Agree, but beware also the profundity of "as it is":

"To make a faithful picture, come as close as possible to copying the object just as it is". This simple-minded injunction baffles me; for the object before me is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a fiddler, a friend, a fool and much more. If none of these constitute the object as it is, what else might? If all are ways the object is, then none is the way the object is. — bongo fury

Fair point.

Cannot something be accurately described in more than one way?

Agree, but beware also the profundity of "as it is":

"To make a faithful picture, come as close as possible to copying the object just as it is". This simple-minded injunction baffles me; for the object before me is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a fiddler, a friend, a fool and much more. If none of these constitute the object as it is, what else might? If all are ways the object is, then none is the way the object is. — bongo fury

Being a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells and so on are modes of activity. All modes of activity would seem to be relational. So, if there is any non-relational "as it is" it would seem to consist merely in the potential to actuate various modes of activity.

The inability to feel someone else's pain, in the strong sense which would be just like feeling one's own pain, and would not be mere empathy, has nothing to do with grammar.

:brow:

As if the linguistic turn never happened.

might — Banno

I’ll take that as “is”. Otherwise you’re just being non committal.

No. The only thing common to our use of the word red might be our use of the word red. — Banno

Then how can people use the correct word when asked what color something is when they haven’t seen its color said before? They should have nothing to go off of. Since the only thing common to our uses of the word red is the uses. So given they haven’t heard what color word is used in this scenario, they shouldn’t be able to guess.

“What color is this” should be an unanswerable question, unless you heard someone call that thing a specific color before. Otherwise, how could you learn the word use? You’d just be guessing.

...and the structure is...? if it is the use of the word, then I don't see that we differ. — Banno

The use is born out of similar structures. But, again, the explanation requires that experiences of red share something.

More acutely, there need be no experience that is common to every instance of the use of the word "red". — Banno

Would you give that there is a specific range of experiences that is common to every instance of the use of the word “red”?

...the correct word... — khaled

What's that, then? Pass me the red cup.

So long as you pass me the cup I want, so long as it works, there is no correct meaning for "red".

"No, Banno - that's a crimson cup".

The use is born out of similar structures. — khaled

The use is the structure.

There is a correct answer to “What color is this” more often than not.

How do people answer the question if they haven’t heard the answer before? How do they learn the word use?

Nothing about passing cups. Please answer the question.

They learn the same way they do for you - by asking for the red cup and getting the one they want. Yours is a non-issue.

Or did you learn to pass the red cup by comparing the various colours to a series of swatches that show the essential colour? Did you commit these swatches to your private, subjective memory?

If there is only a crimson and a blue cup before you, and someone asks for the red cup, do you say "Ah - I can't - there isn't one!"

Or did you learn to pass the red cup by comparing the various colours to a series of swatches that show the essential colour? Did you commit these swatches to your private, subjective memory? — Banno

Sort of.

If there is a crimson and a blue cup before you, and someone asks for the red cup, do you say "Ah - I can't - there isn't one!" — Banno

No, I’m not that precise.

But I know passing them the blue cup is wrong.

So, again:

Would you give that there is a specific range of experiences that is common to every instance of the use of the word “red”? — khaled

Again, you haven’t answered my question.

When you see an object you’ve never seen before, and are asked what color it is, how do you guess the correct color the first time? No asking allowed. There may be no single correct color but there is certainly a fuzzy range of correct answers. How do you guess something in that range the first time?

Would you give that there is a specific range of experiences that is common to every instance of the use of the word “red”? — khaled

No. See this bit:

Suppose you look at an apple. The claim is that you have experience X.

You then turn the apple around. You are still experiencing the apple. But it is different. The apple is the same, not the experience. Let's call the new experience X'

When you look at the blood, you will have yet another experience - X"

But you use the same word - "red" - in talking about all three.

Here's the point: Each of your experiences of red is different. You use the same word for them all. What is it that all your experiences of red have in common? — Banno

At best you might call it a family resemblance.

When you see an object you’ve never seen before, and are asked what color it is, how do you guess the correct color the first time? No asking allowed. There may be no single correct color but there is certainly a fuzzy range of correct answers. How do you guess something in that range the first time? — khaled

You're ignoring what I've said.

