But there are countless situations where theft would overall feel good — khaled

Just declaring it doesn't make it the case. It is unlikely that in a normally functioning brain antisocial behaviour overall feels good and cases where it does seem to require significant alteration in brain structure - https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpsy/article/PIIS2215-0366(20)30002-X/fulltext

This is not to say that there aren't such people in whom it 'feels good', and that it is still wrong, but that's not the same as an argument that 'wrong' is divorced entirely from what 'feels wrong' to most people most of the time.

You seem to like citing unrelated articles in response to reasonable statements. First off, the article isn’t even saying what you’re claiming it is.

It is unlikely that in a normally functioning brain antisocial behaviour overall feels good — Isaac

Whereas the article states:

We aimed to determine whether life-course-persistent antisocial behaviour is associated with neurocognitive abnormalities by testing the hypothesis that it is also associated with brain structure abnormalities. — Isaac

“Life course persistent antisocial behavior is associated with neurocognitive abnormalities” is entirely consistent with “It feels good to rob people if you hate the victim”. One is talking about life course antisocial behavior, one is talking about a single instance. Is there a study showing that a single instance of guilt-free theft is enough evidence to diagnose people with sociopathy?

Is your claim literally that there is never a situation where violence or theft feels good and that it is always a result of a neurological abnormality? I just want to get that clear.

This is not to say that there aren't such people in whom it 'feels good', and that it is still wrong, but that's not the same as an argument that 'wrong' is divorced entirely from what 'feels wrong' to most people most of the time. — Isaac

That’s not the argument I’m making though. I’m saying that what is wrong is entirely divorced from what feels good in a hedonic sense (in the sense that eating chocolate feels good).

It is unlikely that in a normally functioning brain antisocial behaviour overall feels good — Isaac


Whereas the article states:

We aimed to determine whether life-course-persistent antisocial behaviour is associated with neurocognitive abnormalities by testing the hypothesis that it is also associated with brain structure abnormalities. — Isaac


“Life course persistent antisocial behavior is associated with neurocognitive abnormalities” is entirely consistent with “It feels good to rob people if you hate the victim”. One is talking about life course antisocial behavior, one is talking about a single instance. — khaled

I'm not talking about a single instance either, that's why I used the word 'overall', and referred to "what 'feels wrong' to most people most of the time". If we're just going to have the same trouble following an argument here then I'll quit now before I waste too much time.

Is there a study showing that a single instance of guilt-free theft is enough evidence to diagnose people with sociopathy? — khaled

No. There is a significant body of evidence showing that numerous brain regions are involved in decision-making where multiple competing risks and benefits have to be assessed, for example https://science.sciencemag.org/content/293/5537/2105.full, or http://users.econ.umn.edu/~rusti001/Research/Neuroeconomics/JNPAmbiguity.pdf. It would be inconsistent with most of what we know about the psychology of decision-making to assume a model of a single objective from short-term pleasure to be capable of accounting for any given behaviour.

Is your claim literally that there is never a situation where violence or theft feels good and that it is always a result of a neurological abnormality? I just want to get that clear. — khaled

Yes. I would bet money on the claim that you could find no case at all where the only psychological response to an anti-social act was pleasure without also seeing signs of significant neurological abnormality. We're social creatures, have been for some time, and our neurological processes reflect this in our motivating endocrine responses.

that's why I used the word 'overall', — Isaac

Which I took to mean overall for a single instance. As in it feels good despite the guilt.

I would bet money on the claim that you could find no case at all where the only psychological response to an anti-social act was pleasure without also seeing signs of significant neurological abnormality. — Isaac

No one said "the only".

