Infer them from what?
— Luke

Signals from your nociception system. I've already been through this. — Isaac

How do you become aware of these signals?

How do you become aware of these signals? — Luke

Your working memory rehearses the connection between these signals and various areas of the brain dealing with sematic content of one sort or another. When you think about a "What am I feeling right now" type of question in any of it's many guises, your hippocampus enables a return to the working memory of a filtered selection of these signals - ie they re-signal those centres. That, to you, feels like 'awarenss of...'

Your working memory rehearses the connection between these signals and various areas of the brain dealing with sematic content of one sort or another. When you think about a "What am I feeling right now" type of question in any of it's many guises, your hippocampus enables a return to the working memory of a filtered selection of these signals - ie they re-signal those centres. That, to you, feels like 'awarenss of...' — Isaac

So, how do you become aware of the signals?

So, how do you become aware of the signals? — Luke

I just answered that.

I just answered that. — Isaac

Please point out the part where you said you become aware of the signals.

We don’t think in terms the scientists use to tell us how we think. You’re asking a stonemason how he would plumb a bidet when all he knows how to use is a trowel and mud.

Thankfully, you know that as well as I do.

Please point out the part where you said you become aware of the signals. — Luke

Here...

When you think about a "What am I feeling right now" type of question in any of it's many guises, your hippocampus enables a return to the working memory of a filtered selection of these signals - ie they re-signal those centres. That, to you, feels like 'awareness of...' — Isaac

You'll have to be more clear about what you think is missing.

We don’t think in terms the scientists use to tell us how we think. You’re asking a stonemason how he would plumb a bidet when all he knows how to use is a trowel and mud.

Thankfully, you know that as well as I do. — Mww

I don't see how this follows at all. I've been quite clear with Luke that I'm translating into technical terms what's going on with awareness, but he's claiming that it is not a mere translation, that something is missing from the account.

You've given a metaphor in terms of asking an expert in one field to approach a problem in another. I don't see how that applies. What are the two fields of expertise you're suggesting they equate to. Presumably one is neuroscience, the other...?

It's like you're suggesting that; just as someone's introspection of their own mind could not render an account in neuroscientific terms, the neuroscientist would similarly be unable to render an account via introspection of their mind. Well, like it or not, one may or may not have expertise in neuroscience...but everyone does have a mind, I've had one for 55 years, just like you have, just like Luke.

We are not at all like the plumber and the stonemason, each only aware of their own field and ill versed in the other. There's no body of facts about 'how minds work' in the colloquial, ordinary language sense Luke is using that I'm not aware of because all of that information has been derived by introspection of minds. Something to which I've had 55 years of unfettered access. Neuroscience, however, has a body of facts which one is not necessarily aware of unless one has done either the research or the reading.

When you think about a "What am I feeling right now" type of question in any of it's many guises, your hippocampus enables a return to the working memory of a filtered selection of these signals - ie they re-signal those centres. That, to you, feels like 'awareness of...'
— Isaac

You'll have to be more clear about what you think is missing. — Isaac

Which part is you becoming aware of the signals? Do I need to be thinking about a "What am I feeling right now" type of question in order to become aware of the signals? Am I meant to fill in the blank at the end of the quote (after the ellipsis) with "the signals"? That is (if I read you right), the re-signalling of "those centres" feels to me like an awareness of [/]the signals[/i]? Is that it? Is 'feels like awareness' the same as 'becoming aware', or why do you say 'feels like awareness of...'?

Which part is you becoming aware of the signals? — Luke

The re-signalling of the (filtered set of) neurons associated with the original signal. But you don't think that's what they are. Hence my earlier discussion about the empiricism in determining the object of awareness. You can be wrong about what it is you're aware of.

Do I need to be thinking about a "What am I feeling right now" type of question in order to become aware of the signals? — Luke

Yes. What you think of as your awareness of physiological and sensory data is actually a post hoc narrative constructed in response to triggers from the hippocampus - in other words, you 'wondering what's happening'.

Surely you've driven safely somewhere and later thought 'I didn't pay any attention at all to that journey'? You may even have no recollection of it. That's because (for one reason or another) that secondary circuit was not engaged and your brain just did all that was required of driving without compiling any of it into an awareness narrative.

the re-signalling of "those centres" feels to me like an awareness of [/]the signals[/i]? Is that it? — Luke

No, it feels to you like an awareness of your arm. But it isn't.

I've seen no support for the assertion that you know your own conscious experiences, nor have you even suggested a mechanism by which you could (without public linguistic conventions). — Isaac

Luckily for me, it doesn't matter what you've seen. This is like arguing with a solipsist.

Which of all that (and the several hundred more) is 'happiness'? — Isaac

If you don't already know what it is to feel happy, why should I bother trying to tell you?

When people say "I'm happy", what are they doing with the word? Pointing to a chunk of this stream of experience that has a label on it saying 'happiness'? — Isaac

They're talking about an emotional state.

