There's a difference between the allusive, indeterminate kind of sharing of the arts, which speaks to the reality that we do not all see the same way, (that's why we can be so surprised by art works) and the analytic formal way of empirical sharing that says we all see the same things. What can shared in the latter way can be precisely identified. If someone can't see that difference then there's not much to say about it. — Janus
Of course there is! Adding "intersubjectivity" only serves to confuse the two, making a nonsense of the whole. — Banno
There is private subjectivity and there are various kinds and degrees of inter-subjective sharing. — Janus
Materialism to me has only one consequence, objective reality, meaning agreement between subjects about the nature of compelling external forces. There can be nothing to agree upon, if there is only one subject. The notion of objectivity becomes meaningless to me, if there are not multiple subjects. — simeonz
"Exist" is just another word for having a form. But the only way we define the idea of form is through the account of our interactions, through phenomenology. How can we talk about objectivity vs subjectivity of the form we perceive when there is only one subject. The two ideas are indistinguishable even conceptually to me. But I must say, I see where you are coming from. You are not asking the question epistemically at all it appears and to you the ontic difference is evident. — simeonz
I argued here that if a theory made distinct claim about the world, in a logically consistent manner, it is deserving of its title. Even if it is epistemically indistinguishable to other proposals.Some variants of dualism might be ontically distinguishable, albeit not in a way that can be corroborated. The differences might not be detectable on earth or might be perceivable only through the lenses of hypothetical psychic observer. I accept such notions, because like with solipsism, there is difference between the version of the proposed reality therein and the conventional ones, even if it fails to project into sensory experience. Such description is still irrefutable. I insisted originally that there are different categories of questions that we could ask to distinguish one theory from the rest - ontic, epistemic, ethical and antropological. Some are distinguishable only through some of these questions, but to me, all should be distinguishable in an unambiguous manner as ontic descriptions or they are synonyms to another theory. — simeonz
That's the erroneous model, yes. What has happened is that as soon as philosophers admitted the ineffably sibjective into their menagerie of concepts, they found that they could talk about it after all, and had to pretend that it admitted of degrees - hence the oxymoron "intersubjective"! — Banno
I was taking fallible as meaning "capable of making mistakes". Defined as such, it does not apply to statements and claims. — Olivier5
That's what those slew of reasons are there to do. Help you work that out. — Isaac
Why would the only point in arguing be for me to change you from something right to something wrong? — Isaac
I could, for example, offer alternatives. I could help you strengthen your argument so you feel more confident about it. I could resolve internal contradictions which would otherwise cause cognitive dissonance. — Isaac
I could enjoy the game (like chess, which is equally combative, but both parties benefit). I could have a passionate academic interest in how people defend their beliefs and how that approach has been changed by online social media... — Isaac
where does that leave us? — Pfhorrest
Pretty much the place human(-like) social relations have been for the past few million years. — Isaac
The kind of responses I would find most pleasant to get would be "oh hey that's a neat similarity you've observed there, never noticed that before" or "huh that's an interesting approach to that problem I've not heard of before". I'm not looking for people to tell me that I'm right, like you always seem to suggest, but just for people to find the approaches I mention curious, interesting, and worth further consideration — Pfhorrest
So "well done you" then? — Isaac
that thread you started on epistemology had Janus, Banno, Srap and a few others all take your comments in this supposedly 'strange' way — Isaac
Again, if you're simply assuming that my reading of background assumptions and the wrong conclusions they would lead to are erroneous, then you've just assumed you're flawless from the outset. — Isaac
Why would you be perplexed. It's obvious what's happening there. One of us has made a mistake identifying apples. — Isaac
OK, sure "capable of making mistakes" has a different sense than "capable of being mistaken"; the latter could apply to people or claims, whereas the former would seem a bit odd if you tried to apply it to claims. Language is not as tidy as we might like it to be. — Janus
Language is not as tidy as we might like it to be. — Janus
But let's go back to the topic of this thread. Suppose I allow that there are things that cannot be said, that are properly he domain of a subjective world.
Then how could that stuff become inter-subjective? By definition, it cannot move between subjects. Only the public, non-subjecitve stuff can do that.
So if we allow for a private subjective world, the notion of inter-subjective becomes a nonsense. — Banno
In a recent thread I started arguing that solipsism is incompatible with ontic materialism. — simeonz
I was claiming that the materialist position can only hypothesize the existence of objectively correct perception, not inanimate ontology. — simeonz
Materialism to me has only one consequence, objective reality, meaning agreement between subjects about the nature of compelling external forces. There can be nothing to agree upon, if there is only one subject. The notion of objectivity becomes meaningless to me, if there are not multiple subjects. — simeonz
It's the fact that we all have our private worlds which is the basis of commonality. — Janus
It seems you do not have a pet.animals probably have no idea about, much less what, their fellows or themselves are feeling. — Janus
Even if we allow that everyone has the same type of experience - which is very much in question here - by virtue of being human, it is still obviously a fact that each of us (each human subject) has a different token of experience. — Luke
All language is ever meant to do is translate subjective activity into exchangeable representations. — Mww
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