Well, no moral statement, that's my point.

I’m curious. Are you a realist when it comes to scientific progress? Would you say that a science describes a real world independent of the theory, and that it is approximating that real world ? When one theory displaces another can we say it explains the empirical data better or just differently?Im asking because this relates to your ideas about morality.

. And I don’t think there are many moral realists on the forum either — khaled

Then there are moral relativists who define what’s “right” or “wrong” relative to something or other (the individual, the society, etc). Something can be wrong now and right later. This seems to be what applies to the majority of posters here from what I’ve seen. — khaled

It seems to me most on this forum who call themselves moral relativists are only relativist up to a point. I’ve. found very few full fledged postmodern relativists. Most here dilute their Foucault or Deleuze with Cavell and Putnam, and sign on to the usefulness of moralistic terms like racism and homophobia.

Their moral relativism is no more radical than their epistemological relativism, wherein Scientific truth is subject to falsification but rival paradigms are not incommensurate all the way down: it is still
possible to talk of scientific truth as progressing.

Morality is a sense, like a sense of humour. Expression of this sense is opinion, but that doesn't mean morality is just glorified opinion. If you hear and joke and you laugh; you didn't decide to laugh. It's not merely your opinion that it's funny. It's the same with the moral sense. If you see something that's wrong, you don't decide that it's wrong. You feel it. You give expression to that feeling it becomes an opinion - but the feeling that something is wrong, isn't you forming an opinion.

Morality is a sense, like a sense of humour. Expression of this sense is opinion, but that doesn't mean morality is just glorified opinion. If you hear and joke and you laugh; you didn't decide to laugh. It's not merely your opinion that it's funny. It's the same with the moral sense. If you see something that's wrong, you don't decide that it's wrong. You feel it. You give expression to that feeling it becomes an opinion - but the feeling that something is wrong, isn't you forming an opinion. — counterpunch

:up:

I would furthermore add that most disagreements about morality aren't about opinions but are factual. We have similar, if not the same moral intuitions, the question becomes which ones to apply to the situation at hand. Is having children a benign or innocent act, or is it an unfair imposition as the ANs would have it? This is not a question of opinion. Everybody, including ANs would say there is nothing wrong with doing benign or innocent acts. And everybody would say that unfair impositions are wrong. The question then is, which is happening here?

I rarely see anyone have genuinely different moral intuitions. Most morality debates are about arguing about which moral intuition applies to the situation at hand, not about the intuitions themselves.

Is having children a benign or innocent act, or is it an unfair imposition as the ANs would have it? This is not a question of opinion. Everybody, including ANs would say there is nothing wrong with doing benign or innocent acts. And everybody would say that unfair impositions are wrong. The question then is, which is happening here? — khaled

I agree, that people's moral intuitions are remarkably similar. But do we ever exercise those moral intuitions with regard to perfect knowledge? No! So we run into something of a chicken and the egg scenario - when asking about whether the facts provoke the moral intuition, or the moral intuition adduces selected facts in support of a moral opinion. I don't think there's a final answer. It's both. That's what human beings do. We are the bridge between the ought and the is, and it's where we "should be" - striving to know what's true and do what's right in terms of what's true!

I agree, that people's moral intuitions are remarkably similar. — counterpunch

I’d like to agree with this, but I’m not so sure. For example, right now about half of the US sees things like discriminating against particular groups of people as tolerable, if not outright justified. This is illustrated in the amount of people who voted for Trump in the recent election, despite his obvious immoral (at least according to the other half of Americans) treatment of women, Muslims, immigrants, blacks, etc. Treating others with respect and decency regardless of religion, race, ethnicity, gender, etc. does not seem to be an overwhelmingly common moral intuition.