Now back to the actual topic, do you agree with:

what is wrong is entirely divorced from what feels good in a hedonic sense (in the sense that eating chocolate feels good). — khaled

Now back to the actual topic, do you agree with:

what is wrong is entirely divorced from what feels good in a hedonic sense (in the sense that eating chocolate feels good). — khaled

No - hence the 'not only' aspect of the model of decision-making I've been outlining. Decisions are made by the combination of multiple brain regions utilising several endocrine motivators. Hence it would be as ridiculous to say that that what is wrong is entirely divorced from what feels good in a hedonic sense as it would to say it's entirely divorced from any other motivating factor. The list of behaviours we generally agree are 'wrong' are loosely connected by their evoking certain types of displeasure - particularly associated with feelings of empathy for the victim, feelings of social condemnation and feelings of poor self-evaluation. We appear to have biological mechanisms designed specifically to deal with each of these systems and each is activated at the respective type of moral decision. It's fairly easy for a culture to introduce moral 'wrong's by indoctrination, but it's difficult to explain the universality of certain endocrine responses without a very substantial biological basis being inferred.

What is not supported by any evidence I've seen (and is, in fact contradicted by all the evidence I've seen) is the idea that the types of behaviour we generally label 'wrong' have no connection at all and are put into the 'wrong' classification entirely at random.

No — Isaac

Ok. My bad then.

What is not supported by any evidence I've seen (and is, in fact contradicted by all the evidence I've seen) is the idea that the types of behaviour we generally label 'wrong' have no connection at all and are put into the 'wrong' classification entirely at random. — Isaac

Sure would be ridiculous if anyone claimed that huh.

Sure would be ridiculous if anyone claimed that huh. — khaled

Then what are we to make of...

I disagree that it has anything to do with hedonism. — khaled

and...

I’m saying that what is wrong is entirely divorced from what feels good in a hedonic sense (in the sense that eating chocolate feels good). — khaled

?

If hedonic pleasure is not involved at all "entirely divorced from..." and not "...anything to do with", yet the label is not applied randomly either, then what is [one of] the common motivating factors for inclusion in that category?

what is wrong is entirely divorced from what feels good in a hedonic sense — khaled

If what is wrong morally felt bad on a purely sensual level, there would be no need for morality. People would naturally do the right thing because it would be their pleasure. But it ain't like that, as you say. I suspect it is precisely because short term gratification can be pleasurable but anti-social that human societies have a need for a moral code.

Sigh. We went over this on the other thread too... It's so tiring.

what is [one of] the common motivating factors for inclusion in that category? — Isaac

That there is no ulterior practical motive behind it.

What is not supported by any evidence I've seen (and is, in fact contradicted by all the evidence I've seen) is the idea that the types of behaviour we generally label 'wrong' have no connection at all and are put into the 'wrong' classification entirely at random. — Isaac

We don't. But we could.

I suspect it is precisely because short term gratification can be pleasurable but anti-social that human societies have a need for a moral code. — Olivier5

Well, that's great. As I've mentioned before, why don't you get yourself a grounding in social or psychological sciences, put together a research proposal and pursue it. It sounds like an interesting line of investigation...unless, heaven forbid, someone in the world actually thought of that possibility before the topic was blessed with your Solomonesque gaze, and, like, actually did the research, and actually found out and wrote it down in a fucking book or something.

It is precisely because short term gratification can be pleasurable but anti-social that we have a need for a moral code. — Olivier5

I would think this is obvious too.

You conflate what is and what is not a moral claim vs what is and what is not likely to be adopted widely. I'll just quote parts of my last reply on the other thread here because we were basically discussing metaethics there. Seems relevant.

I doubt you'd get a single person to agree that reducing the number of bananas in the world is a moral imperative, or ensuring that there's no electricity, or no number 7
— Isaac

Agreed. But I also doubt that you can get a single person to agree that "We are morally obligated to reduce the number of bananas" is NOT a valid moral claim, though a ridiculous one. Yet you are attempting to redifine what "moral claim" means by referring to the public use of the word even though you are literally the only one going against the public use which I find funny.

There is a distinction between whether or not something is a moral claim and whether or not you agree with it. "We are morally obligated to reduce the number of bananas" is a moral claim. But not one I think anyone will agree with. — khaled

Is what we generally as a society consider moral related to what kinds of experiences the activity produces? Absolutely.

