out of context. — path

The meaning (is) distributed in everything — path

If the context is everything, then it's not a context.

That's the trouble: insisting on telling us details of the ineffable.

If the context is everything, then it's not a context. — Banno

On this side of the pond, we say that 'X is everything' for 'X is important.' I agree that all distinctions break down when pushed to extremes.

That's the trouble: insisting on telling us details of the ineffable. — Banno

What did Witt say about wanting to grunt? But then that grunt or conspicuous silence becomes a token in the game. (Heidegger also talked of conspicuous silence.)

This context thing is basically historicism. 'Meaning' is cumulative. We have to 'read ourselves in' to a certain intellectual community. Hegel, for instance, could take a certain jargon for granted. He was writing for his contemporaries. They wanted their Jesus and Progress rolled into one. How could it be made scientific? How could a certain tension in their form of life be resolved? So to study philosophy (if that means reading the famous dead) is also to study history. We try to feel our way into a form of life. This is a big theme in the Dilthey draft, as one might expect given its nickname.

To be sure, I can't choose the right words, the perfect words. What makes communication possible (inherited conventions) makes perfect communication impossible. The words aren't tied down to Platonic meanings. They drift as we keep using them in new ways and forgetting to use them in the old ways. If meaning is use, then use is unstable.

I think this actually connects to the OP. But it also extends the post above.

Tell me if the below doesn't sound one hell of a lot like Heidegger (who does acknowledge the influence, for what that's worth.)

According to Yorck, the analysis and evaluation of the contemporary intellectual-historical situation is integral to philosophy—all the more so if philosophy self-reflexively grasps its ineluctably historical nature, which in itself is one of Yorck's main philosophical objectives. The basic idea for the historicity of philosophy is straightforward. For Yorck, as for Dilthey, philosophy is “a manifestation of life” [Lebensmanifestation] (CR, p. 250), a product or an expression in which life articulates itself in a certain way. But all life is intrinsically historical. Life is inconceivable without its historical development.
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Consequently, Yorck rejects from the start the transcendental method in philosophy as insufficient for grasping lived historical reality. Transcendental philosophy reduces historical life to the merely “subjective,” which misses the genuine characteristic of Geist, spirit or mind, namely its real, historical extension and connection.
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Yorck's primary category of historical life does not only challenge transcendental philosophy as too-narrow a foothold for philosophy. A fortiori, it also challenges the entire metaphysical tradition, which presupposes or searches for an ultimate objective reality (being, idea, substance, and so on), divorced from the ground of the always shifting historical life. Yorck rejects claims to “knowledge” sub specie aeternitatis. For Yorck, metaphysics is a flight from the historical reality ‘on the ground.’ By making historical life primary, Yorck effectively aims to dismantle the predominance of Greek metaphysics, including the modes of thought of modern science derived from it.
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In the condensed and all too general format of the Correspondence with Dilthey, Yorck develops the practical “application” of philosophy in only the most fragmentary fashion. Its most important part is the actual clarification of the contemporary situation, the determination of the given historical possibilities, and the avenues for implementing some of them. Yorck holds that since the Renaissance and through the works of such thinkers as Galileo, Descartes, and Hobbes, the self-interpretation of life has found its centre of gravity in the cultivation of the theoretical understanding [Verstand]. The primacy accorded to theoretical understanding and what it projects as objective, unchangeable, and ultimate reality (metaphysical & physical) has ushered in “the natural sciences,” “nominalism,” “rationalism,” and “mechanism,” (CR, pp. 68, 63 & 155). But this has come at the exclusion of the full thematization, expression, and appreciation of human affectivity [Gefühl], including the underlying feeling of human connectivity through a shared life in history. Blocked-out are questions which affect the temporal, historical and personal existence of human beings, or what Yorck once calls “existential questions” [Existenzialfragen] (CR, p. 62), which relate to the life-goals human beings strive after, the recognition of dependency, and the awareness of human mortality, finitude, and death (CR, p. 120). The relative sidelining of these aspects in the psychology of human beings lies at the bottom of Yorck's diagnosis of the increasing self-alienation of modern man and the crisis of his time. — link

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/yorck/

30-33. Method. When faced with an impasse, sentences that don't get us any further, ask "what it would be like to think like this?"

What would it be like to think that this was not a hand?

How could doubt have its place here?