I’d like to agree with this, but I’m not so sure. For example, right now about half of the US sees things like discriminating against particular groups of people as tolerable, if not outright justified. This is illustrated in the amount of people who voted for Trump in the recent election, despite his obvious immoral (at least according to the other half of Americans) treatment of women, Muslims, immigrants, blacks, etc. Treating others with respect and decency regardless of religion, race, ethnicity, gender, etc. does not seem to be an overwhelmingly common moral intuition. — Pinprick

I'm not about to weigh in on this. It too loaded to be used as an example of how moral intuitions work; so clearly, that's not your real intent. If you want to signal your virtue elsewhere, I'm sure there are plenty of threads where it would be der rigueur and more than welcome.

I actually prefer not to get into politics, and I’m not trying to virtue signal, I didn’t even say which side I agreed with. That isn’t the point. It’s just a good example of how large groups of people can seemingly have very different moral intuitions. Maybe that can be explained by other factors, but even if it can it shows how easily our moral intuitions can be influenced by things like tribalism, or herd mentality in general.

I think this is an extraordinary thing to say:

half of the US sees things like discriminating against particular groups of people as tolerable, if not outright justified. — Pinprick

How do you know what half the people in the US think?

Do you really imagine:

I didn’t even say which side I agreed with. — Pinprick

It’s just a good example of how large groups of people can seemingly have very different moral intuitions. — Pinprick

No, it's not - because you cannot possibly know why people voted the way they did. You are imposing your moral judgement on their choice.

it shows how easily our moral intuitions can be influenced by things like tribalism, or herd mentality in general. — Pinprick

You are a clear demonstration of tribalism and herd mentality; if that's what you were seeking to show, job done!

How do you know what half the people in the US think? — counterpunch

Because of their actions.

No, it's not - because you cannot possibly know why people voted the way they did. — counterpunch

Not in any specific way, no. But I can deduce that had they found Trump’s actions intolerable, they wouldn’t have voted for him. It could be that they found his actions justified, it could be that they disagreed, but were willing to tolerate it, it could be that they were unaware of his actions or didn’t believe them. But, the fact remains that they were willing to overlook these issues, provided they were aware of them of course.

You are imposing your moral judgement on their choice. — counterpunch

I’m in no way trying to show one group as being morally superior to the other. That’s irrelevant. The only thing that matters is that they have different moral intuitions about what is moral.

You are a clear demonstration of tribalism and herd mentality; if that's what you were seeking to show, job done! — counterpunch

You seem to be assuming a lot regarding my motives, but yes, I believe we all have been influenced morally by social norms, upbringing, etc., and therefore have different moral intuitions.

Political allegiances are complex. They are not a simple matter that can be boiled down to some obvious exercise of moral intuition, so it's not a good example. When we talk about similar moral intuitions, I take that to mean we don't go around killing, robbing and raping each other. We all know that that's wrong. We would, most of us - pull someone out of the path of a car, or hand over a bit of pocket change to help a homeless person. We know that's right. These are decent examples because the exercise of moral intuition is clear in the simplicity of the act. Political motivations are anything but clear, so having signalled your virtue you can move on.

I take that to mean we don't go around killing, robbing and raping each other. — counterpunch

But we do. War is sanctioned killing, all property is theft (according to some) and many countries still sanction rape if it is within marriage, other places treat all sex without affirmative verbal consent to be rape (again with disagreements abound)

We don't even agree that we shouldn't kill, steal and rape. All are allowed in certain context which vary depending on who you talk to.

Once you reach the level of handing over pocket change to a homeless person, you already watered down your claim to "most of us" - which it is abundantly clear is false otherwise there would not be any more homeless people.

Either we do not share any common moral intuitions, or we do, but they are easily swamped by other more important concerns.

Either way, appeal to such commonalities is rendered pointless in resolving moral dilemmas.

That's not a reasonable argument. War is a situation in which moral norms have broken down. All property is theft is Proudhon; an anarchist - so again, a rejection of social norms. Rape isn't considered a moral good, even if it occurs within marriage - and becomes somewhere between difficult and impossible to police, particularly in poorer countries. The point is, that the basic moral intuitions remain - even while circumstances keep the rubber from the road.

