There is a practical difference. I don't have to donate to charity if I don't want to for instance, whereas by your standards you have to. You would also have to volunteer, etc as long as you're capable. — khaled

What could 'have to' possibly mean here? I don't understand your use of the term when discussing 'practical differences'.

What could 'have to' possibly mean here? — Isaac

Just what it means anywhere else. Be obligated to.

No it wouldn't though. My personal assessment of whether life is worth living should be applied for myself, not for others. — khaled

Aren't you directly contradicting your earlier example about vaccinating children here? And apart from that, how are you going to assess whether there is "more harm then good" in general if you're not allowed to generalise your own judgement?

Just because I find life worth living doesn't mean my child will, and so my assessments are unimportant. — khaled

What other assessment could possibly apply?

Still wrong to force people to do it. Much less so than slave labor, but still bad. — khaled

Which once again brings us back to the issue that your standards could only possibly be upheld by living as a hermit somewhere.

There is a practical difference. I don't have to donate to charity if I don't want to for instance, whereas by your standards you have to. You would also have to volunteer, etc as long as you're capable. — khaled

I'll second @Isaac here. You don't somehow loose your ability to act differently if you recognise a moral obligation.

Aren't you directly contradicting your earlier example about vaccinating children here? — Echarmion

You know for a fact that a vaccine doesn't harm. That's non-negotiable. And children are a bit of a special case where doing harm now to alleviate harm later is required (since one of your duties as a parent is to make sure your kid doesn't suffer as much as possible)

And apart from that, how are you going to assess whether there is "more harm then good" in general if you're not allowed to generalise your own judgement? — Echarmion

You don't. Both are subjective. Some are having a blast with life, some hate it.

What other assessment could possibly apply? — Echarmion

The child's assessment which is obviously not available. That would require a time machine.

Which once again brings us back to the issue that your standards could only possibly be upheld by living as a hermit somewhere. — Echarmion

Not really. If I count myself as part of the calculation then I don't have to live as a hermit somewhere. Could you give an example as to why it would lead to me living as a hermit? What harm am I inflicting by being in society that is so bad I must instead suffer myself so as not to cause it?

You don't somehow loose your ability to act differently if you recognise a moral obligation. — Echarmion

Fair enough, but that doesn't mean that there are no practical differences. For instance, if donating to charity was a duty as it is seen in muslim communities for example (zakat), there would be far fewer homeless people. It is a fact of the matter that if you don't consider something a duty you will be less likely to do it (which is why I call doing it anyways virtue)

I think we might be getting bogged down by the word “obliged”. You may be regarding it being used in the same way as a “rule”. That it’s the rule in society that you must help the drowning man and that the only reason people help is because they are coerced by the rule. Hence the idea that there would be a law incarcerating people if they didn’t help.

You know for a fact that a vaccine doesn't harm. That's non-negotiable. — khaled

That's simply not true. Most vaccines can potentially cause serious side effects, and you always gamble the long term benefits outweigh the short-term risk and the pain. It may be a very one-sided assessment, but you're certainly putting your own assessment in place of the child's.

You don't. Both are subjective. Some are having a blast with life, some hate it. — khaled

So what you wrote earlier was just made up BS you don't actually apply in practice? I am confused as to what your actual position is.

The child's assessment which is obviously not available. That would require a time machine. — khaled

So, again, you realise your standards cannot possibly work but you still insist they're correct?

Not really. If I count myself as part of the calculation then I don't have to live as a hermit somewhere. Could you give an example as to why it would lead to me living as a hermit? What harm am I inflicting by being in society that is so bad I must instead suffer myself so as not to cause it? — khaled

For one, I don't see how you could possibly live together with anyone else if you find having to do additional chores as a result fundamentally immoral. That is unless you genuinely like menial work so much you actually want to do it for it's own sake.

To say nothing about things like taxes.

It is a fact of the matter that if you don't consider something a duty you will be less likely to do it (which is why I call doing it anyways virtue) — khaled

I can see how this works if we're looking at someone else's decision from the outside. If they do something I consider a moral duty, but they don't, I could say they're being virtuous.

