Because we can picture having different Xs and Ys. I can imagine having different "flavors" of experience (same structure different content). Idk why I would choose a model that suggests that that cannot be done. — khaled

I don't believe you can. I think what you're imagining has properties, on analysis, which render it non-epiphenomenonological. The thing you're imagining is actual experience (by which I mean the particular chain of responses and recall that's set in motion by whatever feature of perception we're talking about. The reason experience feels so unique is not because it's intrinsically so, but because the individual response is so complex and (to an extent) unending. When do you finish responding to things? The red carpet you crawled on as a baby - there's still neural firing going on today that was set in motion by the photons from that carpet hitting your eyes. The thing is, if you remove the distinguishable sub-types (colour, texture, whatever...) then your example of reaction YYY is absolutely impossible. Everyone's structure is going to be ABC, or DEF, or GHI because no-one is going to respond in the exact same way to three separate instances of anything. The only reason why we can say the colourblind have AAA, whist the normal sighted have AAB is if we've already but arbitrary boundaries on 'experience'. We arbitrarily say we're only interested in the activity of the V4 visual cortex, or we're only interested in the language of colour. Otherwise there's no reason to say our first two (the AA bit) were, in fact the same. They weren't the same experience, without a shadow of a doubt they were different, just not different in terms of the name we'd give to the colour component.

If we're to postulate an epiphenonena associated with physical neural activity, then everyone's epiphenimenal experience is going to be ABC, and DEF and so on. The only way round that is to constrain the type of difference in these epiphenomena we're focussing on, but in doing that we no longer can claim to be unaware of what constitute the physical difference, we're constraining that to colour, so the physical difference is going to be somewhere in the V4 region.

Feelings are intrinsically private and unshareable only in the sense that I can't have yours and you can't have mine. — Luke

But as I said earlier. That's not a property of the feelings. It's the same with noses, I can only have my nose, because, even if it were transplanted onto you, it would become your nose in the process.

But feelings are also non-intrinsically private and shareable in the sense that they can be expressed via language, body language, or otherwise. Intersubjectivity deals only with the latter. — Luke

Still not sure how it 'deals with'. Say I have a feeling X. I show you, using body-language, speech etc. You now know I have feeling X, you may even have feeling X too by the action of your mirror neurons. We've shared feeling X. So is feeling X inter-subjective now? That seems to leave the distinction between subjective and inter-subjective one of arbitrary historical record.

That's not a property of the feelings. — Isaac

Then what is it a property of?

Say I have a feeling X. I show you, using body-language, speech etc. You now know I have feeling X, you may even have feeling X too by the action of your mirror neurons. We've shared feeling X. So is feeling X inter-subjective now? That seems to leave the distinction between subjective and inter-subjective one of arbitrary historical record. — Isaac

We haven't "shared" the feeling in that we both partake of the same feeling. I have my feeling and you have yours, even when they occur at roughly the same place and time.

Perhaps it should be clarified that what is private is having the feeling and what is shareable is expressing the feeling, and that these are not the same thing. I might choose not to express a feeling, or at least try hard to suppress its expression. I can sometimes hide my pain or my thoughts or make the conscious effort not to react to (i.e. express) the feelings I have. The distinction between having feelings and expressing feelings is identical to the distinction between subjective and inter-subjective.

That's not a property of the feelings. — Isaac


Then what is it a property of? — Luke

You. The things you possess are a property fo you (and the law of the country you live in, when it comes to stuff not part of your body). The feeling 'pain' doesn't have the property {belongs to Luke}. How could it?

There's a feeling 'pain' in your body when you stub your toe, there's one in my body when I stub mine. The feeling 'pain' hasn't been changed in any way by whose body it's in, it's just a conceptual collection of worldly events (nociceptor activity, yelling, cringing, defence reflex etc...). When those events are centred on your body, it's your pain, when they're centred on my body it's my pain, but the collection of events that constitute 'pain' is a cultural, linguistic fact, it's not yours or mine. What 'pain' is is determined by the loose collection of events we're collectively prepared to accept to qualify for a use of the term. The props. They belong the the language community, not any individual.

We haven't "shared" the feeling in that we both partake of the same feeling. I have my feeling and you have yours, even when they occur at roughly the same place and time.