However, does that lead to pforrest's claim that what feels to everyone in a hedonic sense is what is good? No. Nor does it lead to your even more ridiculous claim that the phrase "Moral claim" only refers to acts that bring about a stable society.

That there is no ulterior practical motive behind it. — khaled

How does this explain the overwhelming grouping of moral codes, the presence of specific brain regions activated in moral decision-making, the similarity of endocrine response to moral activity, the overlapping psychology of anti-social behaviour with moral impulse control problems, the involvement of regions like the vPFC in moral decision-making, the commonality in criminal psychoses...

The idea that the only common factor in what is considered 'morally wrong' is that lack of ulterior motive is ridiculous.

You can't just claim stuff and not back it up with empirical evidence, it's pointless on a public forum. I can't understand what makes you think people would be interested in what you just 'reckon' is the case. If you've found out something people might be interested in, then great, but just coming on and idly speculating without any prior research seems utterly pointless.

The idea that the only common factor in what is considered 'morally wrong' is that lack of ulterior motive is ridiculous. — Isaac

Agreed. Which is why you should learn to read carefully.

The label in question was "Moral claim" not "Morally wrong".

How does this explain the overwhelming grouping of moral codes, the presence of specific brain regions activated in moral decision-making, the similarity of endocrine response to moral activity, the overlapping psychology of anti-social behaviour with moral impulse control problems, the involvement of regions like the vPFC in moral decision-making, the commonality in criminal psychoses... — Isaac

Read the second response. Maybe you'll finally understand.

a grounding in social or psychological sciences — Isaac

What makes you think I need that anymore than you do?

I would think this is obvious too. — khaled

Too obvious for Isaac, apparently.

What makes you think I need that anymore than you do? — Olivier5

The fact that you keep making inane speculations on the subject which have been already dealt with by entire schools of thought to which you could otherwise have referred. If you are that well-schooled it should be a trivial matter to put your hands on the actual research backing up your claim. This is a public forum, not a private blog. It is a common standard to back one's claims up with reference, quotes or citations. Anyone remotely experienced in academia should have a visceral reaction to making claims without thinking "how do I support that?"

The label in question was "Moral claim" not "Morally wrong". — khaled

No. The claim I was responding to was

what is [one of] the common motivating factors for inclusion in that category? — Isaac


That there is no ulterior practical motive behind it. — khaled

This clearly specifies a reason for inclusion in the category 'morally wrong', not the category 'moral claim' which has not, in this topic, even been mentioned.

This clearly specifies a reason for inclusion in the category 'morally wrong', not the category 'moral claim' which has not, in this topic, even been mentioned. — Isaac

If that's what you're referring to then yes, obviously how an activity feels goes a long way in determining whether or not we consider it right. If it brings about a lot of guilt it is usually labeled wrong.

But that does not lead to pforrest's claim that what is right is what feels good to do. As there are many cases where something feels good to do despite the guilt.

As there are many cases where something feels good to do despite the guilt. — khaled

What is guilt if not a 'bad' feeling, thus rendering the activity one which does not 'feel good'?

What is guilt if not a 'bad' feeling, thus rendering the activity one which does not 'feel good'? — Isaac

Do you know what "despite" means?

And I would say that it is pretty clear that how much guilt you experience varies greatly depending on context. Stealing from an orphanage is likely to produce a lot more guilt than stealing from someone you hate for example. The latter might even overall feel good (in the one instance).

Do you know what "despite" means? — khaled

Fair enough, I misread that.

Stealing from an orphanage is likely to produce a lot more guilt than stealing from someone you hate for example. The latter might even overall feel good (in the one instance). — khaled

Indeed. So why do you hate the person? Are all wars considered morally wrong, for example, despite that fact that they involved much suffering? It seems that in most calculations of 'moral', these considerations have already been taken somewhat into account. Stealing from a orphanage would definately cause more guilt than stealing from someone you hate, but it would also be considered more morally wrong, especially if you hated the person in question for good reason.

...and, if you didn't hate the person for good reason then we're back to abnormal psychology again.

