I was merely being helpful. I did not suggest they were the only valid argument forms (like you know what they are!) But just one valid argument would be nice.
Anyway, stop stalling and just present an argument. And try making the premises comprehensible and not gibberish.

Our reason tells us that if we make a decision, then we are morally responsible for having made it - that is, we are in principle blameworthy or praiseworthy for it. That doesn't mean we are morally responsible, it just means we have prima facie evidence that we are. — Bartricks

But if we stick ruthlessly - as we should - to following reason, then we will come to the conclusion that we are prime movers. For we can, by reason alone, know that we are morally responsible for what we do. And we can, by reason alone, know that for this to be the case, we would need to be prime movers. — Bartricks

You are contradicting yourself. The first passage says that reason tells us we are morally responsible, but that we might not be. This means that we don't know whether we are morally responsible or not, we only know that reason tells us that we are. The second passage contradicts this by saying that we can, by reason alone, know that we are morally responsible.

Yea... You're definitely trolling. Or just inept. I can't help in either case.

Have a good one.

What you actually mean is "I can't do that because I don't know how". Waste. Of. Time.

No what I mean is that you are trolling or inept.

You are contradicting yourself. — Janus

No I'm not. The views expressed in both of those passages are consistent. Having prima facie evidence that a proposition is true is consistent with that proposition being true. And if it is in fact true that I am morally responsible, and I have prima facie evidence that I am morally responsible and form the belief that I am morally responsible on that basis, then other things being equal I 'know' that I am morally responsible.

We both know that you simply can't do what I asked you to do. I mean, if you could, you would.

What is happening is that I have. And you are incapable or unwilling to recognize that I have.

And I have done so enough that I can sleep easily knowing that I have done all I could. And either you are simply incapable of understanding it or unwilling to. I cannot help in either case.

Well, my theory about that would be because I'm debating with people who can't recognize an argument from their elbow. The main argument I made in the OP - the one that's interesting and novel - is one that no-one yet seems even to have noticed or said anything about. — Bartricks

At the risk of confusing the OP for my elbow, I'm going to have to ask you to be more specific about what you consider interesting and novel - because my reading of the OP, is a poor presentation of the ideas put up for discussion, buried in a mess of wild logic chopping.

And therein lies at least one answer to the question I asked earlier. Your threads descend into arguments about the argument because it's not Strawson's views being debated. Have you thought maybe, about removing yourself from the picture - and debating the philosophy?

then other things being equal I 'know' that I am morally responsible. — Bartricks

You have allowed that we might not be morally responsible, and since it is impossible to know that something false is true, the possible falsity of the proposition that we are morally responsible rules out the possibility that we can be certain of knowing it.

Add to that the further problem that you have not explained what the difference between holding ourselves to be, or being held to be, morally responsible and actually being morally responsible, could be, and your position just looks confused.

A more cumbersome statement of the Basic Argument goes as
follows.
(1) Interested in free action, we are particularly interested in
actions that are performed for a reason (as opposed to 'reflex'
actions or mindlessly habitual actions).
(2) When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of
how one is, mentally speaking. (It is also a function of one's
height, one's strength, one's place and time, and so on. But
the mental factors are crucial when moral responsibility isin
question.)
(3) So if one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must
be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking -at
least in certain respects.
(4) But to be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking,
in certain respects, one must have brought it about that one is
the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects. And it
is not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way
one is, mentally speaking. One must have consciously and
explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in
certain respects, and one must have succeeded in bringing it
about that one is that way.
(5) But one cannot really be said to choose, in a conscious,
reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is mentally speaking,
in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally
speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice,
'P1' - preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals - in the light
of which one chooses how to be.
(6) But then to be truly responsible, on account of having chosen
to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects,
one must be truly responsible for one's having the principles
of choice P1 in the light of which one chose how to be.
(7) But for this to be so one must have chosen P1, in a reasoned,
conscious, intentional fashion.
(8) But for this, i.e. (7), to be so one must already have had some
principles of choice P2, in the light of which one chose P1.
(9) And so on. Here we are setting out on a regress that we
cannot stop. True self-determination is impossible because it
requires the actual completion of an infinite series of choices
of principles of choice.
(10) So true moral responsibility is impossible, because it requires
true self-determination, as noted in (3).

https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/The%20Impossibility%20of%20Moral%20Responsibility%20-%20Galen%20Strawson.pdf

The argument seems to turn on this pivot; and therein lies the weak link.

(5) But one cannot really be said to choose, in a conscious,
reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is mentally speaking,
in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally
speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice,
'P1' - preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals - in the light
of which one chooses how to be.

As the assertion is that moral responsibility is impossible, given Strawson's argument here, it would have to be Robinson Crusoe - cast away on a desert island, far removed from any real world moral expectations of him, in regard to which he may or may not be morally responsible, and reliant solely upon his own resources, for this condition to hold. And arguably, a man alone cannot be moral or immoral. This raises a suspicion that, the sterile conditions of Strawson's basic argument create the conditions in which moral responsibility becomes impossible.

