Agreed, but where do we go from here? You're not using pleasure as commonly used. The activity of taking the pill is called pleasurable in everyday discourse, even though it also brings pain in the long term. — Agustino

Yes I am. 'Pleasure' is a non-technical term whose meaning is established independently of philosophical investigations. It is called pleasurable, and it is: and if it causes pain in the long term, we say that as well. Yet it is the pain which is bad, not the pleasure.

Yes, but if it is impossible to have the pleasure without the pain, then does it not follow that that specific pleasure is also bad, in-so-far as it brings pain? Hence a good life cannot possibly involve the pursuit of such pleasures which also bring pain.

Yes, but if it is impossible to have the pleasure without the pain, then does it not follow that that specific pleasure is also bad — Agustino

No. It follows that often pleasure can cause or be associated with bad things.

And therefore, the good life cannot possibly involve the pursuit of such pleasures which can cause or be associated with bad things :)

Sure it can. It just means life is complicated. But it will not help that complication ot confuse yourself about what is good and bad, or to invent stories about what else is good or perfectly good.

Besides, as I said before, this presupposes that the meaningful unit of inquiry is a 'life.' This is dubious since one never experiences a 'life,' which is more of a moralizing abstraction.

But that certainly doesn't add up. If I know that I can take a really powerful drug today, which will make me feel a lot of pleasure, but I will feel extremely sick for the next 5 days, should I take it? Granted that I know I will live for the next five days, I am going to knowingly cause myself a lot of pain. That certainly must be stupid.

should I take it? — Agustino

Hedonism, as I view it, is a position on what is good, not on what you should or should not do.

So then, how ought I to decide what I should and shouldn't do? Afterall, that is the whole point of ethics, to make me in a better position to take decisions.

Most usually what is considered good is what is considered moral.

So then, how ought I to decide what I should and shouldn't do? Afterall, that is the whole point of ethics, to make me in a better position to take decisions. — Agustino

I don't think these are important questions. What matters is what you are going to do, not what you should do, since even if you resolve the latter, you won't have taken even a step toward resolving the former (since you can just do what you shouldn't anyway), which is all that actually matters. And as for what you are going to do, it is a category error to ask for a philosophical position that says what you are going to do, since by definition only actually doing it can decide that. Actions, so to speak, do not follow from philosophical doctrines, and so it is a mistake to ask a philosophical doctrine to make you do something.

Most usually what is considered good is what is considered moral. — darthbarracuda

Hedonism is not in my view a moral position, and I don't think ethics primarily has to do with morality. Morality is a kind of social convention that deals with strictures on behavior. Ethics is, in the Greek sense, an inquiry into what is good, and also the practice of cultivating a good life. 'Moral' and 'good' clearly don't mean the same thing in the sense, that, even if something is good, the question 'is this moral?' is unanswered. Personally, I think morality is a kind of epiphenomenon, and not philosophically important.

I don't think these are important questions. What matters is what you are going to do, not what you should do, since even if you resolve the latter, you won't have taken even a step toward resolving the former (since you can just do what you shouldn't anyway), which is all that actually matters. And as for what you are going to do, it is a category error to ask for a philosophical position that says what you are going to do, since by definition only actually doing it can decide that. Actions, so to speak, do not follow from philosophical doctrines, and so it is a mistake to ask a philosophical doctrine to make you do something. — The Great Whatever

Sure only actually doing it will in the end decide, but that doesn't mean that one shouldn't have goals for which to strive, and deciding on those goals is an enterprise of thought, not of doing.

But you forget that any concept of ideality already presupposes the logical structure of this world - becoming. Hence, a world of being is incoherent and cannot be ideal. I cannot even imagine such a world, much less find it ideal. — Agustino

I would like to address what you are saying, but first let me ask you something. Do you think that something that is "meaningful" trumps what is good? Why or why not? I ask this to Agustino as well as @The Great Whatever.

Wasn't included in the memo but I would like to add that meaning is a part of what makes something good. Meaning, pleasure, and satisfied preferences bundled into one would be what I would consider to be good.

