I can't say I don't appreciate a little armchair psychology, but this makes little sense.

The anti-natalist viewpoint as I have seen it expressed in this thread is based on A: the idea that voluntariness and consensuality form the basis for moral conduct in regards to others, and B: that childbirth does not fit these criteria.

It has nothing to do with distrust of others, a desire to be left alone, the assertion of ego or self-destruction.

Nothing comes out of psychonalayzing the guy giving arguments. Respond to the arguments or please don't respond at all.

They seem like the same kind of comparison to me. In the first case, you look into the future and predict that the child will likely suffer too much (be more unhappy than happy), and based on that conclude that you shouldn't have a child in poverty. In the latter, you look into the future and predict that the child could suffer too much (be more unhappy than happy) and based on that conclude that you shouldn't have a child, period. The only difference is the probability. — khaled

No, the difference is that I can pretend "as if" a child would exist and attribute qualities and states to it and compare that what I know about lives lived by those around me.

I can't pretend "as if" a non-existent child (eg. nothing) is better off because I don't know how nothing feels because it can't have feelings. They're not the same comparison. This point seems rather obvious.

I can't pretend "as if" a non-existent child (eg. nothing) is better off because I don't know how nothing feels because it can't have feelings. They're not the same comparison. This point seems rather obvious. — Benkei

No one is doing this. Antinatalists are not trying to improve life for anyone. There is no one to be better off. It's a very common misconception.

No, the difference is that I can pretend "as if" a child would exist and attribute qualities and states to it and compare that what I know about lives lived by those around me. — Benkei

Agreed. So for the next child to be born in this world let's do this. Let's call him Billy. Billy will NOT be born in poverty or have severe disabilities. However despite this, after countless calculations we find that there is a 6% chance Billy becomes more unhappy than happy. Should Billy be born?

You already gave an example of a situation where you shouldn't have a child (poverty and disability). But the only difference between that pretend person (Let's call her Sarah) and Billy is that Sarah has a higher chance of becoming more unhappy than happy due to the circumstances she would be born under. Let's say 60%.

On what basis do you say Sarah should not be born but Billy should be born?

No one is doing this. Antinatalists are not trying to improve life for anyone. There is no one to be better off. It's a very common misconception. — khaled

Yes exactly. I am not sure if this is a rhetorical move that @Benkei is making. Antinatalists are using the same "as if the child existed" model as well. As I stated over and over, it all about someone who could exist in the future. That person X (you called him Billy or Sarah as a placeholder), would prevented from suffering.

Denying that future person would exist when the decision to procreate is made and that this future person, is what is being prevented, and denying that we can generalize instances of suffering seem to be going on here. However, at the same time, it is recognized as something to keep in mind when discussing the outcomes of poverty and disability.

Also, Benkei I know you have a preference for semantic preciseness here. I can respect that, but I also think this actually gets in the way as to obfuscate the argument at hand. For example, it really doesn't matter if I say: "There will be a state of affairs where a person will be born in the future and by not procreating this state of affairs will not occur", or if you say "preventing a potential child" because those two things are pragmatically the same thing.

What do you mean “will it be universalized”? I can conceive of a world where personal pleasure is a worthy moral goal and people go around doing whatever they want. — khaled

But would you will such a world into existence? Rawls' veil of ignorance provides a good analogy here: Imagine you're going to end up in this society as an inhabitant, but your socio-economic position is chosen at random. Would you want to live in a world where people go around doing whatever they want?

I know. But you didn’t present any reasoning behind your premise that having the next generation is a worthy goal. So until then it’s an unreasoned premise. — khaled

So far, I only wanted to point out that such an argument might exist, given a moral framework different from the one you seem to be applying.

Making the argument properly would require really fleshing out the basics of the moral system first, which would take a lot of text. I am going to try to do a rough sketch.

I have already stated that what morality is ultimately based on recognizing yourself as a subject interacting with other subjects. From this stems the realisation that free will is at the core of morality - it's what turns one into a subject. So moral rules must be that which are conductive of free will.

One obvious conclusion of that is that it's immoral to destroy freedom of will. The direct way to do this is to destroy subjects - kill them. But in a less absolute way, there are lots of other ways the will can turn out unfree. Such as if you only act according to your desires (the extreme case here is addiction) or if you act in a way that subjects other to your desires, since this impinges on their subjectivity.

