Diagnosis of appendicitis relies on the fact that people with an inflamed appendix have the same pain. — Banno

No it's reliant on the fact that people with an inflamed appendix characteristically have pain in the lower right abdomen or pain near the navel. Less commonly dull or sharp pain anywhere in the upper or lower belly, back, or rear end.

So, no not even always the same kind of pain much less the "same pain".

There's much more here. Money, for instance, only functions if people believe in its value. A $100 note costs only a few cents to produce. — Banno

Ah, but it costs only a few cents to produce only if you believe in the value of money.

...it's reliant on the fact that people with an inflamed appendix characteristically have pain in the lower right abdomen or pain near the navel. Less commonly dull or sharp pain anywhere in the upper or lower belly, back, or rear end. — Janus

Yep. What I said.

Yep. What I said.

Yep. What I said. — Banno

No you made the unjustifiable claim that the pain experienced by appendicitis sufferers is the "same". It's not even in precisely the same locations on the various appendicitis afflicted bodies. Even if, per impossibile, it were, there would be no way to determine the intensity of the pain. So, there is nothing to suggest that it is the "same pain", At most it would qualify as the same kind of pain, and that only insofar as it is associated with appendicitis.

Yep. What I said. — Banno

I was just pointing out that there is no anomaly there, regardless of whether you believe in the value of money or not. It seems we agree about that then?

you made the unjustifiable claim that the pain experienced by appendicitis sufferers is the "same". — Janus

Unjustifiable? Because it's a usage that don't fit your narrative. It has a clear use; the pains are the same - as the descriptions you yourself provided show.

...precisely... — Janus

It doesn't have to be in precisely the same place to be precisely the same - it doesn't even stay in precisely the same place in your own body. Nor does the same pain you experience always have the same intensity: one says the pain has lessened, not that he pain has been replaced with another of less intensity.

You seem to be pretending to a precision that isn't there.

I was just pointing out that there is no anomaly there, regardless of whether you believe in the value of money or not. It seems we agree about that then? — Janus

I'm not sure. DO we agree that money has value only because of a shared belief in that value?

You seem to be pretending to an accuracy that isn't there. — Banno

No, I'm taking issue with your usage of "same". Even if the pains were in exactly the same locations in the various bodies, and of exactly the same intensity, they would still only be the same kinds of pain, just as different dogs are not instantiations of the same things, but of the same kinds of things.

DO we agree that money has value only because of a shared belief in that value? — Banno

Sure.

You seem to be pretending to an accuracy that isn't there.
— Banno

No, I'm taking issue with your usage of "same". — Janus

Pains move around and change in intensity, contrary to your:

It's not even in precisely the same locations on the various appendicitis afflicted bodies. Even if, per impossibile, it were, there would be no way to determine the intensity of the pain. — Janus

See my comments on the same nose, here

Pains move around and change in intensity, contrary to your:

It's not even in precisely the same locations on the various appendicitis afflicted bodies. Even if, per impossibile, it were, there would be no way to determine the intensity of the pain. — Janus — Banno

What you quote me as saying there is not at all inconsistent with "pains move around and change in intensity", so I have no idea what you think the "contrary to your.." comment is doing there.

See my comments on the same nose, here — Banno

I already read that. Apart from the bit in it that I originally commented on in disagreement; I don't see any relevance.

You apparently argued that the pain in one person could not be the same as the pain in another person because "It's not even in precisely the same locations on the various appendicitis afflicted bodies". I pointed out that the same pain need not be in the same location even in the same person.

You apparently argued that the pain in one person could not be the same as the pain in another person because the intensity in one person could not be determined to be the same as the intensity in another person. I pointed out that the intensity of a pain at one time cannot be determined to be the same as the same pain in the same person at another time

I pointed out that the same pain need not be in the saem location even in the same person. — Banno

Well, if the pain is no longer in the same location as it was in the one person then it's no longer the same pain.

I pointed out that the intensity of a pain at one time cannot be determined to be the same as the same pain in the same person at another time — Banno

The intensity of the pain can only be gauged by the person experiencing it.Obviously there is no calibrated measure.

It puzzles me that you go to so much trouble in a futile attempt to deny the obvious; which is that I cannot feel your pain, and you cannot feel my pain, which means that our pains, as felt, if not as described, are private and cannot rightly be said to be the same.

We should take the time to relate this back to the OP.

