@Echarmion about what that other guy said..."We could start an interminable series of threads sneeringly implying that anyone thinking the opposite "just doesn't get it" for 27 pages before finally admitting it's just a personal feeling without any objective validity. That might work...

But again, @khaled and I have been agreeing with this sentiment.. It's debatable, hence we are debating. I think it's kinda rich that you are implying rhetorical tactics of "we are already correct", when you and that other guy do exactly that yourself. Pot calling kettle black.

The quintessential problem here is that if I don't agree that this is absurd, there is no further basis for discussion. You think it's absurd, I think it's rather reasonable. Insightful, even. I suppose many of the people who disagree feel the same. There is no easy way to bridge that conceptual chasm. — Echarmion

Yes agreed that you think it makes sense and we think it doesn't, and think it not insightful or helpful at all. I gave an extreme example for example, that if a baby was born into torture, and we prevented this, we wouldn't go ahead and say, "Well, it didn't exist to know that it wasn't tortured". That harm was prevented is what matters. No one needs to be around to know that this is the case. Don't cause conditions of suffering unto another, unless you are trying to get a person (already existing) out of a worse off situation and you try to get permission, if it's possible. Certainly in the case of birth, there is no need in the first place to get someone out of a "worse" situation, and certainly one cannot ask the future person retroactively. This is a case where this is completely unnecessary unlike some contingencies of people who ALREADY exist and you have to make a judgement call without permission, etc. etc. et al, conversations already had.. point to those arguments etc etc. in finitum.

Suppose there were a pill that killed instantly, should parents be allowed to bring children into the world if the children were allowed to take that pill at any time?

Surely that would be in accordance with your logic? — SolarWind

No, procreation isn't justified with faster ways to commit suicide. It's like a game that you start for someone else, and death is an escape. The very fact that you have to do this harm of death, is enough reason not to start the game for that person. It is quite presumptuous to assume, "Well, you'll just endure it.. death is your only option". Something wrong about that. Never existing and existing and then dying are two very different cases.

But again, khaled and I have been agreeing with this sentiment. — schopenhauer1

All your arguments are of the form " but you wouldn't do x, which is similar to conceiving children in ways a, b and c...so you're obliged by reason to not conceive children"

Either you need to claim some objective validity to features a, b and c, or you have no argument (of that form), because the ways in which x is dissimilar from conceiving children could otherwise be held as rational reasons to absolve such an obligation.

Protestations to the contrary aside, your approach implies an objectivity you've not demonstrated to be there.

I don't know why posters are assuming that any argument can't be debated on a philosophy forum. Obviously it's debatable, and the people who hold the beliefs in the premises, believe them to be valid and make sense. To say otherwise is special pleading to undermine the fact that this is the case with all ethics. To assume otherwise would be to assume that all ethical arguments must convince everyone immediately of the argument, otherwise it is invalid. Stupid.

before finally admitting it's just a personal feeling without any objective validity. — Isaac

So are all the other alternatives. Which makes the statement “There is something wrong with antinatalism” false.

If you do not consider acts that result in harm to people that are born yet as wrong, then you cannot say that malicious genetic engineering is wrong. I can’t see how natalists expertly “cut out” or isolate birth. It seems all your arguments would apply to ANY act that results in harm in the future, to people that do not exist yet. Which would make malicious genetic engineering fine. What’s the difference between malicious genetic engineering and having children that makes one wrong and the other fine? I have yet to hear a convincing answer to that question.

because the ways in which x is dissimilar from conceiving children could otherwise be held as rational reasons to absolve such an obligation. — Isaac

Correct but not very convincing. I don’t think anyone here is willing to say something like “Birth, although similar to malicious genetic engineering in every respect, is fine because it starts with a ‘B’”

IF someone were to say that I would think they’re being crazy and ridiculous. You would probably also think so. And no I would not try to appeal to some sense of objectivity to get them to change their mind. No “I think that’s ridiculous” isn’t necessarily said to change people’s minds and neither does it imply any form of objectivity.

And might I point out that this:

All your arguments are of the form " but you wouldn't do x, which is similar to conceiving children in ways a, b and c...so you're obliged by reason to not conceive children" — Isaac

Is EXACTLY how you would go about trying to show there is something wrong with AN. You would try to show that there is a situation, where the application of its principles leads to conclusions that are deemed by both sides to be ridiculous. No objectivity required. And that’s as far as you can take it.

Protestations to the contrary aside, your approach implies an objectivity you've not demonstrated to be there. — Isaac

This thread was started by the other side. The burden is on you to show that there is, objectivity, something wrong with antinatalism.

Though as usual you fail to do so then run back to “Ok but it’s all subjective anyways”. Agreed, but that’s not something wrong with antinatalism. That’s true of all alternatives.

