I was going to reply using my own words but I found a source that words it better than I could:

In the briefest of outlines, the Stoic theory held that the only good thing is virtue (aretê, ‘excellence of character’) and the only bad thing is vice, its opposite. Everything else is ‘indifferent’ between virtue and vice, being in no sense at all good or bad. Thus the Stoics maintained that the bulk of humanity, in pursuing wealth and material goods, status, health and anything at all that is popularly conceiving of as good is making a mistake so long as that pursuit is based on the belief that these things really are good, or are desirable because they are good. Living virtuously is necessary and sufficient for living well and being happy, and the ‘indifferent’ things, although worth pursuing to the extent that it is appropriate for human beings to seek adequate shelter, sustenance and companionship, are in no way required for eudaimonia.

So pleasure and suffering only become "good" or "bad", ethically, when they are associated with virtue or vice. Otherwise they are indifferent, neutral, and are not required to obtain eudaimonia.

Of course if you consider yourself a hedonist then I suppose this doesn't have much bearing on your conception of the world. But for those who do not subscribe to a strictly hedonistic philosophy of living, Stoicism might be of aid.

But for those who do not subscribe to a strictly hedonistic philosophy of living, Stoicism might be of aid. — darthbarracuda

I do not think what is good depends on what you think is good, or what philosophy you ascribe to. In other words, I do not see hedonism as a kind of attitude one adopts toward the world which somehow makes pleasure good; rather, pleasure is good, and hedonism is the recognition of this, and it is true whether you recognize it in a doctrine or not.

So it makes no sense to say that what will be of aid to you depends on which philosophy you adopt, if by 'be of aid' you mean 'be good,' and what is good isn't dependent on your philosophical worldview.

And yes, Stoicism says pleasure and pain aren't inherently good or bad, but this is wrong. Pleasure and pain are the only things that are good or bad on their own terms. Things like virtue, and so on, are only good in virtue of certain arbitrary opinions, customs, consequences, social norms, etc., and then only insofar as they are efficient causes of pleasure. In other words, virtue is always 'good insofar as...' whereas there is no 'insofar as' for pleasure and pain. Virtue is sometimes an efficient cause of both pleasure and pain, and so intrinsically is neither good nor bad, but indifferent.

rather, pleasure is good, and hedonism is the recognition of this, and it is true whether you recognize it in a doctrine or not. — The Great Whatever

No offense but this is a total cop-out argument. I mean, how am I supposed to have a discussion with someone who will just say that I'm blind to the obvious (that pleasure is good)? It won't matter if I disagree with the proposition that pleasure is an intrinsic good.

Furthermore, this line of argument is not only applicable to hedonism. It's applicable to any position.

So it makes no sense to say that what will be of aid to you depends on which philosophy you adopt, if by 'be of aid' you mean 'be good,' and what is good isn't dependent on your philosophical worldview. — The Great Whatever

I might disagree that pleasure is intrinsically good. And when I say "aid someone" I mean to help someone with problems they might be facing.

And yes, Stoicism says pleasure and pain aren't inherently good or bad, but this is wrong. Pleasure and pain are the only things that are good or bad on their own terms. — The Great Whatever

Hypothetically speaking I could disagree. You could call me out and say I'm wrong, but how would you actually formulate an argument except by simply copping out and proclaiming that you are right even if I don't recognize it?

Things like virtue, and so on, are only good in virtue of certain arbitrary opinions, customs, consequences, social norms, etc., and then only insofar as they are efficient causes of pleasure. — The Great Whatever

Pleasure may be defined differently. Obviously a Stoic is going to disagree with your assessment that all pleasure is good no matter what. Also, pleasure being a "good" is really only based on the arbitrary basis of our conscious experiences and our opinions of them. A nihilist could just as easily say this is all bullocks and that there is no good or bad experiences.

In other words, virtue is always 'good insofar as...' — The Great Whatever

Insofar that it leads to eudaimonia, which is not equal to pleasure.

For the record, I am sympathetic to preference utilitarianism.

No offense but this is a total cop-out argument. I mean, how am I supposed to have a discussion with someone who will just say that I'm blind to the obvious (that pleasure is good)? It won't matter if I disagree with the proposition that pleasure is an intrinsic good. — darthbarracuda

I'm not saying you're blind to the obvious, I'm saying that the above defense of Stoicism seemed to operate on the premise that what is good in some sense depends on what you think is good, and so what is helpful will depend on what philosophy you adopt. But I am denying this.

I might disagree that pleasure is intrinsically good. — darthbarracuda

You can disagree with whatever you want. But if you disagreed, you would simply be wrong.

And when I say "aid someone" I mean to help someone with problems they might be facing.

It may be that a philosophy that is wrong about what is good nonetheless is an efficient cause of good things. But it can't be so on its own terms, if you like -- only by accident.

