But I still like my armchair. — Banno

Yes, well... I don't really do any fMRI interpretation, questionnaire asking or behaviour reporting any more either, but rather spend a considerable amount of time in my armchair reading the results of other people's efforts and writing the occasional report on such. Armchairs are good.

Since it's predicated of those concrete things, it is abstract, not concrete. — Andrew M

That seems weird to me. Physical contact consists in concrete actions and responses. It seems very wrongheaded to me to be saying that there are these concrete objects, but that none of their actions are concrete. Sounds like a Parmenidean world in which change and movement is illusory.

@Banno

Parmenides? We might just fit the whole of philosophy in this thread!

So I agree it would be lunacy to give primacy to what's between our ears when we have no clue what that is other than by treating it as an object 'out there'. — Isaac

You will probably agree that if you had nothing between the ears, you wouldn’t look at fMRI scans, ask people for phenomenological reports, and record behaviour. In that sense, what we have between the ears IS indeed primary, as a matter of fact, because it is necessary for any knowledge to accrue. That’s the purely logical aspect of the problem, the easiest aspect to fathom. The really tricky part is to realize what we do when we try to think of consciousness — or of phenomena as they ‘appear’ to our consciousness, i.e. the whole qualia discussion — as an object of knowledge, when we study it as another phenomenon, as another object ‘out there’ as you put it. What happens in our mind when we try to objectify minds; what is the phenomenology of consciousness looking at itself in this objectifying manner? That’s where Michel Bitbol is going in his paper It is never known but it is the knower (thanks Wayfarer), following an intuition by Kitaro Nishida that our effort toward objective knowledge comes from consciousness and subjectivity but turns its back to it, while looking at its objects.

what we have between the ears IS indeed primary, as a matter of fact, because it is necessary for any knowledge to accrue. — Olivier5

Is it? Not what's in your guts, or your heart. Both of which were once thought to be the seat of various conscious phenomenal experience?

To even say it's 'between your ears' is already to treat it as an object of study. To even say "this is what I thought" is to go back through your memories as one would a library of source material.

You can do nothing to escape from the fact that you have no more privileged access to your original thought processes than a suitability dedicated third-party has. All you have is your memories of those processes, which can be put into words and transferred to a third party with no less fidelity than that with which they were stored (which is, not a lot).

Next goal: Brexit thread.

You can do nothing to escape from the fact that you have no more privileged access to your original thought processes than a suitability dedicated third-party has. All you have is your memories of those processes, which can be put into words and transferred to a third party with no less fidelity than that with which they were stored (which is, not a lot). — Isaac

Well, I can hide my thoughts if I want to, and I can share them if I want to. So my thoughts are initially private, but I can decide to share some part of them. Even if I decide to share transparently my experience (as I surmise it by memory), I must always chose what to share, because I could never share the whole of an experience in words. 1, There are things I do not feel like sharing even if I answer your questions faithfully otherwise, e.g. shameful things like ‘I wanted to scratch my balls at some point in that fMRI’... 2, it would last forever while I rack my brain for details that in fact my ‘system’ opted to forget progressively because they were deemed forgettable, and why would I do that?

None of that has anything to do with what has primacy in a philosophical investigation of mind. All of those factors apply equally to a purely phenomenological discussion.

In fact, they apply more because it only takes a few honest people to admit to certain thoughts during fMRI and then I'd have a pretty good idea from your scan that something was going on, regardless of your willingness to admit it. An advantage that pure philosophical discussion cannot claim.

an intuition by Kitaro Nishida that our effort toward objective knowledge comes from consciousness and subjectivity but turns its back to it, while looking at its objects. — Olivier5

I think this is quite perceptive. It introduces a seeming contradiction: to understand itself from the outside, as an object, consciousness must turn its back on itself. So for consciousness to try and apprehend itself as an object is alienating. One looses touch with oneself, by putting oneself in a catch 22. As Bateson argued, catch 22’s tend to generate schizophrenia.

Another way ro say this is that looking at consciousness as an object necessarily introduces in consciousness a distance with itself.

I think the point that my experience and thoughts are initially private, and that I may decide to share them, and always can share a part and not the totality of my experience, is an important point, which establishes that experience is by default private, until made otherwise, and far exceeds ‘reports’. I also explained above how knowledge always stems from subjective experience, and therefore experience is primary to knowledge, in time and causality: existence precedes essence.

The latter.

