Malicious intent has been shown to apply to both. Since in both cases you intend to do harm. Just in one you intend to mitigate it as much as you can. — khaled

Causing non-trivial harm directly is sufficiently different from causing trivial harm (or causing non-trivial harm indirectly whilst pursuing other reasonable goals) that we do not use the term malicious to describe both. again you seem to be going down this weird line that if two things are similar in one aspect, they must be the same thing. Both birth and malicious genetic engineering result in harm to the subject. Just because they share that one thing in common, doesn't mean you can just treat them as if they were identical.

I find that in every day life this is never used — khaled

As an aside, I find this a really bizarre argument that both you and schop frequently use. I give an example of the way people think about birth and you say it's not convincing because it's hardly ever used. It's used all the time - justifying giving birth. It's like you look to normal attitudes as a measure of what's convincing morally but then refuse to allow conception into that set of normal attitudes. Like saying "there are just no examples -apart from the example you just gave". What kind of counter-argument is that?

Anyway, that aside we do use the counterbalancing benefits equation all the time (aside from to justify birth, which is the main one). We've given loads of examples, surgery, imprisonment, laws, childcare... That you phrase these as greater harms is irrelevant. The point is it still serves to differentiate MGE from birth. In MGE there are no greater harms being avoided, with birth there are.

We don't force people to exercise for example, even though we have a reasonable expectation of counterbalancing benefits. — khaled

Of course we don't. Because as I've said for like the hundredth time we do not decide moral dilemmas by applying a single maxim. Honestly - if we could just get past that one point I think we'd make some progress. You keep presuming you can apply some maxim to another situation and expect it to yield the same result. Different situation, different sets of maxim become relevant. It's not rocket science.

With exercise, the benefits of coercion would not outweigh the harms, given the methods we'd have to use. Not so with birth, where the method of coercion is harmless. With exercise, there's and alternative method (persuasion). Not so with birth. With exercise, failure to achieve the benefits is remediable. Not so with birth. With exercise, the benefits accrue mainly to the individual. Not so with birth... I could go on.

And when the befits do accrue to society in general (like severe health service impact) we do coerce - mandatory PE lessons, removal of health services without commitment etc.

I don't find convincing because it is never used in daily life either. I can't break your leg because I intend to pay your hospital bills later — khaled

I'll do one more of these, but I'm not going to just point out the actual differences all the time when the whole "this is a bit like that so it must be the same thing..." argument is flawed. Paying hospital bills is not the same as mitigation. Mitigation would be knowing you've created a risk of a leg breaking but being committed to doing everything in your power to prevent it. Like putting in a flight of stairs, or building a motorbike, or advertising a skiing holiday. All completely normal things were a person creates a risk of harm, but does everything reasonable to mitigate it.

Notwithstanding that, we can go through the differences. With breaking a leg, there's no given reason why you'd do it. Not so with birth. With breaking a leg, the damage is painful at the time regardless of later mitigation. Not so with birth... I could go on.

I'm saying that both birth and MGE are examples of malicious intent. Because they both have the willing intention to do harm. What differentiates? — khaled

See above.

If your goal isn't to say that there is something wrong with AN then what are you replying for? — khaled

I do think there's something wrong with AN. Just not that. A valid argument with ridiculous premises is 'something wrong', in my book. Plus, very little of the discussion here has actually been taken up with the ridiculous but valid AN maxim. Most has been taken up trying to show that it is commonly held but inconsistently not applied to birth. Those arguments are flawed, and it is those I've been mainly opposing.

Plus I think most AN arguments are just different ways to push neo-liberalism, which I think is wrong because of the consequences on society - consequences America is reeling from right now.

It's because you are looking for ways to move the argument of existence vs. non-existence. You are trying to do "If a tree falls in the woods.." — schopenhauer1

That's actually a good analogy. The problem in the "falling tree" thought experiment is also one of communication, namely that it's unclear what "a sound" is. Is the sound just the movement of the air molecules, or does it require a human mind to actually be affected by and interpret these molecules.

The problem here is similar: when you say "harm", you mean an objective state of affairs, i.e. "the amount of harm in the universe has increased". I don't think "harm" or "suffering" can be meaningfully assessed from such a (imagined) objective vantage. Because to me, the moral relevance of "harm" or "suffering" is the effect it has on people's ability to make decisions.