I don't know why posters are assuming that any argument can't be debated on a philosophy forum. — schopenhauer1

As I said quite clearly, it is not the fact that an argument is being presented that I take issue with but its form. Are you seriously suggesting that all argumentative forms are value regardless? That would leave us with very little to do by way of analysis.

So are all the other alternatives. Which makes the statement “There is something wrong with antinatalism” false. — khaled

Despite the title, the OP makes it clear that it is the form of argument, not the subjectivity of the premises which is being taken issue with.

don’t think anyone here is willing to say something like “Birth, although similar to malicious genetic engineering in every respect, is fine because it starts with a ‘B’” — khaled

You can't be seriously saying the only difference anyone could point to between malicious genetic engineering and birth is the initial letter? Ridiculous.

Despite the title, the OP makes it clear that it is the form of argument, not the subjectivity of the premises which is being taken issue with. — Isaac

Sure and I discussed that with Benkei for a while until he stopped replying. But it was clear he had an arbitrary premise as well, despite claiming that he was attacking the form. Page 12 if you’re interested. I don’t think there is anything wrong with my form of the argument at least. Heck, remember the other thread? Where you kept saying “If I have unreasonable premises I end up with unreasonable conclusions” in reference to my argument? That means not even you think there is something wrong with the form, just the premises. That is a failure to show that there is anything wrong with AN.

You can't be seriously saying the only difference anyone could point to between malicious genetic engineering and birth is the initial letter? Ridiculous. — Isaac

I’m saying that if they were to use the first letter as a reason birth should be treated differently in a moral sense, everyone would agree that they were being ridiculous. Although it is a valid moral claim. This was in response to you saying that any way that they are different could be reasonably held as a reason to absolve the obligation. Sure, technically true, but that doesn’t make any difference convincing. Or reasonable in any traditional sense.

But I would be interested in what features about malicious genetic engineering and birth make one ok and the other not, for you. Because all the features I’ve heard so far have seemed ridiculous to me. Not as ridiculous as the first letter, but still ridiculous to think they should matter.

I don't really want to rehash all the same arguments again. It's just the disconnect that I find kinda fascinating. I believe you that you're honestly not seeing the flaw in the reasoning, it's just so weird to me that someone wouldn't. Perhaps you feel exactly the same way. Usually, things like this happen in political topics, were some group affiliation is at stake and the entire thing is really just a song-and-dance routine to affirm your group identity. But there aren't really any strong group identities involved here, so it seems like a geniune breakdown of communication.

I can tell you a hundred times that we can only compare situations of different existences (tortured child - not tortured child, seeing child - blind child), but never compare an existence with a nonexistence. But you just somehow don't see it. And I just somehow don't see why it's just as bad to cause common suffering as it is to inflict special suffering. If I am against suffering due to torture, I must be against suffering due to being born. And I just am not. Weird, right?

If I am against suffering due to torture, I must be against suffering due to being born. And I just am not. Weird, right? — Echarmion

I think you are not seeing the one last step the ANs are taking. Causing the conditions of suffering can lead to any number of harms, many of which were unforeseen. Any and all harms can be prevented, not just the possibility of torture.

I can tell you a hundred times that we can only compare situations of different existences (tortured child - not tortured child, seeing child - blind child), but never compare an existence with a nonexistence. — Echarmion

From what I see from @khaled, he's not comparing to non-existence, just saying, "IF there is a situation to create unnecessary suffering and there is a lack of consent that can be had (and he gives the contingent circumstances of not improving a situation, permissions etc.), don't do it as that will affect a person negatively in the future and violate consent". It is about preventing bad circumstances and violations, not comparing them to non-existence.

Perhaps you feel exactly the same way. — Echarmion

Yup.

I can tell you a hundred times that we can only compare situations of different existences (tortured child - not tortured child, seeing child - blind child), but never compare an existence with a nonexistence. But you just somehow don't see it. — Echarmion

False. It’s simply that it is not what’s being done. Shope just explained to you well what is being done. And so have I countless times. I don’t understand what’s so difficult about it. And I’m not trying to be rude I just genuinely don’t understand how this:

IF there is a situation to create unnecessary suffering and there is a lack of consent that can be had (and he gives the contingent circumstances of not improving a situation, permissions etc.), don't do it as that will affect a person negatively in the future and violate consen — schopenhauer1

Can ever be interpreted as “comparing existence to non existence”. The word “compare” doesn’t come up once in any shape or form. Neither does “existence”

Everyone here agrees that comparing existence to non existence makes no sense. It’s not that “non existence is better for the child than existence”. I have insisted that that makes no sense.

And I just somehow don't see why it's just as bad to cause common suffering as it is to inflict special suffering. — Echarmion

Wtf is common suffering and special suffering? Suffering is suffering.