I don't see the internal monologue if you're considering your own actions though. What would it mean to conclude that something is virtuous, but you "don't have to do it"? The entire point of figuring out what is and isn't right/virtuous/moral is to tell yourself what you have to do.

Just what it means anywhere else. Be obligated to. — khaled

But being obligated to has no practical consequences, and you said it was a 'practical difference'.

I think we might be getting bogged down by the word “obliged”. You may be regarding it being used in the same way as a “rule”. That it’s the rule in society that you must help the drowning man and that the only reason people help is because they are coerced by the rule. Hence the idea that there would be a law incarcerating people if they didn’t help. — Brett

Yea that’s how I use it. I don’t like there being a word “obligated” in the limbo between “not a rule” and “is a rule”.

But being obligated to has no practical consequences — Isaac

Sounds pretty ridiculous. It would be a different world if there was a law that incarcerated people who do not donate to the poor. Being obligated to do something significantly increases your chances of doing it. That is a practical consequence.

but you're certainly putting your own assessment in place of the child's. — Echarmion

As I said: Children are a special case because it’s your job as a parent to make sure they don’t do something stupid. You don’t do that for adults or strangers’ children do you?

So what you wrote earlier was just made up BS you don't actually apply in practice? I am confused as to what your actual position is. — Echarmion

Which part precisely? When did I ever say life had “more harm than good”? Please quote me this supposed BS.

So, again, you realise your standards cannot possibly work but you still insist they're correct? — Echarmion

First off, I don’t understand how they’re not working in this scenario. And secondly there was no previous occurrence of them not working.

For one, I don't see how you could possibly live together with anyone else if you find having to do additional chores as a result fundamentally immoral — Echarmion

Your mischaracterizations are getting tiring. My objection was clearly not against chores. My objection was against forcing people to do things. If I am choosing to live with someone else I’m not actually being forced to do anything am I? I am choosing to live there so naturally I take on part of the responsibility.

I can see how this works if we're looking at someone else's decision from the outside. If they do something I consider a moral duty, but they don't, I could say they're being virtuous. — Echarmion

Good

The entire point of figuring out what is and isn't right/virtuous/moral is to tell yourself what you have to do. — Echarmion

Why are you conflating the 3 terms. I define each of them differently.

No it wouldn't though. My personal assessment of whether life is worth living should be applied for myself, not for others. Just because I find life worth living doesn't mean my child will, and so my assessments are unimportant. — khaled

:100: :up:

Like which ones? — Echarmion

A state of E (existing itself) vs. N (not existing), rather than default already existing E (where x, y, z intra-worldly affairs happen within it). All other moral decisions are of the latter, only pertaining to what is within E where this one is about E vs. N. So, before you jump to the obvious move to then say why isn't death different? Look at what I said about unnecessary impositions on another person's behalf.

So, to leave the boundaries of accustomed debate a bit: Why does it matter whether it's self-imposed? If it's about avoiding suffering, it's not necessarily obvious why we care about concepts of choice or consent. Why aren't we paternalistic and just make sure no one suffers, regardless of choice? — Echarmion

Oh can we make no one suffer? Please tell me how? But since we obviously can't, simply not procreating is sufficient to prevent all harm to a future person, and it is sufficient to not impose unnecessarily challenges to be overcome on someone else's behalf.

So is having choices good or bad now? — Echarmion

No rather, the fact that the happy natalists/optimists cruel next move is to just say something like "Oh well you always have the choice to kill yourself or find a piece of wilderness to slowly die" or something like that. But what a shitty choice.. Either be imposed by the things that you need to live or kill yourself. But where did this choice come from? Being born in the first place.

@schopenhauer1 It doesn't change the assessment that living is not a sufficient condition for such suffering. But maybe your should get specific. Name a suffering.

Sounds pretty ridiculous. It would be a different world if there was a law that incarcerated people who do not donate to the poor. — khaled

There are not laws enforcing all moral duties. Notwithstanding which, the existence of a law does not make it that one 'has to' do something. One could try and get away with it.