T

Sure only actually doing it will in the end decide, but that doesn't mean that one shouldn't have goals for which to strive, and deciding on those goals is an enterprise of thought, not of doing. — Agustino

I don't think it's necessary. These are my own Cyrenaic biases showing, but I think a good praxis can be one that doesn't make any use of abstract goals. Rather, acting toward the future is itself a kind of moment-by-moment mastery. In any case, it's not the job of an ethical doctrine to tell what to do: as I've argued, I don't think this demand even makes sense. Nothing can tell you what to do, only doing something can make you do something.

"it's not the job of an ethical doctrine to tell what to do" - The Great Whatever, 2015.

Wasn't included in the memo but I would like to add that meaning is a part of what makes something good. Meaning, pleasure, and satisfied preferences bundled into one would be what I would consider to be good. — darthbarracuda

I bring this up because I find it an odd paradox that some things that are "meaningful" require suffering or pain. The fact that suffering might bring meaning, though possibly true, is not necessarily good in itself. Oddly enough, I don't think just because suffering (usually in HINDSIGHT) creates or enhances meaning, it is good that some meaning requires suffering to create meaning or enhance meaning. Suffering doesn't get a pass because of this. Similarly, existence doesn't get a pass because we live in such a condition whereby suffering can elicit meaning or enhance one's experience as more meaningful. The odd fact that we must suffer for meaning tells you something of the world itself.

I will add that though some suffering elicits or enhances meaning, not all of it does. There are some situations where suffering is just suffering.

Anyways, going back to @Agustino's previous post about ideality. Schopenhauer's conception of absolute ideality is incomprehensible insofar as we can positively conceive it, but we can get at it from what we know from our current condition, which is to say what ideality is not.

Thanks, I would appreciate it if you would paint that on walls and make me famous.

Also, going with my previous post-

I can think of two scenarios:
1) The first scenario is one in which a person did not suffer much and had a meaningful relationship for 60 years with a romantic partner. These two people enjoyed each other's company, only fought little but nothing stressful, and helped each other in need. In fact, even the courting process was very easy-going. Both parties didn't make it excessively hard for the other at the beginning, both found each other attractive, both found each other's company good at first and better as they hung out more.

2) The second scenario is one in which a person had a terrible time being in any romantic relationship- for contingent reasons of timing, place, etc. the courting process never worked out. This person lived a relatively unromantic life for 60 years. This person had some friends, some closer than others, but never an "intimate" partner as in the first scenario. This person was not content with this situation, but at the end of their life said that the struggle that he/she had to go through maintain a good life despite not having an intimate partner.. even learning to being STOICAL (I'm sure y'all would be happy I mentioned that), and suppressing the original desire and reworking into helping charities instead of developing personal relationships instead gave meaning.

In both cases, meaning was occurring in people's lives. One through developing a strong relationship with an intimate partner, the other through the struggle to overcome the fact that one will not always get what one wants (even something as basic and desirable as romantic intimacy). Now, a cynic might say "hey, meaning was obtained in both cases, it's all equal". But is it really? I mean, yeah the second scenario did provide for a meaningful life but, was it something they would have preferred?

What's the point of providing this scenario? The point is that suffering- though (usually in HINDSIGHT) may be an impetus for meaning does not always mean it is good that one suffered.

At the same time, I can think of another scenario:

1) Someone stumbles upon a $1 million dollars, they buy a house, a lot of goods.. gives some to charity, goes travelling, takes up new expensive hobbies..They had a lot of meaningful experiences involving charity, relationships, travel, etc.. Nothing that took a lot of suffering although maybe it did take up their time.

2) Someone agonizes over a new invention, an app let's say, they spend thousands of hours thinking, developing, tinkering, researching.. and finally they sell it for a modest $10,000 dollars. Along that way, it was not just "hard work" but a lot of set backs, anger, frustration, rage, lost relationships, hair falling out..after many years they finally finished their project and sold it but did not get the money they wanted. They still found meaning in developing the app, they were a bit disappointed, and also could not afford some of the other things they were planning on.. but meaning was found in the struggle.