If this sounds very similar to the arguments you and other have made consent, it's because it's ultimately the reason why consent is important.

Now if we think about having children, what do we have to consider? Should you just have children because you feel a biological urge to procreate? No, because that isn't a free will, it's an urge. The same would be true if you feel lonely, or feel like you need a child to fix your relationship, or help on the family farm. All of these are clearly just you reacting your circumstance. But, having children in order to continue a society of free subjects is different. There is no outside reason for this to exist - the universe doesn't care. The subjects are an end in an of itself, and having a further presence of subjects furthers free will by creating it's necessary preconditions. It does not necessarily follow from this that not having children is immoral - freedom isn't quantified, so there being more subjects doesn't equal more freedom.

But would you will such a world into existence? Rawls' veil of ignorance provides a good analogy here: Imagine you're going to end up in this society as an inhabitant, but your socio-economic position is chosen at random. Would you want to live in a world where people go around doing whatever they want? — Echarmion

Oh. I thought you meant "will" as in actually bring it about.

But, having children in order to continue a society of free subjects is different. — Echarmion

Really? Well:

There is no outside reason for this to exist - the universe doesn't care. — Echarmion

The universe doesn't care about your relationship or your farm either.

The subjects are an end in an of itself, and having a further presence of subjects furthers free will by creating it's necessary preconditions. — Echarmion

This has not been shown to be good in what you have highlighted. You have shown that maximizing PEOPLE'S ability to choose is good (or rather, that limiting it is bad, same thing). You have not shown that producing more people so that those people can go around making choices is good. Those are 2 different things.

It does not necessarily follow from this that not having children is immoral - freedom isn't quantified, so there being more subjects doesn't equal more freedom. — Echarmion

But whenever having more children would equal more freedom, then not having children does in fact become immoral. Are you comitted to that view? Because it follows if we are to accept that you must work to maximize freedom.

This is why I have categories of "moral" and "good" be different. I think what you mean is closer to "reduce freedom is immoral", "maximize freedom is good". As in you must not do the former but you don't have to do the latter.

Or else everyone who can support kids who doesn't have kids is being immoral, a position I find very few people commit to outside of hardcore christians.

Antinatalists are using the same "as if the child existed" model as well. As I stated over and over, it all about someone who could exist in the future. That person X (you called him Billy or Sarah as a placeholder), would prevented from suffering. — schopenhauer1

I think he goes on to generalize form this that we mean to HELP Billy or Sarah. We don't. That makes no sense. We are using the same model, we just set the "Acceptable chance of bad outcome" to 0%.

He has given 2 cases where it is above 0% and procreation is acceptable in one and not the other. Yet there is no indicator as to why one is fine and the other not.

@khaled@Benkei

I think he goes on to generalize form this that we mean to HELP Billy or Sarah. We don't. That makes no sense. We are using the same model, we just set the "Acceptable chance of bad outcome" to 0%. — khaled

Yes, I also think he might be thinking that there is an airtight case around consent. He thinks that because at the time the decision was made, there was no child that could be denied consent, that this is an airtight case against the consent argument. However, at the time the child is born, that is when the violation occurred. Just because there is a displacement from the decision that affects the child (procreation decision) and the actual consequence of the decision (birth) doesn't mean that at the time of birth consent was had (or not needed). I just don't see it as a big deal as he does and find it to be semantic nonsense really.

So I think on both the negative outcomes and consent case he is wrong.

I can't say I don't appreciate a little armchair psychology, but this makes little sense. — Tzeentch

Well, is it accurate in your case? Do you place a strong emphasis on the individual, as per e.g. classical liberalism?

The anti-natalist viewpoint as I have seen it expressed in this thread is based on A: the idea that voluntariness and consensuality form the basis for moral conduct in regards to others, and B: that childbirth does not fit these criteria.

It has nothing to do with distrust of others, a desire to be left alone, the assertion of ego or self-destruction. — Tzeentch

Wouldn't you say that a view that ultimately seeks to create a universe devoid of subjects that can experience it is self-destructive? It seems hard to ignore this ultimate conclusion of the anti-natalist argument.