What I'm getting at is that you're creating a hard line where there is none. That feeling you have 'obliges' you to certain kind acts. Even so much as an unimpressed sniff from a social group member creates a small incentive. And to suggest that the reason you'd do the kindnesses you do is not almost entirely a consequence of the influences of the community you grew up in would be naïve in the extreme.

So community censure and encouragement is what creates the fact that you would perform these acts of kindness. You may not be legally forced to, but that's not what we're talking about with morality anyway.

That something is a moral duty just means that your community will censure or ostracise you if you don't do it. It's exactly that environment during development which causes your (now independent) desire to do kind acts. That plus a hefty dose of biological priming.

So it's mistaken to assume that because you now would act kindly even without the censure of your community that you would have reached that point without it.

Why does it matter whether it's self-imposed? If it's about avoiding suffering, it's not necessarily obvious why we care about concepts of choice or consent. Why aren't we paternalistic and just make sure no one suffers, regardless of choice? — Echarmion


Oh can we make no one suffer? Please tell me how? But since we obviously can't, simply not procreating is sufficient to prevent all harm to a future person, and it is sufficient to not impose unnecessarily challenges to be overcome on someone else's behalf. — schopenhauer1

You've just dodged the question. The question was "why does it matter whether it's self-imposed?", which goes to the heart of the issue. Why is autonomy of choice so monumentally important that it trumps all other considerations? You keep coming back to the same trope that you shouldn't impose inconveniences on others without ever justifying why this is such an important (indeed singular)axiom for you.

It doesn't change the assessment that living is not a sufficient condition for such suffering. But maybe your should get specific. Name a suffering. — Benkei

Are we referring to inherent or contingent? If inherent then, being born is the direct reason why someone is alive which, if inherent suffering exists, is a directly entailed with being alive. What brought about this inherent suffering? Birth. I see inherit suffering as similar to the Eastern version I discussed several posts ago.

Contingent suffering is contextual. It technically is not entailed in being alive, but mine as well be based on the material circumstances. For example, almost everyone will get sick, and that's just a basic example. Then there are just daily challenges great or small to overcome. Somehow this is seen as "justified" by the paternalistic types that think people should be born, to overcome challenges so they can experience the higher "meaning" in overcoming them.

With either example, a future person can be prevented from going through this. Why, someone might ask, would we not just end humanity? And my response, for the thousandth time, is that consent is a huge factor. I give the example usually of veganism. Maybe veganism is correct. Maybe it is best not to eat or use animal products. However, to force this on people would violate that consent idea.

Much of these debates are around the sophistic move that we cannot sufficiently generalize all of life's sufferings and then make a judgement: For all sufferings, we would like them not to be imposed on another. For those who think that you can't generalize sufferings, why? That doesn't make any sense. That is something humans can do.. inferencing particulars to a general category.

Somehow this is seen as "justified" by the paternalistic types that think people should be born, to overcome challenges so they can experience the higher "meaning" in overcoming them. — schopenhauer1

We could say exactly the same about your obsessive liberalism...

Somehow this is seen as "justified" by the neo-liberal types that think people should be completely unimposed upon, to experience the higher "meaning" in being completely independent.

Just paraphrasing your opponent's position using emotive terminology doesn't constitute a counter-argument.

Why should 'paternalistic types' not think people should be born, to overcome challenges so they can experience the higher "meaning" in overcoming them? You've yet to provide anything more than your personal distaste for the idea.

Yes but this is not just a “consideration” it’s a logical argument. If you say that a person experiences X harm due to not having children then all having children does is pushes this X harm onto one or more people (depending on how many children they have) unless THEY (the children) also have children. — khaled

Not necessarily. It depends on if they actually want to have children. If I don’t want to have kids, I don’t suffer by not having any.

There is almost no case where procreation causes less harm than the harm due to not having children. — khaled

You might be right, but I’m not as sure as you seem to be. If you look at couples who have fertility issues you will find that the inability to have children can cause serious emotional/psychological harm, and that harm can be spread out to include the couple, their parents, siblings, etc.

This is why I was asking about how you determine which harm is worse. In some cases, by sparing one person from potentially significant harm, you actually cause some, possibly less significant, harm that is felt by maybe 5 or 6 individuals. Ultimately it is unknown how much a person being born will suffer, and it’s also unknown how much a family will suffer by not having children.

