years since I presented a new generation of scholars have come to see things as I do.

I have more than a passing acquaintance with this text. — Fooloso4

That's apparent, and welcome, but you are not alone.

Hinge concepts are indubitable. That is, they are not to be subject to doubt; hence, they are "outside our epistemological concepts of true and false"... I don't think Sam is overdoing it here. That 12x12=144 is not subject to doubt; it could not be false, and hence is outside our considerations of true and false... that's how I am reading Sam, and I think WItti thought along similar lines.

Hinge concepts are indubitable. That is, they are not to be subject to doubt; hence, they are "outside our epistemological concepts of true and false"... I don't think Sam is overdoing it here. That 12x12=144 is not subject to doubt; it could not be false, and hence is outside our considerations of true and false... that's how I am reading Sam, and I think WItti thought along similar lines. — Banno

This is correct. As soon as you allow true and false to enter the picture it destroys the idea of what a hinge is supposed to be. It allows the doubt to enter the picture. If I ask how you know it's true, or how do you know it's false we are back to Moore's mistake. Hinge-propositions are what support our language of epistemology. They provide the foundation to epistemology.

A bit of personal information before I go: I have more than a passing acquaintance with this text. I did my dissertation on Wittgenstein. It is gratifying to see that in the years since I presented a new generation of scholars have come to see things as I do. — Fooloso4

That's great that you did your dissertation on Wittgenstein. I too welcome you to the discussion. I also have more than a passing interest in OC and Wittgenstein. I've been studying W. off and on for over 40 years. Moreover, I can cite plenty of scholars who agree with how I'm interpreting W. However, this doesn't mean that either of us can't be wrong. There are many scholars who have misinterpreted W., the universities are littered with them. To be honest though, in all my readings, I've never encountered your interpretation, that's not to say that others haven't interpreted W. the way you do. I just have never encountered it in my readings.

Hinge concepts are indubitable. That is, they are not to be subject to doubt; hence, they are "outside our epistemological concepts of true and false". — Banno

12x12=144 is indubitable, but that does not mean that it is not true that 12x12=144.

The truth or falsity of hinge concepts cannot be called into question and remain hinges, but that does not mean that the propositions themselves are not true.

I am reminded of a joke Wittgenstein once made: "we are not crazy, we are doing philosophy".

If I ask how you know it's true, or how do you know it's false we are back to Moore's mistake. — Sam26

We do not question their truth we accept it.

Hinge-propositions are what support our language of epistemology. They provide the foundation to epistemology. — Sam26

Perhaps you get far enough that you will have to confront this:

248: "And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house." — Fooloso4

In order to understand this you should attend to this:

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory. — Fooloso4

But all this really is disruptive of the narrative you are developing. So carry on.

Wittgenstein is challenging the first premise in the above argument; more specifically, he is challenging Moore's claim that he has knowledge of his hands. — Sam26

I am trying to understand Wittgenstein's objection to Moore's use of the word "know". My current understanding is as follows, and I would be interested in your comments.

Wittgenstein found Moore's common sense approach as a reply to the sceptic interesting, as it had similarities with his own nascent thoughts about hinge propositions. However he disagreed with Moore's use of the word "know".

Moore could have said "here is one hand", meaning that ontologically in the world there is an object "one hand". For Wittgenstein, "here is one hand" is a fact in the world, it is not an interpretation, it has no truth value right or wrong, is therefore not open to doubt, is therefore not open to the sceptic and therefore a hinge proposition.

Moore saying "I know here is one hand" has a different meaning, in that in the mind of the object "Moore" are sense impressions. Moore interprets these sense impressions as ontologically there exists an external world in which there exist an object "one hand" and an object "Moore". As "I know here is one hand" is an interpretation, it has a truth value right or wrong, and therefore is open to doubt, and therefore open to the sceptic and therefore not a hinge proposition.

IE - for Wittgenstein, Moore, in adding "I know", is therefore opening his statement "here is one hand" to the sceptic.

We do not question their truth we accept it. — Fooloso4

It's true that we accept hinge-propositions, but we don't accept them because their true, truth has nothing to do with it. In fact, they're not even propositions in the true sense of the word, which is why Wittgenstein refers to them in many different ways. If Moore had said "It's true that I have a hand," it would have been just as unintelligible. In order to see how unclear the statement is, consider it's negation (as Wittgenstein points out in OC 4), "It's false that I have a hand," and here we see just how senseless the statement is. Only in certain contexts would these statements make sense, just as in certain contexts Moore's statements would make sense, but generally to utter these kinds of statements is a misfiring attempt to say what cannot be said.

And, most, if not all of the quotes you give that you think lend support to your position, don't. However, I'm not going to go through each quote when all that is needed is to look at the beginning of OC. He spells out the problems with these kinds of statements.

I may later address some of these quotes, but not at the moment.

Just noticed this at OC 10:

''2 x 2 = 4" is a true proposition of arithmetic

:smile:

Quick question:

Jack Torrence is delusional. He sees a bartender who isn't there.

If he questions the existence of the bartender, is he abandoning a particular language game in favor of a more open-ended one where the question makes sense?