Hypothetically speaking I could disagree. You could call me out and say I'm wrong, but how would you actually formulate an argument except by simply copping out and proclaiming that you are right even if I don't recognize it? — darthbarracuda

I would ask you to elucidate your position on what is good, and because it would be internally inconsistent, draw out a contradiction from it.

Pleasure may be defined differently. — darthbarracuda

No it may not. 'Pleasure' is a word of English whose meaning arises from usage. You cannot stipulate that its definition is whatever you want it to be.

Also, pleasure being a "good" is really only based on the arbitrary basis of our conscious experiences and our opinions of them. — darthbarracuda

No, it is not. It doesn't matter if your opinion is that e.g. pain is not bad, it still will be. To see, this just note that someone can't make what is bad about pain go away by deciding to have the opinion that it isn't bad.

A nihilist could just as easily say this is all bullocks and that there is no good or bad experiences. — darthbarracuda

They can say whatever they please -- but they would be wrong. There are good and bad experiences, regardless of what the nihilist thinks -- i.e., pleasant and painful ones.

Insofar that it leads to eudaimonia, which is not equal to pleasure.

Pain is intrinsically good, whether it leads to eudaimonia or not. Eudaimonia, on the other hand, is in itself indifferent, and only good insofar it leads to pleasure.

You can disagree with whatever you want. But if you disagreed, you would simply be wrong. — The Great Whatever

You are wrong. ayy

I would ask you to elucidate your position on what is good, and because it would be internally inconsistent, draw out a contradiction from it. — The Great Whatever

Like I said, I'm sympathetic to preference utilitarianism.

A man rapes a woman. This woman does not want to be raped, even though she might actually be feeling pleasure. Does this mean it is good?

It would disgusting if you said it was good because she was feeling pleasure, and pleasure was good.

Oftentimes our preference are motivated by pleasure. But not always. Satisfied Preference is my conception of good.

A man rapes a woman. This woman does not want to be raped, even though she might actually be feeling pleasure. Does this mean it is good? — darthbarracuda

The reason rape is bad is that it is traumatic and highly painful, both during and for a long period of time afterward.

Oftentimes our preference are motivated by pleasure. But not always. Satisfied Preference is my conception of good. — darthbarracuda

I never said our preferences are always motivated by pleasure. But it does follow, quite obviously, that not all of our preferences are motivated by what is good.

And yes, Stoicism says pleasure and pain aren't inherently good or bad, but this is wrong. Pleasure and pain are the only things that are good or bad on their own terms — The Great Whatever

Prove it.

I'm not saying you're blind to the obvious, I'm saying that the above defense of Stoicism seemed to operate on the premise that what is good in some sense depends on what you think is good, and so what is helpful will depend on what philosophy you adopt. But I am denying this. — The Great Whatever

No, just like you, Stoicism operates on the principle that virtue is the only good REGARDLESS of what you think. If you think differently, then you are simply wrong.

But for those who do not subscribe to a strictly hedonistic philosophy of living, Stoicism might be of aid. — darthbarracuda

I don't think so. Someone who does not subscribe to a hedonistic philosophy of living hardly needs anyone telling them good is only about feeling pleasure. They already know. No aid required.

For someone to be aided by the discovery of Stoicism, by the realisation good was not equivalent to only pleasure, they would have to find themselves disgruntled by their own understanding of good and its relationship to pleasure. Stoicism aids those who hate the idea of good being about only pleasure, but nevertheless still think that's what defines good. It consists of a new understanding which they can feel comfortable with, the realisation good doesn't have to be about just feeling pleasure, unlike one has previously thought and hated themselves for doing so. Stoicism is of aid to those hurt by the philosophy of hedonism.

Pleasure may be defined differently. Obviously a Stoic is going to disagree with your assessment that all pleasure is good no matter what. Also, pleasure being a "good" is really only based on the arbitrary basis of our conscious experiences and our opinions of them. A nihilist could just as easily say this is all bullocks and that there is no good or bad experiences. — darthbarracuda

The opposition you and TGW are squabbling over here is incoherent. Good, by definition, always involves pleasure. When something good happens, there is an absence of the hurt, of the pain, that some terrible event which ought to have been avoided is present. In any instance of good, of virtue, of eudaimonia, there is pleasure. Good feels nice. Always. Even when it hurts.

Someone giving-up a once in a lifetime opportunity to their favourite musical act, so they can help their sick friend with something they need, still feels good about doing it, even as they might be furious at the world for aligning events in such a way. It is this state which constitutes their understanding they do good, that something which ought to have been done happened.

TGW is half right: doing good is always about feeling pleasure.

Where TGW goes wrong is in separating pleasure from the act which creates it. Performing good is about more than just feeling pleasure. As many example shows, the fact something feels nice or gives pleasure doesn't indicate either that a person wants it or that it is a good act. Otherwise killing someone for fun would be just as good as listening to your favourite band.