Not only this, but if the justification for not having children is that it causes harm, then it contradicts itself because not having children also causes harm.

As I said: Children are a special case because it’s your job as a parent to make sure they don’t do something stupid. You don’t do that for adults or strangers’ children do you? — khaled

You don't usually apply your own judgement in place of others, no. But the reasons why matter. Note that we got here from this:

If you're in an abusive relationship, surely you should cause heartbreak. It'd be just as easy to come up with situations where you should cause pain. — Echarmion

via this:

When I talk of “harm” I mean causing more than you alleviate. So vaccinating a child isn’t harm, even though it hurts and is against their wishes. — khaled

So is harm different for children and adults? Or is harm really only relevant when dealing with children or other dependents, and the general rule is actually about choice or consent or freedom?

Which part precisely? When did I ever say life had “more harm than good”? Please quote me this supposed BS. — khaled

As per above, does it matter whether life is, overall, harmful or not?

First off, I don’t understand how they’re not working in this scenario. — khaled

You're asking for something that's impossible ("you'd need a time machine"), but instead of concluding that, therefore, the standard cannot be applied, you apply it anyways and then claim it's actually violated.

My objection was against forcing people to do things. If I am choosing to live with someone else I’m not actually being forced to do anything am I? — khaled

It's theoretically possible that you literally choose all the consequences, but chances are you don't. There are probably going to be things you end up doing just because you don't want to damage the relationship (and I don't necessarily refer to a romantic relationship here). This gets more obvious the farther out from your inner circle you get. It's at least plausible you can hash things our precisely with your flatmate, your spouse or your nuclear family. It's essentially impossible to have this kind of control over a political entity of any size.

Now you could say you also choose those outcomes, either by virtue of the original decision or by some kind of democratic process. But how far does that justification hold? After all, even in extremely oppressive circumstances, there is usually some kind of choice you could make. It seems to me to avoid any of the extreme outcomes (immoral impositions are either everywhere or nowhere) we need a more nuanced standard for when an imposition is moral and when it is not.

Why are you conflating the 3 terms. I define each of them differently. — khaled

Well, perhaps it was just a misunderstanding then. What are virtuous or right actions?

A state of E (existing itself) vs. N (not existing), rather than default already existing E (where x, y, z intra-worldly affairs happen within it). — schopenhauer1

This implies something that doesn't exist can still have properties, which seems weird. Is everyone who doesn't exist nevertheless hanging around as some kind of disembodied soul?

Oh can we make no one suffer? Please tell me how? But since we obviously can't, simply not procreating is sufficient to prevent all harm to a future person, and it is sufficient to not impose unnecessarily challenges to be overcome on someone else's behalf. — schopenhauer1

This doesn't really relate to the question. I was wondering whether it's the suffering that matters or the lack of choice.

No rather, the fact that the happy natalists/optimists cruel next move is to just say something like "Oh well you always have the choice to kill yourself or find a piece of wilderness to slowly die" or something like that. But what a shitty choice.. Either be imposed by the things that you need to live or kill yourself. But where did this choice come from? Being born in the first place. — schopenhauer1

So can I take from this that bad choices are worse than not having a choice at all?

This doesn't really relate to the question. I was wondering whether it's the suffering that matters or the lack of choice. — Echarmion

So can I take from this that bad choices are worse than not having a choice at all? — Echarmion

It's both. If you want to self-impose your own suffering, go ahead. Once you impose it for someone else, it's not good. Please don't make the move comparing E v. N vs. E only scenarios as I addressed that. Otherwise, we will keep talking in circles.

It's both. If you want to self-impose your own suffering, go ahead. Once you impose it for someone else, it's not good. Please don't make the move comparing E v. N vs. E only scenarios as I addressed that. Otherwise, we will keep talking in circles. — schopenhauer1

So, can I impose things that aren't suffering on others?

Also your request to "not compare E v N vs. E scenarios" just seems impossible. Since there is only a single "E v N scenario" no comparisons are possible at all, and hence the entire argument begins and ends with a claim. You're not even following this request yourself, since "self-imposed suffering" clearly is only possible once you already exist, so it ought to be entirely irrelevant.