If I am against suffering due to torture, I must be against suffering due to being born. — Echarmion

So being born results in suffering now? I am seriously confused on your position here. Does it or does it not? Oh but it’s “common suffering” so it’s ok I guess....

And I just somehow don't see why it's just as bad to cause common suffering as it is to inflict special suffering. If I am against suffering due to torture, I must be against suffering due to being born. And I just am not. Weird, right? — Echarmion

Yes, weird until you can explain what “special suffering” and “common suffering” are. Heck, this particular form of “common suffering” is the source of ALL “special suffering” regardless of how you may define the concepts. So does that make it “special suffering”?


Still waiting on what makes malicious genetic engineering wrong and birth not.

IF there is a situation to create unnecessary suffering and there is a lack of consent that can be had (and he gives the contingent circumstances of not improving a situation, permissions etc.), don't do it as that will affect a person negatively in the future and violate consent — schopenhauer1

This is the best summary so far. No mention of metaphysics anywhere so no pointless nitpicking possible.

I don’t think there is anything wrong with my form of the argument at least. — khaled

I think that's abundantly apparent.

emember the other thread? Where you kept saying “If I have unreasonable premises I end up with unreasonable conclusions” in reference to my argument? That means not even you think there is something wrong with the form, just the premises. That is a failure to show that there is anything wrong with AN. — khaled

How so? There have been several arguments put forward, that was an opposition to one of them.

Sure, technically true, but that doesn’t make any difference convincing. Or reasonable in any traditional sense. — khaled

What does make a difference convincing or reasonable?

I would be interested in what features about malicious genetic engineering and birth make one ok and the other not, for you. Because all the features I’ve heard so far have seemed ridiculous to me. — khaled

I find this quite disingenuous since you've literally had to make a moral judgement in order to even describe the situation. 'Malicious genetic engineering'. One is malicious, the other isn't. Maliciousness is a bad thing, it's what the word literally means. If you really are so sociopathic as to need a fuller explanation (which I don't believe for a minute) -

In the example of malicious genetic engineering there is an intention to cause harm above a threshold level of non-triviality without a counterbalancing intention to mitigate harm and a reasonable expectation of compensatory benefits.

With birth, there is no malicious intent to cause harm above a threshold level of non-triviality, there is a counterbalancing intent to mitigate harms and there is a reasonable expectation of compensatory benefits.

If you can't see that those factors make the two situations meaningfully different with regards to the premises of virtually all ethical approaches, then I can't help you.

What does make a difference convincing or reasonable? — Isaac

Depends on the person. But I don't think anyone here finds

“Birth, although similar to malicious genetic engineering in every respect, is fine because it starts with a ‘B’” — khaled

reasonable or convincing. So not just any difference can be used.

since you've literally had to make a moral judgement in order to even describe the situation. 'Malicious genetic engineering'. — Isaac

Doesn't matter what I call it. I think it's wrong definitely and I know you do too so I didn't expect you to nitpick here. I was just too lazy to write "Genetically engineering your child to be blind".

In the example of malicious genetic engineering there is an intention to cause harm — Isaac

Harm who? There is no one to be harmed. This is a consequence of the insistence that having children is not causing harm "because there is no one to be harmed". Either the argument applies to both cases or doesn't. Either both are a form of causing harm or neither is.

Also, what if the intention was benign? What if the parents come from a religion where blind people go to heaven and everyone else to hell? Or what if the parents just arbitrarily like blind people? In both cases consider that the parents intend to be model parents for their blind child. Does that make it fine? I doubt it.

So your "difference" fails on two fronts. Firstly, you cannot say that there is intention to do harm, as no harm is being done. This is what you say to me when I say that having children is intentionally doing harm. Secondly, intent is clearly not the main factor here, as even with benign intents I think we can agree that genetically engineering someone to be blind is wrong.

I think that's abundantly apparent. — Isaac

Really? What happened here then?

But if there's no compelling argument (other than just "well that's what my unusual premises lead to") — Isaac

From the other thread. "that's just what my unusual premises lead to" implies that the premises logically lead to the conclusion.

How so? There have been several arguments put forward, that was an opposition to one of them. — Isaac

I don't remember putting forward multiple arguments for AN I've been harping about the same one since I found it. But this is also to say that there exists one of them which you consider internally consistent, at least, if your only objection to it is "the premises are weird". Which is all I'm saying. So you clearly don't consider it abundantly apparent.

Also, again, this is not in opposition to anything I'm saying. I'm not here trying to establish that AN follows form any universal beliefs and that everyone who doesn't believe it is deluding themselves or anything to that effect. On the other hand YOU are trying to demonstrate that there is something wrong with the form of the argument. Saying "The form is fine but the premises are weird" is clearly not demonstrating that something is wrong with the form of the argument.