35-6 "This is a physical object" not an empirical statement. If it has any use it is in setting up the language games of empirical statements.


Not said, but shown; and hence, strictly nonsense.

Heiddy had a clue that language effected/affected a speaker. His notions of Dasein and Being proved that much, but... his account was horrendous and clunky. Changing the everyday meaning of some of the most common words did not help his cause.

SO to the methodological point: don't start a philosophical conversation with "First let us define our terms".
— Banno

24. The idealist's question would be something like: "What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?" (And to that the answer can't be: I know that they exist.) But someone who asks such a question is overlooking the fact that a doubt about existence only works in a language-game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a doubt be like?, and don't understand this straight off.

Moore's "I know I have a hand" needs to remove all doubt; but "I know" is not strong enough to do this. "I am certain" suffers a similar fate. But "It is certain..." does not. You might agree that I think I know, and still maintain that I am wrong; but if you agree that it is certain, then you cannot then say that I am wrong. (probably needs unpacking... complicity is achieved in the move from first person to third person). — Banno

This seems confused. The idealist doesn't doubt the existence of hands. They would agree that Moore can show that he has hands. What they doubt is the move from waving hands about, or "it is certain", to saying hands are physical.

The objection to this would be that "physical" is part of the language game. Yes, but physical means real, as in hands are material, not mental. And this is what Moore is trying to establish against the idealist. That his hands are proof of a material world.

Again the objection would be that is how the language game is played. Hands are used as being part of the material world. Sure, but this is means language is used in a naive realist manner. The idealist presumably has reasons to reject naive realism, and thus to suppose that everyday language is mistaken.

For the idealist, waving hands about doesn't mean your hands are physical, it just means you have a consistent experience of waving hands about. You don't get to make that epistemic leap just by pointing to an experience.

The backdrop of reality grounds us, if this wasn't the case, then the skeptic would have an argument. — Sam26

True, but what is this reality? Is it the stuff of everyday experience which populates ordinary language? The skeptic finds various problems with this.

The problem with "showing" is the question of what is being shown? That our experiences of the world are veridical? There are many examples which call this into question. The ancient skeptics had multiple arguments to demonstrate that. Modern science provides even more.

The very act of sitting at a computer and typing shows my belief that there is a keyboard; that I have hands; that I am controlling my fingers; that what I type is saved to a hard drive, etc, etc. I don't even think about it, i.e., I don't think to myself and say, "Is this really a keyboard?" After all there is no reason to doubt it, and even if I did doubt it, would that doubt really amount to anything? That I am certain of these beliefs is reflected in what I do. We all act in ways that show our certainty of the world around us. Occasionally things do cause us to doubt our surroundings, but usually these things are out of the ordinary. I am referring to our sensory experiences, i.e., generally we can trust our senses even if occasionally we draw the wrong conclusion based on what we see, hear, smell, etc. — Sam26

This is either naive realism or pragmatism. All it establishes is that we have a consistent experience of a world. It's not a defeater for skepticism, because the skeptic begins here, and then goes on to point out everything that leads to the problem of perception.

Using the word know as Moore used it, is senseless, in fact, it creates bogus philosophical problems. Many so-called philosophical problems are just as senseless. The way we talk about free will and determinism, time, knowledge, and a whole panoply of other philosophical ideas, propositions, and words are also just as problematic. Once you come to understand what Wittgenstein is saying, or trying to do via his method, then many of the problems of philosophy simply vanish as pseudo-problems - many, but not all. — Sam26

I don't understand how Wittgenstein's method makes these problems go away. In our language game we say we have could have done otherwise. Thus, we're responsible for our actions. But then there are reasons to doubt we actually could have done otherwise. So what to make of that? It would seem our language game has created a paradox.

Or take Hume's critique of causality. We talk about causes all the time. And yet the actual cause never presents itself in experience. So why is causality part of our language game?

Is it really the case that philosophers are abusing language? Or are they pointing out the questionable assumptions used to create our language games?

Did skepticism originate with misuse of the Greek term for doubt? No, it arose because of illusions, hallucinations, dreams, madness, perceptual relativity, sophistry and what not.

Is it really the case that philosophers are abusing language? Or are they pointing out the questionable assumptions used to create our language games? — Marchesk

IMO, you are correct here. A problem is only pseudo from the perspective of a later stage in the critical conversation. The danger in 'language on holiday' talk is that it can be its own 'language on holiday' for an anti-intellectualism that wants to (mis-)take itself as critical.

