"Imagine that there are two distinct worlds that share the same physical laws but are different in that consciousness can emerge from one but not the other. Now imagine two systems, one from each world, that are physically identical to each other but are different in that one is conscious while the other is not. As you can see, it is possible to imagine this scenario because supposing the existence or non-existence of consciousness is of no concern in maintaining physical laws. This means that while the two systems are different from each other, the difference between the two must not be physical in nature: the difference between the two systems being consciousness. As consciousness is not physical in nature, it is not entirely bound to physical elements and, so, freed from having to be deterministic. This establishes the existence of our Free Will because our decisions are affected by non-deterministic factors through our transcendental consciousness." — Yun Jae Jung

This is a thought-experiment that presupposes an actual empirical event. If the empirical event does not happen, the theory does not hold.

Therefore to show this as a proof-strength theory, you must go out and find the empirical scenario you present.

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This proof has no a priori component. You can't say that "this is necessarily true", as your proof depends on a physical scenario, that can be imagined, but can be denied as well, despite the fact that anyone with sound mind can imagine it.

To give you a scenario that may shed more light on what I'm saying: In the 1001 Arabian Nights, some tales talk about flying carpets. Anyone can imagine a flying carpet. But is that proof enough that there are flying carpets? No, it is not a proof. So imagining a world which you present is nice and neat, but it is not guaranteed that it does or can exist, much less is it guaranteed that it must exist. The onus is on you to find such a world, in physical space, as presented in the scenario, if you want general acceptance of your theory.

I think he clearly meant something spiritual instead of a process by his exclusion of the physical. He can clarify is he wants

I vote will comes first, as instinct to.... — tim wood

Will is instinct? Reason isn’t used for instinct. And instinct isn’t refined or made appropriate. If reason is used for the will, will cannot be instinct.

A human can both think and feel, the one being never like the other. I vote the faculty of will comes first with respect to that which is a feeling, the will being the source for determining what satisfies it, which is for us called a desire. While the cognitive faculty of thought, on the other hand, remains associated with that which may arise as experience, the objects belonging to that, arising only from Nature herself.

Yes, it is possible to imagine.

...sentient beings should not exist because there isn't any reason for physical systems to become cognizant. The world should be devoid of awareness filled only with mindless biological machines that ultimately do not experience anything. — Yun Jae Jung

You are assuming your conclusion in these paragraphs.

Humans folllow one of two principles: their ideas (reason) or their heart (will). They choose one of these or both with their "will power. I think humans identify mostly with their thoughts but I'm sure others may disagree

Free will is something we allow to come to the forefront only on occasion, it seems

I don't think free will (as free) comes from the dense and solid aspect of matter

Yes I meant spiritual or transcendental

Well you have a lot of people's opinions about your comments now

If reason is used for the will, will cannot be instinct. — Mww

I agree that you cannot have a scotch and water if there is not water. I think will is the scotch or the fire, reason the water. Or the argument might go that reason itself certainly is not will, and thus will, at least with respect to reason, is something added. Why not just call it will - or if will is the admixture, instinct? And instinct at the first just distinguishing, discriminating, not this from that, but instead this from what seems not this. Something along these lines. That, or will is born Athena-like fully formed and armored. But imo Athena's conception and circumstance birth might bear on this.

Instinct-->preference/desire-->reason-->will. On this model I'm compelled to agree with you. Instinct, then, as the ancestral Eve of will. In any case it seems the freeness of a free will can only enter with reason. Arguably, then, always and necessarily free(!), reason being free. Splice hands on that?

That, or will is born Athena-like fully formed and armored. — tim wood

I think this. Will is born fully formed....half a will is quite useless, after all....and armored, but chinked. Even a toddler makes moral choices, albeit without knowing what he’s doing, but usually predicated on self-conceit rather than self-respect. The chinks in the armor are filled in with practical reason, once the wearer has established his own moral disposition, which come only with experience.

freeness of a free will can only enter with reason. — tim wood

Oh, absolutely. However, without holding to a deontological moral philosophy, the exposition of how this is so, and why it should be so, is to fall on deaf ears.

Initiate splice, on my mark........

Bottle ready, neat.