But you don't necessarily seem to disagree with me here. Anti-natalists place a strong emphasis on voluntariness and conensuality. That is in line with what I said. I merely placed the spotlight on the more negative aspects of this emphasis. All relationships with others have an element of involuntariness, which is inherent with sharing a universe which is causally connected. You cannot ever be truely an island in this cosmos, and this inability is forced on everyone who lives here. And maybe that's ultimately what the anti-natalist view takes issue with - that once we enter the world, we cannot escape the laws that bind us all together in it.

Nothing comes out of psychonalayzing the guy giving arguments. Respond to the arguments or please don't respond at all. — khaled

There isn't much point in responding to the same thing over and over again.

This has not been shown to be good in what you have highlighted. You have shown that maximizing PEOPLE'S ability to choose is good (or rather, that limiting it is bad, same thing). You have not shown that producing more people so that those people can go around making choices is good. Those are 2 different things. — khaled

I don't claim that there is a moral duty to produce more people, as I already wrote. Just that there is a motivation for having children which is in accordance with free will, and as such moral.

There isn't much point in responding to the same thing over and over again. — Echarmion

Neither is there much point in psychoanalyzing.

I don't claim that there is a moral duty to produce more people, as I already wrote. Just that there is a motivation for having children which is in accordance with free will, and as such moral. — Echarmion

Sounds to me like: "It is good to have children, but you don't have to". Even though you kept asking me why I distinguish between things that are good to do and things that you must do, you seem to be doing it.

The subjects are an end in an of itself, and having a further presence of subjects furthers free will by creating it's necessary preconditions. It does not necessarily follow from this that not having children is immoral - freedom isn't quantified, so there being more subjects doesn't equal more freedom. — Echarmion

This seems like a contradiction to me. One sentence you're saying "furthers free will" and the next you're saying "free will is not quantified". Wtf does "furthers free will" mean?

The odd thing though is that literally everyone is in the building, and noone can be outside of it. So one wonders who the anti-natalist are advocating for. — Echarmion

I was referring to the nature of the empirical evidence used in Antinatalism which distinguishes it from a purely theoretical or logical argument.

If you want to dissuade someone from entering a burning building it is usually sufficient to point out that there is a fire going on.

But you are right we are all in the building, which is what puzzles antinatalists. We point out past present and future suffering like the holocaust , world wars, slavery, cancer, depression and nuclear proliferation and damage to the environment, none of which is apparently enough to dissuade people from having children.

No one is doing this. Antinatalists are not trying to improve life for anyone. There is no one to be better off. It's a very common misconception. — khaled

And yet it continually happens in this thread and I've already pointed it out several times. The last time was here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/480046

So no, @schopenhauer1 it's not a rhetorical move it's an actual philosophical point. For example, you agree here with Tzeentch:

Let's say I had the power to make you experience something that you may or may not enjoy. Why should or shouldn't I use that power without your consent? — Tzeentch

Exactly. Well-stated and concise. It isn't that hard. I called it the Argument Against Paternalism. At base, the answers here is that the parent thinks that it is best for the child, even if it is causing suffering, which is why I say, it is still wrong to cause unnecessary suffering unto another even if one has good intentions to do so. — Schopenhauer1

It's not well-stated at all because consent cannot play a role here because this is once again personifying non-existence as if it has thought processes and a will. And consent isn't even necessarily important for moral questions. Actions can be moral or immoral without another person being involved. Unnecessarily cutting down trees because I like destroying stuff isn't right either. Gluttony isn't right either. Lusting after your girlfriend even when nobody in the world is aware of it, isn't right either.

So for the next child to be born in this world let's do this. Let's call him Billy. Billy will NOT be born in poverty or have severe disabilities. However despite this, after countless calculations we find that there is a 6% chance Billy becomes more unhappy than happy. Should Billy be born?

You already gave an example of a situation where you shouldn't have a child (poverty and disability). But the only difference between that pretend person (Let's call her Sarah) and Billy is that Sarah has a higher chance of becoming more unhappy than happy due to the circumstances she would be born under. Let's say 60%.

On what basis do you say Sarah should not be born but Billy should be born? — khaled

Small quibble: I gave "abject poverty" as a reason, which is something different than just poverty. People can be poor and happy, abject poverty and happiness usually don't go together.