Good is always indexical. It is defined not merely by the presence of pleasure (though that is always there), but by the specific feeling of pleasure with other events of the world. The sort, timing, origin and environment of a sensation of pleasure are all important. Some of those moments are good. Others are very bad indeed. Good is not given by anything (e.g. pleasure, taking some action, a stated principle). It is an expression of a moment and cannot be given by anything else. Each instance of good is inseparable from what exists in that moment. If I am do the good of writing this post, it must not only feel nice, but it can only be achieved in performing this specify act of writing.

When good is viewed in these terms, the point you are fighting over, whether there is good without pleasure or if pleasure constitutes good, disappears. Good is simultaneously about feeling pleasure (as understanding and performing good always feels nice), but is never about only feeling pleasure, as one is acting in the (good) manner which feels nice, rather than seeking to gain pleasure through "efficient action."

My critique is coming from another angle. My critique is saying that Stoicism is replacing one bad thing (anxiety and excess dwelling on pain) with an attitude of non-attachment and non-care which could be its own horror. I'll simply refer back to my first post as I would just restating my critique here.

Yet another critique I have is sometimes things in life are too annoying or repulsive to have perfect equanimity- no matter how great the effort. I suspect if a Stoic fell into a fetid sewer, filled to their mouth with raw sewage, with little escape, equanimity goes out the window- though contemplating equanimity in an internet forum will surely continue. — schopenhauer1

The non-attachment part is correct (but how is this a bad thing?), but Stoicism certainly does not promote non-care, this is a technical term you've added entirely by yourself. A third of Stoic philosophy, its ethics, is dedicated to devoting yourself to others and society as a whole. There is nothing in the philosophy that tells you not to care about anything, that is to say, to be indifferent. This is a big misunderstanding that needs to be corrected, so I'll help to do that.

There is a major problem with discussing Stoicism in a language that is foreign to it, as we are doing. Stoicism was developed in the Greek language, the words used in ancient Greek are not perfectly translatable without the English term having common-usage 'baggage'. This applies to more or less every word in Stoic philosophy when converted into English.This is why these conversations are best done with the most charitable of intentions -- so as to be fair to the philosophy itself -- and with a clear and definite understanding of key technical terms. If you want to have a worthwhile conversation about Stoicism, then you need to really know exactly what particular terms mean.

Stoicism uses two very similar words but with distinctly different meanings, "ἀδιάφορα" and "ἀπάθεια".

The term "ἀδιάφορα" is translated as such from the word "indifferents", or adiaphora. It is generally translated as "indifferents", but the full meaning of the word can be better understood as "things indifferent" - things that are indifferent. Remember that in Stoicism, things are only good or bad insofar as they are morally good and bad. There is no good or bad outside the moral sphere. Wealth is not good and poverty is not bad, because they do not have any moral value. Therefore, they are things that are morally indifferent.

The term "ἀπάθεια", or "apatheia", is slightly but importantly different. It means, literally, "without pathos", but is more generally understood as "without passion" or "without suffering". This is the key term you are misusing. Because it so closely resembles the word apathy, it is mistaken to mean indifference in the common-usage sense. But this isn't the case in the Stoicism. When the term indifference is used regarding Stoicism, is means a state of mind that is without suffering or passion, rather than an attitude or not caring towards external things, whether they be people or otherwise. Passion is used to mean irrational or overwhelming emotion - given that Stoics seek to live according to reason, it follows naturally that they use their reason to control their emotions so they operate at rational levels. The point of this control is not to abolish or repress emotions, as per the classic straw man against Stoicism, but to keep them within the bounds of reason. I don't think it's controversial to claim that no one who doesn't have their Descartes hat of absolute scepticism would find this objectionable, once properly understood. It's self-evident to me at least.

This conversation simply shouldn't continue unless these terms are both properly understood in the context of Stoicism and used as such from here on out.

My objection to your second paragraph is one that has been levelled at pessimists on PF before - that of exceptionally high expectations, and second, of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. You say that Stoicism is worthy of rejection because it isn't a perfect system - because it doesn't work in some hypothetically horrendous circumstances. These exceptionally high standards have previously lead to you being criticised for rejecting anything but a perfect world in the anti-natal threads. Then you tend to throw the baby out with the bathwater, as do other pessimists. From book II paragraph 15 of Marcus Aurelius' Meditations, "There are obvious objections to the Cynic Monimus' statement that 'things are determined by the view taken of them'; but the value of his aphorism is equally obvious, if we admit the substance of it so far as it contains a truth.", emphasis mine. So here, we can see that your objection has already been made some 2300 years ago, and addressed by Marcus Aurelius himself. No, it may not be an absolute truth that things are determined by the view taken of them (absolutely true as opposed to generally true) because in your estimation there are some circumstances where it may not work, but there are innumerable day to day scenarios where it does work and is true, and I won't condescend your imagination by pointing them out. It is a maxim that should be used as true only as far as it is true - your mileage may vary. It's simply unreasonable to deliberately attempt to extend this maxim to situations where it doesn't fit, and then reject it when it doesn't work. It's like complaining that your bicycle makes a terrible boat; it's a fine mode of transport when used where it works. However, there is nothing to say that one shouldn't make every effort to exhaust the potentiality of this maxim wherever possible. which, theoretically speaking, is in every scenario. The only limitation to it is your own mind, as James Stockdale can confirm. Therefore, any limitation to the maxim is the fault of the philosopher, not the philosophy.