So, can I impose things that aren't suffering on others? — Echarmion

Let me clarify cause I am using impose in two ways that should be more clearly explained:

1) Imposing suffering.. used in conjunction
2) Imposition in general.. as in for example, if I said you have this game where you make many choices, but you cannot escape except through death. That can be an imposition. It is de facto imposition as there is no escape without death or making the choices the game's conditions imposes. These more generally, are the challenges of life.

Certainly one should not unnecessarily impose suffering on others no matter what. But it also stands to reason, which I will just call Argument Against Paternalism, is to try to benefit someone else by imposing on them challenges to overcome which they could not consent.

Since there is only a single "E v N scenario" no comparisons are possible at all, and hence the entire argument begins and ends with a claim. — Echarmion

Yeah, well it is a special scenario. What do you want me to say. That is the point. It is a special scenario that is hard to analogize without making a false analogy.

ou're not even following this request yourself, since "self-imposed suffering" clearly is only possible once you already exist, so it ought to be entirely irrelevant. — Echarmion

I'll answer in two ways:
1) Fine, ditch it. Self-imposed suffering is also not analogous. Doesn't hurt my argument, just shows how using analogies like these aren't great anyways in this very unique scenario, and hence my highlighting how unique it is.

2) It can be kept because, self-imposed suffering, or suffering on others who consent are examples of being able to consent. The only example where one would unnecessarily cause suffering (because it's not in order to prevent a greater harm as they don't exist obviously), and where there is no consent that can be obtained is the case of E v. N.

1) Imposing suffering.. used in conjunction
2) Imposition in general.. as in for example, if I said you have this game where you make many choices, but you cannot escape except through death. That can be an imposition. It is de facto imposition as there is no escape without death or making the choices the game's conditions imposes. These more generally, are the challenges of life.

Certainly one should not unnecessarily impose suffering on others no matter what. But it also stands to reason, which I will just call Argument Against Paternalism, is to try to benefit someone else by imposing on them challenges to overcome which they could not consent. — schopenhauer1

But this really just sounds like the suffering isn't actually what matters. The argument really only refers to suffering as something that exists. But what changes some behaviour from permissible to impermissible or vice versa isn't some quantification of suffering, but really only whether or not there is consent.

So, where does the consent get it's moral weight from? What is it that makes consent "good"?

Yeah, well it is a special scenario. What do you want me to say. That is the point. It is a special scenario that is hard to analogize without making a false analogy. — schopenhauer1

But you also realize the problem with that is that this almost legitimizes special pleading?

I'll answer in two ways:
1) Fine, ditch it. Self-imposed suffering is also not analogous. Doesn't hurt my argument, just shows how using analogies like these aren't great anyways in this very unique scenario, and hence my highlighting how unique it is.

2) It can be kept because, self-imposed suffering, or suffering on others who consent are examples of being able to consent. The only example where one would unnecessarily cause suffering (because it's not in order to prevent a greater harm as they don't exist obviously), and where there is no consent that can be obtained is the case of E v. N. — schopenhauer1

But to me, the logical thing to do in a situation where the very concept of consent is unintelligible (because whatever could it possiblý mean for a nothing to consent?), is to drop consent from my test or system. It seems a bit like asking whether green is heavier than red, or whether nights are colder than forests.

But this really just sounds like the suffering isn't actually what matters. The argument really only refers to suffering as something that exists. But what changes some behaviour from permissible to impermissible or vice versa isn't some quantification of suffering, but really only whether or not there is consent.

So, where does the consent get it's moral weight from? What is it that makes consent "good"? — Echarmion

Negative states/suffering/causing impositions on others to overcome.. these are things which deal with the dignity of the individual person. That is the locus of ethics because the individual is who bears the burdens of life. Not recognizing suffering in another is not recognizing them as moral agents. We can say it is we are discounting their dignity as people who will be the ones who will bear the brunt of these decisions made on their behalf.

The very fact that you think deliberating upon a moral framework right now, implies that people should be able to make decisions on what affects them. I'll answer your obvious next move which is to explain "affects" for non-existing person, yadayada.. See below where you ask about non-existing persons.