For the rest, I'm hesistant to answer this question because it doesn't pertain to reality which as a moral question makes it useless. We can't calculate if someone is going to be happy or not so the question to me is for all intents and purposes moot and so would be my answer. Even so, I'll answer to give you insight about how I think about these issues.

For me, the first thing is that intrinsic suffering, like the capacity to feel pain and therefore the certainty you will feel pain at some point, are not caused by life the same way that water doesn't cause itself to be wet. So there's no moral question there.

That leaves contingent suffering. Here the likelihood isn't important. What's important is whether we can intervene in the circumstances leading to suffering. If I can intervene in the causal chain because there's a proximate cause that I can affect, then there's a moral duty on me to do so and avoid another person's suffering. If the proximate cause is certain but unavoidable, only then would I consider intervening earlier in the causal chain as a moral obligation.

Which reminds me, I might have missed it but if you don't recognise moral obligations to save drowning people why a moral obligation not to have kids?

This is a post that I made on another forum which I think highlights how I think parents don't consider the suffering they are causing or their link to the suffering going on around us.

Someone asked me that on another forum. "Why do you say every child is harmed by being born" I responded..

"How is a child not harmed?

The most prominent thing is that we have to face our own mortality and die.

The next and biggest category is an array of illnesses from the common cold to migraines and including nausea, an array of cancers, arthritis, dementia, depression and anxiety, schizophrenia and so on.

Then there is work which a lot of people do not enjoy.

Unemployment is also unpleasant linked to things like poverty increased risk of physical and mental illnesses. Poverty is also a hazard for those in work.

Next we have loss and bereavement, relationship breakdowns, bullying and social problems.

Then there is the unpleasant sides of embodiment like feeling too hot or too cold, sweating, itching, general aches and pains, blisters and other irritants.

Then there is existential worry, including fear of death, meaninglessness, and other cognitive sources of anxiety.

There are lots more examples if you need them."

And yet it continually happens in this thread and I've already pointed it out several times. The last time was here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/480046 — Benkei

Ok maybe. But I'm not doing this.

Small quibble: I gave "abject poverty" as a reason, which is something different than just poverty. People can be poor and happy, abject poverty and happiness usually don't go together. — Benkei

"Abject" means extreme. People can be extremely poor and happy.

We can't calculate if someone is going to be happy or not so the question to me is for all intents and purposes moot and so would be my answer. — Benkei

And yet you did exactly such a calculation to conclude that people in abject poverty will in all likelyhood suffer and so one shouldn't have kids in abject poverty.

What's important is whether we can intervene in the circumstances leading to suffering. If I can intervene in the causal chain because there's a proximate cause that I can affect, then there's a moral duty on me to do so and avoid another person's suffering. If the proximate cause is certain but unavoidable, only then would I consider intervening earlier in the causal chain as a moral obligation. — Benkei

So here you are making a calculation about how likely it is that all your child's suffering will be such that you can intervene and stop it. And yet you have a problem with making calculations about whether or not someone is more likely to be happy than not happy? If anything the former is way harder to calculate.

Point is: You cannot know whether or not you will be able to intervene in the circumstances leading up to the suffering, and there is a very real chance you won't be able to. In fact, I'm willing to say it is almost impossible that there will no occasion where your child suffers due to circumstances you couldn't have stopped. So shouldn't intervening earlier be a moral obligation?

Which reminds me, I might have missed it but if you don't recognise moral obligations to save drowning people why a moral obligation not to have kids? — Benkei

You are not obligated to help, you are only obligated not to harm in my view. Helping is good though again, not obligatory.

I was referring to the nature of the empirical evidence used in Antinatalism which distinguishes it from a purely theoretical or logical argument. — Andrew4Handel

I don't know, so far everyone has shied away from basing suffering on any empirical basis. The consensus of the antinatalists in this thread, so far, seems to be that suffering results from an imposition without consent, and that it is not necessary to list individual instances of suffering or quantify some overall value of suffering for a given life.