This is what annoyed Gellner so much. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Gellner We can obviously also criticize Gellner, but I empathize with his frustration.

I like Rorty's use of Kuhn's abnormal/normal distinction. Successful philosophical revolutions are always 'abuses of language' that become the new norm. To fend off (all) 'abuses of language' is to fend of new philosophy, which is to say philosophy itself.

Did skepticism originate with misuse of the Greek term for doubt? No, it arose because of illusions, hallucinations, dreams, madness, perceptual relativity, sophistry and what not. — Marchesk

I also think of the skeptic as belonging to a pluralistic culture like our own. They can see what is attractive and problematic in many different perspectives. I also think of the skeptic as a lover of ideas who doesn't want to harden into a dogmatist.

To me a better also Wittgensteinian 'attack' on skepticism is on its own terms, for not being skeptical enough, for taking its very language for granted.

If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything.
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At the core of all well-founded belief lies belief that is unfounded.
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We are asleep. Our Life is a dream. But we wake up sometimes, just enough to know that we are dreaming.
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To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life.
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Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.
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Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning.
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A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes. — Witt

I picked some quotes as reminders for the particular purpose of suggesting that we don't read Wittgenstein as an anti-intellectual quasi-pragmatist.

"The very act of sitting at a computer and typing shows my belief that there is a keyboard; that I have hands; that I am controlling my fingers; that what I type is saved to a hard drive, etc, etc. I don't even think about it, i.e., I don't think to myself and say, "Is this really a keyboard?" After all there is no reason to doubt it, and even if I did doubt it, would that doubt really amount to anything? That I am certain of these beliefs is reflected in what I do. We all act in ways that show our certainty of the world around us. Occasionally things do cause us to doubt our surroundings, but usually these things are out of the ordinary. I am referring to our sensory experiences, i.e., generally we can trust our senses even if occasionally we draw the wrong conclusion based on what we see, hear, smell, etc."
— Sam26

This is either naive realism or pragmatism. All it establishes is that we have a consistent experience of a world. It's not a defeater for skepticism, because the skeptic begins here, and then goes on to point out everything that leads to the problem of perception. — Marchesk

This criticism misses the point. It's our consistent experiences that make radical skepticism lack any force. The point is that doubting in some circumstances is unreasonable, i.e., our doubting needs good reasons, just as our knowledge claims do. Moreover, as Wittgenstein points out, "My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on (OC 7)."

Of course there are problems with perception, however, note that if I have a perception of X, and it turns out there was a problem with what I perceived, then obviously the doubt is warranted. Most of what we perceive is unproblematic, which is why I use the example of sitting at the computer typing. The so-called defeater for radical skepticism is in the unproblematic cases.

Just as Wittgenstein points out Moore's incorrect use of the word "know," Wittgenstein also points our the incorrect uses of the word "doubt," both have their problems. No one is saying all skepticism is problematic. One needs to come to terms with where these words break down (knowing and doubting).

"13. For it is not as though the proposition "It is so" could be inferred from someone else's utterance: "I know it is so". Nor from the utterance together with its not being a lie. - But can't I infer "It is so" from my own utterance "I know etc."? Yes; and also "There is a hand there" follows from the proposition "He knows that there's a hand there". But from his utterance "I know..." it does not follow that he does know it."

There's some beautiful analysis of first, second and third person accounts here.

Anyone care to unpack this? — Banno

Because someone asserts that they know, that in itself is not enough to conclude that one does indeed know. That one knows needs to be demonstrated in one of the language-games of knowing. Even if it's determined that your not lying when you utter the words "I know...," it still is problematic without the demonstration of how you know.

Can you infer from your own utterance that you know? Yes. I can infer that I know based on the evidence that leads me to the conclusion that I know. I know that I know.

"There is a hand there" follows from the proposition "He knows that there's a hand there." If he indeed does know there is a hand there, i.e., he knows the evidence behind the claim, then he indeed knows it. However, this is a far cry from concluding that one does indeed know simply from the utterance "I know X."

The point is that doubting in some circumstances is unreasonable, i.e., our doubting needs good reasons, just as our knowledge claims do. — Sam26

Sure, so we can dismiss Descartes as being unreasonable when he set out to doubt everything. But the ancient skeptics did provide reasons for their doubts. You have the ten modes of Pyrrhonism which provide arguments based on the relativity of sensory organs, locations, situations and what not. Also that every dogmatic position can have an equally compelling counter argument.