"Suppose there were a pill that killed instantly, should parents be allowed to bring children into the world if the children were allowed to take that pill at any time?

Surely that would be in accordance with your logic?" — SolarWind

No, procreation isn't justified with faster ways to commit suicide. It's like a game that you start for someone else, and death is an escape. The very fact that you have to do this harm of death, is enough reason not to start the game for that person. It is quite presumptuous to assume, "Well, you'll just endure it.. death is your only option". Something wrong about that. Never existing and existing and then dying are two very different cases. — schopenhauer1

In what way is someone dead in a different way if they are not born than if they have lived and died?

If a child is born with the exit-pill and it is happy, then it will not take the pill, if it becomes very unhappy, then it can take the pill at any time and is dead in a second, as if it had never been born.

In what way is someone dead in a different way if they are not born than if they have lived and died? — SolarWind

I already explained my contention in what you quoted.

In line with what I have already written, I don't see how you could expect a sentence like "don't cause unnecessary suffering" (shortened for emphasis) to resolve any argument about a specific moral dilemma. It's the kind of statement that is easy to get the gist of, but hard to pin down, because all of the key words, "cause", "suffering" and "unnecessary" have a large frayed edge to their common definitions. And you require all three to agree on a specific issue.

Do you see the problem here?

Any and all harms can be prevented, not just the possibility of torture. — schopenhauer1

This just goes back to my first point: I do literally believe that someone needs to exist in order for us to conclude that there was harm.

This is true in the literal sense that obviously if no-one was around at all, "harm" wouldn't exist, since it's a human concept.

It's also true in the sense that harm is something that happens to discrete, existing individuals, and so of course only exists when they do.

And it's also true when we consider the hypothetical future person, because to conclude that they will be harmed, we need to imagine a second counterfactual future where they exist but whatever harmful thing we imagine didn't happen to them.

Now you'll dispute this last point and say that no such comparison is necessary, since we can just look at the amount of harm in the abstract and see that, in the world where a person is born, extra harm exists.

That is wrong, I think, because this abstract position is fictional. But I can't think of a way to explain this in a way you're likely to find convincing.

Can ever be interpreted as “comparing existence to non existence”. The word “compare” doesn’t come up once in any shape or form. Neither does “existence” — khaled

I think you're wrong about that. Even though the word "compare" doesn't come up, that's nevertheless what's happening.

To establish causation, we need to compare different potential timelines. Some event A is the cause for B If B would not have happened without A (conditio sine qua non). This implies we're looking at two timelines: one where A happens and one where it doesn't.

"Unnecessary" also implies a similar, but inverted, kind of comparison. Because an event A is necessary for an event B if, in the absence of it, event B doesn't happen. Of course we'll first have to decide what events, or attributes of a state of affairs, we consider important so that we think their presence necessary.

And lastly, the notion of suffering also implies a comparison. This is more or less what I've written to Schopenhauer above with respect to harm. We don't just conclude that bad things are bad in a vacuum. If something had happens to someone, they wish it didn't happen . And since there is no simple absence of events, that means they wish for something different to have happened instead.

Harm who? There is no one to be harmed. This is a consequence of the insistence that having children is not causing harm "because there is no one to be harmed". — khaled

Not my insistence, nor anyone here, as far as I can tell. I think everyone's agreed that we can imagine a future child and mitigate harms that might befall them. It's only your lazy strawman arguments that suggest otherwise. The issue with non-existence is about consent to risk harm, not future harm itself. But this has been made abundantly clear many times, I don't suppose you'll take any more notice of it now than you have done over the last 27 pages.

Also, what if the intention was benign? — khaled

Then you have the recklessness argument, as I stated in my actual definition of the differences which you've just ignored. It is insufficient to have good intentions, one must also have just cause to believe those intentions will yield the expected result. An arbitrary and unevidenced belief in the benefits of blindness does not satisfy this requirement.

I don't remember putting forward multiple arguments for AN I've been harping about the same one since I found it. — khaled

I cannot be expected to argue against the position you think you're putting forward, I can only argue against the one that actually seem to be written. That you think you've been presenting the same argument is irrelevant.

"In what way is someone dead in a different way if they are not born than if they have lived and died?" — SolarWind

I already explained my contention in what you quoted. — schopenhauer1

That is pathetic. When someone is at a loss, they refer to an ominous have already explained.
The status "not born" and the status "already dead" should be the same (in this moment).
You didn't go into the rest with the exit-pill either.

Not my insistence, nor anyone here, as far as I can tell. — Isaac

Echarimon is as far as I can tell.