All are allowed in certain context which vary depending on who you talk to. — Isaac

But that's not true, is it? The basic laws of the land are much the same the world over. Assuming that religion, law, politics and economics are expressions of an innate moral sense - and that devolves in turn to matters of psychology, evolutionary biology, and ultimately causality - it's unsurprising that there's such great commonality of moral intuition, and that there are cultural differences, and differences due to circumstances.

Either we do not share any common moral intuitions, or we do, but they are easily swamped by other more important concerns. Either way, appeal to such commonalities is rendered pointless in resolving moral dilemmas. — Isaac

Right, but my argument isn't about resolving moral dilemmas. For me, this is about the is and the ought. The observation that we have a significant commonality of moral intuition was made in support of the evolutionary argument, but is not really the focus of my argument. I assume that you will have different values to me - and so will prioritise a list of facts differently, but still, you will not but be able to see moral implication in a list of facts. We may disagree as to what they imply given our different values - but it's not illegitimate, as Hume suggests, to continue in the ordinary was of reasoning, making copulations of is and is not, then switch to ought mode. That's what we do. That's who we are - because morality is fundamentally a sense.

This has implications to Popper's 1947 argument in The Open Society and its Enemies, in which he argues that recognising science as truth would require we "make our representations conform" to science as truth, and because scientific truth is effectively indisputable, that it would be dictatorial. That's wrong, because morality is a sense, and while there is a significant commonality of moral intuition, we do have different values based, one presumes on the facts we were exposed to - within our limited apprehensions, and the values we were encouraged to by early experiences, when the human organism is, by dint of evolution, trusting of authority figures. (In that they copy adults because figuring everything out for themselves, they'd die.) So, to sum up - morality is an evolutionary sense. There's remarkable similarity of moral intuition, but values are complex - and inform our understanding of facts. That so, we can accept science is true without it becoming a dictatorial dogma. Hume was wrong, and Popper was wrong, and this in turn, is all a consequence of science rendered a heresy by the Church with the trial of Galileo. But let's put that aside for now.

War is a situation in which moral norms have broken down. All property is theft is Proudhon; an anarchist - so again, a rejection of social norms. — counterpunch

Now you're just begging the question. "Killing is considered morally wrong because when we do sanction killing we're not being moral... because killing is considered morally wrong", "Theft is considered morally wrong because the people who don't consider it that way are themselves morally wrong because they don't consider theft morally wrong".

Oh, and according the WHO report on domestic violence ""Often, men who coerce a spouse into a sexual act believe their actions are legitimate because they are married to the woman."

So yes, we do kill steal and rape and we sometimes consider all three to be morally acceptable, even morally advisable. The factors which make them so vary from culture to culture.

The basic laws of the land are much the same the world over. — counterpunch

What do you see as the similarities then -the world over. Give me a few examples of laws that are universal.

morality is fundamentally a sense. — counterpunch

...is given without any evidential support (again). So it does not show...

That's wrong, because morality is a sense, and while there is a significant commonality of moral intuition, we do have different values based, one presumes on the facts we were exposed to - within our limited apprehensions, and the values we were encouraged to by early experiences, when the human organism is, by dint of evolution, trusting of authority figures. — counterpunch

Where do you get this stuff from?

Now you're just begging the question. "Killing is considered morally wrong because when we do sanction killing we're not being moral... because killing is considered morally wrong", "Theft is considered morally wrong because the people who don't consider it that way are themselves morally wrong because they don't consider theft morally wrong". — Isaac

Doesn't all morality beg the question? Why is it wrong? Because it's wrong! I can give you a slightly deeper reason than that. It's morally wrong because the moral sense objects to it; classifies it as wrong instinctively. And there is considerable commonality between people, and between people's - as to the broad dynamics of right and wrong.

It's not that I don't accept that there are cultural and circumstantial differences in how the moral sense is expressed. I do. The moral sense isn't dictatorial of human behaviour. It's a consequence of evolution, and so the degree to which morality influences behaviour is a matter of how advantageous it was. Being too moral would get you killed quicker than being entirely amoral! So morality is a sense we can disregard at will.

