1. The Will, other than being self-devouring (with "appearances" (i.e. maya) nothing more than "the 10,000" skins shed, shredded & regurgitated by the insatiable ouroboros), has no telos. — 180 Proof

Yet, if the world is composed of undifferentiated willing, why does this force manifest itself in such a vast variety of ways? Schopenhauer’s reply is that the will is objectified in a hierarchy of beings. At its lowest grade, we see the will objectified in natural forces, and at its highest grade the will is objectified in the species of human being. The phenomena of higher grades of the will are produced by conflicts occurring between different phenomena of the lower grades of the will, and in the phenomenon of the higher Idea, the lower grades are subsumed. For instance, the laws of chemistry and gravity continue to operate in animals, although such lower grades cannot explain fully their movements. Although Schopenhauer explains the grades of the will in terms of development, he insists that the gradations did not develop over time, for such an understanding would assume that time exists independently of our cognitive faculties. Thus in all natural beings we see the will expressing itself in its various objectifications. Schopenhauer identifies these objectifications with the Platonic Ideas for a number of reasons. They are outside of space and time, related to individual beings as their prototypes, and ontologically prior to the individual beings that correspond to them.

Although the laws of nature presuppose the Ideas, we cannot intuit the Ideas simply by observing the activities of nature, and this is due to the relation of the will to our representations. The will is the thing in itself, but our experience of the will, our representations, are constituted by our form of cognition, the principle of sufficient reason. The principle of sufficient reason produces the world of representation as a nexus of spatio-temporal, causally related entities. Therefore, Schopenhauer’s metaphysical system seems to preclude our having access to the Ideas as they are in themselves, or in a way that transcends this spatio-temporal causally related framework. — Arthur Schopenhauer, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

2. The Will is neither an intentional nor an intelligent agency. 'Lesser wills' (i.e. appearances) are merely ballistic flotsam and jetsam in the ceaselessly raging superstorm of the 'Greater Will' as well as its constituent ephemerae. — 180 Proof

Then why and wherefrom the world of representation/appearances? — schopenhauer1

So if this is an accurate description of Schop's metaphysics/epistemology ...

... how is my will related to the external factors that impinge upon my will?

There is no telos, no metaphysical why. (re #2) — 180 Proof

Go to the source instead: WWR, vol 1. — 180 Proof

Analogously (re #2), how can rain not be related to the impact of winds in a rain storm? The Will is all, for Schop, so "external factors" are mere illusions due to the finite perspective of "your will". Each wave appears (to itself) to be (more or less) separate from, or independent of, the ocean; this, Schop, describes as a phenomenal conception (outside-in, re: FFR), and yet from within all phenomena (inside-out, contra Kant) the noumenon of The Will is the unitary force that connects all distinct, manifest, phenomena. — 180 Proof

But why would there be appearances along with Will? What is the connection? — schopenhauer1

See (reread) third paragraph in previous post. — 180 Proof