Perhaps it should be clarified that what is private is having the feeling and what is shareable is expressing the feeling, and that these are not the same thing. — Luke

Right. Same with noses. Having a nose is not the same as talking about a nose. But noses are not private as a consequence. Your nose is not the same as my nose. But noses are still not private as a consequence.

noses are still not private as a consequence. — Isaac

Noses are private on the inside.

Noses are private on the inside. — Olivier5

Rhinoscopy.

An intrusive procedure.

then your example of reaction YYY is absolutely impossible. Everyone's structure is going to be ABC, or DEF, or GHI because no-one is going to respond in the exact same way to three separate instances of anything. — Isaac

Sure but I was simplifying by only talking about color.

but in doing that we no longer can claim to be unaware of what constitute the physical difference, we're constraining that to colour, so the physical difference is going to be somewhere in the V4 region. — Isaac

Not necessarily. Differences in the V4 region, that we have studied, are structural physical differences.

I'm imagining having a different experience due to having a different content-determining physical difference. And as I've shown, we can never narrow down what the content-determining physical differences are. The difference between AAB and GGR, constricting it only to color, could be the difference in toe shape of the participants for all we know. Even narrowing it down to color, we have no evidence that the difference is in the V4 region.

However we can in fact know, that the difference between AAB and GGG is a difference in the V4 region, or the eyes themselves, or what have you. Because we have access to the dependent variable (the structure) and so can narrow down what physical differences cause it to change. Going from knowing that the V4 region is responsible for structural difference in experiences of color does not lead to the conclusion that it is also responsible for the content-determining differences.

I don't believe you can. — Isaac

I can imagine what the world would look like with all its colors inverted. I'm sure you can too.

I get the sense you would prefer to reject subjective experience from your explanations entirely. — Luke

What other kinds of experience are there?

Actually it's a very common use of the word "look", you're just obstinate, refusing to look at anything unless it's in front of your eyes. — Metaphysician Undercover

:rofl: It's very common to be misled. I do see what you mean though. But in the context of a discussion of colour and colour experiences, Richard does not see what you mean by 'red', though I do. And this is using 'see' in its visual sense. I am obstinate about that.

So what? There's no structure to things? Things are whatever we want them to be? Is that what you and this guy Goodman are saying? — Olivier5

I think what he is saying is that good analysis of intersubjective representations on a non-cosmic scale is always hobbled by reasoning about their possible foundations on a cosmic scale. I.e. about, usually, objectivity.

would be a fallacy of composition to say that the culture constructs the map. We also have the same type of fallacy if we try to say that the individual's perspective is the perspective of the culture. It's plainly and simply illogical. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think the PLA was supposed to cover that.

Feelings are intrinsically private and unshareable only in the sense that I can't have yours and you can't have mine.
— Luke

But as I said earlier. That's not a property of the feelings.
— Isaac

Then what is it a property of?
— Luke

You. The things you possess are a property fo you (and the law of the country you live in, when it comes to stuff not part of your body). The feeling 'pain' doesn't have the property {belongs to Luke}. How could it? — Isaac

You're saying that pain is not a property of me. But aren't my pains a property of me? I have them. Otherwise, pain is not a property of anybody, so what's the purpose of talking about properties in relation to pain?

Also, just wondering: do you consider my body to be a property of me?

There's a feeling 'pain' in your body when you stub your toe, there's one in my body when I stub mine. The feeling 'pain' hasn't been changed in any way by whose body it's in, it's just a conceptual collection of worldly events (nociceptor activity, yelling, cringing, defence reflex etc...). When those events are centred on your body, it's your pain, when they're centred on my body it's my pain, but the collection of events that constitute 'pain' is a cultural, linguistic fact, it's not yours or mine. What 'pain' is is determined by the loose collection of events we're collectively prepared to accept to qualify for a use of the term. The props. They belong the the language community, not any individual. — Isaac

I take the moral of Wittgenstein's beetle to be that our sensation terms get their meanings from the expression of feelings - from our behaviours (e.g. your "conceptual collection of worldly events") - not from the feelings or private sensations themselves. Therefore, the word "pain" refers only to the outward expression of the feeling, not to the internal feeling.

