Aye I get that. I was driving at the same thing you've been talking about with my question. Removing the aspects of the theory which look like they should be taken literally makes it just "one interpretive device among others", rather than a structure you'll be compelled to believe by its power to facilitate description of stuff that happens.

Gesturing towards "a decent analogy is how ideological production produces subjectivities", kinda names the space the phenomenon occurs in, but doesn't pin down an account. And if you want an account that's tied to an event, hollowing out the literal aspects of the theory won't do - at one point you care that it's really happening, at one point it's devolved to a metaphor that plays a role in describing an interpretive device. — fdrake

Yeah, & I feel like a sufficient account is something as simple as: sometimes people get hurt so bad that its too painful to focus on how hurt they are, and they have to focus on something outside themselves. This has happened throughout all of history, big time. This also happens in capitalism, for many reasons, just as it happened for many reasons throughout the rest of history. People selling things make use of whatever helps them sell things, so they make use of this too.

The mistake, to my mind, is focusing on that (not-focusing-on being very different from ignoring) There is a way in which focusing on it becomes itself a way of doing: 'someone hurt, focusing on something else' and so just perpetuates the whole thing.

I will try to explain myself. Of course, I like this kind of philosophical stuff. Yet, there are a few more things. Pleasure, all types of enjoyment and self-enjoyment are everywhere. People aspire to achieve happiness through the possession of material goods and ordinary self-affirmation. Many of them experience joy, maybe at least for some while. Unfortunately, for some reason, I am different. Therefore, I try to apply my reading to reconstruct various behavioral models connected to desire theories and then experiment with my situation. For me, there are two significant philosophies of desire: Lacanian and Deleuzian. My self-observation and experience incline me towards Lacan's model. Yet, it does not give any way out since it prioritizes an ultimate traumatic character of desire. Differently, Deleuze asserts the existence of lines of flight towards the unknown and creative connections with the forces from outside. Honestly, sometimes I doubt that either Deleuze or Lacan and Zizek are still relevant to explain what is going on right now. As you said:" There's no need for us, in 2020, to approach these matters as though we're living in Paris between 1940-1980." 'The matters' are dizzily super-fascinating!

I've found that, for me, reading Zizek (and many other writers of theory) only led to meta-fascination: fascination with becoming-fascinated — csalisbury

People seem to get addicted to the 'discourse', reading about the same cluster of ideas from different angles, never actually changing anything, but going back to the bookshelf again and again and again. — csalisbury

Zizek is right about the link between fascinating objet a and the void. The addictive meta-fascination, going back to the same self-experiencing again, and again, and again indicates the hyper-accelerating motion around the void. But what is this void? It is a mode of death; it is an experience of death or absolute loneliness. Likely, since one cannot find ways out, and since one’s social self-affirmation could fail, one’s self starts to vibrate at the same location forcefully. It could be possible to find here the Lacanian split and doubling of ego, expressed by an intensive inner monologue between the interiorized Other and the imaginary self
of the mirror stage or a similar structure ( Althusser’s interpellation). One becomes governed by some model of death or fear of death. So, it could be about fear and the actualization of the transcendent subjectivation scheme.

I will try to explain myself. Of course, I like this kind of philosophical stuff. Yet, there are a few more things. Pleasure, all types of enjoyment and self-enjoyment are everywhere. People aspire to achieve happiness through the possession of material goods and ordinary self-affirmation. Many of them experience joy, maybe at least for some while. Unfortunately, for some reason, I am different. Therefore, I try to apply my reading to reconstruct various behavioral models connected to desire theories and then experiment with my situation. For me, there are two significant philosophies of desire: Lacanian and Deleuzian. My self-observation and experience incline me towards Lacan's model. Yet, it does not give any way out since it prioritizes an ultimate traumatic character of desire. Differently, Deleuze asserts the existence of lines of flight towards the unknown and creative connections with the forces from outside. Honestly, sometimes I doubt that either Deleuze or Lacan and Zizek are still relevant to explain what is going on right now. As you said:" There's no need for us, in 2020, to approach these matters as though we're living in Paris between 1940-1980." 'The matters' are dizzily super-fascinating! — Number2018

I sympathize with that. My base-state since ~13 years old has been anhedonia, punctuated by periods of emotional volatility. For me, also, that was the primary draw to Zizek and Deleuze (plus the romance and challenge of reading them.) I mean, I'm glad I'm read them, I think, or at least I wouldn't change anything if I had to go back and do that period of my life again.