The re-signalling of the (filtered set of) neurons associated with the original signal. — Isaac

You do realize this is just a social construct right?

Do I need to be thinking about a "What am I feeling right now" type of question in order to become aware of the signals? — Luke

Yes. What you think of as your awareness of physiological and sensory data is actually a post hoc narrative constructed in response to triggers from the hippocampus - in other words, you 'wondering what's happening'. — Isaac

So none of this is consciously thought/wondered.

the re-signalling of "those centres" feels to me like an awareness of [/]the signals[/i]? Is that it?
— Luke

No, it feels to you like an awareness of your arm. But it isn't. — Isaac

If you become aware of the signals by having the feeling, then the signals are inferred from the feeling, rather than the other way around.

You do realize this is just a social construct right? — frank

A pubic carving up of the world.

Which of all that (and the several hundred more) is 'happiness'? — Isaac


If you don't already know what it is to feel happy, why should I bother trying to tell you? — Marchesk

Because you're claiming it is something private, yet identifiable. I'm refuting that claim, so the next step is for you to present your alternative. I don't know if you're familiar with how discussion works...

You do realize this is just a social construct right? — frank

A pubic carving up of the world. — Marchesk

Yep.

It always baffles me that this this is seen as some coup de grace. "But the study of social constructs is itself just a social construct", "You're using rationality to work out the origin of rationality", "All metaphysics is nonsense is itself metaphysics"...

It's just not the logical flaw people seem to assume it is. I can ask a computer to print out the actual binary of its last calculation. There's no problem at all with it using binary to code a printout of the previous bit of binary. I can even ask it to print out the binary coding for printing out binary. I can carry on doing this forever without running into a single problem with either the process or the utility of the results thereby gained.

Psychology's models of how the brain works (including that we model the world) is itself just a model of the world (in this case the brain bit of it). So what? What's the killer blow we must now succumb to because of that insight?

So none of this is consciously thought/wondered. — Luke

I'm not sure what you're referring to by 'this'. None of the process is consciously thought, no. You're only aware of the result.

If you become aware of the signals by having the feeling, then the signals are inferred from the feeling, rather than the other way around. — Luke

Not following you here. You don't become aware of the signal by having the feeling. You become aware of the signal because they're connected to the part of your brain for which activity therein is what we call 'conscious awareness'.

If, perhaps, what you're getting at is that the feeling itself plays some part in inferring the signals, then yes, that's rather the point. Models higher in the hierarchy suppress and filter signals from those lower down. It's a two-way process.

None of the process is consciously thought, no. You're only aware of the result. — Isaac

Then why are you referring to "thinking" and "wondering"? Those are not things you do unconsciously.

Not following you here. You don't become aware of the signal by having the feeling. — Isaac

I'm not following you here. I asked you whether you become aware of the signals via this process:

your hippocampus enables a return to the working memory of a filtered selection of these signals - ie they re-signal those centres. — Isaac

You said, "No, it feels to you like an awareness of your arm." Now you're saying instead:

You become aware of the signal because they're connected to the part of your brain for which activity therein is what we call 'conscious awareness'. — Isaac

This might be why someone is consciously aware, but I don't follow how they become aware of the signals. My question was how does someone become consciously aware of the signals? What makes someone aware of them? It's not by having a feeling, it's by...what?

If, perhaps, what you're getting at is that the feeling itself plays some part in inferring the signals, then yes, that's rather the point. — Isaac

You said earlier that the feelings are inferred from the signals. This is the opposite.

It's a two-way process. — Isaac

Not in terms of someone's conscious awareness. Conscious awareness only happens at one end of the process, and it doesn't typically include awareness of one's own brain functioning.

Because you're claiming it is something private, yet identifiable. I'm refuting that claim, so the next step is for you to present your alternative. I don't know if you're familiar with how discussion works... — Isaac

You haven't refuted it ...

None of the process is consciously thought, no. You're only aware of the result. — Isaac


Then why are you referring to "thinking" and "wondering"? Those are not things you do unconsciously. — Luke

Yes. They're both things you do unconsciously. You may have a conscious feeling of having initiated them (you could even have your 'free-will' version of having actually initiated them), but the process itself is subconscious. Having initiated a recall, you don't then consciously follow the signals around the brain.

You said, "No, it feels to you like an awareness of your arm." Now you're saying instead: — Luke

The part I was objecting to was "... of your arm", not "become aware...". The process by which you become aware is as described, but it is absolutely evident that it is not 'your arm' that you become aware of.

This might be why someone is consciously aware, ... What makes someone aware of them? — Luke

I don't understand the distinction you're trying to make here. Isn't a reason why the same as the cause?

You said earlier that the feelings are inferred from the signals. This is the opposite. — Luke

I don't see it as opposite. It's not one or the other. It's both. The relevant part of the whole model for our discussion about arms is the inference from somatosensory signals. The fact that there are suppresive feedback signals is irrelevant to that point. I only mention it now because to disagree with your assertion as it stood would be false.

