Indeed, the parent gets to decide. — Tzeentch

No, they don't. The parents don't go around thinking "my child wants to live, therefore I am going to create it". That's not a decision that actually happens.

The community is not bearing the brunt of what it means to live out a life. It is simply a notion in the head of the actual people living out life. It is the individuals which are what are being prevented from suffering. — schopenhauer1

Both individuality and suffering are just notions in certain heads too, so I don't see how this is anything concrete to work with.

Clearly a parent gets to decide whether they want to create children.

The parents don't go around thinking "my child wants to live, therefore I am going to create it". That's not a decision that actually happens. — Echarmion

Indeed. They want a child and therefore they will create one. So what justification is there to make this decision despite being unable to foresee the consequences and being unable to verify in advance whether the child actually wants to experience life?

what justification is there to make this decision despite being unable to foresee the consequences and being unable to verify in advance whether the child actually wants to experience life? — Tzeentch

You've just answered your own question.

The justification is... being able to foresee the consequences (life is really good - love, sunsets, adventure etc) and we can't possibly check in advance whether they want these things, so there's obviously no moral obligation to do so (to have a moral obligation to do something impossible is stupid).

The justification is... being able to foresee the consequences (life is really good - love, sunsets, adventure etc) — Isaac

They are unable. They may believe life is worth living, but there's no way of knowing whether their child will.

we can't possibly check in advance whether they want these things, — Isaac

Indeed. Sounds like a fantastic reason not to force those things upon someone.

They are unable. They may believe life is worth living, but there's no way of knowing whether their child will. — Tzeentch

Exactly. We can't have a moral obligation to consider data which it is impossible to gather. That would make no sense at all.

we can't possibly check in advance whether they want these things, — Isaac


Indeed. Sounds like a fantastic reason not to force those things upon someone. — Tzeentch

There is no someone.

So it is a moral premise of yours that whatever is the law or social norm is morally relevant? How, in your world, do laws and social norms get changed? — Isaac

The premise is that you have an obligation to uphold social contracts you are a part of. So if you work as a doctor for instance, you cannot refuse to treat a patient (unless you can't), because treating patients is what you "signed up for". Society has you "sign up for" a lot of things, depending on the society (Just today I discovered you can actually get sued in the Netherlands if you don't help someone as best you can to survive an accident @Benkei)

How do social contracts change? I don't know, I'm not a political theorist or sociologist. You seem to be implying that my premise implies that they don't change, but I don't see how.

No. Some might be making that point, but it's not mine. I'm quite comfortable with imagining a future child and acting in what I imagine to be it's best interests. — Isaac

Sounds backwards to me. Something that doesn't exist doesn't have future interests in existing. Making a prediction about another's future and acting to help them is one thing. So you can say something like "I will vaccinate my child because it is in their interests not to die to a rusty nail". But you cannot claim to have a child "for the child's sake". There is no child who has a sake, whereas in the first case there was.

The justification is... being able to foresee the consequences (life is really good - love, sunsets, adventure etc) and we can't possibly check in advance whether they want these things, so there's obviously no moral obligation to do so (to have a moral obligation to do something impossible is stupid). — Isaac

You say "life is really good- love, sunsets, adventure" as if the quality of life is not determined by the child. I would say that since you can't check in advance whether or not the child will actually think life is good, it would be unethical to have them.

Usually you say something like "Oh sure, risking harming the child is bad, but it is offset by the survival of the human race" but here you seem to be switching to "Sure, there is a risk the child hates life, but that doesn't matter". And I don't see a convincing reason why it shouldn't matter.

Indeed. Sounds like a fantastic reason not to force those things upon someone.
— Tzeentch

There is no someone. — Isaac

No. Some might be making that point, but it's not mine. I'm quite comfortable with imagining a future child and acting in what I imagine to be it's best interests. — Isaac

Cmon now.....

Clearly a parent gets to decide whether they want to create children. — Tzeentch

Yes. But that's not the same as deciding that those children want to live.

Indeed. They want a child and therefore they will create one. So what justification is there to make this decision despite being unable to foresee the consequences and being unable to verify in advance whether the child actually wants to experience life? — Tzeentch

The same justification there is for anything else that you do that has consequences you can't fully control (i.e. everything). There is nothing unusual about this, you do it when you drive your car to the store. What justification could you possibly have to drive to the store while being unable to foresee the consequences and unable to verify in advance whether anyone wants to take the risk of sharing the road today with you?