But, in my case, the zizekian/lacanian focus on the tragic aspect of desire justified a kind of defeatism (there's nothing more than to accept the bleakness) while the Deleuzian stuff justified the emotional volatility (wild lines of flight, rhizomatic growth, mad-becomings, etc). And interwoven through all of it was some felt urgency, like, for some reason, I had to understand these guys, or be left out in some sort of metaphysical cold. Now, I'm thinking differently, and I guess part of any change is a period where you hit back at the last stage, and this thread is the tail-end of that transition period. It feels more and more like a fading turbulent relationship.

Zizek is right about the link between fascinating objet a and the void. The addictive meta-fascination, going back to the same self-experiencing again, and again, and again indicates the hyper-accelerating motion around the void. But what is this void? It is a mode of death; it is an experience of death or absolute loneliness. Likely, since one cannot find ways out, and since one’s social self-affirmation could fail, one’s self starts to vibrate at the same location forcefully. It could be possible to find here the Lacanian split and doubling of ego, expressed by an intensive inner monologue between the interiorized Other and the imaginary self
of the mirror stage or a similar structure ( Althusser’s interpellation). One becomes governed by some model of death or fear of death. So, it could be about fear and the actualization of the transcendent subjectivation scheme. — Number2018

My feeling is that, of the two things you mention, this 'void' is closer to absolute loneliness than death. But I think, at its essence, its an instinctive fear of re-encountering forgotten emotions and memories which are very painful (or a means of delaying encounter with 'pending' emotions built up from things you've lived without fully digesting) . The results of my own self-experimentation lead me to think that the idea of a 'void' is a sort of veil over very complex, differentiated fullnesses. Many of those are complex, differentiated fullnesses of (quite serious) pain. But there are also little pockets of something you might call happiness, or peace, within that pain, and you have to withstand the pain to expand those pockets. Which is often too much, and can lead you to retreat to the same hyper-accelerating around the void stuff. But as it goes on, and you realize you have the capacity to endure the pain (plus the faith that enduring it is meaningfully leading somewhere), it gets a little easer, and you begin to slip up less.

And interwoven through all of it was some felt urgency, like, for some reason, I had to understand these guys, or be left out in some sort of metaphysical cold. — csalisbury

I can relate to this chase. The thing is always around the corner or hidden in the thicket. The nymph is most alluring when not quite nude. There's no joy in the tavern as on the road thereto. Or occasionally there really is an ecstasy there, for awhile. But the ecstasy is in the transition, in the overcoming of resistance, in the unfastening of the garment.

I think of cats chasing the red dots of laser pointers. Do they know that it's really nothing on some level? But they let themselves believe ?

People aspire to achieve happiness through the possession of material goods and ordinary self-affirmation. Many of them experience joy, maybe at least for some while. Unfortunately, for some reason, I am different. — Number2018

I don't assume that we are different in the same ways, but I think that critical writers (Lacan, Freud, whoever) appeal to creeps and weirdos. I use those term playfully. A small subset of the population maybe just can't embrace various ordinary pleasures without some kind of self-consciousness that gets in the way. Like Zizek can't dance, because it's 'obscene.'

I could use the example of holidays for myself. Excepting early childhood, they are just meaningless to me. It's all the same one day. Birthday, deathday, whatever. It's zero o' clock in World City, and it's just more ripples in the nothingness. And yet sex and philosophy and music punch through. A few strong-enough signals dominate.