@unenlightened's friend Richard learned to use the word "red" despite his difficulty or inability to distinguish red from green, or whatever his private sensation of red was like. Richard's colourblindness was no doubt detected/diagnosed on the basis of his verbal responses, not via the impossible act of looking at his private sensations. But it's unjustified to infer from the private language argument that we do not have private sensations.

Perhaps it should be clarified that what is private is having the feeling and what is shareable is expressing the feeling, and that these are not the same thing.
— Luke

Right. Same with noses. Having a nose is not the same as talking about a nose. But noses are not private as a consequence. Your nose is not the same as my nose. But noses are still not private as a consequence. — Isaac

I'm not saying feelings are private because having a feeling is not the same as expressing a feeling. I'm saying feelings are private because nobody else can have your feelings; they can only have their own. Noses and feelings are also dissimilar because your nose is not fleeting like a feeling, and you don't express your nose in any similar sense. You can also get a nose transplant but not a feeling transplant. And noses are not subjective (mind-dependent).

I get the sense you would prefer to reject subjective experience from your explanations entirely.
— Luke

What other kinds of experience are there? — unenlightened

None. I just added it in to emphasise what I took you to be rejecting.

No, the PLA wasn't supposed to cover that, nor does it cover that.

It's very common to be misled. I do see what you mean though. But in the context of a discussion of colour and colour experiences, Richard does not see what you mean by 'red', though I do. And this is using 'see' in its visual sense. I am obstinate about that. — unenlightened

Well, I'll have to beg your pardon, and I hope you'll accept my apology for interrupting a discussion you were having with a number of other people. I can easily understand how you took me in the wrong direction. You didn't seem to have ever grasped what I was objecting to in the first place.

What I disputed was what you appeared to be asserting, that the difference between Richard's colour experience, and Unenlighten's colour experience, is non-existent, just because you apprehend it as insignificant.

I find this an entirely agreeable explanation, except that I take it one step further, and say that things that make absolutely no difference should be treated as non-existent. So I never speak of X or Y at all, but only of red apples and blood and green grass and colourblindness and such. Subjectivity disappears from the conversation, because there are no words for X or Y and can be none. There are apples and grass and colours, and blindness, and we agree abut that. — unenlightened

Notice your use of "absolutely" to qualify "no difference". That there is "no difference". is simply a subjective opinion, and you use "absolutely" in an attempt to make this judgement sound more authoritative. Furthermore, your mention of colourblindness indicates that you actually recognize such differences as being very real. Therefore you clearly acknowledge the reality of these differences, and your attempt to make them disappear by saying that they make no difference is a foolish error which will inevitably lead to misunderstanding when you assume that another person apprehends a specified thing in the same way that you do.

After that, our discourse went in two different directions. I wanted you to see that since these differences are real, then a person's experience of colour itself can be considered as a thing with properties, which we can talk about. It is necessary to assume it as a distinct thing with properties, in order to support such differences. So we can talk about that thing and its properties, and what make's one person's experience of colour different from another's, being distinct things. However, we need to allow that your experience and my experience are distinct things. If we premise that they are one and the same thing, then the fundamental laws of logic, identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle, get in the way, preventing us from talking about the reality of these differences. You seemed to insist that the only type of thing we ought to talk about is a thing which we can see with the eyes.

No, the PLA wasn't supposed to cover that, nor does it cover that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Gotcha. Nice smack down. So you'd agree that society is a prerequisite for individuality, that the subjective narrative is influenced by society, if only because such narratives are frequently directed at others, but the ego (I) itself can't be reduced to social interaction because that's just retarded. Is that your view?

Right, but I think your personal objective narrative goes unexamined for bias. It's pinned as reality, right? — frank


The way I understand these words, your personal narrative is by definition subjective because your are a subject. — Olivier5

I'm saying you carry an objective image of the world around with you and use it to make sense of your subjectivity and vice versa.

That objective image is yours because it's unique. You have your own little trails marked in it, your own blindspots and errors, your own mythology.

Yes, ideally, everyone has the same objective image and it's 100% accurate, but that's really a goal, it's never a reality.

So you have your own private map of the universe, though much of it is copied from textbooks.