The issue with non-existence is about consent to risk harm, not future harm itself. — Isaac

I haven't mentioned consent in like 12 pages because of nitpicking like this. I'll ask you the same question I asked Benkei. First off, we can agree that having children in some cases is wrong right? Like for example in severe poverty, or if you know they will have some terrible genetic disease or other.

Benkei for example says in the OP that if it is a near certainty that the child will end up more unhappy than happy then it is wrong to have them. AN (a form of it) is simply moving the bar from "near certainty" to ">0%". What is wrong with that? You have to find some logical inconsistency in moving the bar to ">0%" instead of near certainty.

No mention of consent anywhere. Because it is not required for the argument.

Admittedly this is not the system I normally use so I’ll restate that one too:

First: Check if you’re responsible. “Would this harm have happened had I not been there, and if yes could I have reasonably expected it to?” If the answer is no-no you are not responsible. If the answer is “yes” you are not responsible. If the answer is no-yes then you are responsible. You can also be responsible if you have a duty to do something due to your job, that you are getting compensated for and are expected to perform.

If you are responsible you are obligated to pick the option that does the least harm. If you are not responsible you are not obligated to but it’s still good to do so. Harm done to yourself is optionally part of the calculation.

You can only pick the option that does more harm with consent, if it is available. If it isn’t then just pick the option doing the least harm.


“Consent of non-existent people” is not required. Nor has it ever been.

This just goes back to my first point: I do literally believe that someone needs to exist in order for us to conclude that there was harm. — Echarmion

Yes, I get that flawed reasoning.

This is true in the literal sense that obviously if no-one was around at all, "harm" wouldn't exist, since it's a human concept.

It's also true in the sense that harm is something that happens to discrete, existing individuals, and so of course only exists when they do. — Echarmion

So maybe I can help.. IF the capacity exists to cause unnecessary harm that affects someone else, don't do it. You don't look at the reformulations but the straw mans you want to see so you can knock down the straw.

And it's also true when we consider the hypothetical future person, because to conclude that they will be harmed, we need to imagine a second counterfactual future where they exist but whatever harmful thing we imagine didn't happen to them. — Echarmion

Let me repeat.. IF the capacity exists to cause unnecessary harm that affects someone else, don't do it.
Once there is no capacity for this to exist, this ethic doesn't apply.

That is wrong, I think, because this abstract position is fictional. But I can't think of a way to explain this in a way you're likely to find convincing. — Echarmion

It's because you are looking for ways to move the argument of existence vs. non-existence. You are trying to do "If a tree falls in the woods..". Do you exist? Do you have the capacity to cause this to happen? Yes? Prevent it from happening. If no person exists, then this ethic doesn't apply, as there is null sets that this applies to. If one person exists in the world, it doesn't apply. If there are two people in the world that cannot reproduce, then this doesn't apply. It only applies, if the capacity is there. But you knew this and are looking for more straws to grasp and build stuff with.

"cause", "suffering" and "unnecessary" have a large frayed edge to their common definitions. And you require all three to agree on a specific issue. — Echarmion

I think I defined all three pretty precisely.

Cause: Would it have happened if you weren't there.
Suffering: Something you don't want done to you.
Unnecessary: Does not mitigate any larger suffering/Is not the least harmful option

This implies we're looking at two timelines: one where A happens and one where it doesn't. — Echarmion

Correct. And concluding that one of the causes of timmy breaking his arm was that he was born. Because if timmy hadn't been born he wouldn't have broken his arm. What's wrong with this? Where is the mention of non-existent timmy? Where is the comparison between timmy and non-existent timmy (whatever that is)?

Because an event A is necessary for an event B if, in the absence of it, event B doesn't happen. — Echarmion

That's not really how I use the term. The way you put it I would say A was a cause of B.

And lastly, the notion of suffering also implies a comparison. This is more or less what I've written to Schopenhauer above with respect to harm. We don't just conclude that bad things are bad in a vacuum. If something had happens to someone, they wish it didn't happen . And since there is no simple absence of events, that means they wish for something different to have happened instead. — Echarmion

Sure but I don't see how this is any hindrance to the argument. Timmy wishes he didn't break his arm and wishes instead to have stuck the landing from the tree perfectly.

Still, the point is it is wrong to cause Timmy something that Timmy wouldn't want done unto him for no good reason. Timmy being born was a cause of this. And it did not need to happen, nor was there a good reason for it. You need some justification to do something that you know will cause someone to suffer. That justification is what is missing here.

AN (a form of it) is simply moving the bar from "near certainty" to ">0%". What is wrong with that? — khaled

It's ridiculous. No-one normally sets the bar that low. If that's all you're saying then we're back to ridiculous premises leading to ridiculous consequences. But you keep trying to make your premises sound less ridiculous with examples of the form I outlined above. Examples of this form are logically flawed in the way I showed.