The reason rape is bad is that it is traumatic and highly painful, both during and for a long period of time afterward. — The Great Whatever

No, the reason rape is bad is because the act is severely disregarding the preferences of another person. It can presumably still be rape and not "feel bad" in terms of pain.

I never said our preferences are always motivated by pleasure. But it does follow, quite obviously, that not all of our preferences are motivated by what is good. — The Great Whatever

Well, you said your position was that pleasure is the only good.

Stoicism uses two very similar words but with distinctly different meanings, "ἀδιάφορα" and "ἀπάθεια".

The term "ἀπάθεια", or "apatheia", is slightly but importantly different. It means, literally, "without pathos", but is more generally understood as "without passion" or "without suffering". This is the key term you are misusing. Because it so closely resembles the word apathy, it is mistaken to mean indifference in the common-usage sense. But this isn't the case in the Stoicism. When the term indifference is used regarding Stoicism, is means a state of mind that is without suffering or passion, rather than an attitude or not caring towards external things, whether they be people or otherwise. Passion is used to mean irrational or overwhelming emotion - given that Stoics seek to live according to reason, it follows naturally that they use their reason to control their emotions so they operate at rational levels. The point of this control is not to abolish or repress emotions, as per the classic straw man against Stoicism, but to keep them within the bounds of reason. I don't think it's controversial to claim that no one who doesn't have their Descartes hat of absolute scepticism would find this objectionable, once properly understood. It's self-evident to me at least. — WhiskeyWhiskers

I don't know what this means "in the bounds of reason". Is it not "in the bounds of reason" to mourn the loss of a loved one? What does it mean to be without passion? Excessive emotion? We have to define what the boundaries of excessive and reasonable are here. I would agree that mourning to the point of paralysis is no good, but mourning in itself for something one cared about doesn't seem "unreasonable" (whatever that means). My premise earlier is that a life without caring, is possibly a life not worth living, and part of caring is dealing with loss of what one cares about- which does not mean being completely equanimous in the face of a loved one's death. So perhaps we agree as long as we agree on the boundaries of where this "reasonable" and "passionate" distinction lies.

My objection to your second paragraph is one that has been levelled at pessimists on PF before - that of exceptionally high expectations, and second, of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. You say that Stoicism is worthy of rejection because it isn't a perfect system - because it doesn't work in some hypothetically horrendous circumstances. These exceptionally high standards have previously lead to you being criticised for rejecting anything but a perfect world in the anti-natal threads. Then you tend to throw the baby out with the bathwater, as do other pessimists. — WhiskeyWhiskers

Yes, this world is non-ideal and thus not worth starting. Once alive, my preferred mode is rebellion against the condition of non-ideality. I don't see how filling one's time with "virtue' or following the dictates of universal "Reason" (an existence of which is obviously debatable), necessarily follows. One can say any number of things necessarily follows from non-ideality. I personally don't see how thinking or doing virtuous things (can anyone "really" tell if they are doing these things?) means one has found the key to ideality in a non-ideal world. To me, it is like "defining" the standards of morality based on ancient Greek definitions and then just showing off (to oneself but most definitely to others) that one is following them.

I rarely advocate for an actual methodology and I indulge Schopenhauer's asceticism because it is completely world-denying. However, I have always doubted the efficacy of such methodology (along with Buddhism proper) on actually doing anything to get rid of suffering (especially in achieving things like Nirvana-state, etc.). I have the same doubts with Stoicism. In fact, I abhor the idea that I am born into a non-ideal world and that the way to ideality is not having passion except for virtuous things. This seems like a vicious circularity. I am being virtuous to be virtuous to be virtuous. Somehow the elusive term Eudaimonia is supposed to follow from this, but I don't see how. I can imagine someone being virtuous and not feeling satisfied. I am sure you can then say that this means that the person isn't truly virtuous, but then the idea that someone feels satisfied when doing non-virtuous things comes up. But then you might say that this isn't truly satisfied or long-lasting, in which case one can question how one knows. Then it just becomes "one knows it". Then everything becomes self-justified and the system is simply encapsulated in its own self-justification.