My point is that stealing form someone you hate feels good, yet is wrong. So pforrest's claim that what is morally right is what feels good hedonistically, is false. That's it. You seem to be agreeing.

Indeed. So why do you hate the person? Are all wars considered morally wrong, for example, despite that fact that they involved much suffering? It seems that in most calculations of 'moral', these considerations have already been taken somewhat into account. Stealing from a orphanage would definately cause more guilt than stealing from someone you hate, but it would also be considered more morally wrong, especially if you hated the person in question for good reason. — Isaac

What does this have to do with anything. Also the "it" is ambiguous, idk what you mean.

If you are that well-schooled it should be a trivial matter to put your hands on the actual research backing up your claim. This is a public forum, not a private blog. — Isaac

Of course it's a trivial matter. It all starts (?) with Le développement du jugement moral chez l’enfant, by Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, 1932, which describes how hedonic incentives are altered in the family cell by punishments and rewards so that young children would see an advantage in 'behaving'. So the first stage of moral development would be in effect hedonistic: the parents try to align the incentive structure in which their kids operate with their moral requirements through a carrot and stick approach. This is the level where your Buridan-inspired conceptual framework is valid: young children tend to chose what feels good for them. But as the child grows up (still according to Piaget and Kohlberg), she starts to realize higher levels of moral judgment: a sense of social justice and fairness through rules, then a sense of pragmatism in applying those rules and also a sense of self-worth, that allow her to outgrow selfish hedonism and the fear of punishment and develop her own realistic, workable life ethic. This is where your own conceptual framework becomes inadequate.

But if you were that well schooled yourself, you wouldn't need me to point you to Piaget.

What does this have to do with anything. Also the "it" is ambiguous, idk what you mean. — khaled

It has to do with...

stealing form someone you hate feels good, yet is wrong. — khaled

I disagree that stealing from someone you hate is morally wrong for normal people. Hating someone so much that stealing from them becomes overall pleasurable involves either a pathological psychology, or the assignation of a social status to that person which renders stealing from them morally acceptable to the person in question.

That's why I brought up war. Killing Germans was morally acceptable during the Second World War. Why? Because we'd assigned a social status to Germans based on their aggression toward us. Certain types of soldier might even feel good both hedonically and morally about a victory in which hundreds of enemies died.

I'm not suggesting that individual hedonic value can be directly equated with societal-level moral judgement, but I don't see much evidence for factors other than societal-level hedonic value in explaining the vast majority of societal-level moral judgement. Once we've isolated the pertinent subject matter (empathy, social cohesion, self-evaluation), then it seems hedonic responses in those areas are pretty much the be-all and end-all of what is considered 'morally right/wrong'. An exception might be made perhaps for the initiation of some new social taboo, but even then, I'd argue there's little evidence that the initiators themselves considered their new taboo in that way (but rather more as tool for social control) and within barely a single generation acting against it would already be causing negative hedonic values in the social cohesion areas.

I'm not suggesting that individual hedonic value can be directly equated with societal-level moral judgement — Isaac

Good. That's all I was saying was not the case.

Of course it's a trivial matter. — Olivier5

Then why not just include it in the first place. The purpose of a citation is so that we can see where the opinion derives from and follow the line of argument. Without it, there's nothing to argue. We might as well just write "yes it is", "no it isn't" all day - pointless.

A couple of issues -

Firstly Le développement du jugement moral chez l’enfant 1932, was by Piaget. Kohlberg was 5 in 1932, he would have been incredibly precocious to have been involved.

Secondly, why are you citing a work from nearly a hundred years ago to support a modern argument. Are you suggesting that no progress at all has been made in the neuroscience of morality since then? Or do you think that all modern work simply upholds what the likes of Piaget and (presumably the 1958 publication by Kohlberg) concluded? Why no mention of Gilligan, Singer, Wynn or Gopnik?

That’s what I’m comparing to — khaled

Then you're talking past me, because I'm not criticizing the way ordinary people usually think, I'm criticizing a bad philosophical argument.

Sure but if you’re going to suggest an objective morality then that’s more in line with the former not the latter.