I think I defined all three pretty precisely. — khaled

The point wasn't whether you can come up with definitions. The point was that in order to be convincing, you need people to agree to your definitions not just set them out.

Correct. And concluding that one of the causes of timmy breaking his arm was that he was born. Because if timmy hadn't been born he wouldn't have broken his arm. What's wrong with this? — khaled

Nothing. It's just that causality is usually amended with additional stipulations precisely to avoid it being this far reaching. So when people talk about "causing suffering" they ain't usually use this definition of causation.

That's not really how I use the term. The way you put it I would say A was a cause of B. — khaled

What I wanted to point out is that you figure out whether something was necessary by making another comparison. Your definition actually makes this pretty explicit.

The problem here is similar: when you say "harm", you mean an objective state of affairs, i.e. "the amount of harm in the universe has increased". I don't think "harm" or "suffering" can be meaningfully assessed from such a (imagined) objective vantage. Because to me, the moral relevance of "harm" or "suffering" is the effect it has on people's ability to make decisions. — Echarmion

But that's why I mentioned capacity to do harm. Does the capacity exist? Then don't do it. That capacity exists, even if there is no one benefitting from not being harmed. That is the focus in these formulations at least.

But that's why I mentioned capacity to do harm. Does the capacity exist? Then don't do it. That capacity exists, even if there is no one benefitting from not being harmed. That is the focus in these formulations at least. — schopenhauer1

But then, as I said, if the focus is on protecting people's ability to make their own decisions, there is no reason to have a rule that no-one benefits from.

You can't even say that much for certain. Many parents regret having children, because they weren't actually prepared. — khaled

If they’re not prepared, I doubt they want them. But I’d wager that most of us have pretty good idea whether or not having children would benefit us.

Because in this case if we don't buy it we ourselves get harmed comparably to how much we can expect the other person (who now can't buy the bread) to be harmed. I don't understand what's so difficult about this. — khaled

But you can’t be certain about this. The next family may very well be starving to death. Remember, this is strictly about risk. You’re unwilling to risk harming someone without their consent, even if the risk of significant harm is small, when it comes to childbirth. Yet you seem willing to do so in this situation. What’s the difference? And the argument you give here could just as easily translate to childbirth. Parents who want to have children risk significant harm to themselves by not having children (as evidenced by the suffering endured by people who want children, but are unable to have them), yet you would encourage them to take that risk. I don’t see how you can be sure that whatever unknown harm may befall the child will be less than the harm the hopeful parents (as well as hopeful grandparents, siblings, etc.) will experience.

Is it more harmful to not build the pipeline than it is to build the pipeline? — khaled

I truly don’t know. If the thing blows up and kills people, then yes it is. I doubt not having a pipeline would result in any loss of life. Either way though, the amount of harm doesn’t seem to matter to you regarding AN, it’s that there is any risk at all, regardless of how small. But in this situation, you prefer to compare potential harms. Why is that? Why is it ok to risk harming others while building a pipeline without their consent, but not ok to risk harming another person by having a child? It can’t be because of the likelihood of harm occurring (as your button example demonstrates), and it can’t be because of the potential good it can cause (as you’re unwilling to take that risk with childbirth), and it can’t be because of the amount of harm not doing so could cause (we’ve lived this long without a pipeline, so building one is more for convenience than anything else).

It is basically always the more harmful option, because you're comparing a lifetime of suffering to the suffering of childlessness. — khaled

This question is about how you measure harm. If you only want to look at the harm the child will experience, and the parents will experience, you may have a case (but then again, maybe not). However, not having a child will cause more people to suffer. At the very least there are two parents, even more if you consider grandparents, siblings, etc. that may be negatively affected by the parents not having a child.

Putting exact numbers on things is ridiculous, but to illustrate the point, let’s say if I have a child it’s likely that he/she will suffer 20% of his/her life. Let’s say that by not having a child, I, my wife, and our parents will each suffer 5% more than we would if we had a child. Cumulatively, this amounts to an increase of suffering of 30%. Which is the better option in your opinion, and why?