In both cases meaning was occurring in people's lives. One through charity work, travel, etc. with little struggles.. and one through agonizing pain and setbacks. In this case, it is a bit harder to choose, but there might be a slight advantage to scenario 2 due to the "added" quality of suffering before the reward. In this case, though the suffering was intense, the person (in HINDSIGHT) saw how the struggle was meaningful to them even if they did not get the reward. However, scenario 1 did have more opportunities for experiences without struggle, so this may be the one with a slight advantage.

One may be super apathetic and just say- "One's gets what one gets in life". This means that a life can't go another way than it goes- kind of fatalistic. This is to deny that people have preferences (often for pleasure as TGW explains). There is a whole tangle of a mess here that suffering adds because:

1) Suffering MIGHT be preferable if it enhances meaning, AND that is the preferred efficient cause to obtain that meaning

2) Some people LIE to themselves and others (don't want to face their true feelings) that they ACTUALLY preferred the scenario with LESS suffering (no STOICISM is going to make those true feelings go away).

3) Life is certainly not fair, because from a far away vantage point, we can see suffering is not distributed equally, and we can also see that some scenarios can be quite meaningful without much suffering, even if other scenarios were meaningful with suffering.

Another thing to add, just to loop it back to Schopenhuaer (because why not), if Schopenhauer/Buddhism is correct in the diagnosis that life's suffering is due to desire, and that no one, no matter what contingent circumstance is immune from desire, than the optimal state is that of absolute being and not becoming. However, being that this state is nearly (or completely) impossible, it is an impetus for us to be not be happy with the situation- thus pessimism. Pessimism is more of an evaluative standpoint from a meta-perspective. So, though one may use any methodology that one needs to get by (Stoicism, self-help, therapy, what have you..), it is not about a methodology as much as a recognition that there structures of the world that are not good. It is the recognition of this that is most important. The way we deal with this is a bit more complicated. Like I said earlier, I am not sure how much asceticism will actually work (or work for most people) in really getting rid of desire or any contingent pains (if that truly is the root cause of suffering). I have the same doubts with other methodologies like Stoicism. The paradox is, of course that, some suffering (grieving over a loved one), though painful, might be meaningful.

Certainly, one of my "methodologies" (if that's what you want to call it) would be to realize that people are suffering in both very familiar ways (desire/survival/goals) as well as very personal ways (contingent/very dependent on a person's background, environment, and personal history). Life is certainly non-ideal. How we confront this, discuss this, and interact with each other about it, is what is important. When we don't do so, we will be avoiding the very large elephant in the room and constantly be mired in the thick of things without ever confronting why we are mired in the thick of things. So simply discussing the suffering, recognizing it, dealing with the fact that life is non-ideal is at least a good start. Perhaps it will elicit more compassion since we are all essentially in the same situation.

If you notice, I don't like having dialogues with you, so for my happiness I am not replying. — schopenhauer1

Kinda shot yourself in the foot there, didn't ya?

Kinda shot yourself in the foot there, didn't ya? — darthbarracuda

I used it as a diving off point. I still maintain I don't like discussing much with you for various reasons.

Here is yet another scenario:

Say someone has a relatively annoying situation (a physical ailment, mental health condition, bed bugs, whatever), they KNOW, absolutely that they would be happier without it. They would think more clearly, they wouldn't have to go to as many hospital visits and spend their time doing other stuff (more "virtuous stuff" I guess if you are a Stoic :-} ). No meaning was derived from this. In fact, it is almost 100% certain that without the condition, that person's life would be more fulfilling in every way. This is a case where suffering is just suffering. There isn't even a story after-the-fact that could make it such that the condition made the sufferer's life more fulfilling. Here is an example of suffering just being suffering.

I am curious to know why this is the case.

This is a case where suffering is just suffering. There isn't even a story after-the-fact that could make it such that the condition made the sufferer's life more fulfilling. Here is an example of suffering just being suffering. — schopenhauer1

From what you wrote, this means suffering just beings suffering requires it to have no additional purpose behind it. Meaning cannot be derived from it.