You mention 'ordinary self-affirmation.' For me the critical writers are some kind of violent alternative self-affirmation that also involves continual self-negation. It's like a drug addiction. And part of that self-negation gets around finally to mocking the master of various useless lingos, useless unless and until one is famous or paid, etc. But this self-critique is still part of the game of the playing with more fire than others. Lacan is to me just one of these drug addicts who caught on to become a supplier. Outsiders yawn or feel just enough attraction/envy to complain and attack. (Rival suppliers attack for their own reasons.)

I don't assume that we are different in the same ways, but I think that critical writers (Lacan, Freud, whoever) appeal to creeps and weirdos. I use those term playfully. A small subset of the population maybe just can't embrace various ordinary pleasures without some kind of self-consciousness that gets in the way. Like Zizek can't dance, because it's 'obscene.' — f64

For me the critical writers are some kind of violent alternative self-affirmation that also involves continual self-negation. It's like a drug addiction. And part of that self-negation gets around finally to mocking the master of various useless lingos, useless unless and until one is famous or paid, etc. — f64

You represent a relatively common point of view: all these thinkers are freaks and nuts, having enormous and baseless ambitions. It is understandable and widespread. Yet, this opinion is as old as philosophy itself: Plato has perfectly narrated the story of Socrates.

My feeling is that, of the two things you mention, this 'void' is closer to absolute loneliness than death. But I think, at its essence, its an instinctive fear of re-encountering forgotten emotions and memories which are very painful (or a means of delaying encounter with 'pending' emotions built up from things you've lived without fully digesting) — csalisbury

Likely, we do have different personal experiences of the void. Nevertheless, to find common ground, our task could be to conceptualize it. For Zizek, it is a crucial part of his project: "in order to enact the shift from capitalist to analyst's discourse, one has merely to break the spell of objet a, to recognize beneath the fascinating agalma, the Grail of desire, the void that it covers" ((Zizek, 'Incontinence of the void'). The first hypothesis is that the void could be a break, a dysfunction, or social bond destruction. It is how Lacanian classical psychoanalysis proceeds: any treatment procedure to the disruption of some refers to socialization's setting (for example, the mirror stage). Accordingly, the hyper-fascinating retaining of self could be understood as a perversive compensatory reaction, expressing the hyper joy of retaining the lost identity.

The results of my own self-experimentation lead me to think that the idea of a 'void' is a sort of veil over very complex, differentiated fullnesses. — csalisbury

Zizek proposes a more elaborated model. His void is now the current libido economy, directly incorporated into economic, social, and political systems. In fact, Zizek implicitly accepts and further develops Deleuze and Guattari's position that desire is an integral part of economic and political infrastructure. In this case, the void is the newest 'capitalistic' way of organization of the social.
When Zizek states: “: objet a as the void around which desires and/or drives circulate, and objet a as the fascinating element that fills in this void (since, as Lacan repeatedly emphasizes, objet a has no substantial consistency, it is just the positivization of a void)”, he proposes that the fascinating structure of desire is in mutual presupposition with the whole field of desire, the ‘capitalistic’ organization of libido.

The results of my own self-experimentation lead me to think that the idea of a 'void' is a sort of veil over very complex, differentiated fullnesses. Many of those are complex, differentiated fullnesses of (quite serious) pain. But there are also little pockets of something you might call happiness, or peace, within that pain, and you have to withstand the pain to expand those pockets. — csalisbury

I understand what you say, but however painful and traumatic our experiences could be, they tend to acquire inertia and become masochistic:
“one should assert its underlying principle: jouissance is suffering, a painful excess of pleasure (pleasure in pain),
and, in this sense, jouissance is in effect masochistic… We thus
have two extremes: on the one hand the enlightened hedonist who
carefully calculates his pleasures to prolong his fun and avoid getting
hurt; on the other hand, the jouisseur proper, ready to consume his very
existence in the deadly excess of enjoyment—or, in terms of our society,
on the one hand the consumerist calculating his pleasures, well protected
from all kinds of harassments and other health threats; on the other hand
the drug addict (or smoker, or …) bent on self-destruction”. (Zizek,Incontinence of the void")
Both extremes, poles of the spectrum of desire are the necessary products of our society.
We should be able to relate our experiences to our social reality. Likely, it is easier to say than to perform.That is what Guattari tried to accomplish in his therapeutics.

