Perhaps. Could this be filled out in an ineligible way?

Well. Heidegger was a Nazi. Not that there's anything wrong with that, but it is a difference.

In order to conflict, or to force, or any kind of violence, 'care' is presupposed. conflict and violence indicate that there is something that 'matters', that rejects me and that I feel something about. The world inescapably matters to me and that is why I might conflict with it. — Tobias

This sounds like you may be understanding care in a conventional sense. Tell me how you understand Heidegger’s notion of care in relation to his concept of temporality, because this ‘ equiprimordial’ relation between care, understanding, attunement and understanding is crucial to my treatment of ‘care’.

More specifically , the way the my ‘now’ projects my past into my future possibilities means that any ‘object’ in the world I experience is partially build out of my past. This is a crucial point , because it gives all my experiences the sense of a radical belonging to my past, at the same time that the ‘now’ contributes an element of absolute novelty. In this respect , Heidegger inherited Husserl’s formulation of the intentional act as a constitution built on a dimension similarity between previous history and what is encountered.

, Husserl's notion of the foreign must be understood in different terms than that of corporeal otherness. We have seen this difference manifested in the way that for Husserl I maintain an ongoing thread of subjective continuity within my participation in an intersubjective world. I want now to further explore the nature and philosophical justification for the internal integrity of the temporal stream of consciousness . My claim is that Husserl's articulation of the transcendentally reduced sphere of consciousness in terms (mineness, unitary, synthetic, continuous) that risk implying a solipsism closed off to the otherness of the world and history wasn't simply an unfortunate choice of terminology.

In Husserl there is a primordial motivational principle-anticipatory assimilation dominates the foreignness of the noematic object pole. We see the centrality of similarity manifest itself at all levels of constitution, in the subjective achievement of synthetic unities, analogical apperceptive pairing, associative relationality, correlations, harmonious fulfillments, subjective ‘mineness', variations, flowing multiplicities, congruities, nexuses, coherences, etc. Even in difference, negation, senselessness, irrationality, alienation there is no experience in consciousness that is not in an overarching way variation on a thematics (which are already assocative syntheses of variations on variations) for Husserl , a similarity-in-difference.
Now, it is true that Heidegger deconstructed Husserl’s notion of egoic consciousness, but his own work retains this idea of similarity in difference.

It is there also in Derrida’s interlocked concepts of ‘trace’, gramme and differance. The odd verbal construction ‘differance’ indicates
that for Derrida the irreducible primitive of experience, the trace, borrows from my immediate last in forming what differs from me. That is, any ‘object’ of my experience is parasitic in what it opposes itself
to. Therefore, my world cannot be something that ‘rejects’ me or conflicts with me except as
that rejection or conflict pre-supposes a more
fundamental belonging of what opposes itself
to me to my current concerns. It is only because I am already involved with something in a certain way and in relation to ongoing concerns that I can perceive it as conflicting or opposing or rejecting. So the
rejecting of me’ by an object I encounter , always takes place, is possible at all, only as a subordinate to a totality of relevance to which the ‘rejection’ belongs. Put differently , all the various ways in which what I experience affects me(surprising, rejecting, conflicting, agreeing) can do so only within a larger totality of relevance, Superodia to belong of what I encounter to my present understanding, which is why what I find conflictual is never the same as what you find conflictual.

Herein lies the problem I have with Heidegger. There is something like a 'true being with others', opposed to what, an untrue being with others? But if I am with others I am with others, there is no true or false. Just like Sorge, care, is not a self relation, it is a relation towards the other. that is what I mean with I as constituted by the world. It is not a self relation that lights a seinsverstehen, it is the other way around. I see that I care about things and realise that there is something like an I. — Tobias

It sounds like you’re situating an I over here and a world
over there and then putting them together, or choosing one as dominant over the other, the world as dominant over my self-reflexivity. But Heidegger isn’t starting from self and world in some kind of relation. Self-relation IS relation to world. What you need to do is look at the self that you have depicted and split it within itself. Split it so that instead of an entity or a reflexivity or a presence , it ‘is’ a change from past to
present, a differential. Forget about the ‘outside’ world that you think you know and see this world as already inherent in the split in the now. You’re starting from
presences ( Self and world ) and trying to create a difference from our of that binary. it you need to put difference BEFORE presencing.