Because not doing so risks killing them. Which is a much greater harm than a broken rib for most people. I don't understand what's so difficult about this. — khaled

So it’s ok to do because you think it will benefit them?

Most people don't want to die. — khaled

Presumably because they find life valuable, right?

Would you mind if I press the button that has a 2% chance of killing you or breaking a bone for a 98% chance of giving you 1000 dollars without asking? Most people walk away 1000 dollars richer.... Heck, most people who have gone through the experience say that it was worth it! — khaled

Personally, I think my life is worth more than $1000, but everyone has their price. I’m willing to risk dying in a car wreck every day I go to work, with much less to gain btw.

If it is possible that someone will find life not worthwhile because they stubbed their toe once, yes. — khaled

I guess we’re just different in this regard then....

On the other hand you are suggesting that benefits should also be factored in. That would mean that you are obligated to have children in many scenarios. If you can show that it is likely that they will be beneficial to have overall, then it becomes a duty to have them. But you don't agree with this. Which is weird. Furthermore you say that the risk of significant harm outweighs any considerations of pleasure. I don't see how you balance this. You have two different "variables" whereas I have one. — khaled

What you’re missing is that the benefits are for everyone involved. So if there’s a situation where someone would benefit from being born, but the parents would not, then that would need to be considered. Hence no obligations. So, if these two parents are considering having a child, and one parent states that they will kill their self if they have a child, then they shouldn’t have the child, regardless of how beneficial doing so may be for the child. This is due to the risk of significant harm.

But then, as I said, if the focus is on protecting people's ability to make their own decisions, there is no reason to have a rule that no-one benefits from. — Echarmion

The capacity to harm someone in this fashion exists, no? If the person uses this capacity, harm will incur, no? Not hard.

The capacity to harm someone in this fashion exists, no? If the person uses this capacity, harm will incur, no? Not hard. — schopenhauer1

No, it won't. Or, more specifically, there is no capacity to harm people by making them exist. That's not harm. No moral subject is limited in it's ability to exercise it's choice by being created in the first place.

No, it won't. Or, more specifically, there is no capacity to harm people by making them exist. That's not harm. No moral subject is limited in it's ability to exercise it's choice by being created in the first place. — Echarmion

So the possibility of any of the very wide range of harms don't have the possibility of befalling the person born? And via experience, not only any of the possibilities, but inevitably some of them won't befall the person born?

So all instances of harm will not befall the person born? — schopenhauer1

I'm disputing your definition of "harm", so I am not sure what to do with that question.

I'm disputing your definition of "harm", so I am not sure what to do with that question. — Echarmion

Ah you would quote the prior version I had :D.

But what are you disputing about harm.. Does that even matter? You don't think people get harmed after being born? I know you can throw out some wild scenario of a perfectly charmed life but if you do, I won't take it seriously. And if you try to say there is mostly trivial harm for most people, I would dispute that and we can spend some pages on it cause what else do we do here, right?

But what are you disputing about harm.. Does that even matter? You don't think people get harmed after being born? I know you can throw out some wild scenario of a perfectly charmed life but if you do, I won't take it seriously. — schopenhauer1

What I am saying is "harm", in a moral sense, isn't simply you having a negative emotional response to something. If you trip over your own feet and fall, that will hurt, and you won't like it, but that isn't relevant in any moral sense. Tons of people can be involved in the relevant causal chain that lead to you falling - not just your parents, but anyone who had any interaction with you whatsoever. That doesn't mean any of them harmed you.

But if someone does intentionally trip you for fun, that is harm. The difference is not that tripping you is somehow more causal, or that it hurts more to get intentionally tripped. It's that you don't want to be afraid of constantly being hurt by people for fun, and so hurting people for fun is wrong.

What I am saying is "harm", in a moral sense, isn't simply you having a negative emotional response to something. If you trip over your own feet and fall, that will hurt, and you won't like it, but that isn't relevant in any moral sense. Tons of people can be involved in the relevant causal chain that lead to you falling - not just your parents, but anyone who had any interaction with you whatsoever. That doesn't mean any of them harmed you.