But you are right we are all in the building, which is what puzzles antinatalists. We point out past present and future suffering like the holocaust , world wars, slavery, cancer, depression and nuclear proliferation and damage to the environment, none of which is apparently enough to dissuade people from having children. — Andrew4Handel

To me, this is merely evidence (insofar as one can apply the principle to philosophy) that suffering is an insufficient basis for a moral philosophy. Despite assertions to the contrary, people don't seem to act as if avoiding suffering was actually their overriding concern.

And since, as you pointed out, suffering is can hardly be avoided, perhaps that is an entirely rational thing to do.

So, regarding this:

There are lots more examples if you need them." — Andrew4Handel

What's the point of listing all the negative aspects of life, apart from trying to eliminate or ameliorate them? It's not as if we have an option to not be born. That choice is entirely imaginary. It's almost like imagining that one might not have been born is an escapist fantasy.

What's the point of listing all the negative aspects of life, apart from trying to eliminate or ameliorate them? It's not as if we have an option to not be born. That choice is entirely imaginary. It's almost like imagining that one might not have been born is an escapist fantasy. — Echarmion

What puzzled me is the person I was responding to did not seem to think a parent could cause a child any suffering simply by creating them. If you were going to create a child why not consider the suffering that already exists. Like I said in my initial posts we do this predicting the future all the time.

For example if you were going to a shop and someone said that there was an active shooter on the loose would you want to know this before you started out on your journey?

I am concerned that most people do not seem to make the link between creating a child and the reason there is suffering and inequality etc. The first post I made on the Old Philosophy forums was about this. The only reason we do philosophy is because our parents created us and that is the reason we exist and why we asks all the questions we do and few people question why we were made to exist on the first place.

Creating a new sentience (deliberately) is profound and has profound implications. (Compare this to being the first person to create a sentient robot) If you create the first sentient robot it would make international headlines and you would be considered a genius yet people are creating sentient beings everyday as if it was the product of a fast food chain.

Point is: You cannot know whether or not you will be able to intervene in the circumstances leading up to the suffering, and there is a very real chance you won't be able to. In fact, I'm willing to say it is almost impossible that there will no occasion where your child suffers due to circumstances you couldn't have stopped. So shouldn't intervening earlier be a moral obligation? — khaled

Nope. As you indicate yourself this is all surrounded by unknowns. All I do know is that these types of suffering aren't caused by living because being alive is not a sufficient condition for suffering, only a necessary condition. This is why when I "calculate" this borders on certainty. I'm not concerned with heartbreak of my daughter because I don't cause it.

You are not obligated to help, you are only obligated not to harm in my view. Helping is good though again, not obligatory. — khaled

This is rather perplexing to me. Your choice not to intervene causes the person to drown and die because if it hadn't been for your choice the person would still be alive. So your choice is a conditio sine que non for the drowning. If you aren't supposed to cause harm, you have to intervene.

My take on this: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/479032

This is rather perplexing to me. Your choice not to intervene causes the person to drown and die because if it hadn't been for your choice the person would still be alive. So your choice is a conditio sine que non for the drowning. If you aren't supposed to cause harm, you have to intervene. — Benkei

What you cause and what you are responsible for are different. If the bad outcome would have happened without you being there you are not responsible for fixing it. You are only responsible for not causing bad outcomes by being there. So don't drown people.

Nope. As you indicate yourself this is all surrounded by unknowns. All I do know is that these types of suffering aren't caused by living because being alive is not a sufficient condition for suffering, only a necessary condition. This is why when I "calculate" this borders on certainty. I'm not concerned with heartbreak of my daughter because I don't cause it. — Benkei

I have no clue how this relates to what I said. No one brought up sufficient and necessary conditions. I'm just looking at the conditions under which having children would be unethical rn. You made the claim that if you can reasonably expect your child to suffer too much, it would be unethical to have them. Yet you do not specify what "too much" means.

And yet you did exactly such a calculation to conclude that people in abject poverty will in all likelyhood suffer and so one shouldn't have kids in abject poverty. — khaled

Also, another point, I wouldn't have kids under these circumstances, it's not a universal rule. Maybe someone with a different outlook on life, different skillset etc. would.