No, you simply don't know how to express your hodge podge of claims in a logical way.

You have allowed that we might not be morally responsible, and since it is impossible to know that something false is true, the possible falsity of the proposition that we are morally responsible rules out the possibility that we can be certain of knowing it. — Janus

I don't know what you mean. The two claims of mine that you quoted were perfectly compatible with one another.

Strawson thinks it is metaphysically impossible to be morally responsible, because he believes that moral responsibility requires the ability to create oneself from scratch. I am disputing that this is necessary. I am pointing out that the only reason to think one would need the ability to create oneself from scratch to be morally responsible is because if one did this - if one created oneself from scratch - then one's subsequent decisions would not trace to external causes. Yet that would also be the case if one was an uncreated thing. And thus contrary to what Strawson has argued, it is metaphysically possible to be morally responsible.

It does not follow from something being metaphysically possible that it is actual. But that's a silly point to keep making. Nobody disputes it. I don't. Strawson doesn't. No one does. The point, though, is that if we have powerful prima facie evidence that a proposition is true, and no reason to doubt the truth of that proposition, then we have the best possible grounds for believing the proposition is true. And if the proposition is indeed true, and we have come to believe in its truth in the right way (one way would involve recognizing that there is overwhelming reason to think it is true and none to think it is false and believing in it accordingly), then we 'know' that it is true.

Your assessment of Strawson's argument has nothing whatsoever to do with his argument. I mean, what on earth does this mean:

As the assertion is that moral responsibility is impossible, given Strawson's argument here, it would have to be Robinson Crusoe - cast away on a desert island, far removed from any real world moral expectations of him, in regard to which he may or may not be morally responsible, and reliant solely upon his own resources, for this condition to hold — counterpunch

It's complete gobbledygook. Strawson's point is the one I expressed in the OP. Namely, that one's decisions are a product of one's character, but to be morally responsible for those decisions one would need to be morally responsible for one's character. But our characters are a product of external cause - heredity and environment - neither of which are things for which we bear any moral responsiblity.

So, what's the more basic underlying principle at work here? It is this one: that if one is not morally responsible for A, and one is not morally responsible for B, and A and B are causally responsible for C, then one is not morally responsible for C.

As such, even if one's decisions are the conscious product of a reason-responsive process, one will not be morally responsible for them if one is not morally responsible for their causal precursors.

That's Strawson's assumption. I think it is correct.

But Strawson thinks that the 'only' way that this condition can be satisfied is if we create ourselves from scratch (which is, of course, impossible).

He's wrong though. If we are uncreated things then the condition would be satisfied.

Thus, Strawson is incorrect. Moral responsibility is not impossible, it just requires that we be something that flies in the face of conventional beliefs about what we are.

This is the point at which you find something out about yourself: are you a true follower of reason or do you let convention restrict where she can lead you? That is, do you put reason above convention, or vice versa?

(Note, Strawson is conventional at a crucial juncture - for he says "It is undeniable that one is the way one is, initially, a a result of heredity and early experience". No, Strawson, that is deniable.)

Your assessment of Strawson's argument has nothing whatsoever to do with his argument. I mean, what on earth does this mean. It's complete gobbledygook. — Bartricks

I'm unable to help you with your incomprehension. They are English words, plainly spoken.

if one is not morally responsible for A, and one is not morally responsible for B, and A and B are causally responsible for C, then one is not morally responsible for C. — Bartricks

Where is this from? You attribute it to Strawson, but I did not find it among his writings.

It's implicit. Try reading the article and thinking about what he's saying.

And what you said was not written in plain English. It was gobbledygook. It had nothing to do with what Strawson argued.

So we're debating your argument - which is:

If one is not morally responsible for A, and one is not morally responsible for B, and A and B are causally responsible for C, then one is not morally responsible for C. — Bartricks

End of debate. Nothing to see here!

I am discussing Strawson's argument. Criticising it. It's called philosophy.

I am discussing Strawson's argument. Criticising it. It's called philosophy. — Bartricks

You're not though. It's like I said earlier:

Your threads descend into arguments about the argument because it's not Strawson's views being debated. — counterpunch

I posted Strawson's Basic Argument and commented on it. You have ignored Strawson's argument, and dismissed the comment as gobbledygook, and have insisted on your restatement of his argument.

If not A, and
If not B, and if
A+B=C
Not C!

Your restatement is not debateable, because you have removed all the debateable questions about how moral responsibility is formed and operates.

What you've done is create another: "God is omnipotent. He can do anything! Anything means anything!" You then adopt this non-debateable position as your own, because your purpose is to win. You're not doing philosophy. You're doing rhetoric. And in rhetorical terms, you just got your ass handed to you!

More gobbledygook. Media studies may be a better fit methinks.