Another way ro say this is that looking at consciousness as an object necessarily introduces in consciousness a distance with itself. — Olivier5

According to Bitbol, this effect is used in Dennett’s Quining Qualia to introduce confusion in his reader’s mind. Dennett does so by asking his reader to intuit or imagine herself away from her own experience, to take a distance with one’s phenomenological world: imagine your tastes were changed, the colors you see were changed, etc. By going along with the text, the reader walks away from her own intuitions and starts to consider alien ones until she gets confused about herself and her own perceptions, until like Bano, the reader concludes ‘there’s nothing useful to be said about experience, it’s all very confusing...’

And when one does not follow the alienating flute player, when one derives other conclusions from his intuition pumps, when a reader sticks to her own intuitions rather than fabricated, artificial ones, that reader is said to have « the wrong intuitions », or to just go on and on saying « but it’s obvious »...

But what we (Wayfarer, frank, marchesk et al.) are saying is obviously far from obvious, because many of you don’t even start to get it. It goes beyond pointing at logical contradictions in naive materialism. It extends to the need for the subject trying to understand himself to remain connected with his own subjectivity, to include himself as part of his description of any experience, including in scientific experiments and reasoning. According to Bitbol, it’s no coincidence that both the Copernician revolution and the Quantic one repositioned the observer as central to understanding the observed phenomenon. Trying to forget about the place that we occupy and how it shapes our observations is always a mistake. All observation is subjective, and science does recognise this by calling for metadata: data about the observers, their analytic framework and their methodology. This is normal and philosophically sound. Man (in his subjectivity) is the measure of all things.

I also explained above how knowledge always stems from subjective experience, and therefore experience is primary to knowledge — Olivier5

Yep. But what we're talking about here is your memories of the experiences which preceded knowledge, not the actual experiences themselves. You no longer have direct access to those seconds after you've had them, so their causal primacy is irrelevant.

Just want a point out that our ancestors evolved the ability to see color prior to language and public models. You can't quine color away without consulting evolution first. — Marchesk

No, our ancestors evolved to respond to wavelengths of light, prior to language. Had they not then they would not all have picked the ripe berries (which are united in the wavelength the reflect, not the experience they produce). If you want to have wavelengths of light as 'colours' I'm happy with that, but qualia aren't required here either. — Isaac

Hmm. It seems like wavelengths of light aren't necessarily required either. Maybe we should consider the implications of what Sara Walker was saying in Marchesks other thread in that biology is ontological and physics is epistemological. Colors would be ontological and wavelengths epistemological. After all, wavelengths of light is an explanation for the experience of colors, mirages, bent straws in water, etc.

For you, the grocer is an object and his subjectivity is irrelevant to you. For the grocer, you are the object and your subjectivity is irrelevant to him.
— Mww

I realize this remark is partly in jest, and in response to a mind denier. I don’t think people treat other people as pure objects, without ever thinking of other people’s opinions — Olivier5

True enough, but in context, the discussion concerns not people in general but a person in particular, in relation to another person in particular, with respect to a certain activity. I have no consideration of opinion, when I require certain things from the only person in the position of grant the requirement. Opinion would count if I asked the grocer which apples would be better for me to want. But when I tell him to give me two apples, his opinion is completely irrelevant to me. Just as my opinion as to why I want apples and not bananas is irrelevant to him. He doesn’t give a damn why I want apples.
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what we have between the ears IS indeed primary, as a matter of fact, because it is necessary for any knowledge to accrue. That’s the purely logical aspect of the problem, the easiest aspect to fathom.......

Agreed.

.......The really tricky part is to realize what we do when we try to think of consciousness — or of phenomena as they ‘appear’ to our consciousness, (...) as an object of knowledge, when we study it as another phenomenon, as another object ‘out there’ as you put it. — Olivier5

Tricky indeed. To think of consciousness, and to think of phenomena as they appear to consciousness as objects of knowledge, are two completely difference domains within a system common to both. Consciousness cannot be a phenomenon, hence cannot be an object of knowledge. We don’t know consciousness in the same way we know skyscrapers, but we can think consciousness, that is, represent consciousness to ourselves, just as well as we can think skyscrapers without any contradiction, hence.....the primacy of subjectivity. Which is, at bottom, nothing but the activity of pure thought, or, reason itself.
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It extends to the need for the subject trying to understand himself to remain connected with his own subjectivity, to include himself as part of his description of any experience. — Olivier5

Extends to the need? If the subject is absolutely indissoluble from himself, how could he NOT include himself? Ever notice the absence of the first person personal pronoun “I” when you think to yourself? You never think “I think.....”, “I am....”, I want.....”, “I feel....”. If that first person personal pronoun is a representation, and in some cases there is no use of the representation, then all thinking IS the subject itself that thinks. Then it becomes the case that subjects don’t include themselves at all, but are that which includes.