But if someone does intentionally trip you for fun, that is harm. The difference is not that tripping you is somehow more causal, or that it hurts more to get intentionally tripped. It's that you don't want to be afraid of constantly being hurt by people for fun, and so hurting people for fun is wrong. — Echarmion

Oh this stupid thing...back to Benkei's OP of causation. So, there are levels of nested causation. If you can prevent ALL instances of harm from befalling someone, do it. (Cue more stupid argument about someone not existing now but only in future which has been argued already).

Oh this stupid thing...back to Benkei's OP of causation. So, there are levels of nested causation. If you can prevent ALL instances of harm from befalling someone, do it. — schopenhauer1

You're not reading it properly. I am not saying nested causation doesn't count. I am saying causation doesn't count, period. It's not enough to be merely part of a causal chain that led to a bad emotional response. That's morally irrelevant.

You're not reading it properly. I am not saying nested causation doesn't count. I am saying causation doesn't count, period. It's not enough to be merely part of a causal chain that led to a bad emotional response. That's morally irrelevant. — Echarmion

It's not morally relevant to prevent unnecessary harm to another person (especially keeping mind contingencies discussed already about ameliorating from worse harm for people who already exist to be harmed)?

It's not morally relevant to prevent unnecessary harm to another person (especially keeping mind contingencies discussed already about ameliorating from worse harm for people who already exist to be harmed)? — schopenhauer1

Given your definition of harm, yes.

Given your definition of harm, yes. — Echarmion

How so? And how would your answer not relate to Benkei's OP about causation? Cause that's where I see this going...

How so? And how would your answer not relate to Benkei's OP about causation? Cause that's where I see this going... — schopenhauer1

I think the conclusion is somewhat similar, but the OP seems to be arguing from an utilitarian perspective that accepts the idea of objective, measurable suffering as the basis for morality. It then distinguishes bewteen "entails" and "causes".

My position is more that utilitairan perspective doesn't work as the foundation of a moral philosophy, and instead of going the roundabout route of distinguishing between different kinds of causality, I just put the value judgement at the center. First comes the question of what outcomes you should will, and only then can we look at what causal chains might be relevant with respect to that outcome.

First comes the question of what outcomes you should will, and only then can we look at what causal chains might be relevant with respect to that outcome. — Echarmion

Even if you define it this way, surely you agree that harm happens once born, right? And I already made references to charmed life response to this, or my willingness to dispute the response that only trivial harm occurs in a typical life. Keep em coming.

again you seem to be going down this weird line that if two things are similar in one aspect, they must be the same thing. — Isaac

Until the difference is stated explicitly they are.

It's like you look to normal attitudes as a measure of what's convincing morally but then refuse to allow conception into that set of normal attitudes. — Isaac

Because it is the topic of debate....

That you phrase these as greater harms is irrelevant. — Isaac

False. That they can all be phrased as avoiding greater harms makes it dubious that “greater benefits” is the significant variable here.

In MGE there are no greater harms being avoided, with birth there are. — Isaac

What is the greater harm being avoided in birth?

Because as I've said for like the hundredth time we do not decide moral dilemmas by applying a single maxim. — Isaac

For fucks sake I know. I am giving examples that break it so that you continue to add caveats until you have a self consistent system with no side effects. Then I look to see if I agree or disagree with that system. That’s the point of these examples. I am fully aware that there are a 100 caveats you can use to resolve this. However I want to see which you actually use.

With exercise, the benefits of coercion would not outweigh the harms, given the methods we'd have to use. — Isaac

Now you have to lay out exactly when this is the case and when it isn’t.

With exercise, there's and alternative method (persuasion). — Isaac

And when that fails it’s justified to force?

With exercise, failure to achieve the benefits is remediable. — Isaac

No? What?

I'll do one more of these, but I'm not going to just point out the actual differences all the time when the whole "this is a bit like that so it must be the same thing..." argument is flawed. — Isaac

Even though you constantly point out flaws in my argument until I add enough caveats until you’re unable to. But when I do the same you stop.

But yea I’m getting tired or this too. All your caveats I can easily think of exceptions to. You seem to just be making up caveats as you go, relevant or not. What do you do when these caveats clash? When there is a reason to do something, but no desire to mitigate harm or when the benefits outweigh the costs, but there is intent to do harm, etc. It’s getting too complicated to keep track of.

