Sure but what's the relevance here? We're talking about whether an entity can itself be under the illusion of having sensations (a nonsensical notion in my view). I don't see the relevance of your point to that discussion.

Physical pain is unpleasant, and explaining how matter can have unpleasant sensations is the hard part. The "illusion" of being in pain seems to also be unpleasant. So what exactly is calling it an illusion bringing to the table?

I don't think consciousness is immaterial, but I don't think dennett is right either. Explanatory power is the measure of any hypothesis. — Mijin

I agree. I don't think consciousness is immaterial either, and saying that consciousness is an illusion is unhelpful, and it comes across as an abuse of language.

I don't see the relevance of your point to that discussion. — Mijin

So what exactly is calling it an illusion bringing to the table? — Mijin

The temptation to believe in unicorn-illusions that are no less fanciful than unicorns.

What you'll see and hear will be exactly what the camera records through its lens and microphone — TheMadFool

When you think of it a bit more, you realize that what the camera and microphone record are just bits. 0/1. Those bits are recorded so that the images and sounds can be recreated for someone to experience them.

0’s and 1’s are very different from what I see.

Yep, images and sounds don't literally exist inside computers. They're encoded as information for output devices that create sound and light waves for our eyes and ears.

Exactly. If your cellphone was conscious, it would tell you things like: « Sorry, i don’t feel like taking pictures today; you are such a boring photographer »

So, everywhere. I disagree. — bongo fury

Your disagreement isn't an valid argument against anything I've said.

But it's a special fiction indulged by animals capable of playing along. — bongo fury

Then semantics/meaning is a fiction?
Wouldn't that mean that syntax is non-fiction?

Yep, images and sounds don't literally exist inside computers. They're encoded as information for output devices that create sound and light waves for our eyes and ears. — Marchesk

How do images "literally" exist inside brains?

How do images "literally" exist inside brains? — Harry Hindu

I don't know. The exist in our minds, though, and arguably nowhere else.

I don't know. The exist in our minds, though, and arguably nowhere else. — Marchesk

Well, that was my question: how do minds exist "inside" brains?

But then I think you need to also explain how images are "in" minds, too.

Well, that was my question: how do minds exist "inside" brains? — Harry Hindu

It's a hard problem. But maybe we'll know in another century.

But then I think you need to also explain how images are "in" minds, too. — Harry Hindu

Produced by minds, part of the makeup of minds, however you wish to phrase it. Mind being a word for consciousness, thinking, intentionality, desire and anything that's difficult to reduce to neurons firing and chemicals flowing.

But then I think you need to also explain how images are "in" minds, too.
— Harry Hindu

Produced by minds, part of the makeup of minds, however you wish to phrase it. — Marchesk

Displayed to minds, I would say. There’s a mechanical, predictable aspect to perception. I cannot really chose what to see.

How do images "literally" exist inside brains?
— Harry Hindu

I don't know. — Marchesk

Then how do you know that minds or images don't literally exist in computers?

It's a hard problem. But maybe we'll know in another century. — Marchesk

Its only a hard problem if you're a dualist. You have to explain how certain hardware contains minds and other hardware doesn't. The problem is thinking in "physical" and "mental" terms - that there are physical boxes that contain these non-physical things we call images and minds.

Produced by minds, part of the makeup of minds, however you wish to phrase it. Mind being a word for consciousness, thinking, intentionality, desire and anything that's difficult to reduce to neurons firing and chemicals flowing. — Marchesk

Thats just rephrasing your statement that images are in minds. What does it mean for a mind to produce images? Doest your computer produce images on the screen? Where is the image of this web page- in your brain, in your mind, or on the computer monitor?
I don't know what consciousness is, but thinking, intentionality and desire can all be reduced to behavior.

The Consciousness Deniers
Galen Strawson, March 13, 2018
One of the strangest things the Deniers say is that although it seems that there is conscious experience, there isn’t really any conscious experience: the seeming is, in fact, an illusion.

What is the silliest claim ever made? The competition is fierce, but I think the answer is easy. Some people have denied the existence of consciousness: conscious experience, the subjective character of experience, the “what-it-is-like” of experience. Next to this denial—I’ll call it “the Denial”—every known religious belief is only a little less sensible than the belief that grass is green.

The Denial began in the twentieth century and continues today in a few pockets of philosophy and psychology and, now, information technology. It had two main causes: the rise of the behaviorist approach in psychology, and the naturalistic approach in philosophy. These were good things in their way, but they spiraled out of control and gave birth to the Great Silliness. I want to consider these main causes first, and then say something rather gloomy about a third, deeper, darker cause. But before that, I need to comment on what is being denied—consciousness, conscious experience, experience for short. […]

https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/

Then how do you know that minds or images don't literally exist in computers? — Harry Hindu

Similar question to panpsychism. I don't have certainty, but I doubt they do, since we can explain computer functionality just fine without consciousness. But we can't do that for ourselves. Or at least I'm not a p-zombie.

Its only a hard problem if you're a dualist. — Harry Hindu

Sure, but doesn't change the fact that consciousness is difficult to account for if one also accepts physical reality. Are you some sort of information idealist?

It really depends on where one is convinced to bite a philosophical bullet. But we all do.

Thats just rephrasing your statement that images are in minds. What does it mean for a mind to produce images? — Harry Hindu

If i knew, I'd be famous. Assuming I could explain it to the rest of you bullet-biting p-zombies.

don't know what consciousness is, but thinking, intentionality and desire can all be reduced to behavior. — Harry Hindu

Here I'm going to say a hard no we can't. That's why behaviorism fell out of favor. Cognitive science has made more inroads on those, but I don't believe intentiionality has been solved. I do know Chalmers thinks it can be, unlike consciousness.