...how do you guess the correct color the first time? — khaled

You look at the thing, and choose a word that might work.

What do you think is the problem with that? Spell it out.

What do you think is the problem with that? Spell it out. — Banno

That if there is absolutely nothing in common in our experiences of colors, you'd expect people to guess randomly. On what basis are they choosing a word that might work? This is the first time they have this particular experience. They have not learned what words to call this particular object. So how come they tend to always guess something within the range of acceptable answers, even though it is the first time being exposed to that experience.

Unless there is something common to experiences of "red"? A resemblance they can use? They think to themselves "Oh that's a similar color to blood, so I'll call it red" or crimson or what have you.

That if there is absolutely nothing in common in our experiences of colors... — khaled

You keep atributing this to me and attacking it.

It's not what I said.

And I've explained that several times.

EDIT - Oh. fuck Maybe I did say that.

Now I don't see that there need be anything that each and every experience of red that you have has in common. Here, I am following Austin. Why shouldn't we use a word such as "red" for a bunch of different experiences? — Banno

Ehh, no, that's right - no single thing or even group of things in common. That just doesn't stop someone choosing "red" instead of "blue" to describe the cup. But at least now I understand your insistence.

:brow:

But you use the same word - "red" - in talking about all three.
— Banno

Because they share something. — khaled

Because they share something.
— khaled

That's the assumption Austin pointed to. I think it is wrong. — Banno

Wouldn’t there have to be some commonality to experiences of “red”
— khaled

I say no. Why should there be? — Banno

if there is absolutely nothing in common in our experiences of colors...
— khaled

You keep atributing this to me and attacking it.

It's not what I said. — Banno

So what are you saying?

Your critique of my argument was:

Here's the point: Each of your experiences of red is different. You use the same word for them all. What is it that all your experiences of red have in common?

Now I don't see that there need be anything that each and every experience of red that you have has in common. — Banno

So I assumed that you meant.... you know..... that experiences of red have nothing in common.

But apparently not, despite all the above quotes.

So what is your critique of my argument exactly?

That no one thing, or group of things, need be common to all cases of the use of "red".

No A, B, or C such that

X is "red" IFF X is (A & B & C)

No A, B, or C such that

X is "red" IFF X is (A & B v C)

...no specifiable criteria which determines when the word "red" is used correctly.

Your question is, does this mean that there is also no specifiable criteria that determines that "red" is the right word to use in a new situation? Yep.

You choose a word that has worked for similar cases, and see what happens.

...no specifiable criteria which determines when the word "red" is used correctly. — Banno

But there is clearly a range no? If I call the sky red I'd be incorrect. Outright. Or do you think someone calling the sky red is not wrong?

But you wouldn't even give that there is a range:

Would you give that there is a specific range of experiences that is common to every instance of the use of the word “red”?
— khaled

No. — Banno

But there is clearly a range no? If I call the sky red I'd be incorrect. Outright. Or do you think someone calling the sky red is not wrong? — khaled

I'd suppose it was sunset.

But you wouldn't even give that there is a range: — khaled

I'm saying the range does not give the definition of red; nor is the range fixed; nor is it delimited.

I'd suppose it was sunset. — Banno

And if they called it purple? Or if it was the middle of the day?

I'm saying the range does not give the definition of red; nor is the range fixed; nor is it delimited. — Banno

Sure. But now what is your issue with my argument?

If I changed it to:

or do you have access to the structure of other people's experiences?
— unenlightened

I can infer it yes.

Let’s call experience you are subjectively having when looking at a red apple X. And let’s call the experience I am subjectively having when looking at a red apple Y.

We both communicate our respective experience by saying “that’s red”

If we both look at blood, you will have an experience similar to X and I will have an experience similar to Y. We will again say, that’s red.

But if you look at grass and have an experience similar to X, and so say “That’s red” then we have a different structure. You’re probably colorblind, as you can’t recognize green things.