Like saying "there are just no examples -apart from the example you just gave". What kind of counter-argument is that? — Isaac

It points out that maybe you’re using the wrong principle. For the case of “benefits outweighing costs” for example I’ve already given examples where we do not follow this. We do not force people to exercise or diet, even though by this principle alone we should. So you introduce 3 more caveats. Point is you introduce so many caveats and do not show how they relate or what to do when they clash. You don’t show which are actually more or less relevant. And it’s getting to be too many to keep track of so I don’t care anymore.

Most has been taken up trying to show that it is commonly held but inconsistently not applied to birth. Those arguments are flawed, and it is those I've been mainly opposing. — Isaac

I’ll take your word for it that you actually have some consistent system that can make birth ok and MGE not. But I will point out that, again, “This principle would lead to this or that ridiculous conclusion if applied in this other situation” is the argument used by BOTH sides. I have gone through the motions and given a system that works (or at least that people stop challenging) every time.

But no one here has argued that the AN premises are commonly held. That would be stupid. They’re clearly not. All that’s been argued is that the premises and their caveats result in a succinct and self consistent system that leads to birth being wrong with no weird side effects elsewhere. And that no one has presented an alternative from the other side that can differentiate between MGE and birth well. You at least tried but it’s getting way too complicated for me to follow.

What I wanted to point out is that you figure out whether something was necessary by making another comparison. — Echarmion

The comparison is between: Harm done when doing the act vs Harm done by not doing the act. Not between existent and non-existent Timmy whatever that is. That's the point. There is no weird metaphysical mumbo jumbo going on here.

Use the reply function please so I get notifications

If they’re not prepared, I doubt they want them. — Pinprick

You'd be surprised. For the record I'm not referring to my own parents I had a normal childhood.

But you can’t be certain about this. The next family may very well be starving to death. — Pinprick

But that is incredibly unlikely. In other words, the chances that I cause more harm than I alleviate from myself here are very slim. It is far more likely that not buying is the more harmful choice.

And if they were starving they’d just buy any other food. It doesn’t have to be what I’m considering

I don’t see how you can be sure that whatever unknown harm may befall the child will be less than the harm the hopeful parents (as well as hopeful grandparents, siblings, etc.) will experience. — Pinprick

Very simple: Would Adam and Eve suffering from childlessness compare to the suffering of all mankind thus far? No. Clearly not. Heck they caused more suffering due to childlessness alone than the suffering due to childlessness than they would have experienced themselves.

There is no mathematical way that not having children is the less harmful alternative.

But in this situation, you prefer to compare potential harms. Why is that? — Pinprick

I am doing so in both situations. Try comparing potential harms in the case of birth. There is no way having children is the less harmful alternative.

Why is it ok to risk harming others while building a pipeline without their consent, but not ok to risk harming another person by having a child? — Pinprick

It is NOT always okay to risk harming others by building a pipeline that was my point. It matters what that pipeline accomplishes. If it alleviates more harm than it is likely to cause then it's fine. If it doesn't (say, because it connects to nowhere and some rich guy is building it for literally no reason) then it's wrong.

and it can’t be because of the amount of harm not doing so could cause (we’ve lived this long without a pipeline, so building one is more for convenience than anything else). — Pinprick

The benefit isn't for you. But I doubt that pipeline is useless. That it is not needed by someone else. But if it is purely for convenience then I'm not sure it should be right. We pay a lot more attention and condemn people when a forest fire occurs due to a gender reveal party than if it occurs because of a construction mistake when building an orphanage. Why? Because in the former there was no need for the party, but in the latter it was an accident that happened while doing something that alleviates harm from someone else. People would not blame the construction worker for the damages as much as people would blame the people holding the party.

If it's purely for convenience I think they would need consent from the people living in the neighborhood.

However, not having a child will cause more people to suffer. At the very least there are two parents, even more if you consider grandparents, siblings, etc. that may be negatively affected by the parents not having a child. — Pinprick

Still shouldn't even be close.

Putting exact numbers on things is ridiculous, but to illustrate the point, let’s say if I have a child it’s likely that he/she will suffer 20% of his/her life. Let’s say that by not having a child, I, my wife, and our parents will each suffer 5% more than we would if we had a child. Cumulatively, this amounts to an increase of suffering of 30%. Which is the better option in your opinion, and why? — Pinprick

The calculation is incomplete. Think about it. Parents (2 people) and their parents (4 people) each suffer 5%.