To include himself as part of a description of any experience, on the other hand, because all descriptions carry objective implications, requires a representation of the subject that is describing experience as an object, and here the “I” stands as that representation. The description of the going, re: “The other day, I went to the grocery store to get two apples”, is very far removed from the going.
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don’t even start to get it. — Olivier5

Boy howdy. Metaphysical reductionism is your very best friend.

If it is the case that we are both objects in the world and subjects taking account of it and/or ourselves, then the dichotomy cannot be used as a means to draw a distinction between us and our accounts... — creativesoul

Us and our accounts are not the dichotomy, they are the same thing, in that the account is contained in us. An account is, after all, merely a judgement, thus the account belongs to that which judges.

The dichotomy is between the constituency of the account, and that which judges of what the constituency entails. My body (in the world of things) has arms and legs (objects included in the world of things) is an account I make as a judge of things in the world belonging to my body. My account is not in the world, it is in me as the judge of the relatedness of things.

The only way to reject the counter-argument favoring the necessary subject/object dualism, is to deny the human cognitive system is inherently a logical system. We don’t know with apodeitic certainty that the human system is in fact predicated on natural logic, but we certainly know we can’t talk about it unless it is. Besides, it is absurd to suppose Nature allows us to examine ourselves, and then not give us the means to do it with some measurable degree of rational assurance.

Yep. But what we're talking about here is your memories of the experiences which preceded knowledge, not the actual experiences themselves. You no longer have direct access to those seconds after you've had them, so their causal primacy is irrelevant. — Isaac

No, because what you remember of an experience is yet another form of experience. Therefore experience still precedes any report, and can never be fully described by reporting.

While there are all sorts of language less creatures incapable of drawing correlations between different things, those aren't of interest here, for such creatures aren't capable of attributing meaning, and consciousness is the ability to attribute meaning. — creativesoul

Good. Now we can remove the ghost of anthropomorphism from the dialectic. I just needed assurance, if not actual verification, so....thanks for that.

I’m not onboard with your rendering of consciousness, but that’s ok.We may return to that after I’ve a better understanding of the intricacies of your account.

But when I tell him to give me two apples, his opinion is completely irrelevant to me. — Mww

Unless he’s got no apple, or several different types of apples, in which case he will tell you and I trust you may listen to his opinion and his to yours. He will also ask for a certain price for his apples, and you may have to agree with him on that as well. So even in this simple example there will be some normal, human interaction between the two of you, where he cares a bit for what you want and vice versa.

If the subject is absolutely indissoluble from himself, how could he NOT include himself? Ever notice the absence of the first person personal pronoun “I” when you think to yourself? You never think “I think.....”, “I am....”, I want.....”, “I feel....”. If that first person personal pronoun is a representation, and in some cases there is no use of the representation, then all thinking IS the subject itself that thinks. Then it becomes the case that subjects don’t include themselves at all, but are that which includes. — Mww

Interesting. See how you fall on both sides of the paradox here? You start by assuming that ‘the subject is absolutely indissoluble from himself’, and end with the idea that ‘subjects don’t include themselves at all, but are that which includes’. Hence when subjects try to understand subjectivity as an object, they must try to take a distance with their own subjectivity, which tends to lead to logical paradoxes.

To include himself as part of a description of any experience, on the other hand, because all descriptions carry objective implications, requires a representation of the subject that is describing experience as an object, and here the “I” stands as that representation. The description of the going, re: “The other day, I went to the grocery store to get two apples”, is very far removed from the going. — Mww

Indeed, a description, a report, is always ‘removed’ from what is reported. The map is not the territory. The word ‘apple’ is quite removed from real apples. Ceci n’est pas une pipe.

The poverty of Kant is the supposition that there is stuff we have to have before we can do the things......

Yes, the stuff we have to have is the categories.

.......We make the stuff by doing the things.......

No. Backwards. The stuff of categories make the doing of things possible.

.......Drop meaning, look to use. — Banno

Yes. Look to the use of the stuff of categories in order to do things.

In your view opposed to this, in what manner do you come up with numbers, without the stuff of “quantity” beforehand? How do you come up with cause and effect without the stuff of “relation” beforehand? How do you deny the supernatural domain without the stuff of “possibility” beforehand? How do you construct a triangle without the stuff of “necessity” beforehand.