Then you have Humean skepticism based on the problem of induction. A popular modern version of skepticism is Bostrom's simulation hypothesis. Then there are arguments based on the findings of science that the world we perceive is a kind of illusion. The Problem of the Many attacks our standard notion of regular objects as having well defined boundaries. And this forum has had many debates which involved QM and what that means for the kind of world we live in. I'm currently reading this book:

Because someone asserts that they know, that in itself is not enough to conclude that one does indeed know. That one knows needs to be demonstrated in one of the language-games of knowing. — Sam26

To assert that I know is different from agreeing that you know that I know and again from a dogmatic we know.

No-one can reasonably doubt Moore when he says that he knows his hand, But how could Wittgenstein possibly know that Moore's hand is real and not a fake hand, and again, no scientific encyclopedia is going to help in telling us that we know whether Moore does or does not have a hand.

Therefore it would appear that both Moore and Wittgenstein are correct in their assessment of knowing but not in telling us about the type of knowledge they mean by knowing. If they cast aside metaphysical differences as nonexistent or irrelevant then they can argue past each other forever.

Sure, so we can dismiss Descartes as being unreasonable when he set out to doubt everything. But the ancient skeptics did provide reasons for their doubts. — Marchesk

Descartes doesn't need to provide a reason for his doubt because it is self-explanatory in the same way that Moore only needs to raise his hand to prove to himself that he has a hand. This kind of subjectivism is self-sufficient, absolute and certain in all respects to the subjective I. A second or third person demonstration is redundant. The ancient skeptics had a different empirical knowledge to doubt and not this self-proving subjective kind.

The point Wittgenstein is making about Moore's claim to know is that it's a misuse of the word know. Moreover, he contrasts knowing with doubting because of the close association between the use of these words. "I know..." is suppose to have the intended effect of tamping down any doubts that you don't know. Both knowing and doubting must be reasonable, i.e., the implicit rules that govern these words must be followed. To doubt everything, as Descartes did, not only trivializes the concept of doubting, but shows a fundamental misunderstanding of how doubting logically works. To doubt everything as Descartes did lacks sense. There has to be a framework in which doubting gets its meaning. That framework allows doubting to take place, to gain a foothold. You have to at least be sure of the meaning of your words, otherwise what would it mean to doubt. Descartes didn't really doubt everything. He surely didn't doubt what it means to doubt.

Radical skepticism is incoherent. On the other hand, so is Moore's argument that he knows "this is a hand." The same thing that grounds the correct use of doubting, also grounds the correct use of knowing. Both inextricably rely on the backdrop of reality itself, otherwise there is no foothold for doubting or knowing to get their meaning. Just as chess relies on the board and pieces in order to play the game. If you doubt the board and pieces, where do you go from there? You can't play the game.

The rules of language, or the rules of correct usage, tell us how we are to use these concepts (knowing and doubting). They're not created in a vacuum, but in a culture of correct usage. We can't just create our own uses, as many people do, and expect something coherent. To be fair, though, it must be said that many incorrect uses have to be pointed out because they're very difficult to see.

In considering the proposition "here is one hand", Moore's common sense approach of Direct Realism does not stand a chance against the sceptics, in that even though I perceive a hand in front of me , I may be mistaken, because from my perception knowledge of the world does not necessarily follow.

For Wittgenstein in On Certainty the proposition "here is one hand" is more a performative speech act than constative, where "here is one hand" is a naming by the observer of what the observer perceives rather than a description of what the observer believes to be in the world.

Wittgenstein's unaltering bank of a river within which the river of language constantly flows are these performative acts immune to the sceptic, an idea as later developed by Austin. When a dignitary performatively names a new aircraft carrier "HMS Albion", the sceptic cannot question that this is the true name of the vessel, as evidence is held in newspaper articles.

Wittgenstein's approach to the proposition "here is one hand " as performative rather than constative becomes the first step in a theory of language where public communication becomes possible potentially free of sceptical doubt.

Subsequent steps in a theory of of language would be in expanding the meaning of "here is one hand " by placing it within a coherent linguistic context and then discovering correspondences between language and the world.