Only quite recently did we form civilisations - and here there's a Nietzschean transvaluation of values, of sorts - not the strong fooled by the weak, but implicit tribal morality made explicit for political purposes. Because any dispute would naturally split a fledgling society along tribal lines, it was necessary to have an objective expression of the moral sense, ostensibly justified by God, as authority for moral laws that applied equally to everyone. This is the origin of religion.

Where do you get this stuff from? — Isaac

Does it matter? I'm saying it. This is my philosophy. I'll gladly explain it to you, but I honestly cannot understand your interest in something you apparently have such disdain for.

.

I believe it's raining. You believe it is sunny. Therefore whether it is raining or sunny is just a matter of opinion.

@Bartricks

No, your approach is all wrong here. If I believe it's raining and you believe it's sunny, it is, therefore, true that you hold a belief that it is sunny and also true that I hold a belief that it is raining. It is not an objective opinion, but rather a subjective one. This is more accurately illustrated with an abstraction concept (eg, a value judgment) rather than a concrete concept (eg, rain or sunshine).

If I say a "x is immoral", I am making a statement analogous to saying "vanilla is my favorite flavor." Notice that the analogous statement is not an objective one, such as "vanilla is the best flavor" but rather as a subjective one "to me, vanilla is the best flavor." It is the same with moral statements or other normative statements. If I make the statement "stealing is wrong" what I actually mean to say is "to me, stealing is wrong."

If morality is subjective, then it would not make sense to interpret moral statements objectively, as in some inherent moral property of the thing in question. If morality is subjective, then we are not able to make moral statements outside from the subjective confines of our own minds. I mean, we technically can, however, there is no objective standard available for us to test such statements upon.

We can only know our own values that guide our own principles. We are a social species that developed a proclivity for social cohesion and our sociological environments naturally produce pressures within peer groups, societal boundaries, cultures and other social constructs that heavily influence from a top-down perspective (societal influence upon an individual) and mostly lightly influence from a bottom-up perspective (individuals influence upon society).

This is why we share many values - because we adapt to our social environment which is segregated into groups with disproportionate levels of power. The most powerful groups often dictate which values are allowed to be proliferated through influence and the strength that each influence is allowed to have.

No, your approach is all wrong here. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Highly unlikely.

If I believe it's raining and you believe it's sunny, it is, therefore, true that you hold a belief that it is sunny and also true that I hold a belief that it is raining. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes. From which it would be fallacious to infer that therefore weather itself is subjective. Which is the same fallacy that those who appeal to variation in moral belief across space and time commit when they blithely conclude that morality is individually or collectively subjective.

It is not an objective opinion, but rather a subjective one. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Now you're just abusing language and/or confusing a belief with its contents. There is no such thing as an 'objective' opinion or belief. All beliefs are subjective, because beliefs are subjective states. But some beliefs are about objective matters - such as the belief that it is raining - and some beliefs are about subjective matters - such as my belief that I am believing something, or my belief that Jane is enjoying the donut.

If I say a "x is immoral", I am making a statement analogous to saying "vanilla is my favorite flavor." Notice that the analogous statement is not an objective one, such as "vanilla is the best flavor" but rather as a subjective one "to me, vanilla is the best flavor." It is the same with moral statements or other normative statements. If I make the statement "stealing is wrong" what I actually mean to say is "to me, stealing is wrong." — Cartesian trigger-puppets

No, you're very confused. If you believe stealing is wrong, what exactly do you believe about stealing? That is, provide a translation for that word 'wrong'.

I am not saying that weather itself is subjective. Im saying that we can talk about weather in an objective way - as some fact of the world - and that to talk in such an objective way about morality doesn't make sense if we are supposing morality is subjective.

But some beliefs are about objective matters - such as the belief that it is raining - and some beliefs are about subjective matters - such as my belief that I am believing something, or my belief that Jane is enjoying the donut.