There, I questioned what it was to share a common understanding of supposed intersubjective phenomena. Pain is taken by some as the archetype of phenomenon understood intersubjectively. On that account pain is private, unshared, only understood intersubjective.

If that were the case then talk of shared pain would not make sense.

And yet, as the very discussion here shows, we can talk of pains that are the same - both from time to time and place to place in one's own body, and also in the bodies of other people.

This to show that the logic or grammar of pain is not private, unshared, only understood intersubjective.

The archetype of the intersubjective phenomena fails to meet the criteria for being intersubjective.

The conclusion is that the notion of intersubjectivity is fraught.

As ought be apparent after 17 pages.

If that were the case then talk of shared pain would not make sense.

And yet, as the very discussion here shows, we can talk of pains that are the same - both from time to time and place to place in one's own body, and also in the bodies of other people. — Banno

Isn't this confusing quantitative and qualitative identity? Tokens are private. Types are shared.

Tokens were mentioned earlier, sending me off to the SEP to look again at the type-token distinction.

Nothing there seems to indicate that tokens are private. Indeed, I'm not at all sure what that could mean.

Here's the SEP example:

Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.

Three tokens of the type "a".

Which one is private?

The first one I think.

It's private in the sense that when I stub my toe, you don't say 'ouch'.

Well, if the pain is no longer in the same location as it was in the one person then it's no longer the same pain. — Janus

That's just not so. "The pain has moved to my back" makes sense.

Obviously there is no calibrated measure. — Janus

And yet: Pain assessment and measurement

It puzzles me that you go to so much trouble in a futile attempt to deny the obvious; — Janus

...because it's not obvious. Don't you find it odd that so much of what you suppose to be the case, as a consequence of thinking of pain as subjective, turns out to be wrong on closer investigation?

It's private in the sense that when I stub my toe, you don't say 'ouch'. — bert1

What are you talking abut, Bert? Tokens or pains? If tokens, where is the token in stubbing your toe?

And if I see you stub your toe, I might indeed say "ouch!".

What are you talking abut, Bert? Tokens or pains? If tokens, where is the token in stubbing your toe?

And if I see you stub your toe, I might indeed say "ouch!". — Banno

Tokens. The toe stubbing I did on Tuesday is the same type of toe-stubbing that I did on Wednesday, but they are different tokens.

You might say 'ouch' but in sympathy only. Your toe wouldn't hurt.

Is pain an object like a rose? Or is it an experience?

Plus, why would we do philosophy by concentrating on turns of phrases?

The toe stubbing I did on Tuesday is the same type of toe-stubbing that I did on Wednesday, but they are different tokens. — bert1

...so you wish to clarify the fraught notion of pain by bringing in a fraught analogy with the fraught notion of tokens.

I'll just point out that there is nothing in, say, the SEP article on tokens to support your contention that they are private:

Tokens are private. — bert1

I can't see this line of reasoning being of any help.

Plus, why would we do philosophy by concentrating on turns of phrases? — frank

Because words are a philosopher's tools, and one ought understand one's tools.

I'll just point out that there is nothing in, say, the SEP article on tokens to support your contention that they are private. — Banno

Well fuck the SEP then. Instances of pain are obviously private in the sense that when I feel a pain you don't. OK, lets test this. Which finger did I just stab with a toothpick?

...which is to entirely miss the topic.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/503394

A pain is not an analogue of a token. It is a token of pain. An instance of a universal. A token of a type.

You're talking about types.

An instance of a universal. — bert1

Are types universals?

Again, I can't see how bringing in a another controversy will be of any help here.

That's just not so. "The pain has moved to my back" makes sense. — Banno

It might make sense to you. If I experienced pain in one area, and then pain in another area I would not say the same pain has moved, but that I now have a different pain in another area. Pain doesn't actually move; different nerves are actuated.

And yet: Pain assessment and measurement — Banno

From the article:

"Three ways of measuring pain:

Self report - what the child says (the gold standard)
Behavioural –how the child behaves
Physiological –clinical observations"

It's not an exact science like measuring temperature, and it relies largely on the reports of the people experiencing the pain ("the gold standard"). You cannot feel another's pain; but you can get some idea of its intensity by taking what they say as your guide.

It puzzles me that you go to so much trouble in a futile attempt to deny the obvious; — Janus


...because it's not obvious. — Banno

What is obvious is that you cannot feel another's pain, just as you cannot know what they are thinking. All you have to go on is what they tell you. That's what is obvious; I don't even know what counterpoint you're trying to make.