There has to be a framework in which doubting gets its meaning. That framework allows doubting to take place, to gain a foothold. You have to at least be sure of the meaning of your words, otherwise what would it mean to doubt. Descartes didn't really doubt everything. He surely didn't doubt what it means to doubt.
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Just as chess relies on the board and pieces in order to play the game. If you doubt the board and pieces, where do you go from there? You can't play the game.
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The rules of language, or the rules of correct usage, tell us how we are to use these concepts (knowing and doubting). They're not created in a vacuum, but in a culture of correct usage. We can't just create our own uses, as many people do, and expect something coherent. — Sam26

:up:

In other words: I don't have the language, the language has me. And I am more within the language than the language is within me. To exist in a community where something like 'reality' makes sense in the first place is to already have learned this framework (to have learned to talk/think in terms of appearance/reality). With this in mind, there is a limit on how radical any facetious skepticism (that wants it articulate itself) can be. To speak at all seems to indicate an expectation that being understood is at least possible.

Yes, good response.

The idea that there is a supporting structure to language is very important if you want to understand Wittgenstein's thinking about knowing and doubting (and words in general). The supporting structure (reality, if you will), and the culture that develops within this structure, sets the limits of use. Just as a board in chess limits the use of its pieces within the game, although, language is a bit more flexible in terms of the use of words. But, not so flexible that we can do whatever we want with the words we use. The tendency is for us to think that there is something within (the inner subjective me) that controls meaning and/or the use of words. This isn't always easy to see or understand, Moore fell victim to it without realizing the implications of his use of know.

Once we understand the limits of language (how we use words like know and doubt), then we can see how some uses of words have gone beyond the board of use. It's as if we've removed the bishop from the board and are using it in our imaginary game. However, it's even more strange than this, because others are also playing the same imaginary game. When others join in, this gives us the illusion that we're really playing the game. There is a very subtle loss of meaning when we do this. It certainly looks like we're playing the same game. After all, we're using the same pieces (same words, i.e., they're spelled the same), but we're moving them in strange ways. Ways that violate the original intent of the pieces and their use.

Yes, even a sceptic needs something, such as a set of rules, about which they can be sceptical.

Moore said that these rules are the rules of common sense, and has been criticised for not justifying to the sceptic why common sense should be the basis for the rules.

Wittgenstein said that once the proposition "here is one hand" is placed within the context of language, within a language game, as language is founded on logical propositions, and as logical propositions are beyond knowledge or doubt (being norms that are neither true nor false), scepticism is not able to function within language.

It is true that once the proposition "here is one hand" becomes part of a particular language game, both internally coherent and logical, then it becomes necessarily free from the sceptic.

However, the proposition "here is one hand" may be included within any number of internally coherent and logical language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask how Wittgenstein explained the basis on how to decide from the many possible language games the one that corresponds to reality.

OC 6 brings up an important point (Wittgenstein says an "extremely important" point) about mental states and the connection to Moore's misuse of know. I think to understand Wittgenstein's point one must understand the context of Moore's presentation, which is given before an audience. "Here is one hand," Moore's claim is that he knows this. Such a statement, as Moore holds up his hand, is what reveals the mental state Wittgenstein is writing about, i.e., according to Wittgenstein Moore's proposition is more of a conviction about what he believes, not a case of what he knows. In OC 42 Wittgenstein refers to the mental state of conviction expressed "by tone of voice in speaking, by gestures etc." Why does Wittgenstein see it this way? One reason is that Wittgenstein sees Moore's propositions as special kinds of propositions, that in given contexts can't be expressed in this way. Why this is the case is the subject of Wittgenstein's investigation in OC. We will try to bring forth these ideas as we move along.

In OC 7 Wittgenstein points out the important idea of showing a belief. He says, "My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on." Then he gives an example of showing, "I tell a friend e.g. 'Take that chair over there', 'Shut the door', etc. etc." These are only one or two examples of how we show a belief. The mere act of sitting in the chair or opening the door shows that we believe there is a chair or a door. Acts alone, show, or have the potential to show what we believe.

Moore said that these rules are the rules of common sense, and has been criticised for not justifying to the sceptic why common sense should be the basis for the rules. — RussellA

Yes, Moore did believe that his propositions were common sense propositions that all of us know, but Wittgenstein is challenging this idea. To most us it seems that Moore is correct. I mean if we don't know this is a hand, then what do we know?

