Heidegger’s version of this integration between feeling and thought is the equiprimordiality of Befindlichkeit ( attunement) and Understanding. — Joshs

This really doesn't make much sense I'm afraid.
— Xtrix

You mean in Heideggerese or in normal english? I think it makes good sense in Heideggerese. — fdrake

Not really. Where is the equiprimordiality of attunement and understanding to which Josh is referring -- in Being and Time or anywhere else? And how does it reduce to something like "feeling and thought" being integrated? Heidegger never talks like that. But what does it mean anyway? Is it simply saying that the mind/body and subject/object dichotomy is a construction of the West that we can go beyond? Alright, fine. Say that, then. Heidegger actually says that. The rest is just interpretation.

Incidentally, your quote of Heidegger seems unrelated to what you're saying. There he's in the middle of discussing the meaning of phenomenology.

Incidentally, your quote of Heidegger seems unrelated to what you're saying. There he's in the middle of discussing the meaning of phenomenology. — Xtrix

In the interest of beating a dead horse and explaining a terrible joke I made at the same time.

I summarised the claim that moods and interpretation are equiprimordial out of Heideggerese with:

moods couldn't make stuff seem different if stuff seeming different couldn't affect moods. — fdrake

I used the quote to highlight the criticism Heidegger has of using "seeming" vocabulary to describe phenomena...

Rest of this post is is in merciless Heideggerese.

..because "seeming" is privative with regard to disclosure and phenomenon need not be.

Regarding the equipromordiality of attunement and understanding. Two existentialia are equipromordial (or co-originary) when each founds the other - in more transcendental vocabulary each is a condition of the possibility for the other.

There is direct textual support for the claim:

The two equi-primordial constitutive manners of being the there we see in attunement and in understanding. The analysis of these two will in each case receive the necessary phenomenal confirmation by way of an interpretation of a concrete mode, one important for the subsequent problematic. And both attunement and understanding are equiprimordially determined by talk (discourse - me) — Being and Time, P171

I don't think @Joshs is misinterpreting Heidegger by claiming attunement and understanding are equiprimordial. If you want to push on the idea that mood is a mode of attunement and not the existentialia attunement as such, and therefore there's a case to be made that mood isn't equiprimordial with understanding, I'd be game to talk about it. But I don't think it's super necessary considering there's direct textual support for the interpretation that attunement and understanding are equiprimordial.

I don't think Joshs is misinterpreting Heidegger by claiming attunement and understanding are equiprimordial. — fdrake

In my translation it's "state of mind" -- but regardless, I don't see how this relates to "thinking and feeling" being integrated. What Heidegger is talking about here is one aspect of being-in-the-world, namely "being-in," of which understanding and state-of-mind are two constitutive "ways." This is on the way to re-interpreting it all once again as care (Sorge), and then care as temporality. All very interesting, but I still don't see how any of this is related to Joshs' post.

Where is the equiprimordiality of attunement and understanding to which Josh is referring -- in Being and Time or anywhere else? And how does it reduce to something like "feeling and thought" being integrated? Heidegger never talks like that. — Xtrix

Heidegger wrote:
“ In terms of fundamental ontology it can also be expressed by saying that all understanding is
essentially related to an affective self-finding which belongs to understanding itself. To be affectively self-finding is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect, and the like, which are constitutive for all comportment toward beings, although they do not by themselves alone make such comportment possible but always only in one with understanding, which gives its light to each mood, each passion, each affect. Being itself, if indeed we understand it, must somehow or other be projected upon something. This does not mean that in this projection being must be objectively apprehended or interpreted and defined, conceptually comprehended, as something objectively apprehended. Being is projected upon something from which it becomes understandable, but in an unobjective way. It is understood as yet pre-
conceptually, without a logos; we therefore call it the pre-ontological understanding of being."(Basic Problems of
Phenomenology)

Gendlin writes:"Heidegger says that Befindlichkeit refers to what is ordinarily called "being in a mood," and also whatis called "feeling" and "affect." But Heidegger offers a radically different way of thinking about this ordinary
experience. Befindlichkeit refers to the kind of beings that humans are, that aspect of these beings which makes for them having moods, feelings, or affects. But Heidegger thinks about this human being in a very different way than mostpeople do, and so he also thinks about mood and feeling very differently."

Matthew Ratcliffe writes :

“ schematic causal interaction between body states and meaning intentions.