Now I am not denying that there are certainly cases of suffering (usually extreme) that would add no value or meaning to a person's life, but I struggle to understand how the person is "burdened" with this everyday.

Something about making suffering meaningful makes it easier to cope with.

You are too kind there. That's true in every single instance of annoyance or suffering. The question of paying suffering to obtain a fulfilling life is incoherent. Suffering is always just suffering. Never is anything good "derived" from it, for fulfilling events are other particular states of existence. The fact such a fulfilling event is given with suffering is always just a frustrating coincidence.

People may find fulfilment in the passing of suffering and achieving something. Frequently, people are happy about experiencing an annoyance of hard work to finally achieve something which wouldn't have happened otherwise. But what exactly is fulfilling for these people? Is it the annoyance of work? Is it the suffering? Not at all. In such cases, it is the end of suffering and creation of something worthwhile which is fulfilling. The suffering itself was just a useless burden.

You and darthbarracuda are approaching the question of Stoicism from the wrong angle. Stoicism isn't a question of making suffering "worth it." Nothing can to that. It's an oxymoron. Rather Stoicism is about holding a particular stance which brings fulfilment regardless of suffering. Or in some cases, to replace (e.g. someone's understanding life is now worthless because the were dumped) some instances of suffering with fulfilment (e.g. "sometimes bad things happen. I shouldn't let that conquer me" ) .

Schopenhauer/Buddhism is correct in the diagnosis that life's suffering is due to desire, and that no one, no matter what contingent circumstance is immune from desire, than the optimal state is that of absolute being and not becoming. However, being that this state is nearly (or completely) impossible, it is an impetus for us to be not be happy with the situation- thus pessimism. — schopenhauer1

And that's is their error. The problem lies in that, while they are no doubt correct an absence of "becoming" would eliminate suffering, they are not as to clear why. As we are finite states, states which are always becoming, the absence of becoming is a solution precisely because it eliminates us. If we did not exist, if there was no becoming (i.e. only logic and no existence), then there would be no suffering people that exist.

The problem is, of course, this is utterly useless to any living being. Since we do exist, we cannot escape becoming. The advice of Schopenhauer/Buddhism cannot help us with respect to telling us a solution to suffering. We can never do what it proposes. It is not "nearly impossible." It is impossible. While Schopenhauer/Buddhism may act to end or replace a person's suffering (just as any philosophy, religion or ideology might), it will never do so by the means it proclaims. Schopenhauer/Buddhism is telling falsehoods about ourselves, our suffering and how we might live with instances absent of suffering. Our suffering or otherwise is always "becoming." Whether we are suffering or not is a state of existence. If we are to eliminate instance of suffering, it is a question of having particular moments of becoming, not suffering, as opposed to other moments of becoming, suffering.

This is what Stoicism seeks to achieve. To have us exist, to react, to be "becoming," which is the absence of suffering rather than the presence of suffering in as many instances as possible.

You are too kind there. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Fair enough. I was just trying to address the issue of "meaning through suffering" that has become the usual retort when explaining away the problem of suffering.

The fact such a fulfilling event is given with suffering is always just a frustrating coincidence. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Here is where we have to be nuanced in HOW this is so. I think "in the moment" people are suffering and wishing they did not have to feel the pain. After the fact, they tend to Pollyannize the situation and say it was for the better even though they PREFERRED that it did not occur while it was happening. I don't know, I am sure someone will bring up the exercise example or dieting or something. Painful but leads to pleasure, etc. You may disagree that this is suffering, but I guess some sort of pain is occurring so maybe not suffering but certainly a negative aspect of "feels hurty" is happening. There is also (as you pointed out), suffering that is just suffering with very little to no meaning attached at all. Conditions one just knows they would have been better without. No meaning was gained- more meaningful moments would have been had otherwise.