Authentic being with others isn’t ‘true’ and
inauthentic ‘false’. Inauthentic being with
others is a derivative mode of mit-dasein, just as the present-to-hand is a derivative mode of
interpretation.

Heidegger chooses words like average, vague, flattened , confused and ambiguous to describe
Dasein’s being as Das Man, to indicate that the heedfulness of Care is still primordially and
implicitly operative even when it is explicitly concealed and suppressed . Average everyday
discourse has to be vague, approximate, superficial and ambiguous enough to conceal, disguise,
cover over, miss, obscure, suppress the fact that the meaning of what is shared is never
interpreted identically for each dasein.

“What is talked about is understood only approximately and superficially. One means the same
thing because it is in the same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is
said.” “Publicness ” does not get to "the heart of the matter," because it is insensitive to every
difference of level and genuineness.”

To say that in the mode of average everydayness Dasein disguises, covers over, conceals, obscures its genuine self, a genuine understanding, an originary and primordial way of appropriating the matter, “getting to the heart of the matter,” primordially genuine relations of
being toward the world, toward Mitda-sein, toward being-in itself, is to say that Dasein explicitly
experiences itself as a constituted self, introjecting norms from other selves , but this awareness
pre-supposes and is grounded in an implicit mineness.

Heidegger says average everydayness alienates Dasein from itself, but without Dasein’s therefore being merely conditioned by others.
“However, alienation cannot mean that Da-sein is factically torn away from itself....this alienation, which closes off to Da-sein its authenticity and possibility, even if only that of genuinely getting stranded, still does not surrender it to beings which it itself is not, but
forces it into its inauthenticity, into a possible kind of being of itself.”

Evidence that the heedful relevance and mineness of Care undergirds the normativity of average
everydayness, preventing it from being a mere introjection from world to self, come not only
from Heidegger’s treatment of idle talk and average everydayness, but also from his analysis of
the propositional statement. Here we see him using similar adjectives to describe what he calls an
‘extreme’ mode of present-to-handness : veiled, cut-off, levelled down.

In the present-to-hand propositional statement, “The as-structure of interpretation has undergone
a modification. The "as" no longer reaches out into a totality of relevance in its function of appropriating what is understood. It is cut off with regard to its possibilities of the articulation of referential relations of significance which constitute the character of the surrounding world.”

So the wider experience of a totality of relevance is that out of which something like a present-to- hand thing emerges. But it cuts itself off from , and thus conceals this contextual richness of significance and meaningfulness that it depends on and implies, and as a result it is impoverished of meaningful significance, intelligiblity, relevance. It is a ‘dwindling down’ relative to heedfully circumspective modes of experience.

Average everydayness of Das man and idle talk shares with the present to hand in general the features of being derivative modes of the ‘as’ structure of heedful circumspective significance, functioning as a contextually rich totality of relevance. They also share the feature of being a ‘dwindling down’ of that wider experience. Of central import here is that primary intersubjective models such as those of Gallagher and Merleau-Ponty and social constructionisms assume that, as Zahavi writes, “we take over from others (and make our own) a language, roles, attitudes and
norms” and that these culturally normed practices that we internalize represent forms of meaning no less robust in significance and relevance to our lives than those which we generate.

In contrast, for Heidegger the social norms and practices that Dasein takes in are specific modifications of meaning on the order of a diminution of significance. The publicness of Das Man and the present to handness of things are modes of Dasein representing a deprivation and trivialization of intelligibility, significance and relevance, and thus a reduction of meaningfulness. Dasein becomes alienated from itself not by being taken over by an outside but by encountering itself (its ownmost world of possibilities) as almost devoid of sense. Alienation as senselessness rather than internalization of an other.

They have much different critical postures toward philosophy. Both of them think philosophers spend their time asking the wrong questions, and these errors in questions asked derive from the way philosophers approach questioning itself.

Wittgenstein thought that the errors in these questioning strategies derived from insufficient attention payed to the context of philosophical language - with philosophy being particularly unmoored and thus occlusive. Philosophy as a dead, beached whale, mourn and then forget.