What you cause and what you are responsible for are different. If the bad outcome would have happened without you being there you are not responsible for fixing it. You are only responsible for not causing bad outcomes by being there. So had I can't go around drowning people (If I hadn't been there they would not have drowned). — khaled

Yeah, we're lightyears apart on our ethical frameworks. I get where you're coming from though. I'm not trying to convince you but for you to understand where I'm coming from: to me the outcome comes about precisely because you are there and don't do anything. The world where you wouldn't be there doesn't exist so pretending it does exist, doesn't have any relevance to this world, where this happened.

How about a doctor, who can treat a life-threatening condition, and he just decides not to treat a patient? That would be a serious breach of his duties and promises but since the patient would die any way, no responsibility based on the above.

I have no clue how this relates to what I said. No one brought up sufficient and necessary conditions. I'm just looking at the conditions under which having children would be unethical rn. You made the claim that if you can reasonably expect your child to suffer too much, it would be unethical to have them. Yet you do not specify what "too much" means. — khaled

What thread have you been reading? it's in the OP and has been discussed several times in these pages. And, no I don't specify what "too much" is, because it depends on the circumstances, so I can't.

What puzzled me is the person I was responding to did not seem to think a parent could cause a child any suffering simply by creating them. If you were going to create a child why not consider the suffering that already exists. Like I said in my initial posts we do this predicting the future all the time.

For example if you were going to a shop and someone said that there was an active shooter on the loose would you want to know this before you started out on your journey? — Andrew4Handel

Well, what puzzles me is why we're treating existence as a choice, which we might able to weigh according to the risks and benefits. It's not a choice. Treating it as one is, at best, wishful thinking and at worst evidence of some serious confusion.

I am concerned that most people do not seem to make the link between creating a child and the reason there is suffering and inequality etc. The first post I made on the Old Philosophy forums was about this. The only reason we do philosophy is because our parents created us and that is the reason we exist and why we asks all the questions we do and few people question why we were made to exist on the first place. — Andrew4Handel

But we weren't "made to exist". We're made to do a lot of things, but existing isn't one of them. In a sense, even parenty don't "create" new humans because however it is that we end up as conscious subjects, our parents certainly didn't control that process. They merely initiated it and perhaos gave their input.

Creating a new sentience (deliberately) is profound and has profound implications. (Compare this to being the first person to create a sentient robot) If you create the first sentient robot it would make international headlines and you would be considered a genius yet people are creating sentient beings everyday as if it was the product of a fast food chain. — Andrew4Handel

It would certainly be better if people considered whether they actually should have children more thoroughly in general, but it is also the case that no-one really knows beforehand whether the resulting life will be particularly happy or sad.

I'm coming from: to me the outcome comes about precisely because you are there and don't do anything — Benkei

Oh I agree. If you let a man drown you caused his death. But that is not immoral. That's my view.

How about a doctor, who can treat a life-threatening condition, and he just decides not to treat a patient? That would be a serious breach of his duties and promises but since the patient would die any way, no responsibility based on the above. — Benkei

You said it yourself.

That would be a serious breach of his duties and promises — Benkei

So in that case he does actually have to treat them, because that's his responsibility.

What thread have you been reading? it's in the OP and has been discussed several times in these pages. And, no I don't specify what "too much" is, because it depends on the circumstances, so I can't. — Benkei

No one brought it up in our conversation so far. I have read the OP, and still wonder why Billy should be born but Sarah shouldn't. And what do you mean "depends on the circumstances"? It is these circumstances that I'm asking about. What makes procreation ethical in one (billy) and not the other (sarah)

So in that case he does actually have to treat them, because that's his responsibility. — khaled

But you just said you're not responsible if a thing would happen if you weren't there. Why is the doctor responsible for something that would occur even if he wasn't there and yet you're not when someone is drowning?

No one brought it up in our conversation so far. I have read the OP, and still wonder why Billy should be born but Sarah shouldn't. And what do you mean "depends on the circumstances"? It is these circumstances that I'm asking about. What makes procreation ethical in one (billy) and not the other (sarah) — khaled

But giving random percentages isn't "circumstances".

But you just said you're not responsible if a thing would happen if you weren't there. Why is the doctor responsible for something that would occur even if he wasn't there and yet you're not when someone is drowning? — Benkei

When I said that I assumed it is not your job to save the drowning person, aka it is not your responsibility. A doctor already has a responsibility to save patients. Or else he wouldn't be a doctor.