To be honest this has been the pattern for the last 27 pages and is the reason I stopped responding. You start out with some ridiculous premise, for which it is shown to be trivially true that it leads to ridiculous conclusions. On being shown this you add a load of caveats to your ridiculous premises (like the special status of dependents, assumed consent of the unconscious, avoidance of greater harms, lack of duty where there's no causal responsibility...) to make the premises seem less ridiculous. But in adding these caveats, you change the nature of the argument. When these altered arguments are shown to be flawed (as I've just done), you revert back to the original ridiculous premise and we start all over again...

It's ridiculous. No-one normally sets the bar that low. — Isaac

Really? I would say we set the bar pretty low when dealing with others. We certainly don't need "near certainty" that our actions will cause more harm than good to do them normally. So let's take the example of shooting someone for entertainment. At what percentage chance that the gun would jam does it become acceptable? And assume they don't know you're doing this so you can't say "they get shocked and that's a harm in itself" or anything. If the gun has a 1% chance of jamming is it acceptable? What about 30%? 80%?

I'd say we need the gun to have a 100% chance of jamming for the act to be considered neutral. Extreme example, sure, but it goes to show that we don't take dumb risks when dealing with others usually. Which is why it's puzzling to me why Benkei requires a near certainty in this one specific case. I'd say we require a "sneaking suspicion" that our actions will hurt someone in order for doing them without consent to be wrong.

If that's all you're saying then we're back to ridiculous premises leading to ridiculous consequences. — Isaac

Sure but that's not a critique of the form.

But you keep trying to make your premises sound less ridiculous with examples of the form I outlined above. — Isaac

Still not a critique of the form.

Examples of this form are logically flawed in the way I showed. — Isaac

You didn't show much. Again, not any old difference will do. Birth is not fine because it starts with a "b" as that would result in Burglary being fine too, which is an unwanted side effect. I use these examples to try to find a premise that makes having kids ok, without any unwanted side effects. Just out of curiosity. I haven't found one that satisfies me yet.

for which it is shown to be trivially true that it leads to ridiculous conclusions. — Isaac

Try it. At least with my own system. The >0% chance thing isn't mine it's something I found online. It's edited into the same comment.

But in adding these caveats, you change the nature of the argument. — Isaac

What do you mean "change the nature of the argument"?

When these altered arguments are shown to be flawed (as I've just done) — Isaac

You didn't. You said it's trivially easy then proceeded to not give an example.

Also I want to point out:

assumed consent of the unconscious — Isaac

Is not something I ever add but something NAs add often if anything.

And: It's not that I add these caveats on a case by case basis haphazardly. I add the same caveats and start with the same premises over and over. Because I have my "system" figured out already. I just don't present all of it because I don't want to dump a wall of text on someone. I present as much as needed.

let's take the example of shooting someone for entertainment. — khaled

No intent to mitigate non-trivial harm, no reasonable expectation of counterbalancing benefits, no reasonable expectation of consent.

So not an example comparable to conception.

You didn't show much. — khaled

That's yet to be established as you've not yet offered any counter-argument to most of my points and have not pursued my response to those to which you did, instead choosing to switch lanes again, back to the ridiculous premise.

Try it. At least with my own system. — khaled

Most people consider ending the human race as an ethical outcome prima facie ridiculous.

What do you mean "change the nature of the argument"? — khaled

X > y is one argument. Both x and y might be shown to be ridiculous, but the argument valid. Xa>y (in certain circumstances) is a different argument and depends on the circumstances, the discussion of which always seems to cause you to switch tack back to the original form, making it impossible to ever properly address.

You didn't. You said it's trivially easy then proceeded to not give an example. — khaled

The difference between malicious genetic engineering and birth is trivially easy to show once you allow the kinds of caveat to a single maxim which you allow. That is what I showed in my example.

I should add that I'm also trying not to just repeat what @Echarmion is saying, much of which classes as further examples of where the added caveats undermine the force of the argument.

assumed consent of the unconscious — Isaac


Is not something I ever add but something NAs add often if anything. — khaled

Well, I'll take your word for it, I thought I recalled a response to the 'unconscious patient' example where it was argued that we could assume consent. I must have misremembered.

No intent to mitigate non-trivial harm, no reasonable expectation of counterbalancing benefits, no reasonable expectation of consent. — Isaac

Who's adding caveats now?

So not an example comparable to conception. — Isaac

I didn't mention conception. I was just saying that setting a low bar when it comes to "how likely it is that our acts will harm someone" is the norm, and not ridiculous in any way.