From book II paragraph 15 of Marcus Aurelius' Meditations, "There are obvious objections to the Cynic Monimus' statement that 'things are determined by the view taken of them'; but the value of his aphorism is equally obvious, if we admit the substance of it so far as it contains a truth.", emphasis mine. So here, we can see that your objection has already been made some 2300 years ago, and addressed by Marcus Aurelius himself. No, it may not be an absolute truth that things are determined by the view taken of them (absolutely true as opposed to generally true) because in your estimation there are some circumstances where it may not work, but there are innumerable day to day scenarios where it does work and is true, and I won't condescend your imagination by pointing them out. It is a maxim that should be used as true only as far as it is true - your mileage may vary. It's simply unreasonable to deliberately attempt to extend this maxim to situations where it doesn't fit, and then reject it when it doesn't work. It's like complaining that your bicycle makes a terrible boat; it's a fine mode of transport when used where it works. However, there is nothing to say that one shouldn't make every effort to exhaust the potentiality of this maxim wherever possible. which, theoretically speaking, is in every scenario. The only limitation to it is your own mind, as James Stockdale can confirm. Therefore, any limitation to the maxim is the fault of the philosopher, not the philosophy.

Granted, but the point is that this methodology is highly contingent on various situations. The sewage example was extreme but I can be more subtle and say that certain people might be in situations that are not amenable to easily access the methodologies of Stoicism (mental conditions, temperaments, situations, etc.). Thus, when the rubber meets the road, it can be useless in that regard. Perhaps for a certain norm-defined condition, situation, personality-type, etc. its efficacy is useful.

Excellent post!

You say this world is non-ideal. This implies you have a standard of ideality, you know what would be ideal. But how can you have such a standard? All standards are necessarily prisoners of this world, because they presuppose the world, or at least it's logical structure. To me a world with no suffering is an abomination: absolutely incoherent and incomprehensible. No world that is anything like what we understand by world can be like that. To me, an ideal world must have the potential for suffering always present. The only reason why I enjoy few moments in life is because of all the other moments I don't enjoy. The only reason I enjoy when people are nice to me is because there's always the possibility of them not being nice. And i cannot even conceive of a world in which everyone was nice and I was happy about it. As Schopenhauer put it, if that was the case, I would start wars, violence, divisions, aggression etc. myself

You say this world is non-ideal. This implies you have a standard of ideality, you know what would be ideal. But how can you have such a standard? All standards are necessarily prisoners of this world, because they presuppose the world, or at least it's logical structure. To me a world with no suffering is an abomination: absolutely incoherent and incomprehensible. No world that is anything like what we understand by world can be like that. To me, an ideal world must have the potential for suffering always present. The only reason why I enjoy few moments in life is because of all the other moments I don't enjoy. The only reason I enjoy when people are nice to me is because there's always the possibility of them not being nice. And i cannot even conceive of a world in which everyone was nice and I was happy about it. As Schopenhauer put it, if that was the case, I would start wars, violence, divisions, aggression etc. myself — Agustino

I think I agree with Schopenhauer that non-ideality can be likened to an always "becoming". There is in a certain sense a "lack" which presupposes the world. There are annoying things, painful things, frustrating things, and a need for things which we "lack" for no better term (desire/goals/survival). Opposed to this would be "being". Being and not becoming is a strange concept as you note, because it is not the condition of our world. A completely ideal world would be one of being and not becoming. This is probably the elusive state that Buddhists and ascetics are trying for (not to say they are getting it or will come closer to it, or even be able to attain it in principle).

Schopenhauer has a quote describing this state:

Accordingly this is a finite existence, and its antithesis would be an infinite, neither exposed to any attack from without nor in want of help from without, and hence [Greek: aei hosautos on], in eternal rest; [Greek: oute gignomenon, oute apollymenon], without change, without time, and without diversity; the negative knowledge of which is the fundamental note of Plato’s philosophy. The denial of the will to live reveals the way to such a state as this. — Schopenhauer

I think I agree with Schopenhauer that non-ideality can be likened to an always "becoming". There is in a certain sense a "lack" which presupposes the world. There are annoying things, painful things, frustrating things, and a need for things which we "lack" for no better term (desire/goals/survival). Opposed to this would be "being". Being and not becoming is a strange concept as you note, because it is not the condition of our world. A completely ideal world would be one of being and not becoming. This is probably the elusive state that Buddhists and ascetics are trying for (not to say they are getting it or will come closer to it, or even be able to attain it in principle). — schopenhauer1

But you forget that any concept of ideality already presupposes the logical structure of this world - becoming. Hence, a world of being is incoherent and cannot be ideal. I cannot even imagine such a world, much less find it ideal.

No, the reason rape is bad is because the act is severely disregarding the preferences of another person. It can presumably still be rape and not "feel bad" in terms of pain. — darthbarracuda

What do you mean by 'preferences?' One thing you might mean are pleasures and pains, which doesn't help. Another thing you might mean is what people, when asked, say they approve and disapprove of; but this is clearly of not help, since you can't make something good or bad just by holding a certain opinion or saying it is. If that were true, there would be no problems, since you could just decide to approve of everything that happened and make it good. So 'preferences' must be something in that sense beyond your control. But then, what are they?