But you also realize the problem with that is that this almost legitimizes special pleading? — Echarmion

It's unique, but not special pleading. This is a unique situation and I explained the difference. I explained how the situation is sufficiently different and is not comparable other cases. Perhaps one of the interesting aspects of antinatalism in general vs. almost all other moral quandaries. It is at the core of existence itself. It is the start of it all and perhaps the most important moral question because it gets to the core of the existential "Why?". Other questions are almost pragmatics of living in an intra-worldly reality.

But to me, the logical thing to do in a situation where the very concept of consent is unintelligible (because whatever could it possiblý mean for a nothing to consent?), is to drop consent from my test or system. It seems a bit like asking whether green is heavier than red, or whether nights are colder than forests. — Echarmion

If you can't get consent for being imposed upon and harmed, are you saying it is okay to to do for someone else? That's what you are implying here. Someone doesn't exist NOW so it is okay to allow impositions for them in the future. Doesn't make sense and while you are trying to claim my claim is nonsensical, that definitely flies in the face of how most people view impositions.

An aside about meta-ethics.. At the end of the day neither you nor me can open up the universe and show an objective principle. At some point, it is about how the individual views the the principle. Is it emotionally or intuitively appealing? That's pretty much it at the end. But ironically, in a sort of Kantian way, the very fact that we are deliberating and trying to choose which system makes sense to us intuitively, emotionally, etc. means that we are using the very ability to deliberate which cannot be had by the person who will have suffering and impositions initiated for them. So there is a contradiction in the very act of deliberating here admitting that this is the very thing, not quite "denied" the person that will be affected, but simply incapable of even doing so from the very nature of the non-existence.

So there is a contradiction in the very act of deliberating here admitting that this is the very thing, not quite "denied" the person that will be affected, but simply incapable of even doing so from the very nature of the non-existence. — schopenhauer1

Yes, precisely. That is the contradiction. So what is your answer?

Because if this is so:

The very fact that you think deliberating upon a moral framework right now, implies that people should be able to make decisions on what affects them. — schopenhauer1

Then how can you support denying people any decision whatsoever by denying them existence itself?

Then how can you support denying people any decision whatsoever by denying them existence itself? — Echarmion

So if you cannot get consent, you should be able to impose suffering and impositions on someone unnecessarily? In other words, there is no reason to do it other than you want to.. you are not saving them from a greater harm, but simply to initiate it. That is what I meant by absolute imposition vs. instrumental and why this is different than other things.

However, if I was to indulge this as if it was a symmetry rather than an asymmetry, then I don't want to be around you at all because your default position is you are allowed to cause impositions if you cannot get consent.

So if you cannot get consent, you should be able to impose suffering and impositions on someone unnecessarily? — schopenhauer1

But if consent is something that matters, then the imposition is necessary, because its the conditio sine qua non for consent. If the core of morality is people deciding their own destiny, then it seems to follow that it's a moral good to create that ability.

However, if I was to indulge this as if it was a symmetry rather than an asymmetry, then I don't want to be around you at all because your default position is you are allowed to cause impositions if you cannot get consent. — schopenhauer1

I mean obviously I do think it's permissible to cause impositions if you cannot get consent. Else we'd not be allowed to operate on unconscious patients etc.

Not necessarily. It depends on if they actually want to have children. If I don’t want to have kids, I don’t suffer by not having any. — Pinprick

Yea I said X as in it can take on whatever value.

If you look at couples who have fertility issues you will find that the inability to have children can cause serious emotional/psychological harm, and that harm can be spread out to include the couple, their parents, siblings, etc. — Pinprick

Fair enough. And I would actually agree that in cases where X is large enough having children is moral. Problem is that's going to be a miniscule portion anyways.

Not only this, but if the justification for not having children is that it causes harm, then it contradicts itself because not having children also causes harm. — Pinprick

The principle is to cause the least harm. Not to cause no harm. That's impossible.

So it's mistaken to assume that because you now would act kindly even without the censure of your community that you would have reached that point without it. — Isaac

When did I claim that?