There is no someone. — Isaac

This keeps being repeated, and it seems to be the last wall to hide behind, but you build your walls flimsy indeed.

Tell me then, for who is it we seek to preserve the planet?

What justification could you possibly have to drive to the store while being unable to foresee the consequences and unable to verify in advance whether anyone wants to take the risk of sharing the road today with you? — Echarmion

I would say that anyone who feels they cannot guarantee the safety of others while driving should not get behind the wheel.

Well, then noone should get behind the wheel.

So it is a moral premise of yours that whatever is the law or social norm is morally relevant? How, in your world, do laws and social norms get changed? — Isaac


The premise is that you have an obligation to uphold social contracts you are a part of. So if you work as a doctor for instance, you cannot refuse to treat a patient (unless you can't), because treating patients is what you "signed up for". Society has you "sign up for" a lot of things, depending on the society (Just today I discovered you can actually get sued in the Netherlands if you don't help someone as best you can to survive an accident Benkei)

How do social contracts change? I don't know, I'm not a political theorist or sociologist. — khaled

Well don't you think that looking into it might be relevant, if you're going to make claims about it?

No. Some might be making that point, but it's not mine. I'm quite comfortable with imagining a future child and acting in what I imagine to be it's best interests. — Isaac

Something that doesn't exist doesn't have future interests in existing. — khaled

Correct.

you cannot claim to have a child "for the child's sake". There is no child who has a sake, whereas in the first case there was. — khaled

That's not the claim. The claim is merely that there will be a child whose existence might well be quite enjoyable. That in itself is a perfectly reasonable thing to aspire to.

since you can't check in advance whether or not the child will actually think life is good, it would be unethical to have them. — khaled

Why? The vast majority of people broadly agree about stuff that's good, so it can't be a case of making a poor prediction. It's not reasonable to deny action in cases where we cannot obtain all potentially relevant data (we'd literally do nothing if that were the case). So I'm lost as to why you think this particular inaccessible bit of data prohibits action.

Usually you say something like "Oh sure, risking harming the child is bad, but it is offset by the survival of the human race" but here you seem to be switching to "Sure, there is a risk the child hates life, but that doesn't matter". And I don't see a convincing reason why it shouldn't matter. — khaled

I didn't say it doesn't matter. It simply can't be ascertained. You then make the move to say we can't act, in the basis of that lack. We act in the absence of complete data all the time, I don't see why this is an exception.

There is no someone. — Isaac


This keeps being repeated, and it seems to be the last wall to hide behind, but you build your walls flimsy indeed.

Tell me then, for who is it we seek to preserve the planet? — Tzeentch

The future someone. The children who will exist.

But we are not forcing anything on these children. They exist already (in our possible world we're investigating). We can imagine what type of world they'd like, but only after assuming they already exist to hold an opinion on it. What we cannot coherently do is wonder if they'd prefer to exist or not because nothing which has that choice is capable of forming an opinion on the matter.

Maybe so.

What we cannot coherently do is wonder if they'd prefer to exist or not because nothing which has that choice is capable if forming an opinion on the matter. — Isaac

One only needs to conclude there is no way of knowing, and make decisions based on that.

Some may want to risk it. Others may not.

I lean towards the latter, but I don't consider the former to be unreasonable. It simply makes me wonder what the justificiation is to take such a risk.

Well don't you think that looking into it might be relevant, if you're going to make claims about it? — Isaac

I have not made claims about the rate of change of laws. So I don't need to look at how they change. I have set out a moral framework where socially placed responsibilities play a role.

Why? The vast majority of people broadly agree about stuff that's good, so it can't be a case of making a poor prediction. It's not reasonable to deny action in cases where we cannot obtain all potentially relevant data (we'd literally do nothing if that were the case). So I'm lost as to why you think this particular inaccessible bit of data prohibits action. — Isaac

Not having complete data always makes us pick the conservative option, unless we have consent to do otherwise. Exceptions include when we have dependents that require us to make sure we maximize the other's wellbeing even if they don't want that (vaccines, surger, etc).

If I don't know that you're going to like a certain suit, I won't buy it for you with your money. Because if I turn out to be wrong, I will have caused harm. My decision should not depend at all on how much I personally like the suit, but simply on whether or not I can be sure you will like it. If I cannot be, then I don't take the risk with your money.