@Bartricks

This is what I'm trying to say, that moral statements are really an expression of a personal belief and that some beliefs are about objective matters - such as the belief that it is raining - and some beliefs are about subjective matters - such as my belief that stealing is wrong. I cannot make a statement that stealing is objectively wrong, as if the action itself contains some inherent immoral property. I can only say that I hold the belief that stealing is wrong as a personal axiom.

If you believe stealing is wrong, what exactly do you believe about stealing? That is, provide a translation for that word 'wrong'.

@Bartricks

I cannot provide you a meta-ethical translation for the word 'wrong'. All that I can say is that I have a preference against the act. I don't think that I can make meaningful statements about an act being inherently wrong, or objectively wrong. I believe I can provide descriptive statement that explains some of the consequences of stealing, but not a prescriptive statement stating why we ought not steal. Just as your example of conflicting beliefs regarding rain or sunshine, I don't think there's a way to bridge the is-ought divide. I don't think that you can make moral statements as if our value judgments represent something that just is, as in, a fact of the world.

Political allegiances are complex. They are not a simple matter that can be boiled down to some obvious exercise of moral intuition, so it's not a good example. — counterpunch

Ok, that’s fair.

But if...

The moral sense isn't dictatorial of human behaviour. — counterpunch

Then this...

When we talk about similar moral intuitions, I take that to mean we don't go around killing, robbing and raping each other. — counterpunch

Can’t be used as evidence for having similar moral intuitions. IOW’s just because we don’t rape, rob, or kill doesn’t mean that’s due to having similar moral intuitions.

I can give you a slightly deeper reason than that. It's morally wrong because the moral sense objects to it; classifies it as wrong instinctively. — counterpunch

I'm just going to refer you to 's comment above which makes the case far more eruditely that I was doing.

Where do you get this stuff from? — Isaac


Does it matter? I'm saying it. This is my philosophy. I'll gladly explain it to you, but I honestly cannot understand your interest in something you apparently have such disdain for. — counterpunch

You do know there's a difference between 'Philosophy' and 'Making shit up' don't you?

You do know there's a difference between 'Philosophy' and 'Making shit up' don't you? — Isaac

I do, but it's a subtle distinction, and one is not wholly exclusive of the other.

Can’t be used as evidence for having similar moral intuitions. IOW’s just because we don’t rape, rob, or kill doesn’t mean that’s due to having similar moral intuitions. — Pinprick

One can, for example, use an illustrative example of a phenomenon that requires explanation. Why don't we just rob, kill and rape each other? I hope it's moral intuition, and not just because we're scared to. I'd like to think there's some prohibition from empathy, and it's not just a lazy way to save ourselves the hassle! Should I be worried that you don't think so?

For me, I begin with the evolutionary reality of the hunter gatherer tribe, because that's where the enormous majority of human development occurred, and because in my view, Nietzsche was wrong. Man in a state of nature could not have been some savage, amoral brute - or he could not have survived. He defended the tribe, shared food and raised the young; and this is where his moral sense originates. It's remarkably similar to all peoples because the relationship of the human organism to the reality of the environment is remarkably similar for all peoples. Just as all human cultures invented art, music, pottery, agriculture, architecture, jewellery - albeit in culturally specific ways, they all have a moral sense expressed in culturally specific ways; because otherwise, the human organism could not have survived.

Morality isn't just an opinion. Any particular expression of the moral sense is an opinion. But the moral sense predates intellectual intelligence - if chimpanzees are anything to go by, and so is a behaviourally intelligent adaptation, advantageous to the individual within the tribe, and to the tribe made up of moral individuals.

Why don't we just rob, kill and rape each other? I hope it's moral intuition, and not just because we're scared to. — counterpunch

Ok, but then you have to allow, and account for, questions like why do we rape, rob, and kill each other in certain circumstances. The fact that we do act in this way illustrates that we may not have similar moral intuitions.