It is also a way to address the idea that some people think that a life without pain is a life not worth living. Someone gave the example of being hooked up to a computer that provided only pleasant feelings and I think this was to point to the idea that life, with its contingencies (of where, how, and how much pain will occur), and the goals it makes us works towards somehow make life more meaningful than the case of being constantly stimulated with happiness.

People may find fulfilment in the passing of suffering and achieving something. Frequently, people are happy about experiencing an annoyance of hard work to finally achieve something which wouldn't have happened otherwise. But what exactly is fulfilling for these people? Is it the annoyance of work? Is it the suffering? Not at all. In such cases, it is the end of suffering and creation of something worthwhile which is fulfilling. The suffering itself was just a useless burden. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Again, I point to what I said above. Some people think the annoyances, tribulations, pain, what have you give them meaning (usually in hindsight). I agree with you in a really roundabout way that, this in itself is telling of life if we can't handle even just tranquility that we must gain meaning from painful experiences.

You and darthbarracuda are approaching the question of Stoicism from the wrong angle. Stoicism isn't a question of making suffering "worth it." Nothing can to that. It's an oxymoron. Rather Stoicism is about holding a particular stance which brings fulfilment regardless of suffering. Or in some cases, to replace (e.g. someone's understanding life is now worthless because the were dumped) some instances of suffering with fulfilment (e.g. "sometimes bad things happen. I shouldn't let that conquer me" ) . — TheWillowOfDarkness

To me, this is equivalent. I mean, making lemonade out of lemons.. all that jazz. But I think you are trying to say the super-hero Stoic variety that Agustino seems really into- the idea that we can be come impervious to pain. I brought up several ideas in objection to this:
1) Does this "really" work when the rubber meets the road? Certain people might be in situations that are not amenable to easily access the methodologies of Stoicism (mental conditions, temperaments, situations, etc.). Thus, when the rubber meets the road, it can be useless in that regard. Perhaps for a certain norm-defined condition, situation, personality-type, etc. its efficacy is useful.

2.) I abhor the idea that I am born into a non-ideal world and that the way to ideality is not having passion except for virtuous things. This seems like a vicious circularity. I am being virtuous to be virtuous to be virtuous. Somehow the elusive term Eudaimonia is supposed to follow from this, but I don't see how. I can imagine someone being virtuous and not feeling satisfied. I am sure you can then say that this means that the person isn't truly virtuous, but then the idea that someone feels satisfied when doing non-virtuous things comes up. But then you might say that this isn't truly satisfied or long-lasting, in which case one can question how one knows. Then it just becomes "one knows it". Then everything becomes self-justified and the system is simply encapsulated in its own self-justification.

3.) Perhaps Stoicism deals with mitigating excess responses, but I think his point was that desiring itself- even if it is just for preferred indifferents, still produces suffering so to completely cut it at its root, one has to give up even that. After all, any accomplishment needs the fuel of the desire to complete it, to see it done a certain way, etc. I am pretty sure that in this critique there is a subtle understanding that desire can never be without its negative consequences of frustrated desire, disappointment, boredom, etc.

That isn't quite my critique although he has a good point which is that it desire/goals themselves create suffering not wrong reactions to excess. So it is a matter of where the suffering resides. At the end of the day Schopenhauer thinks the efficacy of Stoicism and its diagnosis is wrong.

4.) Stoicism is replacing one bad thing (anxiety and excess dwelling on pain) with an attitude of non-attachment and non-care which could be its own horror. I'll simply refer back to my first post as I would just restating my critique here.

And that's is their error. The problem lies in that, while they are no doubt correct an absence of "becoming" would eliminate suffering, they are not as to clear why. As we are finite states, states which are always becoming, the absence of becoming is a solution precisely because it eliminates us. If we did not exist, if there was no becoming (i.e. only logic and no existence), then there would be no suffering people that exist. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I think I agree? You have a peculiar way of making something that we mostly agree on seem totally inimical to each other. Why be so belligerent?

If we are to eliminate instance of suffering, it is a question of having particular moments of becoming, not suffering, as opposed to other moments of becoming, suffering.