In contrast, Heidegger thought that errors in these questioning strategies derived from people paying insufficient attention to the context of philosophical language - with philosophy being particularly moored on ossified, unnoticed framing devices and thus occlusive. Philosophy as a still living, beached whale, and gotta save that whale.

Wittgenstein is an undertaker for the living, Heidegger is a necromancer for those that never died.

I'm finding this unineligible.

What I would reject is the notion that because a biography shines through, the arguments made can be rejected or accepted. Most importantly, that it would be a reason to spare yourself the difficulty of trying to understand a thinker. — Tobias

To clarify my position on how biography might affect a philosopher's work, I'm not claiming the relationship is causal but rather, in a broadly Nietzschean sense, diagnostic (or symptomological). Only by doing the hard work of studying the work are – and I very much agree with your suggestion, Tobias, that intellectual honesty requires this – its problematic aspects of a philosopher's thought made explicit which, thereby, offer cracks in the philosophy's 'reflective mask', so to speak, through which to correlate the role biography's pre/non-reflective face plays in a philosopher selecting, re/making, wearing & even changing his/her mask (or masks).

For this reason I think (for better and worse) Freddy anticipates – invents – psychoanalysis here:

Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood.

Then we agree it is eligible.

Wittgenstein thought that...philosophy being particularly unmoored and thus occlusive. Philosophy as a dead, beached whale, mourn and then forget.

In contrast, Heidegger thought ...philosophy being particularly moored on ossified, unnoticed framing devices and thus occlusive. Philosophy as a still living, beached whale, and gotta save that whale. — fdrake

Put another way, both Witt and Heidegger thought traditional philosophy failed to understand meaning as emerging out of contexts of social engagement
Witt associated all philosophy with traditional
metaphysics and did not know how to articulate his thinking as a kind of post-metaphysical
philosophy, having been unable to learn from Nietzsche’s approach. Heidegger, on the other hand , claimed to locate a way of doing philosophy that moved beyond metaphysics.He may very well have located Witt’s work within a religious metaphysics akin to Kierkegaard.

My oh My....

This sounds like you may be understanding care in a conventional sense. Tell me how you understand Heidegger’s notion of care in relation to his concept of temporality, because this ‘ equiprimordial’ relation between care, understanding, attunement and understanding is crucial to my treatment of ‘care’.

More specifically , the way the my ‘now’ projects my past into my future possibilities means that any ‘object’ in the world I experience is partially build out of my past. This is a crucial point , because it give all my experience cues the sens of a radical belonging to my past , at the same time that the ‘now’ contributes an element of absolute novelty. In this respect , Heidegger inherited Husserl’s formulation of the intentional act as a contittionbased on a dimension similarity between — Joshs

I do not know if I understand care conventionally. In Heideggerian terms, I understand care as an 'existential of Dasein' ;) . However I think there is a difference. Heidegger makes a different between the ontic and the ontological and I do not see that difference. This duality emerges because Heidegger has some sort of primordial idea of Dasein who for itself has a world. First and foremost Dasein is a self relation. I think there is Dasein is created by the world in that our self understanding is not primordial but a product of our relation to the world and how this is conceptualised. There is no authenticity, there is no primordial relation, there is just a relation and there is acting and what not.

Heidegger makes a different between the ontic and the ontological and I do not see that difference. This duality emerges because Heidegger has some sort of primordial idea of Dasein who for itself has a world. First and foremost Dasein is a self relation. I think there is Dasein is created by the world in that our self understanding is not primordial but a product of our relation to the world and how this is conceptualised. There is no authenticity, there is no primordial relation, there is just a relation and there is acting and what not. — Tobias

For Heidegger the ontic-ontological difference is not the Kantian difference between things in themselves and
my presentation of them, which it sounds like you’re reading him as saying, but transit, a primordial between, which defines identity as relation to something other.
Dasein isn’t an ‘itself’ that happens to have a world. Dasein is not a ‘self-relation’ if you’re understanding that term as referring to a relation that can be in any way distinguished from , separate from , before or outside of relation to a world. For Heidegger self-relation means nothing other than relation to a world.
“That differentiation alone grants and holds apart the "between," in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward one another, are borne away from and toward each other."(Identity and Difference.p.64)

“I think there is Dasein is created by the world in that our self understanding is not primordial but a product of our relation to the world.”