I'm curious why you think this is a special case actually. I cannot think of many cases where we take risks with others' wellbeing without permission.

I'm curious why you think this is a special case actually. I cannot think of many cases where we take risks with others' wellbeing without permission. — khaled

I guess what it boils down to is the claim that at the point of decision there is no individual whose well-being can be violated, foregoing the fact that we already know such an individual will come about as a direct result of our actions.

It's an odd wall to hide behind.

I guess what it boils down to is the claim that at the point of decision there is no individual whose well-being can be violated, foregoing the fact that we already know such an individual will come about as a direct result of our actions. — Tzeentch

For Isaac he usually goes to the "The human race is worth preserving" wall. I'm curious why he's trying this one for a change this time. At least the former is unassailable. This one can be smashed by the malicious genetic engineering argument. If there being no one whose well-being can be violated leads to the conclusion that you can have kids whenever wherever, then it will also lead to the conclusion that it is fine to genetically engineer kids to be crippled, which is a very hard one to swallow.

One only needs to conclude there is no way of knowing, and make decisions based on that. — Tzeentch

No. It's not that there's no way of knowing. It's not a data point which exists but is not 'knowable'. The data point doesn't even exist. To ask if one prefers A or B is to ask whether A or B produce greater positive feelings. A non-existent entity does not have feelings, so cannot 'prefer' anything. Where A or B are 'non-existence'. The question is meaningless, and, more importantly, has no answer.

It simply makes me wonder what the justificiation is to take such a risk. — Tzeentch

The benefit. Same as the justification for any risk. Why would you think this one any different?

I have not made claims about the rate of change of laws. So I don't need to look at how they change. I have set out a moral framework where socially placed responsibilities play a role. — khaled

If your moral framework includes a feature which you cannot even predict changes in, it would seem little better than just throwing your hands up and saying "I'll just do whatever everyone else is doing". If the law said you must murder Jews would you do so? No, obviously not. So something judges laws, they are not simply accepted at face value.

Not having complete data always makes us pick the conservative option, unless we have consent to do otherwise. — khaled

Maybe. What's the most conservative option? Having children could lead to an entire generation of resentful malcontents (but it hasn't done so yet, so seems unlikely). Not having children leads to the extinction of the human race. What on earth kind of heterodox definition of 'conservative' are you using which allows the extinction of the human race to fall under it?

If I don't know that you're going to like a certain suit, I won't buy it for you with your money. Because if I turn out to be wrong, I will have caused harm. — khaled

You will have caused harm if it turns out you're right too. I'll have no suit. I don't see how the consequences of being wrong have any bearing here.

I cannot think of many cases where we take risks with others' wellbeing without permission. — khaled

Every time you drive anywhere, for example.

No. It's not that there's no way of knowing. It's not a data point which exists but is not 'knowable'. The data point doesn't even exist. — Isaac

Enough with the semantic games. We are talking about the same thing. You have acknowledged that birthing a child is taking a risk in regards to its future, implying we do not have all the information. Whether that information is unknown or unknowable is irrelevant, because the basis (or lack thereof) for our decision remains the same.

The benefit. Same as the justification for any risk. Why would you think this one any different? — Isaac

Because one is taking a risk on someone else's behalf, obviously. What necessity is there to make such a decision?

What on earth kind of heterodox definition of 'conservative' are you using which allows the extinction of the human race to fall under it? — Isaac

"Does no harm". Last I checked "the human race" was not a person. On the other hand, a generation of resentful malcontents comprises of many people.

You will have caused harm if it turns out you're right too. I'll have no suit. — Isaac

If I was right, and I didn't buy a suit, you would just be where you started. I wouldn't have worsened the situation. So unless by "caused harm" you mean "Did not bring about the absolute best outcome" then I did not cause harm.

The question is what happens if I do buy the suit. I could be wrong: In which case I make the situation worse (you have a useless suit and less money) or I could be right and make it better: In whichcase you got a brand new suit you like. Given these chances, I think we can both agree that buying the suit is wrong, without asking first.

Maybe a suit is too small, what about a house?