This is what Stoicism seeks to achieve. To have us exist, to react, to be "becoming," which is the absence of suffering rather than the presence of suffering in as many instances as possible. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Honestly, I did not really understand this. You are going to have to elaborate or clarify. Also, I did write a good deal in regards to those scenarios, I think they can be useful here, whether agreeing or disagreeing.

If I was to take a stab at it, I think you are trying to say that Stoicism is trying to teach us how to live in becoming without suffering. Again, I go back to my objections above and throughout this thread. I also think you are definitely missing Schopenhauer's point that becoming (for humans at least) entails suffering. Desire does not go away. In fact, it cannot.

Finally, why do your posts always have this "frothing-at-the-mouth" animosity tone to them? How do you expect to convince anyone with that? Is it just bludgeon the interlocutor at all costs with you?

don't think these are important questions. What matters is what you are going to do, not what you should do, since even if you resolve the latter, you won't have taken even a step toward resolving the former (since you can just do what you shouldn't anyway), which is all that actually matters. — The Great Whatever

Assuming that what I'm going to do isn't influenced by what I think I should do. Which it is, for everyone but sociopaths.

In any case, it's not the job of an ethical doctrine to tell what to do: as I've argued, I don't think this demand even makes sense. — The Great Whatever

Sure it is, otherwise, what's the point in having ethics? That we don't always live up to our ethical standards is a different matter.

Nothing can tell you what to do, only doing something can make you do something. — Teh GreatWhatever

But it can and it does, otherwise I'd just do whatever the hell I wanted all the time without consideration for what's right. But I don't do that., and neither do most people.

But it can and it does, otherwise I'd just do whatever the hell I wanted all the time without consideration for what's right. But I don't do that., and neither do most people. — Marchesk

True, I think people have a moral sense (stemming from a combo of environment and innate fairness), of justice, fairness, compassion, etc. However, I have brought up the idea of what if everyone were to be completely virtuous in all actions. What is the point of virtuousness at all costs- including happiness? The problem when I pose this question is people will assume, that it MUST be good because virtuous acts are being performed, but if we were to take this to the broadest extent, where everyone was always virtuous, it becomes a circularity. I help to help to help. We help to help to help. Always helping, always doing "the right thing".
1) This leaves little room for self-interest other than pursuing more virtue. and
2.) What happens if one doesn't have any Eudaimonia or satisfaction from virtuousness? Doesn't some self-interest come into play? Doesn't some attachment to people and things come into play as well- even "healthy" things like attachment to exercise or competitive sports?
3.) If one were to say a virtuous person would do what he feels is best for him, then are we not making virtue a catchall for happiness in general, and thus conflating Eudaimonia with virtue itself? Virtue then becomes (helping others, being just, being temperate, etc. but also doing things that makes one happy above and beyond that for oneself).. That is giving virtue almost everything that "well-being" "flourishing" and Eudaimonia mean, thus subtly changing the definition from developing a good character to a sort of limited hedonism.

If all the "preferred indifferents" were taken away, a dreary world it would be. Therefore, I feel, it seems like what Stoics called "preferred indifferents" are part of the equation for a "life worth living" not accidental to a life of Eudaimonia. Perhaps one can learn through the "methodology" how to survive it with dignity and grace, but I think it is a conceit to say it is actually a life worth living. To point to the practically self-evident fact that humans can survive and habituate to shitty conditions or a less-than-optimal situation, doesn't mean that it is a good life. It just means we can learn to live with. People even try to push the conceit far more absurd levels (pace Nietzsche) that overcoming pain is what counts anyways, so "bring it on". Meaning here counts more than mere happiness.. Meaning that one gets from having a "cross to bear"- the bigger the better. However, for me at least, I see something wrong with this picture where
1) We have to settle for less optimal situations in the first place
2) Meaning is derived from suffering

This is where my pessimism towards life itself comes in. Life certainly isn't created "for us" though it is an obvious fact that we can withstand some of the shit life gives us (and even this might not be true in all situations, people, temperaments, conditions, etc.). It can be postulated that this is simply a basic outcome of our evolutionary history.