That's yet to be established as you've not yet offered any counter-argument — Isaac

That you think this is the case is not sufficient for it to be the case. Your claim was that any difference between the two acts in question can be used to make one ok and the other not. I showed that this is ridiculous with the "Birth starts with B" example. I only give these examples to try to find a premise that leads to having kids being ok without any bad side effects. Not even to make my premises seem less ridiculous, but to find how you can keep yours together. Because oftentimes I find that the differences you cite between birth and MGE (malicious genetic engineering) ridiculous.

The difference between malicious genetic engineering and birth is trivially easy to show once you allow the kinds of caveat to a single maxim which you allow. That is what I showed in my example. — Isaac

You did a terrible job at it then. Let me re-examine this for a second because I meant to reply but I completely forgot:

Harm who? There is no one to be harmed. This is a consequence of the insistence that having children is not causing harm "because there is no one to be harmed".
— khaled

Not my insistence, nor anyone here, as far as I can tell. I think everyone's agreed that we can imagine a future child and mitigate harms that might befall them. — Isaac

So if we can imagine a future child and recognize that an act done now, that will result in harm later, is considered "harmful" and therefore shouldn't be done, that would apply to both. If the only reason MGE is wrong is that it is harmful then by the same token having the child in the first place is wrong because it is harmful. So what caveat will you add now? I am not saying this smugly or anything, I am curious as to how you resolve this. Because, as usual, the argument as to why MGE is wrong is applying to both MGE and birth in general, you haven't actually said what it is about MGE that makes it different from birth.

Intent doesn't work, because:

Then you have the recklessness argument, as I stated in my actual definition of the differences which you've just ignored. It is insufficient to have good intentions, one must also have just cause to believe those intentions will yield the expected result. An arbitrary and unevidenced belief in the benefits of blindness does not satisfy this requirement. — Isaac

The recklessness argument also applies to birth in general. Birth will cause harm in the same way MGE does. So it can't just be harm or intent to do harm, because both are present in both cases. What's the difference still? Amounts? Pleasure caused? Something else?

I suspect you will in the end resolve it with "The survival of the human race makes it worth it" as usual.

instead choosing to switch lanes again, back to the ridiculous premise. — Isaac

I did so to demonstrate your inability to find anything wrong with the form of the argument. You still have not provided anything wrong with the form of the argument.

But I didn't mean to switch lanes I genuinely forgot about your reply because it didn't differentiate between MGE and birth in any way. Everything you said applies to both.

Most people consider ending the human race as an ethical outcome prima facie ridiculous. — Isaac

Not me. Or else I obviously would not have had a system that leads to it. Look, if you're not a moral realist, which you're not, you can only argue against an ethical position in two ways.

1- The argument logically makes no sense. For example: Saying that not having kids is good for the kids. Makes no sense as there is no one for it to be good for.

2- It results in outcomes that the proposing party finds ridiculous. For example, if my system brings about that "Murder is fine on Wednesdays" then something is wrong with it and I cannot use it to argue for AN. Because I find that that is a ridiculous outcome, so I have a contradiction on my hands that needs to be resolved, either with more caveats or a complete overhaul.

You are not doing either.

When I give an example I am trying to do 2.

Who's adding caveats now? — khaled

I'm not opposed to adding caveats. On the contrary, I think it's absolutely essential to any ethical approach. The point is only that adding caveats changes the force of the maxim to which they're added.

I was just saying that setting a low bar when it comes to "how likely it is that our acts will harm someone" is the norm, and not ridiculous in any way. — khaled

But it is ridiculous in some circumstances. That's the whole point. We do not simply have one unadulterated maxim which we apply in all cases. You yourself admit that when you add the caveats to your own. In a scenario like the one you present, where there's a non-trivial harm involved, no counterbalancing benefits, a seemingly very selfish intent, no reasonable expectation of happiness, no shared goal etc... then yes, we might have a very low bar. But in other circumstances with all those features, it would be ridiculous to have such a low bar.

Your claim was that any difference between the two acts in question can be used to make one ok and the other not. — khaled

No. I never claimed that, only that it was disingenuous of you to ignore differences.

So if we can imagine a future child and recognize that an act done now, that will result in harm later, is considered "harmful" and therefore shouldn't be done, that would apply to both. — khaled

Only we can't agree. Not even you agree. When pressed on "we should not cause harm" as a maxim you add a load of caveats, we all do. The maxim is unworkable on its own. So whether the harm ought to be avoided does not necessarily apply to both because it only applies given certain caveats and those caveats depend on the circumstances.

So what caveat will you add now? — khaled

I listed them right from the outset. Non-malicious intent, reasonable expectation of counterbalancing benefits, intent to mitigate forseeable harms, mutual goal, expectation of duty...

Intent doesn't work, because: — khaled

You're simply confusing sufficient with necessary. The fact that it alone cannot account for the difference does not mean it's not a contributory factor.