Every time you drive anywhere, for example. — Isaac

If I cannot reasonably expect not to hurt others while driving, I shouldn't be driving, you're right. But since I can, I can drive. Because not driving harms me, since I won't be able to go to work, and harm done to me is part of this calculation.

Disclaimer: I don't actually drive, I am speaking hypothetically.

If your moral framework includes a feature which you cannot even predict changes in, it would seem little better than just throwing your hands up and saying "I'll just do whatever everyone else is doing". If the law said you must murder Jews would you do so? — Isaac

I don't use law and responsibility interchangeably. It is just often the case that if the law think I have a responsibility to do something, I do. So if I am a doctor, I can be sued for refusing to treat a patient. This does not logically lead to the conclusion that I had a responsibility to help said patient, but oftentimes the two coincide. In the case of killing jews, even if the law thinks I have that responsibility, I do not.

1) The essential nonsense that we cannot consider the future person being born because there is no person currently existing. I've seen uses of "potential parent" in the mix. Yet, "potential child" is also a consideration of course. Someone will exist, and it is that person who will exist that we are preventing either the suffering or non-consent, or the "not being used for means to an end" result.

Essentially what this comes down to is the themes I have seen here regarding community vs. the individual. The community may be ordinarily needed for the individual to survive, but it is not the community that lives out life.

2) Rather "community" is an abstract concept of interactions between individuals composed of institutions, historical knowledge, location, etc. However, it would be using an individual for an abstract cause that isn't any actual person to then determine that people need to be born to feed the community's needs.

3) The locus of ethics is the individual, not the community. The community is not bearing the brunt of what it means to live out a life. It is simply a notion in the head of the actual people living out life. It is the individuals which are what are being prevented from suffering.

4) There seems to be an underlying Paternalism in the natalist's thought. Other people must be affected greatly because I deem it good. This is the height of hubris to think other people should affected greatly in a negative way by what you deem is good for them. In doing so of course, many other negative things have been imposed/violated. Suffering, consent, using people as a means for your/community's ends. There are a number of reasons this paternalism argument is simply license to use do these negative things on behalf of other people.

I still like khaled's analogy of being kidnapped for a game regarding this paternalism. If I was to kidnap you into a game where this structurally meant to be many challenges to overcome, and there is also sufficient room for contingent harms to also affect the player, and the only way to escape is death, so you are de facto forced into playing the game or commit suicide, being harmed along the way, is the a good thing to do?

The only defense people are going to give for this is going back to the nonsensical argument that in the birth scenario there is no "one" to be kidnapped. Yet antinatalist arguments keep repeating that there will be someone born, and this "kidnapped" in the future. By being born this becomes the case, even if at the moment one decides, there is no actual person yet. — schopenhauer1

Denying that future person would exist when the decision to procreate is made and that this future person, is what is being prevented, and denying that we can generalize instances of suffering seem to be going on here. However, at the same time, it is recognized as something to keep in mind when discussing the outcomes of poverty and disability.

Also, Benkei I know you have a preference for semantic preciseness here. I can respect that, but I also think this actually gets in the way as to obfuscate the argument at hand. For example, it really doesn't matter if I say: "There will be a state of affairs where a person will be born in the future and by not procreating this state of affairs will not occur", or if you say "preventing a potential child" because those two things are pragmatically the same thing. — schopenhauer1

As far as I'm concerned the failings of natalist arguments were encapsulated in this post. I haven't seen much progress from them since either.
Addressing the conversations I am seeing now:

@Tzeentch @Albero@Andrew4HandelYou are getting a complete runaround. The interlocutors are trying to say that they can make decisions based on how it will affect the child in the future and then keep contradicting themselves by saying that you cannot make decisions based on how it will affect the child. All instances of suffering that the future child might experience are being prevented by not bringing about a state of affairs where said child will be born. Don't fall for the very obvious contradiction they are claiming they are not making. Your case is good. You see it too, as I can see from your posts, I just wanted to mention I see it too.

Also, as stated above, they are trying to find a loophole in the consent thing, but it's not working. One cannot get consent from something that does not exist and therefore the consent thing cannot matter because there is no referent that it is talking about. That's their claim. However, they fail to recognize the decision that they are making at time X affects someone who will exist. So there is a displacement of time. Just because there is a displacement of time between the decision and the person it affects, does not make it invalid that a decision is being made on someone else's behalf. If there is a state of affairs that a person is born, there is a person affected by someone else's decision. However, if there is a state of affairs with no person born, then there is a state of affairs where no person was affected by the decision, thus no violation, and no new individual who suffers will take place. All of this is encompassed with colloquial terms like "potential child" etc.