Now, the standard rejoinder is, experience teaches all those things. True, but that presupposes experience and leaves unexplained what happens when there isn’t any.

The spin of an electron could never have been theorized, if it hadn’t first been thought possible that electrons could have what eventually became known as spin. By the same token, do you see that drawing three lines in a certain orientation does not give you the absolute necessity that the sum of the interior angles can only be one number?

It is not the poverty of Kant, but the genius. With some help, if not metaphysical robbery, from Aristotle, of course.

Witt and those guys did much for the human being, but there are others that did infinitely more towards being human.

Unless....... — Olivier5

Sure, but all those are amendments, qualifiers, if you will. Changing the conditions. You’re not wrong, just that such amendments are inadmissible with respect to the principle being discussed.

I’m unconvinced by:

For you, the grocer is an object and his subjectivity is irrelevant to you. For the grocer, you are the object and your subjectivity is irrelevant to him. You want two apples, the grocer must understand you want two apples, or he isn’t going to do anything, or he will do what doesn't conform to your ask. — Mww

Emphasis added. You also need to understand that he wants money in exchange of the apples. So you need to understand his (subjective) intentions and he needs to understand yours.

But looking at the broader argument I agree that it supports your side of it: the grocer’s subjectivity is important.

what you remember of an experience is yet another form of experience. — Olivier5

Correct, and its name is intuition.

experience still precedes any report, and can never be fully described by reporting. — Olivier5

Correct, there is no need to fully report on an experience, but only the need to report enough to demonstrate understanding of it, the rest being cognitively discarded.**

I understand some experience of fire without needing to report how hot the fire is, for if there is fire, hot is given necessarily, hence reporting hotness is superfluous.

** There is empirical evidence that enabled neural networks subsequently unused, become disentangled, in order to be re-used later. Forgetfulness explained.

@MwwEmphasis added. You also need to understand that he wants money in exchange of the apples. So you need to understand his (subjective) intentions and he needs to understand yours. — Olivier5

Right, consider going to a foreign market. It helps to keep in mind that the grocer may see you as a naive tourist, and jack the price of the apples up. Or as an angry ex, they might lace the apples with cyanide. Just saying.

You also need to understand that he wants money in exchange of the apples — Olivier5

No, I do not. There might be an apple give-away that day. He might wish to piss off his boss. While I may need to understand monetary exchange is the normal process, in that I should expect to pay for the apples, it is still not a necessary condition, such that if I don’t pay it becomes immediately impossible for me to get my apples.

Don’t mistake a need, for an interest. The difference becomes clear when some little old lady in abject poverty is selling apples on the streetcorner. Her need is something for me to consider, as opposed to a clerk who may very well be the owner of a multi-state chain of stores. I am much more disposed to understand a need as it relates to survival alleviated by paying for her apples, as opposed to an inclination to understand a mere want as it relates to just the grocer not getting yelled at for not collecting my money.

I'm attempting to provide an adequate evolutionarily amenable account of all conscious experience from non linguistic through metacognitive. — creativesoul

Interesting. What's your present view of the non-linguistic phase? Those of us inclined to agree with this,

consciousness is the ability to attribute meaning. — creativesoul

... might assume there wasn't one?

Romans see it as rude to conduct any commercial transaction without a little chatter, a little joke, a bit of push and shove. They see commerce as a normal social interaction. So if they like you or want you to like them, they will give you the extra apple free.

At some point my wife and I would go to this grocery store held by a young couple. He was handsome, she was a bomb. They would alternate at the shop. He was always passive-aggressive with me, while handing out my apples, but she was all smile and flirtatious. I thought she was nice and he was just an asshole.

Then one evening, it was my wife’s turn to do the groceries. Dropping the bags on the kitchen counter she unloaded on how much a bitch that girl fruit vendor was, and how much of a sweetheart her husband, who unlike his wife always smiles when handing out the apples...

While I may need to understand monetary exchange is the normal process, in that I should expect to pay for the apples, it is still not a necessary condition, such that if I don’t pay it becomes immediately impossible for me to get my apples. — Mww

If you can run very fast, yes.

If you can run very fast, yes. — Olivier5

What do you suppose would be between the ears of our dear apple seller in that case?

What do you suppose would be between the ears of our dear apple seller in that case? — Marchesk

He may feel like chasing after the indelicate customer.