We know the child suffers 20%. Let's assume THEY don't have kids. After they grow up, we can assume 5% of that 20 comes from them not having children. Then we take into account their spouse, another 5%, and the parents of the couple (in this case you are part of them), another 20%. So it comes out to: 20% + 5% + 20% for a total of 45% total for having a child that then doesn't have a child.

Let's assume they DO have a child. Then the percentage is still bad. 15% from the person themselves (since I counted childlessness as 5% and that won't be the case here) and 20% from their child. 35% right there. Not even considering whether or not this child will have kids or not (both will increase the percentage)

Both cases are larger than not having a child and taking the 30%.

And this is WITH counting childlessness as 25% of a person's suffering throughout their life which I find inaccurate in the first place. Never mind the fact that if you adopt you don't even have to deal with the 30% and you don't cause any extra harm.

So it’s ok to do because you think it will benefit them? — Pinprick

Because I think the alternative is even worse for them*

Presumably because they find life valuable, right? — Pinprick

Yea.

Personally, I think my life is worth more than $1000, but everyone has their price. — Pinprick

But your principle would imply that if I think I know your price I MUST press the button for you. I don't think either of us thinks so.

So, if these two parents are considering having a child, and one parent states that they will kill their self if they have a child, then they shouldn’t have the child, regardless of how beneficial doing so may be for the child. — Pinprick

A bit extreme eh? What if the parent says "I kinda don't wanna have a kid". By your principle that would not be enough to outweigh the "benefits to the child" (still think this doesn't make sense but ok). So in that case they should be FORCED to have the child. That's the consequence of requiring that people don't deny pleasure.

Even if you define it this way, surely you agree that harm happens once born, right? — schopenhauer1

Yes. And it's predictable, too. But the responsibility for that harm doesn't lie with just anyone who causes it. It only attaches to specific acts, in the same way that in a legal system, only specific acts are illegal.

The comparison is between: Harm done when doing the act vs Harm done by not doing the act. Not between existent and non-existent Timmy whatever that is. — khaled

This comparison, yes. But I earlier pointed out there different comparisons. And the one where we establish harm/suffering in the first place does require us to compare two different versions of Timmy.

And the one where we establish harm/suffering in the first place does require us to compare two different versions of Timmy. — Echarmion

Huh? In order to say “My child will suffer” I have to compare two different “versions” of him? No.

I don't have a problem with the arithmetic, rather with the central premise. That is, while many label human experiences as suffering and joy, and seek to eliminate the suffering, statistically one could just as easily label the sum total of the negative and the positive over a lifetime as "average" or normal. After all suffering and joy are relative not absolute terms. One person's agony is another's below average day. And just as the unrealistic kids in Lake Wobegon are all above average, it is an error to lament the shape of a bell curve.

It's like you look to normal attitudes as a measure of what's convincing morally but then refuse to allow conception into that set of normal attitudes. — Isaac


Because it is the topic of debate.... — khaled

That doesn't justify the approach. Prima facie, if all the balls in a jar are blue except one which is red, that fact alone doesn't have any bearing at all on whether that ball is supposed to red, or is 'really' red, or morally out to be red, or any other such thing... Until you've demonstrated an underlying reason why you'd expect there to be no aberrant cases, pointing out that they exist carries no weight at all.

That they can all be phrased as avoiding greater harms makes it dubious that “greater benefits” is the significant variable here. — khaled

Differentiating 'benefit' from 'lack of harm' is not a matter which can be settled objectively. Desire creates mental pain no less than actual physical pain (in fact uses the same circuits in some cases). So frustrated desire is a 'harm' in no less a sense than a broken arm. Unless you want to make neuroscientific case for a substantial difference, the terms are just vague synonyms in most of the caese we're talking about here.