The matter at hand is the proper object of your awareness. I'm saying it can't be {your arm} because {your arm} is a public object, you can be wrong about it. So we need a more proximate source for our model.

You haven't refuted it ... — Marchesk

Refuting. The activity, not the status.

There's no problem at all with it using binary to code a printout of the previous bit of binary. — Isaac

Machine language is usually handled in hexadecimal, but yes, of course you could deliver commands in binary.

Realizing that is not at all the same as considering that the world is basically discourse.

Realizing that is not at all the same as considering that the world is basically discourse. — frank

Are you planning to support that, or was it just for me to add to my collection of 'things Frank thinks'?

Are you planning to support that, or was it just for me to add to my collection of 'things Frank thinks'? — Isaac

You want a lesson in computer architecture?

You want a lesson in computer architecture? — frank

That wasn't the part of your response I quoted. You compared two things. Only one of them was computer architecture.

A computer is just a machine. Commands are just input. Printing is output. Humans are the meaning-makers and we're outside the computer.

Thinking of the world as discourse places the meaning-makers in the machinery that they themselves created.

Yes. They're both things you do unconsciously. You may have a conscious feeling of having initiated them (you could even have your 'free-will' version of having actually initiated them), but the process itself is subconscious. — Isaac

I typically think and wonder using language. Are you suggesting that the signals carried to and from the brain are linguistic?

Having initiated a recall, you don't then consciously follow the signals around the brain. — Isaac

This relates to the point I'm getting at: what I'm consciously aware of does not have the nature of, or is not in the form of, a brain signal, so how can I be consciously aware of a brain signal? I do not become consciously aware of a signal received from the brain because I am not aware of it in that form. This is why I keep asking you how I become consciously aware of the signals.

The part I was objecting to was "... of your arm", not "become aware...". — Isaac

That objection was prior to your more recent explanation of how one becomes aware of their brain signals. Your explanation only two posts ago was that "it feels to you like an awareness of your arm." In your next post your explanation was: "You become aware of the signal because they're connected to the part of your brain for which activity therein is what we call 'conscious awareness'." The latter doesn't at all explain how, or at what point, you become aware of the signal.

The process by which you become aware is as described, but it is absolutely evident that it is not 'your arm' that you become aware of. — Isaac

Then what is it that you are aware of? In this case, doesn't it seem to you - that is, aren't you consciously aware - of your arm being in one location, when it is, in fact, in another location? Otherwise, what are you consciously aware of in relation to your arm?

Humans are the meaning-makers and we're outside the computer. — frank

I don't see what that's got do do with the metaphor. All I'm saying is that computers can use their internal calculation mechanisms to report the state of that same mechanism.

We can use our models and shared language to report the state of our models and shared language. Saying "Ah, but your conclusion is just a model too" isn't sufficient on its own to undermine anything.

I typically think and wonder using language. — Luke

No you don't. You think and wonder using neurons. You talk using language.

what I'm consciously aware of does not have the nature of, or is not in the form of, a brain signal — Luke

It obviously does. That doesn't mean it's the only way to talk about it. But you seem to be missing the point I raised a few posts back (Shakespeare/Milton example). Common use of 'about', or 'of' when it comes to awareness assumes one can be wrong in identifying the object. Yet here you want to say that whatever you think is the object of your awareness just is, purely by virtue of the fact that you think it is. That seems contrary to the way we use the expression in all other areas.

You become aware of the signal because they're connected to the part of your brain for which activity therein is what we call 'conscious awareness'." The latter doesn't at all explain how, or at what point, you become aware of the signal. — Luke

But I said "...because they're connected to the part of your brain for which activity therein is what we call 'conscious awareness'". That's how. As to 'at what point'. It's dynamic, so I'm not sure that identifying a specific point in the process would be anything other than arbitrary.

Then what is it that you are aware of? — Luke

We could say neural signals, or we could perhaps also talk about models, or features of perception to get away from neuroscience terms.

In this case, doesn't it seem to you - that is, aren't you consciously aware - of your arm being in one location, when it is, in fact, in another location? — Luke

Yes, it does seem that way to me. As I've just said above, in no other field is 'it seems that way to me' deemed sufficient ground to establish the object of one's awareness. If it 'seems to me' that I'm aware of the works of Shakespeare that is insufficient ground alone to say that is indeed what I'm aware of.

computers can use their internal calculation mechanisms to report the state of that same mechanism — Isaac

Your metaphor depends on it, but is that a fact? Can computers describe their own calculations in detail, bit by bit? Or do they only report the results of theses calculations, at points specified in the program? It makes a difference.

No you don't. You think and wonder using neurons. You talk using language. — Isaac

Inner dialog doesn't exist? I hear my thoughts in words.