You are responsible for what happens if you not being there would have resulted in the better outcome. But you can also be responsible in other ways, like jobs or parenthood, to prevent suffering that would have occured even if you weren't there.

But giving random percentages isn't "circumstances". — Benkei

I was just using it as an example. You refuse to give any indication of what the circumstances would be in order for procreation to be become unethical. You gave a single example (Sarah) where it would be unethical but did not make any effort to generalize from that what makes it ethical or unethical. That's what I'm asking for.

And you're not going to get it because I don't believe in general rules derived from circumstantial decisions. It's why different murderers get different sentences and why murder is sometimes excused due to circumstances. There is no general rule. There never is in ethics.

When I said that I assumed it is not your job to save the drowning person, aka it is not your responsibility. A doctor already has a responsibility to save patients. Or else he wouldn't be a doctor.

You are responsible for what happens if you not being there would have resulted in the better outcome. But you can also be responsible in other ways, like jobs or parenthood, to prevent suffering that would have occured even if you weren't there. — khaled

What if society agrees it's everybody's responsibility to intervene, so it's everybody's "job" to save drowning people?

To expound a bit, generally it's a good rule of thumb not to kill people but sometimes it is. Generally, it's a good rule to be nice to people but sometimes it isn't. When it isn't has such a wide variety of reasons that it's no use to try to catch that in a general rule. It's enough to realise that almost every moral rule we can think of, can be provided with circumstances where the opposite is better.

So generally it's perfectly fine to have babies but sometimes it isn't.

It's why different murderers get different sentences and why murder is sometimes excused due to circumstances. — Benkei

But we can still generalize there. I'm not asking for hard rules, just any indication at all. Murderers get different sentences or are sometimes excused due to the murderer's mental state, history with the victim, among other factors. You've given an example where the "risk of bad outcome" is high and one where it is lower and said that in one procreation is ethical and in the other unethical. You have given 0 factors or explanation. That wouldn't be a problem if you weren't at the same time claiming that setting the "acceptable risk of bad outcome" to 0% (Antinatalism) is wrong. You can only say it is wrong according to this or that factor, but you've provided none.

What if society agrees it's everybody's responsibility to intervene, so it's everybody's "job" to save drowning people? — Benkei

What a great society that would be! It's not the one we live in though. If society agrees about something there is generally a law to enforce it. This isn't a hard rule, but it is generally applicable. For example: When doctors refuse to treat they get charged with misconduct and their licence gets revoked. We don't punish bystandars. Because we don't all agree they should be punished.

To expound a bit, generally it's a good rule of thumb not to kill people but sometimes it is. Generally, it's a good rule to be nice to people but sometimes it isn't. When it isn't has such a wide variety of reasons that it's no use to try to catch that in a general rule. It's enough to realise that almost every moral rule we can think of, can be provided with circumstances where the opposite is better.

So generally it's perfectly fine to have babies but sometimes it isn't. — Benkei

But if asked to come up with reasons why killing in self defence is okay but killing for pleasure is not, I would provide a reason. You refuse to, or cannot, do that for your claims. Which again, wouldn't be a problem if you weren't at the same time claiming that a certain way of defining "acceptale circumstances" is wrong.

I'm going to sleep now, have a think on it, or don't. Good night.

You have given 0 factors or explanation. — khaled

But I have. I don't account for intrinsic suffering because those aren't caused by living. For proximate causes, if it's a near certainty the proximate cause will exist and cannot be avoided or alleviated then it makes sense to move up the causal chain.

Wouldn't you say that a view that ultimately seeks to create a universe devoid of subjects that can experience it is self-destructive? It seems hard to ignore this ultimate conclusion of the anti-natalist argument. — Echarmion

Views are not actors, but to follow the spirit of your comment I would say no.

I don't seek to create such a universe. I haven't seen anyone here expressing that they do.

As far as I have seen, the anti-natalist argument as shared in this thread consists of observations and questions to which there do not seem to be any good answers. Every individual can draw their own conclusions and make their own choices based on that.

But yes, if every person on earth were to conclude at once that the questions and observations of the anti-natalist argument are sufficient reason not to have children, humanity would eventually cease to exist. If that is a result of people's voluntary choice not to have children, then what business is that of mine?