@khaled The interlocutors are going to claim that we make risky decisions all the time when we do X, what makes procreation different? But procreation is an example of a decision where one can indeed prevent all suffering from incurring if one simply does not procreate. This is why I make a distinction between inter-wordly and intra-wordly affairs. It's not special pleading when the circumstances are actually different by de facto circumstances. Once born, indeed almost any action that one needs to take to live (presumably the normal course of a society for humans), would incur risk. Not so in inter-wordly affairs where one is deciding on new life. One can prevent all risk for a future person, period.

You know a discussion is in a good place when the factions that have emerged stop engaging with the critical comments and instead reaffirm to each other how right they are in a big, happy circlejerk.

One can prevent all risk for a future person, period. — schopenhauer1

No, one cannot, period.

You know a discussion is in a good place when the factions that have emerged stop engaging with the critical comments and instead reaffirm to each other how right they are in a big, happy circlejerk. — Echarmion

There's too many similar conversations. Best to summarize at this point if I don't have time to hit each and every point, and again, they are similar in nature. Best in one bigger post. And it's addressed to them because I see what you and others are doing in your arguments that's flawed and just wanted them to know that they are not crazy, I see it too. Didn't want them to be gasllighted :D.

One can prevent all risk for a future person, period.
— schopenhauer1

No, one cannot, period. — Echarmion

And you keep doing it.

You have acknowledged that birthing a child is taking a risk in regards to its future, implying we do not have all the information. Whether that information is unknown or unknowable is irrelevant, because the basis (or lack thereof) for our decision remains the same. — Tzeentch

That is not the information I'm referring to. I really don't want to have to walk you through what has already been written. Just read it again more carefully. The data point in question is not about the rusk of harm in general (which is the only rusk I've spoken about considering). It about the rusk of consent violation or displeasure over the matter of existence.

Because one is taking a risk on someone else's behalf, obviously. What necessity is there to make such a decision? — Tzeentch

The benefit. Same as any other risk. I've just answered that question, why are you asking it again?

And you keep doing it. — schopenhauer1

I keep reaffirming logic, yes. It's gaslighting only if your view is so muddled that it feels the need to undercut the principles of logic, like the principle of non-contradiction. Future persons cannot both exist and not exist at the same time, and yet you claim they do again and again.

I keep reaffirming logic, yes. It's gaslighting only if your view is so muddled that it feels the need to undercut the principles of logic, like the principle of non-contradiction. Future persons cannot both exist and not exist at the same time, and yet you claim they do again and again. — Echarmion

Displacement of when decision is made to when person is affected doesn't negate that a decision was made that affects a person.

"Does no harm". Last I checked "the human race" was not a person. On the other hand, a generation of resentful malcontents comprises of many people. — khaled

Conservatism does not restrict itself to individual harms. As I said, if you want to use a term in a particularly unusual manner you'll need to explain it first, or preferably pick a term that more commonly covers you use.

If I was right, and I didn't buy a suit, you would just be where you started. — khaled

Right. Which is a harm if what I wanted was a suit.

The question is what happens if I do buy the suit. I could be wrong: In which case I make the situation worse (you have a useless suit and less money) or I could be right and make it better: In whichcase you got a brand new suit you like. Given these chances, I think we can both agree that buying the suit is wrong, without asking first. — khaled

No. We don't both agree at all. You've still not given anything close to an explanation of why you think non-action has some moral strength over action when faced with uncertainty about outcomes and the impossibility of consent. Either could equally bring about a negative consequence, or lack virtue, or defy a duty... whichever moral framework you subscribe to, inaction does not just magically trump action.

If I cannot reasonably expect not to hurt others while driving, I shouldn't be driving, you're right. But since I can, I can drive. — khaled

How can you reasonably expect not to hurt others while driving? Are you a uniquely brilliant driver. Since road deaths are one of the highest causes of death who's causing all these accidents if everyone can reasonably expect not to hurt others while driving?

I don't use law and responsibility interchangeably. It is just often the case that if the law think I have a responsibility to do something, I do. — khaled

So how do you work out when it does and when it does not?