Wittgenstein found Moore's common sense approach as a reply to the sceptic interesting, as it had similarities with his own nascent thoughts about hinge propositions. However he disagreed with Moore's use of the word "know". — RussellA

My interpretation and the interpretations of others who agree is that Wittgenstein found Moore's statements interesting because he found something special about them, not because there were similarities in their thinking. In fact, Wittgenstein goes to great lengths to point out the contrast between the way Moore is responding to the skeptic, and the way he might respond, or the way we should respond to the radical skeptic. It is true that Wittgenstein disagreed with Moore's use of the word know, this we know for sure.

Moore could have said "here is one hand", meaning that ontologically in the world there is an object "one hand". For Wittgenstein, "here is one hand" is a fact in the world, it is not an interpretation, it has no truth value right or wrong, is therefore not open to doubt, is therefore not open to the sceptic and therefore a hinge proposition. — RussellA

For Wittgenstein, even the statement "There are physical objects (OC 35)," is nonsense. He goes on to ask, "Is it supposed to be an empirical proposition?" Moore did say "here is one" in the sense that you put forth, but that still would have failed (if I'm following your point). Moreover, Wittgenstein isn't saying that "here is one hand" is a fact in the world. Do you see somewhere where he says that?

It’s a bit off topic. My guess would be that Jack’s doubts about the existence of the bartender is not a language game.

s a bit off topic. My guess would be that Jack’s doubts about the existence of the bartender is not a language game. — Luke

Oh, sorry. I'll head out here. But you agree he dropped out of a language game when he questioned the existence of the bartender?

Hi Luke,

One thing is for sure much of this depends on context, even Moore's proposition "I know this is a hand," has a use on particular occasions, Wittgenstein stipulates this. This seems to be what he's saying in OC 10 when he says, "'2x2=4' is a true proposition of arithmetic--not 'on particular occasions' nor 'always,'"
although, to be honest, I'm not sure. Again, though, consider its negation.

Sorry to be a dull boy but I don’t recall the movie well enough, so I’m probably lacking some context. Maybe you could start another discussion about it in more general terms?

Consider the negation of what?

The negation of 2+2=4. Maybe you haven't been following everything that's been said. I've been pointing out that these basic mathematical propositions are hinges, so that generally we don't say that they're true or false, except in particular contexts.

Wittgenstein points out that one of the ways we can see how unclear the sense of Moore's proposition is, is to point out its negation. I think we can do this generally with all hinge-propositions, which is why I said to consider its negation. It's false that 2+2=4.

I've been pointing out that these basic mathematical propositions are hinges, so that generally we don't say that they're true or false, except in particular contexts. — Sam26

This contradicts what Witt says at OC 10. As you quoted: “'2x2=4' is a true proposition of arithmetic--not 'on particular occasions' nor 'always,'"
Moore’s proposition is not a mathematical proposition, obviously.

Is there somewhere in the text where Witt states that hinge propositions, or indubitable propositions, are neither true nor false?

Is there somewhere in the text where Witt states that hinge propositions, or indubitable propositions, are neither true nor false? — Luke

No, but I think it follows from his ideas.

Wittgenstein isn't saying that "here is one hand" is a fact in the world. Do you see somewhere where he says that? — Sam26

In Tractatus 1.1 Wittgenstein wrote - "The world is the totality of facts, not of things"

An explanation of what Wittgenstein meant may be found in Russell, who had similar views

Russell wrote in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism - “I want you to realize that when I speak of a fact I do not mean a particular existing thing, such as Socrates or the rain or the sun. Socrates himself does not render any statement true or false. What I call a fact is the sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like ‘Socrates.’ . . .We express a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a certain property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing; but the thing which has the property or the relation is not what I call a ‘fact.”

It seems to me that "here is one hand" fulfills what Wittgenstein meant by a fact in the world.

Is there somewhere in the text where Witt states that hinge propositions, or indubitable propositions, are neither true nor false? — Luke

I think what Wittgenstein intends, is that it doesn't make sense to ask this question, because to ask whether they are true or false is to doubt them. The truth of them is accepted without having to say they are true, or ask of them, is this true.

I of course do not agree with this, as I see that there is no such thing as a proposition, or any sort of belief, or idea which is indubitable. That supposition seems so obviously false. Hinge propositions are a fiction and that's why it's so difficult for these people who believe in them to agree on the criteria of being such.

Wittgenstein points out that one of the ways we can see how unclear the sense of Moore's proposition is, is to point out its negation. I think we can do this generally with all hinge-propositions, which is why I said to consider its negation. It's false that 2+2=4. — Sam26

There is nothing unclear about the proposition: "It's false that 2+2=4." It is clearly false.

What is unclear is how we could learn mathematics if mathematical propositions are neither true nor false. We are not taught that 2+2=4 is neither true not false or 2+2= n for any number is neither true nor false.

Is there somewhere in the text where Witt states that hinge propositions, or indubitable propositions, are neither true nor false?
— Luke

No, but I think it follows from his ideas. — Sam26

Wittgenstein clearly states that 2x2=4 is a true proposition of arithmetic. He also clearly states mathematical propositions are hinge propositions. From this it should be clear that what follows is that at least some hinge propositions, namely mathematical propositions, are true. Moore, so to speak, has no hand in the truth of mathematical propositions.

Yes...