The recklessness argument also applies to birth in general. Birth will cause harm in the same way MGE does. — khaled

No, again, you're either just not reading carefully or you're being willfully stupid here. Why would you think, when given a list of factors, that each factor alone is sufficient? Recklessness matters with non-trivial harms you've no intention of mitigated less than it matters with trivial harms or those you fully intend to mitigate. To say the birth will cause harm in the same way MGE will is again monumentally disingenuous. Of course it won't. The 'way' in which each cause harm, the types of harm they cause, the circumstances surrounding that harm... all hugely different.

I did so to demonstrate your inability to find anything wrong with the form of the argument. You still have not provided anything wrong with the form of the argument. — khaled

I've never claimed there is anything wrong with that argument, so I don't know why you might have done that. The argument "we should not cause any harm under any circumstances, birth causes harm so we shouldn't do it" is valid as far as I can see. Utterly ridiculous, but valid. The argument that "'we should not cause any harm under any circumstances, birth causes harm' - is not a ridiculous premise because we generally agree to something similar" is not valid. It assumes a similarity with other moral dilemmas without taking any account of the circumstances which make them different.

When I give an example I am trying to do 2. — khaled

I understand that. And your examples fail, as I've shown, because they fail to take into account differences between your examples and birth which render the examples ridiculous, but birth not - according to the proposing party - the party you just specified was relevant to the discussion about ridiculousness.

It feels far more like you're trying to sneak in an argument in favour of AN by suggesting some inconsistency between our response to your examples and our response to birth. But no such inconsistency can be shown once you allow for caveats to the maxim, and you have already agreed that caveats are required.

But it is ridiculous in some circumstances. That's the whole point. We do not simply have one unadulterated maxim which we apply in all cases. — Isaac

Sure. And I don't intend to defend that line further. Because it's not really the argument I use. I stated which one I use.

only that it was disingenuous of you to ignore differences. — Isaac

Or maybe I don't find the differences you cite important? Like spelling for example, if you were to cite it.

Only we can't agree. Not even you agree. When pressed on "we should not cause harm" as a maxim you add a load of caveats, we all do — Isaac

Sure and I already said what those caveats are. I am not opposed to adding caveats either.

Non-malicious intent — Isaac

Malicious intent has been shown to apply to both. Since in both cases you intend to do harm. Just in one you intend to mitigate it as much as you can.

reasonable expectation of counterbalancing benefits — Isaac

I don't find convincing. Because I find that in every day life this is never used. When dealing with others we only concern ourselves with how much harm doing the thing vs not doing the thing will bring about then pick the one that does less. We don't force people to exercise for example, even though we have a reasonable expectation of counterbalancing benefits. Nor do we force people to eat foods that we like because we think it will be good for them. Etc. Don't bring up children, I have a way of dealing with that if you were to actually apply my system.

intent to mitigate forseeable harms — Isaac

I don't find convincing because it is never used in daily life either. I can't break your leg because I intend to pay your hospital bills later...

mutual goal — Isaac

With who? The child? That would make no sense. If you mean the mutual goal of keeping humanity afloat you already know my position on that.

expectation of duty — Isaac

Sounds like "intent to mitigate forseeable harms". Same treatment. I can't break your leg because I intend to take responsibility and fix it later.

So it's not that your caveats aren't working, it's that I find none of them convincing. You probably do have a self consistent system, that has premises I don't agree with. I don't intend to change anything about that.

You're simply confusing sufficient with necessary. The fact that it alone cannot account for the difference does not mean it's not a contributory factor. — Isaac

That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that both birth and MGE are examples of malicious intent. Because they both have the willing intention to do harm. What differentiates?

To say the birth will cause harm in the same way MGE will is again monumentally disingenuous. — Isaac

I don't actually think so obviously I just want to see how you resolve it without side effects.

I've never claimed there is anything wrong with that argument, so I don't know why you might have done that. — Isaac

Oh, I just realized I misread. I thought you meant "I think that's abundantly apparent" that there is something wrong with the argument.

If your goal isn't to say that there is something wrong with AN then what are you replying for?

The argument that "'we should not cause any harm under any circumstances, birth causes harm' - is not a ridiculous premise because we generally agree to something similar" is not valid. It assumes a similarity with other moral dilemmas without taking any account of the circumstances which make them different. — Isaac

I don't care to make that argument. I don't care to convince you.

It feels far more like you're trying to sneak in an argument in favour of AN by suggesting some inconsistency between our response to your examples and our response to birth. — Isaac

Not to sneak in an argument, just to see how you resolve the inconsistency.

But no such inconsistency can be shown once you allow for caveats to the maxim, and you have already agreed that caveats are required. — Isaac

Yup. I just want to see what caveats you use. If someone can come up with caveats I don't find ridiculous that can deal with the examples then I probably wouldn't be an AN anymore.