Ratcliffe writes;

“...a mood is not an intentional state but a condition of possibility for intentionality .According to Heidegger, moods are not intentional states that encompass a wide range of objects. Rather, they are modes of Befindlichkeit, ways of finding oneself in the world. This, he says, is presupposed by the intelligibility of intentionally directed experiences, thoughts and activities: „: “The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something” (Heidegger, 1962, p.176/ 137). A central characteristic of Befindlichkeit, in its various modes, is that it determines the ways in which things can matter to us and, therefore, the kinds of intentional state we can adopt.” (Ratcliffe 2012)

Heidegger’s version of this integration between feeling and thought is the equiprimordiality of Befindlichkeit ( attunement) and Understanding. — Joshs

Heidegger wrote:
“ In terms of fundamental ontology it can also be expressed by saying that all understanding is
essentially related to an affective self-finding which belongs to understanding itself. To be affectively self-finding is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect, and the like, which are constitutive for all comportment toward beings, although they do not by themselves alone make such comportment possible but always only in one with understanding, which gives its light to each mood, each passion, each affect. Being itself, if indeed we understand it, must somehow or other be projected upon something. This does not mean that in this projection being must be objectively apprehended or interpreted and defined, conceptually comprehended, as something objectively apprehended. Being is projected upon something from which it becomes understandable, but in an unobjective way. It is understood as yet pre-
conceptually, without a logos; we therefore call it the pre-ontological understanding of being."(Basic Problems of
Phenomenology) — Joshs

Are you equating understanding and thought (in the sense Heidegger means, in the sense of "apprehension" and "disclosure" [aletheia])? Because otherwise I still fail to see how this relates to the above quotation of yours, to which I initially referred. What Heidegger is talking about here is the pre-ontological (pre-theoretical) understanding of being.

The question, then is whether MP's gestalts are indeed irreducible primitives of meaning or whether they are derived abstractions hiding within their 'fatness' a more intricate structure of sense. Similarly, we must ask whether the irreducible primitives of content in Deleuze and Massumi are not in fact over-determined abstractions resulting in a model of inter-personal change that is too arbitrary and violent.

Derrida can help us out here. The point where Derrida steps in is before you get to start with your structures and then show how they relate to each other. He breaks apart the ability to claim that there is a structure of any kind ( or force, energy, power, quality) in the first place that isn't already divided within itself prior to its claim to be an itself. — Joshs

I try to understand your points and your enthusiasm about Gendlin, Kelly, Heidegger, and Derrida. Honestly, I am more familiar with Derrida's works than the rest of them, and we could discuss Derrida's philosophy of time in more detail. We could take his essay
"Before the law" as an example of his conceptualization of time, differance, and identity.

The practical significance of this is not only to unravel the presuppositions of psychoanalytic
models , not only to problematize Foucaultian or social constructionist notions of a socially
created subjectivity determined and redetemined by cultural interchange( and Deleuze's approach
I think belongs to this zone), not only to recognize the site of culture within the so-called subject
even before expose to a social-linguistic community, but to situate the place of this decentering even before a single mark or fold can claim to be an entity ,an itself.

What Eugene, Gendlin, Geoge Kelly, Heidegger and Derrida have in common is that they don't being with gestalts, patterns, configurations, flows, concepts that interact with each other to form bodies and worlds. They begin from something more intricate, a simple referential differential. Not a difference between concepts or pattern or any other form, but differences of differences of differences. — Joshs

There is nothing in Deleuze that allows for the fact that each of us in social relations maintain a thread of assimilative self-continuity above and beyond the way that we are mutually shaped in interaction with others. There is nothing in Deleuze
that recognizes that affect and intention are the same thing, not interacting elements — Joshs

No doubt, your group of thinkers have contributed a lot to understanding the founding of 'continually changing relation to yourself moment to moment, day to day.' By the way, I hope that you agree that your conceptualization of time is not an absolute and ultimate truth that should be accepted by everyone. It is an influential and interesting phenomenological perspective that can match well with one's experience of time and operate as an orienting grounding for a few domains of science and psychology. Yet, what is at stake here is not how the philosophy of time can serve as a better foundation for understanding a more significant number of texts or writing academic papers. It is not just about the ontological or epistemological foundation of apprehension of our time, answering the question: What is our time? It is more about an ethical question: How should one live in our time? You claim that your 'radical time' could help us maintain ‘a thread of assimilative self-continuity.' That means that one should be extremely attentive to one's most profound, usually indiscernible mental processes. The result could be the achievement of a culminating gestalt, of discovering and preserving one's authentic identity. (Despite all your claims that your philosophy is beyond any subjectivity). Yet how is this program related to our social realities, to our ordinary identities that we need to play out continually?
I do not see (so far) how you can bridge the gap. It looks like you misunderstand or misinterpret how Deleuse starts. He does not begin from separate entities or processes, but develops a transcendental empiricist dialectics of virtual and actual. When he writes: "As for the third time that uncovers the future: it signifies that the event and the action have a secret coherence that excludes the coherence of the self. It has become equal to them, and they shatter it into thousands of pieces, as if the bearer of the new world were taken up and dissipated by the shattering of what it, in the multiple, gives birth to. The self is equal to the unequal in itself", he lays out an ultimately different (from yours) existential program: one should not maintain and preserve any stable identity. Why? Because they are not authentic anymore. They are created and reproduced primarily for valorization or utilization purposes. They are pre-given and pre-programmed. One cannot discover or retain any authentic experience. One should live in 'the middle of things.' Has an almost inaccessible experience of death become the most authentic experience?

Let me clarify how I view Heidegger’s use of understanding in relation to conventional uses of terms like thinking, intentionality, cognition, perception, theorization, etc. Heidegger says that these terms are all forms of interpretation and interpretation is a modification of understanding.
Understanding is initially inexplicit, indefinite, undifferentiated totality of relevance in which something is still veiled. Being falls prey to, gets tempted by, and lost in beings as understanding is modified into interpretation. Interpretation develops understanding into the 'as' structure of 'this as this'. Definite conceptuality, perception and theory are all modes of interpretation and thus are all derivations of primordial understanding.

I see understanding and all its derivative modes as conveying the ‘content’ aspect of experiencing, the ‘what it is’ Dasein falls prey to, and attunement as conveying the ‘how it is’ aspect, how what I fall prey to affects me.

If computation and emotion are equiprimordial – in a system in motion, consciousness would work something like a two cylinder rotary engine.

Self organisation is spherical – the nucleus is empty. There is no central or enduring self, the self is the state of an evolving system at any given time.

In Gendlin’s model, the awareness and intending of something is a single differential crossing between one’s implicit past and what occurs into it, — Joshs

The state of the system changes at the crossing, and so does the self . In the absolute sense “the self” changes from thought to thought – Radical Temporality :clap:

he lays out an ultimately different (from yours) existential program: one should not maintain and preserve any stable identity. Why? Because they are not authentic anymore. They are created and reproduced primarily for valorization or utilization purposes. They are pre-given and pre-programmed. One cannot discover or retain any authentic experience. One should live in 'the middle of things.' — Number2018

He is absolutely right. I could t agree more. I want to take his direction further. If you radically dissolve the basis of identity , you don’t end up with power relations or relations of force or a subjectivity created and recreated like a ping pong ball through conditioning by the social milieu. If your starting point is deconstructed enough, it has too little force to lead to the kind of political model that Deleuze offers. A truly mobile self - transforming self will be founded on such an insubstantial basis that there will be nothing to prevent it from appearing to be radically self-consistent. A conservative retreat from Deleuze, which is what the above quote is referring to , sees a substantial self. Many different philosophies of dialectical self-transformation , such as Hegel and Marx , begin from such a substantial base , and it shows. They are dominating, violent and arbitrary compared to what Deleuze and Foucault accomplish. But a philosophy to the left of them dissolves even Deleuze’s
claim to an irreducible violence in experience.

It is more about an ethical question: How should one live in our time? You claim that your 'radical time' could help us maintain ‘a thread of assimilative self-continuity.' That means that one should be extremely attentive to one's most profound, usually indiscernible mental processes. The result could be the achievement of a culminating gestalt, of discovering and preserving one's authentic identity. (Despite all your claims that your philosophy is beyond any subjectivity). Yet how is this program related to our social realities, to our ordinary identities that we need to play out continually? — Number2018

It’s not about maintaining a thread of assimilative self-continuity. It’s about recognizing that this is always already the case for everyone. It is built into the very structure of temporality. Put differently , radically temporal approaches are more effective at understanding others, as individuals and as groups, than Deleuze’a approach. What he would see as arbitrary , they would perceive a finer order hiding within.

As a ‘psychotherapeutic’ approach , Deleuze would look for how individuals are defined and created by their positioning within a social arrangement. Radical temporal approaches see the social rearrangement as secondary and derived in relation to the social movement that already defines the individual.

Let me know if you are familiar with John Protevi’s work, and if you see it as consonant with Deleuze’s. We could analyze his psychological model in relation to Heidegger et al.