OC 9 brings up an important point about Moorean propositions. Do we in general makes sure that we know that this is a hand, or this is a tree, or that we live on planet Earth? This is not to say that there can't be instances where we doubt these propositions (OC 23), as Wittgenstein points this out, but we are not talking about contexts where it makes sense to doubt "this is a hand," but contexts, like the Moorean context, where a doubt doesn't normally arise. "Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand--my own hand, that is?" No. Do doubts normally arise about such things? And how far would we get if we did doubt such things? This brings us back to the supporting structure that gives language its foothold. The language of doubting is sustained only because the supporting structure (reality) supports it. Remove the supporting structure and there are no doubts, because there is no language. We learn to trust things first, then we learn what it means to not trust.

"We just do not see how very specialized the use of 'I know' is (OC 11).

"For 'I know seems [my emphasis] to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression 'I thought I knew' (OC 12)."

There are clearly a variety of correct uses of the words "I know," and each of these correct uses reflects one of the several ways we are able to objectively verify how it is we know that something is or is not the case. Some of the ways we verify how it is we know, include, logic (inductive and deductive reasoning), sensory experience (I know the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it), linguistic training (I learn how to correctly use words through linguistic training.), and finally, testimony (much of what we learn and know comes through the testimony of others). These are some of the ways we learn to correctly use the word know. Each of these ways gives a justification to our claim to know. One must demonstrate or show that one really does know. The claim "I know," does nothing by itself. All it is doing is showing your conviction that you know. One's conviction is only an assurance, but surely that is not enough to make the claim that you know (OC 15).

Given that this is the way we use the word know, what is the problem with Moore's proposition? The problem (one of the problems) is that Moore is using the word know in conjunction with a statement that generally has no need of justification. There are some basic statements about reality that do not need any justification, i.e., in some way they are foundational. These propositions (more like pseudo propositions) have the function of supporting our language, and hence, the language-game of epistemology. Wittgenstein never really worked out how we should describe these kinds of statements. He refers to them in a variety of ways. He calls them hinge-propositions, bedrock propositions, foundational propositions, etc. In OC 415 Wittgenstein says, "...certain propositions seem to underlie all questions and all thinking." This is one of the reasons I refer to these propositions as a kind of foundation, without which we no language. It seems to follow from this that talk of knowing falls apart without these bedrock propositions.

I think what Wittgenstein is referring to is a bedrock or foundational belief that undergirds everything. I do not think they should be called propositions.

Note that if one claims to know, then it means that in some way he has verified his claim (as pointed out in the previous post). But more than this, it has to be possible for him to make sure that his claim is correct, i.e., that he really does know what he claims to know. However, in Moore's case what would it mean to make sure? Do I have a closer look at my hand to make sure it's not my foot? It's the making sure part that lacks sense in Moore's case.

If I claim to know the history of England, there are ways to verify my knowledge. And, note, that if someone doubts that you are an English historian, there are ways to remove the doubt, so to speak, by objectively verifying one's claim. The doubts of others is why one's claim to know needs justification. But what if one's claim to knowledge brings no doubt to mind. In other words, what if we generally can't doubt a particular claim (like Moore's claim, that he knows he has hands)? I'm talking about particular claims within specified contexts (for e.g. Moore's context). If Moore's claim cannot be doubted, i.e., we cannot imagine its justification, then it's not a knowledge claim. How we come to doubt someone's claim to knowledge is important in terms of understanding the correct use of know. Again, if it's not possible to doubt in a given context, then it's not possible to know. The proper doubts of others, is what tests our claims. This is why Wittgenstein points out the importance of the phrase "I thought I knew." It's the doubt that brings the negation of "I know." It's also the doubt that can affirm one's claim to knowledge.

"It's not a matter of Moore's knowing that there's a hand there, but rather we should not understand him if he were to say 'Of course I may be wrong about this'. We should ask 'What is it like to make such a mistake as that?'--e.g. what's it like to discover it was a mistake (OC 32)?"

Wittgenstein's proposal of the hinge proposition may close down one route for the sceptic, but opens another.

Wittgenstein said that language has meaning within the context of its language game, meaning is determined by use, and the language game corresponds to a reality. A game such as chess has rules, but different games have different rules. A language game may be internally logically coherent and correspond to a reality, but each language game will correspond to a different reality. I look at the optical illusion "Rabbit and Duck" and see a rabbit, my reality is the rabbit. Another person looks and sees a duck, their reality is the duck. We may have the same perception but arrive at different interpretations. The sceptic may rightly ask for what reason should one interpretation have precedence over another.