That objective image is yours because it's unique. You have your own little trails marked in it, your own blindspots and errors, your own mythology. — frank

Very much so, but in what sense is this image objective?

Very much so, but in what sense is this image objective? — Olivier5

It's a map-like image. You don't see it out of your eyeballs. You see it with your mind's eye.

Why? What's your definition of objective?

I go by the dictionary, usually. Make your pick:

Objective (adj.)
1: expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations
- an objective history of the war
- an objective judgment

2a: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind
- objective reality

b: involving or deriving from sense perception or experience with actual objects, conditions, or phenomena
- objective data

1 and 2b aren't about philosophy. 2a is, but that's just a starting point.

None. I just added it in to emphasise what I took you to be rejecting. — Luke

That's frankly bizarre. I say "I experience ... " And you say I want to deny experience. I don't have anything to say about that.

Notice your use of "absolutely" to qualify "no difference". — Metaphysician Undercover

Notice that in my use I am copying the exact phrase that my interlocutor used and that I quoted in my post.

I think I'm done with this discussion, chaps. It's been loads of fun.

That's interesting. It highlights the existentialist point that the objective narrative is not necessarily closer to the truth. It's apt to be further away. The only thing you know for sure is what it feels like to be alive and feel what you feel. As soon as you place yourself in an environment (locate your self on a map), you're off to the realm of objectivity. — frank

Anyone else find this problematic?

My feet are cold. There's a truth. I know my coffee cup is empty - expect for the dregs.

How could Frank have it so wrong?

Popper was a realist. He saw intersubjectivity as a tool, as means to an end, which is knowledge. — Olivier5

Moreover, you did not comment on this:

Wittgenstein might have pointed out that it's not actually necessary for us to agree as to what is the case in order to get by. — Banno

which was in reply to your:

Key words: to get by. Which a good way to put it. Our senses have been selected to help us get by, based on their utility to survive and procreate. That 's why we can taste the sugar in the bowl, and see a red apple in the tree. — Olivier5

which in turn was a reply to

We might do well to avoid this trap: inventing a distinction between the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-experienced, only to find that we cannot say anything about the thing-in-itself; and thinking we have found some profound truth when all we have done is played a word game. — Banno

Notice how poor @frank, above, now thinks he knows nothing? He somehow made that conclusion after you pointed out that the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea is disputed...

I'd suggest that there is something deeply problematic in the notion that we understand a map of the world, and not the map itself. I'm not suggesting that this is what you are doing - although it may be what Frank is thinking.

Perhaps, there's a difference, subtle or not, you be the judge, between observation and belief. — TheMadFool

A good post.

The difference is between truth and belief. If one were to look for the thing that most folk around here get wrong more than any other, it would be this distinction.

If knowledge is taken as justified true belief, further observation will not change the truth or falsehood of some proposition. But it might change its believability. Bayesian inference can formalise this.

There's much more here. Money, for instance, only functions if people believe in its value. A $100 note costs only a few cents to produce.

My feet are cold. — Banno

I'm sorry. What I usually tell people is: your pain is a social construct. Stop talking about it and it will go away. Then I run off before they can say anything else.

But as I said earlier. That's not a property of the feelings. It's the same with noses, I can only have my nose, because, even if it were transplanted onto you, it would become your nose in the process. — Isaac

A small comment here. There's a complexity to the ownership of the transplanted nose that I think worth paying some small attention to; and that is, who's nose it is depends on what we are doing. It's fine to ay that @Luke's nose was once Isaac's; it's also fine to say that Isaac's nose is now on Luke's face. Further, it's not that here is an ambiguity here - it's clear which nose we are talking about in each case. Neither description is more accurate than the other, despite their being superficially contradictory.

The same sort of thing applies to sensations. Diagnosis of appendicitis relies on the fact that people with an inflamed appendix have the same pain. Luke might object that somehow it's not literally the exact same pain, or some such; but that's to ignore the role the pain plays in diagnosis of multiple patients. Like with the noses, Luke would be both right and wrong.

I just put on some slippers.

The claim you made, that the

...objective narrative is not necessarily closer to the truth. — frank

needs rethinking.

So the objective narrative is necessarily closer to the truth?

No, Frank.