Well, you said your position was that pleasure is the only good. — darthbarracuda

Yes.

Prove it. — Agustino

One way to test whether something is intrinsically good or bad, rather than merely relative to something, is to do the 'so what?' test. The question is, given that something happens that someone claims is intrinsically good, can one sensibly ask 'so what?' and force to be given an intelligible answer? If so, then it seems there is some external reason for holding that the initial thing is good.

Suppose, for example, I claim money is intrinsically good. If I then hold up some money I got and say 'look, I have money!' I might ask, 'so what?' What's good about that? And there is an answer to this question: so, I can buy things, I can show off my status, etc. But then, it is being able to buy things, and showing off one's status, that is good, and money is only an efficient cause of this, that is, good only insofar as it leads to those things, and not good insofar as it doesn't. Money therefore stops being good in an apocalyptic wasteland where it no longer affords me those purported goods. When whatever I answer 'so what?' with can't be acquired, then the value of the merely extrinsically good thing disappears.

Notice that this is impossible with pleasure or pain. If someone is in pain, then to ask 'so what?' is pointless. There is no other reason that pain is bad, and nothing that can be added to it, that is not pain, that can make it worse. That is, the pain itself already answers that question, as by virtue of it being pain, it is impossible not to care about it precisely to the extent that it is pain, and not because of anything else. Pain's value, its badness, is thus intrinsic. Notice that virtue is not like this: we may find virtue instrumentally bad where it is not serviceable to something else.

Another thing you might mean is what people, when asked, say they approve and disapprove of; but this is clearly of not help, since you can't make something good or bad just by holding a certain opinion or saying it is. — The Great Whatever

Why not?

If that were true, there would be no problems, since you could just decide to approve of everything that happened and make it good. — The Great Whatever

Bullshit, we don't have that kind of omnipotent control over our preferences. I can't just say that being stabbed is okay to make it okay. It's not okay. I would prefer not to get stabbed because I prefer to not feel the sensation of suffering. But suffering alone without any preference has no value. Same with pleasure.

Interesting. I can see this working for pain. You can't ask "So what? What's bad about that?" to someone who says they're in pain. The very asking of the question is impossible.

But, the same cannot be said about pleasure. If someone says they're having great pleasure, I can proceed to ask "So what? What's great about that?". There will be no acceptable answer to me, if I don't already consider pleasure to be intrinsically good. I might think that you're wasting your time, as pleasure itself is empty - neither good, nor bad - as such it is to be expected that you will not be able to answer in any way as pleasure itself is a dead-end for you. Notice that this underlies that "the good" is more than just simple pleasure. Maybe it's pleasure associated/derived from virtue. Maybe virtuous pleasure. But certainly pleasure alone is not sufficient to qualify as good.

For example, if someone could be given a pill to feel intense happiness and pleasure all the time - and they decided to take it - and then proceeded to sit on the couch for their whole life - I would not consider them to be living a good life.

Why not? — darthbarracuda

Because if you could, all problems would be trivial, and in effect there would be no problems, since you could just decide that they were not problems. But this is not so.

Bullshit, we don't have that kind of omnipotent control over our preferences. I can't just say that being stabbed is okay to make it okay. It's not okay. I would prefer not to get stabbed because I prefer to not feel the sensation of suffering. But suffering alone without any preference has no value. Same with pleasure. — darthbarracuda

So you seem to be making a strange claim here:

1) We cannot control our preferences.
2) The reason we cannot control our preferences is because we cannot control what causes us to suffer.
3) Yet our preferences are in some sense independent from this suffering.

But how so? Note that 'suffering' sounds a lot like 'pain,' and if you believe this, you will collapse into the hedonist position.

So it is our preference that we not feel suffering, but that preference might be different? But how? How is it possible to prefer suffering? And is this meta-preference itself something that can be changed at whim? If not, and we have no control over it, what is this preference? And if the preference collapses just into feeling suffering itself -- viz., feeling suffering itself means a kind of 'dispreference,' then we have hedonism yet again.

But, the same cannot be said about pleasure. If someone says they're having great pleasure, I can proceed to ask "So what? What's great about that?". There will be no acceptable answer to me, if I don't already consider pleasure to be intrinsically good. I might think that you're wasting your time, as pleasure itself is empty - neither good, nor bad - as such it is to be expected that you will not be able to answer in any way as pleasure itself is a dead-end for you. Notice that this underlies that "the good" is more than just simple pleasure. Maybe it's pleasure associated/derived from virtue. Maybe virtuous pleasure. But certainly pleasure alone is not sufficient to qualify as good. — Agustino

But insofar as pleasure is good, there is no extrinsic reason for its being good. It is not 'good because of...' and nothing can be added to it other than pleasure itself to make it any better (as with pain).