I'd like to think there's some prohibition from empathy, — counterpunch

There may be, but there may also be emotional drives to kill, etc. Impulses, as their commonly called. So why do you cherry pick things like empathy and use it to justify universal moral intuition, but exclude things like anger, lust, revenge, self-preservation, etc.?

It's remarkably similar to all peoples because the relationship of the human organism to the reality of the environment is remarkably similar for all peoples. — counterpunch

I don’t see hunter-gatherer tribes’ culture as being very similar to modern culture. Are you meaning in the more general sense that all people try to adapt to their environment to ensure survival?

Just as all human cultures invented art, music, pottery, agriculture, architecture, jewellery - albeit in culturally specific ways, they all have a moral sense expressed in culturally specific ways; because otherwise, the human organism could not have survived. — counterpunch

Ah. Ok, but I would argue that the moral sense itself is determined by environment, a la natural selection. This sense has to be broad enough to encompass all expressions of it, which renders the idea essentially powerless. Everyone has the capacity to have a multitude of different moral intuitions. It seems like you’re just saying we all have a will to live, which causes us to behave and think differently depending on the obstacles encountered in our environment.

Morality isn't just an opinion. Any particular expression of the moral sense is an opinion. But the moral sense predates intellectual intelligence - if chimpanzees are anything to go by, and so is a behaviourally intelligent adaptation, advantageous to the individual within the tribe, and to the tribe made up of moral individuals. — counterpunch

I see what you’re saying, I think, but it seems tautological. A moral fact for you would be whatever particular moral sense is evolutionarily advantageous for a particular group in a particular environment. In this way, there is no possible wrong morality, since any disadvantageous morality that would happen to develop wouldn’t last very long. This, of course, leads to the conclusion that there is no one correct morality either. Your idea is so general that it excludes nothing, and thereby says nothing of importance.

Ok, but then you have to allow, and account for, questions like why do we rape, rob, and kill each other in certain circumstances. The fact that we do act in this way illustrates that we may not have similar moral intuitions. — Pinprick

I have no particular insight into abnormal or criminal psychology. I haven't given it any thought. My point was that people don't generally behave this way - so please don't ask me why they do. My point is that overwhelmingly people don't. That I can explain. If you say people do, and therefore don't have similar moral intuitions, okay then. That's your opinion. It was something of a throwaway line anyway - Illustrative of a point made by someone else, and I'm sick of you banging at this same point over and over and over again. So I concede the argument. You can chalk that up as a win. People are rapists, murderers and thieves! Well done!

By the way, those moral rules that we agree on - thou shalt not kill for example — TheMadFool

Not everyone agrees on these moral rules, and therefore apply a nearly instant exception to them. "Thou shalt not kill..." is qualified by adding exceptions "...except in defense of your life, or the life of another, or..." so really, it comes down to "Thou should not kill without reason", as do most other moral rules. Make a rule, create the exception. Only if the rule is universally accepted as 'Wrong", then would it really be rule? No one would do it anyway so no one would have to confirm its wrongness.

Not everyone agrees on these moral rules, and therefore apply a nearly instant exception to them. "Thou shalt not kill..." is qualified by adding exceptions "...except in defense of your life, or the life of another, or..." so really, it comes down to "Thou should not kill without reason", as do most other moral rules. Make a rule, create the exception. Only if the rule is universally accepted as 'Wrong", then would it really be rule? No one would do it anyway so no one would have to confirm its wrongness. — Book273

My only response is to remind you that morality is, at its heart, a plea, a desire, a hope in re how the world should be and not the way it is. That being so, moral injunctions and the codes that are built of them are not meant for the world as it is but rather for a world as it should be.

Consider the all-time favorite criticism of Kantian ethics - the lying to the murderer thought experiment. In the world as it is, there are murderers and there'll be dilemmas like these but in a world in which everyone practices Kant's ethics there will be no murderers and the lying to the murderer scenario is meaningless. In other words, exceptions to moral codes like the one you mentioned are a part of our experience precisely because some moral theory is being applied to a world that doesn't fully support it. It's like trying to play Diablo III (a video game) on Windows 1995.