What is the greater harm being avoided in birth? — khaled

We've been through this. For many the simple lack of a next generation is a harm. It's a harm to the older generation that there will be no younger generation to care for them, depending on your estimation of your own children's contribution it may be a harm to the new generation that they are without your children (note - your children don't have to be superstars to achieve this, only better than average). There may be problems the next generation will face which won't be solved without some 'hands-on-deck'. Human life has an intrinsic value and its absence from the universe is something most people think of as a harm. But the harms reduced by birth needn't even be that great because the circumstances in which our imagined future child may find themselves will (according to the intention of the would-be parent) will be overall pleasant.

I am giving examples that break it so that you continue to add caveats until you have a self consistent system with no side effects. Then I look to see if I agree or disagree with that system. That’s the point of these examples — khaled

But they don't 'break it'. That;s the point. What you're doing is presenting situations for one maxim in which it is insufficient on its own to explain the result. That's entirely to be expected if we use more than one maxim. Nothing's being 'broken'.

With exercise, the benefits of coercion would not outweigh the harms, given the methods we'd have to use. — Isaac


Now you have to lay out exactly when this is the case and when it isn’t. — khaled

That would takes far too long. We weigh each moral dilemma as it arises depending on the factors which seem to us to be relevant to it. That's largely why we come up with different answers a lot of the time.

Like saying "there are just no examples -apart from the example you just gave". What kind of counter-argument is that? — Isaac


It points out that maybe you’re using the wrong principle. — khaled

Why? Why would you expect there to not ever be any single exceptions. We've established that differnet scenarios introduce different factors to consider. What's so special about the number 1 that it can't be the sum total of cases with some given set of factors?

no one here has argued that the AN premises are commonly held. — khaled

That is exactly what you are de facto arguing by using examples of the form "but you wouldn't...". You're appealing to a commonly held premise, showing it's similarity to the premises of AN to lend them support. It's the standard response when I raise the 'Ridiculous premises, ridiculous conclusion' argument.


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I think there's a fundamental error you're making here. At least twelve different brain regions have been shown to be involved in moral decision-making, some say more. Different specialised regions get involved in different types of moral decision-making ranging from empathy, social status, prediction, disgust, goals...and more. Joshua Greene's paper is really good on this if you're interested. The point is each of these regions has tens of thousands of neurons, even millions. Apart from managing our body, working out social/moral dilemmas is the biggest job our brain does. It's occupied with it almost all the time at a tremendous rate of calculations per second. The effort is literally exhausting (one of our biggest calorie demands) and is most probably the reason why our brains barely fit through the birth canal (at huge survival cost). That anyone would expect the answers to be writable in a few pithy maxims is absurd. It's fiendishly complicated. Luckily for us we have the most integrated supercomputer the world has ever seen working on the problem almost every second of our waking day. The problem arises when, instead of trusting the results of that network, we ignore all but one region and expect the results to be anywhere near as good.

Huh? In order to say “My child will suffer” I have to compare two different “versions” of him? No. — khaled

The comparison is hard to notice, because it's such a natural thing to do. But when you say "I wish this didn't happen to me", you're not wishing for an absence, an empty set, because you cannot actually imagine the absence of a state of affairs. What you do instead is imagine a different state of affairs that the event isn't part of. Absence is always relative.

The comparison is hard to notice, because it's such a natural thing to do. But when you say "I wish this didn't happen to me", you're not wishing for an absence, an empty set, because you cannot actually imagine the absence of a state of affairs. What you do instead is imagine a different state of affairs that the event isn't part of. Absence is always relative. — Echarmion

And when I say "My child will suffer" I am saying "My child will do this comparison you are speaking of and wish for a different state of affairs". That's it. No metaphysical mumbo jumbo.

Seriously, do you think the sentence "My child will suffer" makes no sense?

But they don't 'break it'. That;s the point. What you're doing is presenting situations for one maxim in which it is insufficient on its own to explain the result. That's entirely to be expected if we use more than one maxim. Nothing's being 'broken'. — Isaac

Call it what you will. In my book that's called "breaking". Because until caveats are introduced your system is insufficient.

Why? Why would you expect there to not ever be any single exceptions. We've established that differnet scenarios introduce different factors to consider. What's so special about the number 1 that it can't be the sum total of cases with some given set of factors? — Isaac

Nothing weird about it. But I haven't seen a combination of factors that actually succeeds in doing this that don't break elsewhere.