For example, if someone could be given a pill to feel intense happiness and pleasure all the time - and they decided to take it - and then proceeded to sit on the couch for their whole life - I would not consider them to be living a good life. — Agustino

First, the question is what is good, not what a good life is -- the latter presupposes that a 'life' is the appropriate unit of consideration for what counts as good. Second, your consideration that this is not good is a mere extrinsic opinion, while the pleasure itself is good on its own terms, and so external opinions as to whether it is good don't matter to it (since nothing external can 'make it bad').

But insofar as pleasure is good, there is no extrinsic reason for its being good. It is not 'good because of...' and nothing can be added to it other than pleasure itself to make it any better (as with pain). — The Great Whatever

Well said, only insofar as it is good, which is admitting that pleasure is not always good :)

Second, your consideration that this is not good is a mere extrinsic opinion, while the pleasure itself is good on its own terms, and so external opinions as to whether it is good don't matter to it (since nothing external can 'make it bad'). — The Great Whatever

But if I myself lived such a life I would be unsatisfied, and unhappy. Why is that?

Well said, only insofar as it is good, which is admitting that pleasure is not always good

I don't see how you can claim this unless you think pleasure is either always good or always not good. After all, the features of it relevant to its goodness are always the same qua pleasure. It is good in virtue of being pleasant, and pleasure is of course always pleasant. So it seems to me to take this position you must claim that being pleasant is never a good thing. Which is what the Stoic says, but this is not true.

But if I myself lived such a life I would be unsatisfied, and unhappy. Why is that?

Are dissatisfaction and unhappiness kinds of pain? If not, then what are they? If they are, then ex hypothesi haven't you stipulated by your very example that you are not unsatisfied or unhappy?

So you seem to be making a strange claim here:

1) We cannot control our preferences.
2) The reason we cannot control our preferences is because we cannot control what causes us to suffer.
3) Yet our preferences are in some sense independent from this suffering. — The Great Whatever

Erm, no. I don't claim to know how preferences work, although I might actually end up pursuing a degree that may help solve this.

Pain by itself is not worth anything. There must be an entity that attributes a value to this experience. This is why pain is not necessarily equal to suffering. A person who is into BDSM, for example, wouldn't consider the pain associated with it to be suffering. They would actively pursue it.

Pleasure by itself it not worth anything in the same way as well. For example, let's there's a box of chocolates next to me. Eating them will stimulate my taste buds, release some dopamine to be sure, and give me a "pleasurable" experience. But say I want to lose weight. What then? Am I still enjoying this box of chocolates if I know I need to lose weight?

The problem I see with pure hedonism is that it inevitably leads to unsavory scenarios. Situations such as being jacked up on drugs simply because they make you feel pleasure. Even if I don't want to take these drugs, I would still be obligated to as a hedonist because pleasure is seen as good no matter what. This is otherwise known as the experience machine thought experiment.

But why would this be bad? To say this scenario would be bad would be to appeal to something other than the experience of pleasure. This is, as I have said, the preferences of the individual.

I don't see how you can claim this unless you think pleasure is either always good or always not good. After all, the features of it relevant to its goodness are always the same qua pleasure. It is good in virtue of being pleasant, and pleasure is of course always pleasant. So it seems to me to take this position you must claim that being pleasant is never a good thing. Which is what the Stoic says, but this is not true. — The Great Whatever

I have suspended judgement on Stoicism at the moment, to permit an investigation into this. Do not take my agreements as final. However, pleasure, as meaning is use, is used in quite a few different ways, and it refers to quite a few different things. There need to be more distinctions applied. I could see a quasi-Stoic agree with what qualifies as virtuous pleasure, but not what is most often thought as pleasure by the common lot of mankind for example.

Are dissatisfaction and unhappiness kinds of pain? If not, then what are they? If they are, then ex hypothesi haven't you stipulated by your very example that you are not unsatisfied or unhappy? — The Great Whatever

Yes to the first question. However - here lies the problem. Some distinctions need to be made about pleasure, because, as it can clearly be seen, some pleasures inevitably bring pain along with them. (like taking and living on the pill) Hence only some pleasures are good (those which never bring pain). Am I getting something wrong?

Pain by itself is not worth anything. — darthbarracuda

Sure, it is. Pain is intrinsically bad.

There must be an entity that attributes a value to this experience. This is why pain is not necessarily equal to suffering. A person who is into BDSM, for example, wouldn't consider the pain associated with it to be suffering. They would actively pursue it. — darthbarracuda

What do you mean by, attributes value to? If you mean that someone must feel the pain, then of course, otherwise it wouldn't be pain, since pain is a feeling.

What else would 'attribute a value to it' mean? Have an opinion on it? Put a price on it? But none of these things alter what is relevant to pain being bad, i.e. its very painfulness. So what difference does it make if you e.g. have an opinion that pain is not bad? So long as it's still just as painful, it's still just as bad.