Saying “there is objective morality” while also holding that we can be wrong about it, is in absolutely no way different from saying there is no objective morality. — khaled

So if you admit that we might be wrong about what is objectively real, is that the same thing as saying there is no objective reality? I suspect your answer to that is "no", so why the double standard when it comes to morality?

Punching people you disagree with feels good to everyone all the time. — khaled

Not the people being punched. (Not to mention, even if you only consider the punchers, that's dubious. If you were within punching range right now I'd be pretty hesitant to punch you, despite our disagreement).

I don’t think it’s very difficult to come up with things that feel good but are wrong. — khaled

There are things that feel good to some people in some circumstances that are still wrong, but they're wrong on account of them feeling bad in other circumstances or to other people. Just like there are things that look true (to empirical observation) to some people sometimes but then look false in other circumstances. It's by those other contrary experiences that we assess something that looked true or felt good as actually false or bad.

Claiming that there's something that's good or bad in a way that has no bearing whatsoever on what hurts or pleases anybody anywhere ever is as absurd as claiming that there are facts about reality that have no observational implications. (And the reason that's absurd is another practical concern, namely that it leaves you with no possible way of evaluating those claims).

This makes objectivity no more than a popularity contest. — khaled

Intersubjectivity is not majoritarianian. We don't do natural science by asking people to vote on whether or not things look true to them, do we? No, we strive to build models that account for all observations.

And what are these “pragmatic reasons not to do that either”? If someone believes in God then it becomes very pragmatic to consider things entirely beyond the realms of phenomenal experience. — khaled

Believing in God is already an appeal to things entirely beyond the realm of phenomenal experience, which is a reason not to believe in God. (You're not going to tell me you're a theist now, are you?)

Anyway, as I said just above, the reason is that it leaves you with no possible way of evaluating those claims. If it makes no noticeable difference whether it's true or not, how are you to assess its truth? (Which means if you care at all about what is or isn't true, that's an impractical thing to do; and if you don't care at all about what is or isn't true, you've just bowed out of any argument about that subject and everyone else can just ignore you while they try to sort out the truth).

Of course it's a trivial matter.
— Olivier5

Then why not just include it in the first place. — Isaac

Precisely because it's trivial. You could find some literature supporting pretty much any common sense position. In fact even the most non-sensical positions would have some literature backing them up.

Secondly, why are you citing a work from nearly a hundred years ago to support a modern argument. Are you suggesting that no progress at all has been made in the neuroscience of morality since then? — Isaac

It's still fresher than Buridan, who dates back to the middle ages and is what you seem to go by. You are just another behaviorist if you ignore the multilayered complexity of our cognition, and the role of language in it, and behaviorists are basically treating people as beasts, like Buridan was doing. That's bad middle age thinking...

So if you admit that we might be wrong about what is objectively real, is that the same thing as saying there is no objective reality? I suspect your answer to that is "no", so why the double standard when it comes to morality? — Pfhorrest

My answer is "What's the difference?" Or, in more detail: Why propose an objective reality that you can be wrong about? What advantage does that give you that a lack of an objective reality lacks? What does it allow you to say that the no objective reality model doesn't? Same question with objective moralities. Though I guess this is more meta-meta-ethics now.

There are things that feel good to some people in some circumstances that are still wrong, but they're wrong on account of them feeling back in other circumstances or to other people. — Pfhorrest

Thanks for clarifying. If that's what you mean then I largely agree.

Claiming that there's something that's good or bad in a way that has no bearing whatsoever on what hurts or pleases anybody anywhere ever is as absurd as claiming that there are facts about reality that have no observational implications. — Pfhorrest

Even more absurd, because claiming that something is good or bad forces you to act in a certain way whereas claiming some super convoluted physical explanation for things that uses 50 more variables than required doesn't actually change anyone's behavior, it just makes calculations harder.

If it makes no noticeable difference whether it's true or not, how are you to assess its truth? — Pfhorrest

But it does make a huge difference in the case of God. A difference that will last an eternity.