I on the other hand properly have a sufficiently different experience from Y when looking at grass (let’s call it Z) and so I say “that’s green”

Now, importantly: Whether or not X and Y are the same experience makes absolutely no difference. What matters is the structure. If the same objects consistently produce the same experience (X or similar for you, Y or similar for me) we can talk.

X and Y do not have to be the same at all.

A public language, based on private experiences. — khaled

Does that satisfy?

That's not a property of the feelings. — Isaac


Then what is it a property of? — Luke

As I said earlier

You. The things you possess are a property of you (and the law of the country you live in, when it comes to stuff not part of your body). The feeling 'pain' doesn't have the property {belongs to Luke}. How could it? — Isaac

If I have red hair, then red hair is a property of me, but a property of 'red hair' is not {belongs to Isaac}. Red hair is a public concept. Same with pain. Pain (or any specific type of pain) does not belong to you, it doesn't have the property {belongs to Luke} any more than red hair does. You may have the (hopefully transient) property {in a certain specific type of pain}.

We haven't "shared" the feeling in that we both partake of the same feeling. I have my feeling and you have yours, even when they occur at roughly the same place and time. — Luke

I'm still lacking an explanation as to what 'yours' and 'mine' has to do with the ontology of the feeling. Unless you're going for an extreme rejection of universals, even in a figurative sense. No two things are exactly alike, ever. Pain's not unique in this respect. No two phones are exactly alike either, but we still refer to them as 'the same' phone - "Oh look, you've got the same phone as me". We seem to be constructing this arbitrary wall around feelings when their intrinsic differences between people are no more than the particular scratches on your phone that are not on mine. If we share the same make and model we happily say we have 'the same' phone.

As @Banno is right to point out, I think, this is context dependant, the degree of specificity we require might change with circumstance, and at times even the history of one object (used to be my nose) might become a relevant distinction from another otherwise similar one. But no context has primacy over another, things are not really one way.

So It's perfectly reasonable to use language like "you have the same phone as me" despite the fact that the two phones have minor differences, different histories, different legal statuses (with regards to possession). and, more importantly, this talk is not a facon de parler, overlying the real status of the phones as two separate distinct objects. If that were the case, then the phone itself is a facon de parler too - really it's just a collection of parts which just happen for a short time to be next to one another, which are really just a bunch of atom fleetingly brought together, which are really...

So what is it about feelings which prevents us from using this same language?

then your example of reaction YYY is absolutely impossible. Everyone's structure is going to be ABC, or DEF, or GHI because no-one is going to respond in the exact same way to three separate instances of anything. — Isaac


Sure but I was simplifying by only talking about color. — khaled

I don't see how that gets around the problem. In positing the possibility of XXY you're implying that the first two experiences are identical, when they're not. They have some broad similarity, but the degree of similarity will be context dependant which means we're already bringing in our culturally mediated linguistic categories to group them.

The difference between AAB and GGR, constricting it only to color, could be the difference in toe shape of the participants for all we know. Even narrowing it down to color, we have no evidence that the difference is in the V4 region. — khaled

No it couldn't, because you've 'narrowed it down to colour'. How have you done so without some relation to light waves or something? Once we have light waves, we know that their reception does not go via the toes. Without talking about light waves, we've no reason at all to say XXY and GGR have anything to do with colour. All we can say, absent of this grouping is that person 1 had epiphenomena ABC in response to the entire environment they found themselves in at the time, and person 2 had the epiphenomena DEF in response to the similar (but obviously slightly different) environment in which they found themselves.

The moment you start saying that person 1's A and B are basically the same (XX) because they're about the same colour, you've decided on an arbitrary grouping based on some artefact of the real world (colour). That means you're talking about light and wavelengths etc, so the physical cause of the epiphenomena has to be triggered by those external stimuli in some way. One's toe is not.

1 and 2b aren't about philosophy. 2a is, but that's just a starting point. — frank

2a: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind

My own mental map is not independent if my mind, so it cannot fit this definition of objective.

I am afraid that maps are subjective, in that they represent a territory from someone's point of view, and make choices as per what to represent and what not to represent.

I don't see how that gets around the problem. — Isaac

X is the set of experiences that are similar enough to be called "red" by me. Y is the set of experiences that are similar enough to be called "red" by you. When I say "You had X" (or Y) I mean you had an experience that belongs to that set. Better?