As to BDSM, first, there is no contradiction in saying people actively seek out or want to inflict bad things on themselves. Second, there is no contradiction in saying that some bad things might be pursued because they are intermixed with good things (i.e., one can find pleasure in pain, but then one must in some sense find the act pleasant, or they are not 'into' BDSM to begin with).

Pleasure by itself it not worth anything in the same way as well. For example, let's there's a box of chocolates next to me. Eating them will stimulate my taste buds, release some dopamine to be sure, and give me a "pleasurable" experience. But say I want to lose weight. What then? Am I still enjoying this box of chocolates if I know I need to lose weight? — darthbarracuda

Of course you are. This might extrinsically cause some other bad thing, like gaining weight, but that too is only bad insofar as it is somehow painful to have more weight. Put anther way, eating the chocolate is not bad insofar as it is pleasant, but insofar as it causes you to gain weight. To see this, note that the dilemma disappears if the chocolate no longer causes you to gain weight, but is still just as pleasant.

The problem I see with pure hedonism is that it inevitably leads to unsavory scenarios. Situations such as being jacked up on drugs simply because they make you feel pleasure. Even if I don't want to take these drugs, I would still be obligated to as a hedonist because pleasure is seen as good no matter what. This is otherwise known as the experience machine thought experiment. — darthbarracuda

Hedonism as such is a claim about the good, and so makes no claims about obligations.

But why would this be bad? To say this scenario would be bad would be to appeal to something other than the experience of pleasure. This is, as I have said, the preferences of the individual. — darthbarracuda

Why would what be bad? Again, the point is not to elicit intuitions from external viewpoints about something being bad -- the point is, is the thing itself bad on its own terms? If your answer is no, what do your extrinsic, arbitrary opinions that nonetheless it is bad matter?

However - here lies the problem. Some distinctions need to be made about pleasure, because, as it can clearly be seen, some pleasures inevitably bring pain along with them. (like taking and living on the pill) Hence only some pleasures are good (those which never bring pain). Am I getting something wrong? — Agustino

If pleasures bring pain with them, then they are not bad insofar as they are pleasant, but insofar as pain is bad. Thus it is still the pain which is bad, not the pleasure, though pleasure may be an effiicient cause of bad things.

Sure, it is. Pain is intrinsically bad. — The Great Whatever

Stop asserting. Try arguing instead.

As to BDSM, first, there is no contradiction in saying people actively seek out or want to inflict bad things on themselves. Second, there is no contradiction in saying that some bad things might be pursued because they are intermixed with good things (i.e., one can find pleasure in pain, but then one must in some sense find the act pleasant, or they are not 'into' BDSM to begin with). — The Great Whatever

So you admit that pleasure and pain are not simply black and white labels for what is good and bad. There must be first a subject to experience them, and two, an opinion/preference about these experiences.

Of course you are. This might extrinsically cause some other bad thing, like gaining weight, but that too is only bad insofar as it is somehow painful to have more weight. Put anther way, eating the chocolate is not bad insofar as it is pleasant, but insofar as it causes you to gain weight. To see this, note that the dilemma disappears if the chocolate no longer causes you to gain weight, but is still just as pleasant. — The Great Whatever

But that's just what I'm saying, the circumstances are what dictate whether or not a pleasurable experience is desirable! The preference must come first. First, I must want to eat the chocolates. Then I can count it as a pleasurable experience.

Forcing me to eat the chocolates would be immoral because I would not want to eat them. It doesn't matter that I will inevitably taste the smooth, milky texture of the chocolate and get a spike in dopamine. That pleasure lacks any meaning towards me, and might as well not exist.

Hedonism as such is a claim about the good, and so makes no claims about obligations. — The Great Whatever

Okay, here we go, scenario time!

You, a hedonist, are walking down the street one afternoon when you bump into me. I tell you that I have a great offer that you won't be able to deny: an experience machine! You'll feel pleasure beyond your wildest imagination, but if you plug in, you will be in for the rest of your life. You will not be able to leave. But don't worry about your family or friends, I have plenty more of these machines back at my shop that I will hook them up to as well.

Being a hedonist, and professing that pleasure is the only good, you would be obligated to plug in to this machine on pain of contradicting your own philosophy. The only reason you wouldn't plug in would be because you don't desire to, even if there is pleasure available. Desire-satisfaction is a far better theory than hedonism.

If pleasures bring pain with them, then they are not bad insofar as they are pleasant, but insofar as pain is bad. Thus it is still the pain which is bad, not the pleasure, though pleasure may be an effiicient cause of bad things. — The Great Whatever

Agreed, but where do we go from here? You're not using pleasure as commonly used. The activity of taking the pill is called pleasurable in everyday discourse, even though it also brings pain in the long term.