That is exactly what you are de facto arguing by using examples of the form "but you wouldn't...". — Isaac

False. I only say the "but you wouldn't..." when critiquing the premises you present me. So you say something like "Denying pleasure is wrong" and I reply with "But you wouldn't just give me 100 bucks if I asked you even though that would be denying pleasure". You then have to go back and add caveats to the original premise of "Denying pleasure is wrong". Etc. Until you can actually come up with something that is surgical enough that it makes birth ok and MGE not and doesn't have weird side effects elsewhere.

But you add 3 different caveats every time I give a point at which they don't work. Like a hydra, you cut one head off and 3 more pop out. At this point you have like 15 different completely unrelated factors that go into what makes something right and neither of us can be bothered to clean them up. So I'll just take your word for it that you have some consistent system or other there that somehow incorporates all these factors and makes birth ok without coming up with weird results like "but eating skittles on Christmas eve is wrong".

Apart from managing our body, working out social/moral dilemmas is the biggest job our brain does. It's occupied with it almost all the time at a tremendous rate of calculations per second. The effort is literally exhausting (one of our biggest calorie demands) and is most probably the reason why our brains barely fit through the birth canal (at huge survival cost). That anyone would expect the answers to be writable in a few pithy maxims is absurd. It's fiendishly complicated. Luckily for us we have the most integrated supercomputer the world has ever seen working on the problem almost every second of our waking day. The problem arises when, instead of trusting the results of that network, we ignore all but one region and expect the results to be anywhere near as good. — Isaac

And when the network is indecisive what do we do? Or when it produces different results for different people like it is here? We try to find the most important factors. I have done so and come up with a system that I haven't seen critiqued successfully so far. You have started to do so but stopped because you keep adding factors on factors on factors and it is too much to keep up with.

And I think it's fallacious to say that because the problem is computationally costly, that the answer has to be complicated. Maybe a few pithy maxims IS all it comes down to for a certain individual. And the other factors in the network are just never prevalent enough to overcome those few important maxims. It's not that they're being ignored it's that they're insufficient to change anything.

Yes. And it's predictable, too. But the responsibility for that harm doesn't lie with just anyone who causes it. It only attaches to specific acts, in the same way that in a legal system, only specific acts are illegal. — Echarmion

This is not about law, so not sure why we need to make those comparisons. Clearly, the law doesn't prevent a lot of things people find immoral or wrong. For example,the law doesn't consider procreation to be illegal, so anything you analogize from this system will of course already be skewed in favor of what you are saying. But you know that. Hell, in 1857, just before the American Civil War, the Supreme Court considered someone a slave no matter what they did otherwise, according to the Dread Scott Supreme Court case. Law changes with attitudes and judges' own propriety. It's not the universe handing down what is right.

I don't get your claim here "It only attaches to specific acts.." You just said earlier you understand nested causation. ALL instances of harm will follow if someone is born. I asked you earlier whether you believe harm occurs after someone is born? The trivially true question is at the heart of the matter. Of course it does. One can prevent all instances of harm. And again, we can debate all day whether a typical life has more than trivial harm, but first I'm trying to understand your evasion of the fact that we all know being born creates the conditions for all the causes for harm in a life. Do not create unnecessary harm for another without cause (ameliorating a worse situation). Same for the axiom of unnecessary impositions and violations of consent.

The responsibility to have prevented this unnecessary harm, in this case lies with the person who creates the conditions for all other harms (and impositions) to occur for the future person who will be born from the decision.

Note, this doesn't mean that the parent is the cause of all specific harms, simply that the parent is the cause of not preventing (and more accurately, enabling) the conditions for these unnecessary harms. There is a difference you are conflating

Edit: Also note, that the condition of being born, in order to "know" one is being harmed and imposed upon, doesn't compute in this argument. It is simply about not creating conditions of harm and impositions for someone else. Period. The person who would have been affected, does not need to be born to know that this was prevented. It is simply about that situation not occurring for someone else. It is about not creating a future condition. You certainly do not need someone to exist currently for this condition not to be created in the first place. The thing is, it really is not a hard ethic. It's certainly not the only one, but it's not a difficult one to put into practice. Just don't do something that is easy to prevent.

Added a bit more to last post.