You represent a relatively common point of view: all these thinkers are freaks and nuts, having enormous and baseless ambitions. It is understandable and widespread. Yet, this opinion is as old as philosophy itself: Plato has perfectly narrated the story of Socrates. — Number2018

What you are missing (I think?) is that I count myself among them. Socrates is an excellent mention. Lately I'm fascinated with radicalizing his image.

While maybe it's a widespread view that philosophers are wackos, folks like Plato are used symbolically to help hallow institutions like universities. 'Critical thinking' is supposed to be a good thing, but institutions as such have to police their boundaries. These same hallowed institutions are largely gateways to $ in our society. Pay lipservice to some worn-out notion of critical thinking (or head-in-the-clouds transcendence) but really it's about hustling and conforming.

I do wonder how perfectly Plato narrated the story of Socrates. It seems likely enough that he swallowed up a more radical figure in order to cough up yet another story of this-is-how-it-is. We might call it a false assimilation of the negative.

What I most like about Lacan is that he is only interested in people who are interested in their condition. Like it was something that paying attention to could change.
Otherwise, why bother?

What I most like about Lacan is that he is only interested in people who are interested in their condition. Like it was something that paying attention to could change.
Otherwise, why bother? — Valentinus

True, but any therapist worth their salt is going to be interested in helping their patient to pay attention to their condition. I think the particular aspect of Lacan that makes him appealing to people into philosophy (like us) is his interest in people who are interested in paying attention to their condition as a way of moving toward intellectually modelling it (what number is saying when he talks about moving to 'the analyst's discourse'.) The end result of Lacanian therapy seems to be very close to 'knowing Lacanian psychoanalysis' (of course you have to keep going to the seminars to download the most recent OS update) And this is interesting, granted, but I don't think it's necessarily therapeutically helpful - at best relating your experience to a model is an auxillary step that helps you avoid psychological traps, at worst its entrenching a particularly recalcitrant defense mechanism (namely, intellectualization.)

I very much agree that paying attention is the crux, but there are different ways of paying attention.

I hear you man. Again, I am familiar with Zizek and Deleuze, and I follow what you're saying. But all those thoughts swarming around a central goal feel to me like expressions of the thing they're describing. They will keep swarming around, tentatively descend, and then rise to swarm around again.

What you are missing (I think?) is that I count myself among them. — f64

Sorry, I did not understand.

I do wonder how perfectly Plato narrated the story of Socrates. It seems likely enough that he swallowed up a more radical figure in order to cough up yet another story of this-is-how-it-is. We might call it a false assimilation of the negative. — f64

Maybe you are right about Plato vs. Socrates relations. Even if
Plato’s representation of Socrates’s story was polished and censored, it contained scandalous and shocking elements. Differently, nowadays, we see an enormous augmentation of suppressing mechanisms that are ultimately pushing away any expressions of dissent and disturbance. Many of them are deployed at an undetectable, unconscious level of ordinary social interactions. Others are incorporated within the structures of public institutions and social networks. Likely, the individual unconscious self-censorship and self-control function as the most crucial factor in maintaining our social order.

Yes, what "paying attention" actually amounts to is the interesting thing.

The modelling element either reveals something kept from view or it does not. I don't know how to approach that side of things. It is easy to become what one opposes.

The modelling element either reveals something kept from view or it does not. I don't know how to approach that side of things. It is easy to become what one opposes. — Valentinus

Very much so. My go-to is if someone tells you they have the answer, they don't. & If you think you have the answer, then you no longer do (if you ever did)