The argument then still stands. The contents of X and Y do not need to be the same at all for communication to happen. And we can never know what the content determining differences are.

How have you done so without some relation to light waves or something? — Isaac

What do light waves have to do with anything?

The moment you start saying that person 1's A and B are basically the same (XX) because they're about the same colour, you've decided on an arbitrary grouping based on some artefact of the real world (colour). — Isaac

Yup.

That means you're talking about light and wavelengths etc, so the physical cause of the epiphenomena has to be triggered by those external stimuli in some way. One's toe is not. — Isaac

Complete non sequitor. I legitimately have no clue how this follows from the rest of what you said.

Going from knowing that the V4 region is responsible for structural difference in experiences of color does not lead to the conclusion that it is also responsible for the content-determining differences. — khaled

X is the set of experiences that are similar enough to be called "red" by me. Y is the set of experiences that are similar enough to be called "red" by you. When I say "You had X" (or Y) I mean you had an experience that belongs to that set. Better? — khaled

Similar in what way?

Does that matter? Similar enough to be called "red".

But if I had to answer, similar in terms of content I guess. There is something similar about seeing sunsets and oranges.

Moreover, you did not comment on this:
Wittgenstein might have pointed out that it's not actually necessary for us to agree as to what is the case in order to get by. — Banno

I have zero respect for Wittgenstein, whom I consider a fake philosopher as well as a coward. If you want me to comment on everything you say, you gona have to pay me for it.

We might do well to avoid this trap: inventing a distinction between the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-experienced, only to find that we cannot say anything about the thing-in-itself; and thinking we have found some profound truth when all we have done is played a word game. — Banno

You are talking about the thing in itself right now, so you actually can say something about it. You just did!

I cannot live without the assumption that there's an objective world, independent of my mind and of how I see it. Nor can I dispense of the assumption that my view of the world can be incorrect or biased. Illusions are possible, error is possible, mistakes are made and biases play out. I recognize this fallibility of human knowledge and perception, and I think it is important to recognize it. People who are too sure of themselves make a lot of mistakes.

I have zero respect for Wittgenstein, whom I consider a fake philosopher as well as a coward. If you want me to comment on everything you say, you gona have to pay me for it. — Olivier5

Meh. That's about you.

While you have a decent understanding of aspects of science, your background in philosophy is pretty restricted. I don't think you see the implications of much of what has been said here. But that's OK - you will pick stuff up with time and effort.

And if they called it purple? Or if it was the middle of the day? — khaled

Then triangulation or radical interpretation or whatever you prefer.

It still has:

Let’s call experience you are subjectively having when looking at a red apple X. — khaled

...as if there were one experience of looking at a red apple.

Does that make the problem clearer?

Good riddance.

Does that matter? Similar enough to be called "red". — khaled

Yes. Two distinct (but similar) things can be determined 'the same' for some purpose by seeing similar features. To use the example I just used with Luke (save me having to think of another), two phones are two different objects, but we might say "you have the same phone as me" by picking out certain characteristics (make and model). If, instead we focussed on history, or scratches, or data content, we wouldn't make such a comment. There's no real or right way on which the two phones are similar/dissimilar, it just depends on what we focus on.

But each feature has been caused physically. the scratches, the data, the history, the make, the model...all have unique physical causes. so when we focus on a specific feature (like make and model) we also focus on specific causes. We would not expect make and model to vary as a result of history, or data use, we know that those features vary when the company they're made by varies.

So with your posited epiphenomena, by focussing on the similarity in the features relating to colour, we know that those features change in correlation mainly with changes in lightwaves hitting the retina. They don't generally change for any other reason. So when we look for the physical cause of such a change we know it has to be a route triggered by lightwaves. We know how they enter the brain, so we can trace them from there. Somewhere in that trace has to be the physical trigger for the particular feature of the epiphenomena you're focussing on. Without that, you couldn't even distinguish one feature (colour-related) from another feature in order to say A and B are similar enough to called X in that particular aspect. How would you judge otherwise?