Our self understanding IS primordial because self IS nothing but relation to a world. But this doesn’t mean Dasein is ‘created’ by the world, and it doesnt mean the world is created by Dasein. It means Dasein is the in-between, not between an already present self and existing world but prior to either of these concepts.

He may very well have located Witt’s work within a religious metaphysics akin to Kierkegaard. — Joshs

Points of commonality between late W and early Heidi:
(1) Holism, especially with regard to meaning.
(2) (allegedly) Attempting to hue close to the contextual aspects of language.
(3) W's "picture frame" metaphor is extremely similar to H's propositional/apophatic as-structure.
(4) Seeing-as in W is tightly related to as-structure in Heidegger. "How does this count as that?" so to speak is a central point of investigation in both, both bottom out in coupling convention to perception.
(5) Both have a rhetorical posture of attending to the every-day, rather than philosophical idealisations of the every day.
(6) Both have ambiguous roles for the individual.

These come with points of contrast.

(1) W's holism isn't unified conceptually into a single category - the "form of life" and boundaries of any given language game remain ambiguous -, in contrast Heidegger's holism is aggregate into temporality - as the unfolding of history is a generator and overcomer of conventions. Heidegger's a proto-historicist and proto-discourse analyst, W remains profoundly ahistorical in his analysis.
(2,5) Heidegger's simplifications in an attempt to hue close to context are politically+religiously coloured and romantic, W can't help but treat such rules as definite but largely ineffable, a "logic of things unsaid" so to speak. Both are huge simplifications and distort their topics of concern.
(3,4) The picture frame is seen as contingent and nothing more, it's something that can be picked up and is located as internal to philosophy/analysis - it's just something philosophers tend to do, Heidegger locates the dominance/over-emphasis of the propositional as-structure within the history of ideas (Descartes role in the forgetting of the question of the meaning of being). Both philosophers can be read as reacting to this over emphasis as a central concern.
(6) Idiosyncrasy poses a problem for conventional accounts of meaning but also phenomenology based on a bodiless and morose every-man. The latter requires analysing the conceptual structure of "mental furniture" and its behaviour - like a logical psychology or anthropology - the former requires attending to individual intentions and states. Both projects get royally undermined by human heterogeneity in bodies and frames.

Idiosyncrasy poses a problem for conventional accounts of meaning but also phenomenology based on a bodiless and morose every-man. The latter requires analysing the conceptual structure of "mental furniture" and its behaviour - like a logical psychology or anthropology - the former requires attending to individual intentions and states. Both projects get royally undermined by human heterogeneity in bodies and frames. — fdrake

I like your comparisons between Witt and Heidi.
Maybe you could explain this last point a bit better. I assume by ‘phenomenology based on a bodiless and morose every-man, you mean Das Man? If so, I read Das Man and idle talk not as a founding feature of Dasein but as one of its derivative modalities, and an inadequate one at that. Das man is a kind of illusion , a mistaken belief that one is talking about the same things, shares the same sense of meanings as others one is engaged with in the ‘language games ‘ of normative discourse. This illusion of being on the same page with others in discourse covers over the underlying particularity and individuality of personal understanding.

Heidegger's simplifications in an attempt to hue close to context are politically+religiously coloured and romantic, — fdrake

Could you say more about what you see as simplifications? As far as politics-religious inspiration , the imprint of an intense, devout religiosity is imbedded in Witt’s work.

One difference between them that is important to me is that while Witt was in thrall to Freudian theory, Heidegger effectively critiqued it. Also, implied in Hedeigger’s view of religious faith is his assimilation of Nietzsche’s critique of religion, which Witt was unable to grasp.

I assume by ‘phenomenology based on a bodiless and morose every-man, you mean Das Man? — Joshs

I meant Dasein. It can't fuck. It can't even fuck its wife!

I meant Dasein. It can't fuck. It can't even fuck its wife! — fdrake

I think it fucks. But it doesnt do any embodied fucking. Heidegger’s only elaboration of the role of the body was in the zollikon seminars, where he talked about ‘bodying forth’. Unfortunately he didn’t live long enough to offer any courses on how to fuck that way.

I think it fucks. But it doesnt do any embodied fucking. — Joshs

:chin: :fear: