But that's wrong. Because it assumes that when you start the game, you already have something to loose. Hence the "or die" part has significance. This isn't the case though. The supposed "game" is literally all there is. It isn't a game where you either play or die. It's a game where you play, dying is part of playing. — Echarmion

Yes, die slowly (by playing the game in various ways.. some leading to faster death than others) or kill yourself. Kind of strengthens the argument actually.

Uh, I am? — Echarmion

I just have this theory that anti-natalism is a secularised version of heaven. You see all the pain and suffering in the world and look for a metaphysical way out. Some way to fight all the evils at once, without actually having tofigure out a solution for anything in particular. — Echarmion

Sounds like a game.. challenges to overcome.. figuring out the key to overcoming the challenges. That's what I mean by you reiterating the game analogy.

Yes, die slowly (by playing the game in various ways.. some leading to faster death than others) or kill yourself. Kind of strengthens the argument actually. — schopenhauer1

Still wrong though. There is no "or" here.

Sounds like a game.. challenges to overcome.. figuring out the key to overcoming the challenges. That's what I mean by you reiterating the game analogy. — schopenhauer1

So challenges are a game, and death is a game, and I suppose making an argument is also a game, since it's also challenging. Everything is games!

What I wanted to point out that for someone who can't abide smugness, your own position sure is awfully convenient. You get to feel morally superior to everyone else without actually having to address a single real problem. Because you're doing the much more important work of fighting the devil himself

Behaving morally is done for its own sake. I don't see what's weird about that. Idk what brought the whole desire thing into it.

I don't think we have any common ground on which to base an argument. — Isaac

You laid out the common ground. You summed it up very well. Then refused to actually apply it. If if "misapplying" the framework we set out, where exactly am I doing so?

Still wrong though. There is no "or" here. — Echarmion

Die through the course of living life (through its challenges) or don't do that, just kill yourself. Don't see the problem with the or.

So challenges are a game, and death is a game, and I suppose making an argument is also a game, since it's also challenging. Everything is games! — Echarmion

No the challenges are a game.. I guess death is a way out of the game. I'm calling it that.. Call it challenges if you want. Discreet things to overcome over a lifetime of surviving, finding comfort, entertainment in a society being exposed/impinged along the way by contingent harms. Stop trying to find "gotchas" and engage and maybe this will go somewhere :roll:. This is getting tiresome, not because the topic isn't endlessly fascinating (I think it's important), it's that this particular dialogue hasn't gained much traction. It would be nice not to do tit for tat responses and actually understand the perspectives at hand. That's difficult on this forum for whatever reason though.. Mainly due to personalities perhaps.

What I wanted to point out that for someone who can't abide smugness, your own position sure is awfully convenient. You get to feel morally superior to everyone else without actually having to address a single real problem. Because you're doing the much more important work of fighting the devil himself — Echarmion

No, see I never said that. You can certainly address other problems I just focus on this one. It is the originator of all the other problems, so is one place to start. For people already existing, yep there is a shit of challenges to get your hands dirty if you want.

What does seem like moral superiority to me is chastising those who do not want others to live out the challenges but rather default assuming that the challenges are the be all and end all.. But that's just it.. Of course it is, because what else is there if we don't kill ourselves right away or die of starvation? Yep, of course we are going to buy into the challenges thing.. It's a must. Do or die.. I get it.

@Echarmion
Of fuck, I used the term "people already existing".. But you know what I meant.. We exist rather than there being a state of affairs of no people..

But see this is the bullshit we all agree on... and we can word it to be semantically proper but now because you are in gotcha mode.. and even though you know I know this because we discussed it a billion times.. you are going to bring it up in another gotcha.. so now I have to waste a post addressing it.

I don't think it's a loophole though but a serious logical error to pull in consent in this discussion. It's gaming the issue by demanding that there should be married bachelors and then pointing out there are no married bachelors as a moral reason there shouldn't be any married people.

I do agree with you that it's not the issue necessarily but will point out the problem when it occurs. I also say this earlier :

It's not well-stated at all because consent cannot play a role here because this is once again personifying non-existence as if it has thought processes and a will. And consent isn't even necessarily important for moral questions. Actions can be moral or immoral without another person being involved. Unnecessarily cutting down trees because I like destroying stuff isn't right either. Gluttony isn't right either. Lusting after your girlfriend even when nobody in the world is aware of it, isn't right either. — Benkei

:up: Anti-Natalism is basically a series of grammar mistakes themselves mistaken for substantive philosophy. A position lacking even the dignity of being 'wrong'.

Anti-Natalism is basically a series of grammar mistakes themselves mistaken for substantive philosophy. A position lacking even the dignity of being 'wrong'. — StreetlightX

Usual pile on without adding. You know that's not true. If there are grammar mistakes to your filter, then as this thread has shown with people like me and @khaled and @Tzeentch it can easily be re-written to pass through the gotcha filter regarding the the non-person (non-issue) argument.

No the challenges are a game.. I guess death is a way out of the game. I'm calling it that.. Call it challenges if you want. Discreet things to overcome over a lifetime of surviving, finding comfort, entertainment in a society being exposed/impinged along the way by contingent harms. Stop trying to find "gotchas" and engage and maybe this will go somewhere :roll:. — schopenhauer1

I am trying to engage in a new direction, but it's perhaps not clear that I do. I think there is an alternative perspective that you're not fully considering. That death isn't actually "a way out", but rather just another part of "the game". That there aren't ways out, and that the idea that there should be is really kind of absurd.

I think it's the same kind of problem that happens when people ask "what's the meaning of life?" The question contains a hidden assumption (that someone imbued life with meaning) that people who ask the question don't realize, and hence they don't realize that the question they're asking is nonsense. To ask for the meaning of life is to give someone else the authority to set that meaning.

The problem I see with your approach isn't the same one, but it's similar. You're trying to conceptualize life in a way that's not compatible with a secular, materialistic worldview. There is a hidden assumption here, something along the line that we're souls trapped in bodies that we could conceivably escape.

That's difficult on this forum for whatever reason though.. Mainly due to personalities perhaps. — schopenhauer1

Did you have better luck in other forums? Purely text-based conversation has the tendency to get aggressive, probably because it's much easier to be angry at a red bird than at someone actually in front of you.

No, see I never said that. You can certainly address other problems I just focus on this one. It is the originator of all the other problems, so is one place to start. For people already existing, yep there is a shit of challenges to get your hands dirty if you want. — schopenhauer1

But why is it "get your hands dirty if you want, but do not, under any circumstance, have children?

What does seem like moral superiority to me is chastising those who do not want others to live out the challenges but rather default assuming that the challenges are the be all and end all.. But that's just it.. Of course it is, because what else is there if we don't kill ourselves right away or die of starvation? Yep, of course we are going to buy into the challenges thing.. It's a must. Do or die.. I get it. — schopenhauer1

But, aren't the challenges the be all and end all? This kinda refers back to my remark about "the meaning of life". If there is no outside, metaphysical reason for any of this - and I assume you'd say there isn't - then why complain about the nature of life itself? There isn't any point of comparison, outside the utopias we can dream up. And dreaming them up of course requires that we exist first.

What do you think about the line of reasoning that life is the universe experiencing itself? Useless drivel or important insight?

I am trying to engage in a new direction, but it's perhaps not clear that I do. I think there is an alternative perspective that you're not fully considering. That death isn't actually "a way out", but rather just another part of "the game". That there aren't ways out, and that the idea that there should be is really kind of absurd.

I think it's the same kind of problem that happens when people ask "what's the meaning of life?" The question contains a hidden assumption (that someone imbued life with meaning) that people who ask the question don't realize, and hence they don't realize that the question they're asking is nonsense. To ask for the meaning of life is to give someone else the authority to set that meaning.

The problem I see with your approach isn't the same one, but it's similar. You're trying to conceptualize life in a way that's not compatible with a secular, materialistic worldview. There is a hidden assumption here, something along the line that we're souls trapped in bodies that we could conceivably escape. — Echarmion

Well, first thing's first.. I do think that antinatalism is actually a good insight into general pessimism and big picture questions.. before I get into that though, we do have to resolve at least something..

It seems even @Benkei agrees that there is some threshold in which it is not okay to have a child. He mentioned a few circumstances. So clearly, there is something going on here where we can look at a future where there will be a person who exists and project what might happen to that person. If we can't get past this, then we shouldn't even really be arguing anymore. At that point you would be arguing for argument's sake to argue at least that point and I frankly think we would have no shared ground of anything to discuss.

That being said, if we all can agree that we can project the outcomes of a future person who would be alive if we procreated them, then it becomes a matter of what are the facts, and what is the threshold. The threshold means, at what projected amount of suffering/negativity would you find it AT THE LEAST distasteful to entertain having a child? Now clearly you, Benkei and others a way lower threshold. My view is that ANY form of negativity is wrong. Now, we can go down the stupid rabbit-hole of pinpricked charmed lives, but let's not cause that is just a cul-de-sac. Rather, Let's just agree that at least life has challenges to overcome and harms that we are exposed to. Knowing this, I see it as paternalistic to think that another person should be born, because I deem life's negativity/challenges sufficient to bear the burden of.

So based on the evidence of what living a human life entails, that is where the main disagreement lies. Unlike intra-wordly scenarios where we have to make compromises all the time, this is a unique area where no person will exist to be harmed by a simple inaction of procreation, where there presumably could have been someone if this action was taken. Antintatlists will either take the metaphysical stance that it is a "good state of affairs" (a sort of absolute axiom) that all cases of harm were prevented in one inaction OR, simply that AT LEAST the bad situations of affairs of all/any harm befalling a future person was prevented.

Similarly, antinatalists often view impositions on other people as wrong. Starting someone else's life by having them is seen as an imposition. This is where the facts on the ground are seen as different. Natalists don't see starting someone else's life as an imposition. They see individual instances of challenges to be the impositions. Antinatalists don't understand why these individual instances cannot be summed up as a general category of negativity/harm. Thus instead of 1, 2, 3 instances it is X[1,2,3] that is being prevented.

So it is really a case of the threshold and the facts of what counts as causation of harm.

But, aren't the challenges the be all and end all? This kinda refers back to my remark about "the meaning of life". If there is no outside, metaphysical reason for any of this - and I assume you'd say there isn't - then why complain about the nature of life itself? There isn't any point of comparison, outside the utopias we can dream up. And dreaming them up of course requires that we exist first.

What do you think about the line of reasoning that life is the universe experiencing itself? Useless drivel or important insight? — Echarmion

Well there is no alternative for us. We exist. However, as long as a capacity exists where someone in the future can be prevented from challenges, then it is incumbent not to start X[1,2,3] challenges for that person (that is to say all harms/challenges that come from existing in the first place, which is caused by procreation of that person).

What do you think about the line of reasoning that life is the universe experiencing itself? Useless drivel or important insight? — Echarmion

It's kind of an anthropic principle argument that we need to exist for the universe to exist. A negative version of this to some extent is Schopenhauer.. The phenomenal world is the playground of the Will but it has no end to its striving, thus causing the misery for the manifestations that arise from it's illusory flip-side of phenomenal existence. I don't necessarily subscribe to this theory, but it's aesthetically intriguing.

I do think that antinatalism has implications for how to act as a community. If you want to discuss that, let me know.

Another antinatalism thread and another case of the same arguments being re-hashed or going nowhere :roll:

Behaving morally is done for its own sake. — khaled

Not quite sure how to take this. Are you implying that moral behaviour has no objective. It's just series of arbitrary rules we follow just because...?

You laid out the common ground. You summed it up very well. Then refused to actually apply it. — khaled

You'll have to point me back to where you think I did this.

You'll have to point me back to where you think I did this. — Isaac

Here:

There is some benefit A which carries a risk B to person C. If I'm under no duty to provide benefit A then it is not appropriate to take risk B if I cannot get the consent of person C to do so. IF, however, I'm under some responsibility to provide benefit A and still can't get the consent of person C, I might well take risk B because failing to provide A would be no less of a risk - be an equally morally relevant outcome — Isaac

A would be the good things in life, B would be the bad things in life, and C would be the child. You are not under any responsibility to provide A. So don't.

Not quite sure how to take this. Are you implying that moral behaviour has no objective. It's just series of arbitrary rules we follow just because...? — Isaac

The objective of moral behavior is moral behavior. I don't know how many ways I have to restate this. And this isn't some fringe belief either, Kant thought that way. To him, the consequences don't matter, only the behavior does. Same here. The rules are set out because we deem them as good.

Another antinatalism thread and another case of the same arguments being re-hashed or going nowhere :roll: — Albero

Really hoping someone will say something interesting one of these days.

You'll have to point me back to where you think I did this. — Isaac


Here: — khaled

It was the refusing to apply it bit I was confused about. Not sure what I've said outside of a principle of weighing harms, benefits and duties.

The objective of moral behavior is moral behavior. I don't know how many ways I have to restate this. And this isn't some fringe belief either, Kant thought that way. — khaled

I'm no Kant scholar but the SEP has...

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that the supreme principle of morality is a standard of rationality that he dubbed the “Categorical Imperative” (CI).

And...

a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, or free, in the sense of being the author of the law that binds it. The fundamental principle of morality — the CI — is none other than the law of an autonomous will.

None of that sounds anything like an arbitrary set of rules which are simply followed for their own sake.

What prevents 'maximise my personal wealth' becoming a moral imperative?

It was the refusing to apply it bit I was confused about — Isaac

In my comment I told you how I apply it to get the conclusion “You shouldn’t have kids”. What do you think of that application? I think yours was hand wavy. Didn’t specify exactly what A B or C were for one.

None of that sounds anything like an arbitrary set of rules which are simply followed for their own sake. — Isaac

I didn’t say that. I said Kant didn’t care about consequences. If you had the option to lie to save some innocent’s life from a killer, he would say don’t lie. Period.

Same for me. I don’t care about the consequences. I set my rules and I follow them. If your question is where do these rules come from? Why do you care? That shouldn’t affect what we’re talking about.

I could “embed” them in some sort of “respect of human freedom” or something like that. As in the reason you don’t do things to people without consent (under the conditions we highlighted) is because it “violates the principle of human freedom” or “treats people as ends in themselves”. There are a gajillion things I can embed these rules in. I don’t feel the need to do that though. These rules just seem right to me, that’s why I follow them. I don’t see how “embedding” them in deeper, yet still arbitrary rules helps. Though everybody seems to like that for some reason.

Knowing this, I see it as paternalistic to think that another person should be born, because I deem life's negativity/challenges sufficient to bear the burden of. — schopenhauer1

Well, in a sense it is almost the definition of paternalism. Of course if you're a parent, you're going to be involved in paternalism, it's right there in the word. But of course parental guidance isn't usually seen as a negative, whereas paternalism usually is. Adults are supposed to make their own decisions.

But given the scenario we are dealing with, it's not obvious why paternalism should have a negative connotation. We can imagine a fantasy scenario where we time-travel to ask all out future children on their opinion about being born. But then the question is, what more right does any one version of me have to decide on all of my existence with all its consequences? Is some moment of me empowered to make the decision for all moments? And what about the consequences for everyone I have and will meet?

This sounds like a scenario where I'd welcome some paternalism.

Antintatlists will either take the metaphysical stance that it is a "good state of affairs" (a sort of absolute axiom) that all cases of harm were prevented in one inaction OR, simply that AT LEAST the bad situations of affairs of all/any harm befalling a future person was prevented. — schopenhauer1

But where do you even get the moral weight of harm from? That's a problem for all utilitarian ethics, but it's especially problematic here, because you square absence of harm with absence of existence. But aren't harm and it's absence judgements by existing minds? How then could there be an absence of harm without minds?

Similarly, antinatalists often view impositions on other people as wrong. Starting someone else's life by having them is seen as an imposition. This is where the facts on the ground are seen as different. Natalists don't see starting someone else's life as an imposition. They see individual instances of challenges to be the impositions. Antinatalists don't understand why these individual instances cannot be summed up as a general category of negativity/harm. Thus instead of 1, 2, 3 instances it is X[1,2,3] that is being prevented. — schopenhauer1

My view here is different insofar as I don't even see why impositions are strictly negative in the first place. I am aware the word has negative connotations, but are they warranted in this scenario?

Well there is no alternative for us. We exist. However, as long as a capacity exists where someone in the future can be prevented from challenges, then it is incumbent not to start X[1,2,3] challenges for that person (that is to say all harms/challenges that come from existing in the first place, which is caused by procreation of that person). — schopenhauer1

Why though? I can see the argument being made for particular sets of challenges, but what right does the "future person" have to not have challenges "imposed" at all? What rule, based on what philosophy, would be broken?

I do think that antinatalism has implications for how to act as a community. If you want to discuss that, let me know. — schopenhauer1

What I'd be interested in is how you view the relationship between the individual and the community. Does the community only exist to facilitate the purposes of it's individuals or is community a more fundamental element of humanity?

But given the scenario we are dealing with, it's not obvious why paternalism should have a negative connotation. We can imagine a fantasy scenario where we time-travel to ask all out future children on their opinion about being born. But then the question is, what more right does any one version of me have to decide on all of my existence with all its consequences? Is some moment of me empowered to make the decision for all moments? And what about the consequences for everyone I have and will meet?

This sounds like a scenario where I'd welcome some paternalism. — Echarmion

What makes this game so good, other people must play it, instead of worrying about playing it yourself? If no one is born, clearly no one is suffering from not playing the game there. So it seems at the decision, it is only about the parent wanting something.. Their desire leads to tremendous outcomes.. in fact a whole life existential decision made for someone else. Seems a bit odd that you have a notion and someone else is the one that has to be profoundly affected by it.

But where do you even get the moral weight of harm from? That's a problem for all utilitarian ethics, but it's especially problematic here, because you square absence of harm with absence of existence. But aren't harm and it's absence judgements by existing minds? How then could there be an absence of harm without minds? — Echarmion

I explained that it is just an axiom that preventing harm itself is absolutely good in some views. In other views, it's not about good but about simply activating a principle when a situation arises. So, if someone exists and they have a capacity to make an inter-wordly decision, such as preventing all harm unnecessarily by a certain inaction, then there you go.

My view here is different insofar as I don't even see why impositions are strictly negative in the first place. I am aware the word has negative connotations, but are they warranted in this scenario? — Echarmion

It's just an axiom, no unnecessary harms and challenges are taking place versus they are taking place.

Also just intuition on things like resentment for being kidnapped into a fatal and sometimes harmful game with various tedious, annoying, neutral, (even if interesting or not so bad at times) that have to be played out. It certainly doesn't follow that, since we must exist to know the game in the first place, it is permissible for people to start the game.

Why though? I can see the argument being made for particular sets of challenges, but what right does the "future person" have to not have challenges "imposed" at all? What rule, based on what philosophy, would be broken? — Echarmion

I mean someone might ask the same thing, why is causing harm bad? Why is forcing someone to do something just because you want it bad? I mean you can question anything. At some point it's your intuition. I can provide analogies, emotional appeals, but if you are not convinced so be it. Unlock physics or something, I am not going to reveal to you something where it will convince you by way of working a certain way that happens all the time, etc like a piece of technology derived from a scientific discovery.

What I'd be interested in is how you view the relationship between the individual and the community. Does the community only exist to facilitate the purposes of it's individuals or is community a more fundamental element of humanity? — Echarmion

I think that individuals are the locus of experience. Certainly community is a necessary part of being socialized as a human, but the community doesn't feel a knee being scraped, going through this or that experience, an individual does.

However, I think as a community, we can look at each other as fellow-sufferers in life. We can more clearly see the harms that are necessary to stay alive as they are being enacted in real time. This may lead to minimizing our harmful interactions as much as possible. Our desires and needs are necessary parts of our beings and they cause other people to have to work, and us to work for them. I am not talking about compassion or heroics or something, just the everyday entailment of economic existence that needs to take place to maintain the structures for survival, comfort, entertainment.. The expectations that need to be there, the attitudes, the de facto forced behaviors and interactions. We are a species that knows we don't like something but yet know we have to go through with it to. We can contemplate life, see that it isn't ideal even in possibility but still live it out.

It was the refusing to apply it bit I was confused about — Isaac


In my comment I told you how I apply it to get the conclusion “You shouldn’t have kids”. What do you think of that application? — khaled

That's mainly what I was trying to address in my later comments, but perhaps I didn't relate them clearly enough. It comes down, I think, to the nature of the decision that no amount of benefits constitute an A that you have any moral obligation to consider - hence all the discussion about where moral obligations arise from. I think if you're of the opinion that moral obligations just spring out of nowhere and then must be followed for their own sake, then we are too far from one another to gain anything from a conversation such as this. I don't think that's even close to a definition of what moral obligations are.

I said Kant didn’t care about consequences. If you had the option to lie to save some innocent’s life from a killer, he would say don’t lie. Period.

Same for me. I don’t care about the consequences. — khaled

Isn't the harm future people will suffer a consequence that you care about?

These rules just seem right to me, that’s why I follow them. I don’t see how “embedding” them in deeper, yet still arbitrary rules helps. Though everybody seems to like that for some reason. — khaled

It's not that the 'deeper' rules are arbitrary, it's that they're definitional. Obligations which count as 'moral' ones (as opposed to just any obligation) have to be defined, in order to be in that class. The class makes no sense in language unless it has a public definition - even if only a vague one. How do you think we come to learn how to use the word 'moral' unless there's some definitional parameters to it's use we can identify publicly?

For me, I'd say 'moral' obligations we those obligations which related to creating a more harmonious community (we live together with less conflict and suffering if we follow them). That seems to encompass what most people are trying to get at - even Kant.

But the existence of a definition for the class {moral activities} means that not everything can fit in that class. Causing the extinction of the human race, for example, doesn't fit in that class - it doesn't create a more harmonious community - it creates no community at all.

We seem to have come back to the conclusion of our last conversation on anti-natalism. What you have is a plan (eliminate suffering). It's not moral - by definition. It's just a plan.

It's just an axiom, no unnecessary harms and challenges are taking place versus they are taking place. — schopenhauer1

Finally. This time it only took you sixteen pages to admit the same point we get to every time...

"I have some weird axioms, look what weird consequences arise from following them"

Summarises all these threads in one sentence.

Finally. This time it only took you sixteen pages to admit the same point we get to every time...

"I have some weird axioms, look what weird consequences arise from following them"

Summarises all these threads in on sentence. — Isaac

Problem is all you can say about these axioms is that they’re weird. That’s not really important, it’s like saying you don’t like vanilla ice cream. But this thread is an attempt to say they’re wrong. I’ll reply to the rest later I don’t have time right now but just a few thoughts:

I'd say 'moral' obligations we those obligations which related to creating a more harmonious community (we live together with less conflict and suffering if we follow them). That seems to encompass what most people are trying to get at - even Kant. — Isaac

Does allowing serial killers to kill innocents by refusing to lie to them create a more harmonious community?

On another occasion, I remember hearing that Kant was asked: If there were 2 people male and female, left alive on earth but one of them was a criminal, should she be executed or should the couple try to rebuild the human race and he answered: Executed for her crimes. I don’t know if this actually happened, I only heard it from a friend. But that was Kant’s philosophy. It doesn’t matter what the impact is on the community, it only matters whether or not the act is right

Problem is all you can say about these axioms is that they’re weird. That’s not really important, it’s like saying you don’t like vanilla ice cream. But this thread is an attempt to say they’re wrong. — khaled

Not 'wrong', just not moral. 'Moral' has a meaning, and wiping out the human race isn't it. If your axiom happened to be 'kill everyone who annoys me' we'd be in exactly the same situation, but I don't think anyone would object to countering an argument that such an axiom was a 'moral' one.

I remember hearing that Kant was asked: If there were 2 people male and female, left alive on earth but one of them was a criminal, should she be executed or should the couple try to rebuild the human race and he answered: Executed for her crimes. I don’t know if this actually happened, I only heard it from a friend. But that was Kant’s philosophy. It doesn’t matter what the impact is on the community, it only matters whether or not the act is right — khaled

That may well be, I'm no expert on Kant. If true then it just confirms my suspicion that Kant was a sociopath, but as far as I can tell such a view would contradict the CI. I suppose, if not, then I'd have to agree that some uses of the term 'moral' are so far removed from others that one could reasonably define it as 'an arbitrary set of rules one sticks to for no reason at all', but such a definition would be next to useless as no-one would know what you were talking about when you used the term.

It's not that the 'deeper' rules are arbitrary, it's that they're definitional. Obligations which count as 'moral' ones (as opposed to just any obligation) have to be defined, in order to be in that class. — Isaac

Obligations are obligations. Who cares which class they're in? What are "non-moral obligations"?

that one could reasonably define it as 'an arbitrary set of rules one sticks to for no reason at all' — Isaac

As I've said, it doesn't need to be arbitrary. But you have to start from some arbitrary point. For example:

For me, I'd say 'moral' obligations we those obligations which related to creating a more harmonious community (we live together with less conflict and suffering if we follow them). — Isaac

"Creating a more harmonious community is moral". Is just as arbitrary as the rules we set out. Only one level deeper. I don't see any need for that "extra level". For me it's: "Acting as follows

There is some benefit A which carries a risk B to person C. If I'm under no duty to provide benefit A then it is not appropriate to take risk B if I cannot get the consent of person C to do so. IF, however, I'm under some responsibility to provide benefit A and still can't get the consent of person C, I might well take risk B because failing to provide A would be no less of a risk - be an equally morally relevant outcome — Isaac

is moral". Arbitrary? Yes, but not any more than alternatives.

You're missing the point. 'Moral' is a word in our shared language. It has to have a public meaning in order to be able to carry out this function. It can't be a term which you apply to describe absolutely anything, otherwise it has no meaning, I'm none the wiser if you say "X is immoral", than if you just say "X is". The word has no function whatsoever.

In order for words to function in a language they have to have some shared meaning, we can't just go around saying any old thing counts as 'moral'.

As to where those shared meanings come from in the first place, I'm generally in favour of some biological origin with a significant history of cultural modifications. Which means that the deep driver of morality is not arbitrary at all, it's not something you even get to choose.

'Moral' is a word in our shared language. — Isaac

Well considering how many debates we have about it, maybe its meaning isn't as "shared" as, say, "dog". It has some flexibility.

It can't be a term which you apply to describe absolutely anything — Isaac

Agreed, which is why I don't apply it to absolutely anything.

'Moral' is a word in our shared language. — Isaac


Well considering how many debates we have about it, maybe its meaning isn't as "shared" as, say, "dog". It has some flexibility. — khaled

Yeah, I think that's right. So what kind of evidence would one bring to bear if one were to make an argument about the parameters? Say if we were talking about 'dog', you might argue some new creature was a type of dog by pointing to similarities with other dogs (physiology, genetics etc). You might argue that my toaster isn't a 'dog' by the opposite method.

Yeah, I think that's right. So what kind of evidence would one bring to bear if one were to make an argument about the parameters? Say if we were talking about 'dog', you might argue some new creature was a type of dog by pointing to similarities with other dogs (physiology, genetics etc). You might argue that my toaster isn't a 'dog' by the opposite method. — Isaac

Whatever the evidence is, it is not hard and fast. The line gets blurry at foxes and wolves. But you seem to me to be asking for hard and fast.

What makes "Moral acts are for the benefit of the community" so incredibly different than the moral rule we outlined that the former works as a definition and the latter becomes "arbitrary rules followed for no reason"? They seem to be at similar levels of arbitrariness for me.

Whatever the evidence is, it is not hard and fast. The line gets blurry at foxes and wolves. — khaled

Agreed.

you seem to me to be asking for hard and fast. — khaled

No, just within the ballpark.

What makes "Moral acts are for the benefit of the community" so incredibly different than the moral rule we outlined that the former works as a definition and the latter becomes "arbitrary rules followed for no reason"? — khaled

I don't see them as two examples of the same thing. One's an attempt to summarise the purpose of the rules, the other is a rule itself (and so, without purpose, is arbitrary). The equivalent for the antinatalist would be something like "Moral acts are to minimise suffering".

I can raise evolutionary, cultural, linguistic, psychological and sociological reasons why moral acts might be those which benefit the community. I'm asking what equivalent type of evidence you can bring to support your idea that moral acts are those which minimise suffering.

The equivalent for the antinatalist would be something like "Moral acts are to minimise suffering". — Isaac

Sure let's go for that one. As if that takes away from any of the arbitrariness. The natural next question then becomes "Why pick that premise instead of 'moral acts are fo the benefit of the community'?" which would bring it all back again.

I can raise evolutionary, cultural, linguistic, psychological and sociological reasons why moral acts might be those which benefit the community. — Isaac

This sounds to me like a natrualistic fallacy at best and a type error at worst. If by this statement you mean that we should follow this or that moral intuition because they are culturally and biologically evolved that would be a natrualistic fallacy. And last I checked we have an intuition both not to harm people AND to help the community thrive. Are you asking me to provide evolutionary, cultural, linguistic, psychological and sociological reasons why we try not to harm others in general?

If by it you mean that an explanation of the factors causing us to have this or that moral premise suffices as a moral premise then that's a type error. Why we came to have this or that moral premise, and the moral premise itself, are very different things.

So I'm not exactly sure what evolutionary, cultural, lingustic, psychological and sociological reasons qualify as "evidence" for exactly? What are you trying to prove by citing these?

If by this statement you mean that we should follow this or that moral intuition because they are culturally and biologically evolved that would be a natrualistic fallacy. — khaled

No it wouldn't. Maybe to a moral absolutist it would, but I thought you and I were past that. Anyone not absolutist about morals, these ideas have arrived in our heads by some natural means, they are not given by God and they are not us getting in touch with some platonic realm of moral values... So, given we both agree that they have not arrived in our heads by divine force, then their origin is natural, hence it is not a naturalistic fallacy. There is no 'should'. We simply will or will not according to our mental states. The relevant task is only to try to describe and predict that process.

So, given we both agree that they have not arrived in our heads by divine force, then their origin is natural, hence it is not a naturalistic fallacy. — Isaac

A naturalistic fallacy is when you say "We should do this because it's natrual". For example: "People naturally want to steal therefore they should". That seems to me what you're doing.

There is no 'should'. — Isaac

Bit late for that.

The relevant task is only to try to describe and predict that process. — Isaac

That's psychology and sociology. Not ethics. Ethics is precisely concerned with what you should and should not do.

Tell me what you have in mind. Cite these sociological, biological, cultural "evidences" and tell me exactly what you mean to prove by them. Then maybe we'll get on the same wavelength.