Wittgenstein is correct that there is no room for a sceptic within a particular language game, but as the reality of each language game is relative, the sceptic may still ask for justification as to which language game is nearer to the absolute reality.

On Certainty it is not only Moore's claim to knowledge that Wittgenstein criticizes, but he also critiques the skeptic, and specifically their use of the word doubt. — Sam26

It's tough on philosophers, to be deprived of obvious choices. I know between certainty and doubt, one has to go but to disallow both is going to leave even the best thinkers scratching their heads.

I can get a handle on how certainty can be questioned but to claim, if I read the OP correctly, that doubt ain't it too is as perplexing as it is depressing.

Wittgenstein said that language has meaning within the context of its language game, meaning is determined by use, and the language game corresponds to a reality. A game such as chess has rules, but different games have different rules. A language game may be internally logically coherent and correspond to a reality, but each language game will correspond to a different reality. I look at the optical illusion "Rabbit and Duck" and see a rabbit, my reality is the rabbit. Another person looks and sees a duck, their reality is the duck. We may have the same perception but arrive at different interpretations. The sceptic may rightly ask for what reason should one interpretation have precedence over another. — RussellA

Yes, part of what Wittgenstein said is that language derives meaning within the context of a language-game, and that meaning is closely connected with how we use a word in language-games. However, this is not to say that all language-games have the same force, or that we can arbitrarily make up any language-game and derive meaning from it. The same is true of use, I can't arbitrarily use words the way I want without the loss of meaning.

Not all language-games or all uses are correct. If I teach a child how to use the word pencil, and later the child points to a cat, and says, pencil, then their use of the word is incorrect, even if it's used in a particular language-game. Furthermore, note that use gets its force within a culture of agreement, and even this has its limits. So, there is a kind of objective reality in our agreement (at least generally). If there wasn't we wouldn't be able to communicate.

If I understand you correctly, you seem to be saying that each of us has a different reality (a subjective view of things), which in turn causes us to interpret things differently. Without getting into your use of the word reality, suffice it to say that you, just as the child in my example, cannot derive meaning based on how you, personally, use words. No more than you can play the game of chess by using your own rules. No one would know what you're doing. You wouldn't be playing the game of chess, as much as you might protest. After all, you might protest, it's my reality.

Meaning is derived within our world of reality, but it's not subjective, i.e., it's not something I personally determine. Meaning is derived from the social nature of language within the confines of an agreed upon reality (the agreement is general in nature). The fact that the Earth has one moon cannot be seen in the same light as the duck rabbit illustration. I don't look at the moon and see two moons while you see one. Reality, in general, is not like the duck rabbit picture.

You seem to think that all interpretations are equal, and this goes back to your subjective view (or the skeptics subjective view as you presented it), as if my interpretation is the only one that counts for me. However, if I want to use language as a tool to communicate, then there are standards that correspond to the correct use of the words within that language. The standard is derived from a community of language users, not through some internal reality.

If the skeptic replies "why should one interpretation have precedence over another," then one could answer, that not all interpretations are equal. In other words, in terms of language and the language-game, again, meaning is not a matter of your personal interpretation. The radical skeptic (I'm referring to a specific kind of skepticism, not all skepticism) is not playing the game correctly. And, this must be viewed from outside our subjective view. It's viewed by looking at the community of language users, not one's personal interpretation. One's personal interpretation may or may not line up with the community, and this corresponds to the correct or incorrect interpretation. When I say correct and incorrect, I'm speaking generally, if it wasn't true generally, language would simply fall apart.

I'm not denying the subjective, I'm simply saying that the subjective has nothing to do with how meaning is derived within a society of language users.

Wittgenstein said... the language game corresponds to a reality. — RussellA

Did he?

Where?

It's tough on philosophers, to be deprived of obvious choices. I know between certainty and doubt, one has to go but to disallow both is going to leave even the best thinkers scratching their heads.

I can get a handle on how certainty can be questioned but to claim, if I read the OP correctly, that doubt ain't it too is as perplexing as it is depressing. — TheMadFool

Wittgenstein isn't disallowing the use of know and doubt, he is saying that in some cases philosophers are not using the words correctly. By the way, I know that in some cases we use the word certainty as a synonym for know, but to avoid confusion I stick with Moore's use of know.