Ok. Everyone hang their gloves up, fight's over. Someone thinks it's silly, so that's settled the matter to everyone's satisfaction...

...but hang on, some other writer doesn't think it's silly...oh no, now what will we do?

It's almost as if it's a difficult issue on which many intelligent people have differing opinions...

But by all means just find whichever one agrees with you and cite them as if they were gospel.

One of the strangest things the Deniers say is that although it seems that there is conscious experience, there isn’t really any conscious experience: the seeming is, in fact, an illusion. — Olivier5

Given that our knowledge and understanding of brains is in the form of conscious visual models, if our minds are illusions, then so is our understanding of brains. All the deniers do is undermine their own theories of how brains work.

iven that our knowledge and understanding of brains is in the form of conscious visual models, if our minds are illusions, then so is our understanding of brains. — Harry Hindu

We agree on that. I don't understand what your position is, though. You think it's information all the way down. What sort of metaphysics is that?

Also, would be curious to get your feedback on the thread I created about information being a strongly emergent physics, as proposed by one physicist and researcher into life's origins.

If i knew, I'd be famous. Assuming I could explain it to the rest of you bullet-biting p-zombies. — Marchesk

I'm not one of those asserting that the mind is an illusion, or doesn't exist. What I'm saying is that our view of the world as "physical" boxes containing "non-physical" images and minds is wrong. The boxes are quantified information. There are no "physical" boxes with "non-physical" items in them. It is all information.

Do we have to have the same damn discussion year round in five different threads? "What does it mean? How can consciousness be an illusion? What is it an illusion of?" I mean, how hard is it to read anything by Dennett, Frankish, Graziano, Pereboom? Or a frigging Wiki article? The main idea is not difficult to understand, whether or not you agree with it.

Ok. Everyone hang their gloves up, fight's over. Someone thinks it's silly, so that's settled the matter to everyone's satisfaction... — Isaac

The main idea is not difficult to understand, whether or not you agree with it. — SophistiCat

It’s about the logical contradictions of materialism. Logic is important for some.

Given that our knowledge and understanding of brains is in the form of conscious visual models, if our minds are illusions, then so is our understanding of brains. All the deniers do is undermine their own theories of how brains work. — Harry Hindu

Exactly.

What's the distinction between the illusion of consciousness and consciousness? — Mijin

Good question! If the illusion of consciousness is what you experience as awareness, then for you it's your window to reality. But apparently, Dennett is simply saying that Consciousness is not a material substance, hence not a real thing, therefore not important. The reality for him is objective neurons twinkling, and the subjective experience is a deception. Perhaps, when Dennett sees a beautiful woman, he ignores that illusion, and focuses on those lovely abstract neuronal patterns.

For me though, Consciousness is the function (the purpose) of the brain. Hence, it's the gateway to my personal reality. I'm not aware of my own neurons --- only of the imaginary patterns they form in my Cartesian Theater. When you go to a movie, do you look at the "real" projector (hardware) or at the illusory fleeting images on the screen (function; purpose)?

It seems that, in his attempts to deny the experiencing Cartesian Soul, Dennett says that only the sensing physical Body is real, and worth talking about. But what good is objective Reality, if you are not subjectively aware of it? Would you call his materialistic worldview a case of "misplaced emphasis"? :smile:

Function : 1. an activity or purpose natural to or intended for a person or thing.

Consciousness : Consciousness refers to your individual awareness of your unique thoughts, memories, feelings, sensations, and environments. Essentially, your consciousness is your awareness of yourself and the world around you. This awareness is subjective and unique to you.

Cartesian Theater : Cartesian theater" is a derisive term coined by philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett to refer pointedly to a defining aspect of what he calls Cartesian materialism, which he considers to be the often unacknowledged remnants of Cartesian dualism in modern materialist theories of the mind.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartesian_theater

PS__I think Hoffman has a more useful interpretation of Dennett's "illusion" :
http://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page21.html

Consciousness is the human being's ability to talk to himself about himself, tell his own story and draw long-term conclusions, from where he acquires the ability to promise things. — Rafaella Leon

Apparently, Dennett doesn't value that mushy sentimental illusion we call "the Self", simply because it doesn't "matter", literally. :smile:

Matter :
1. physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit; .
2. be of importance; have significance.

Significance :
1. the quality of being worthy of attention; importance.

It’s about the logical contradictions of materialism. Logic is important for some. — Olivier5

Ah, how wonderful it is to be a self-assured fool. Everything is crystal-clear, and no question requires more than two seconds of contemplation.

Thanks for the laugh! I have contemplated these things for about 40 years now. How long have you?

I'm sorry but to me, philosophy cannot ignore logic. I wish I could say whatever comes to mind, like many here do in automatic writing style, without caring for the logical consistency of what they say, but I can't.

Some time after his Chinese Room argument Searle wrote that the syntax of the digital computer is as observer dependent as the semantics. That is, the syntax is ascribed (by a conscious human) just as much as the semantics is. Searle said that he should have realised this long before. It's actually very obvious when you take into account how a computer works. The ones we are using have electronic logic gates, and the designer specifies what range of voltages qualify as 0 and 1. That is where the syntax is ascribed, the distinction between 0s and 1s is not intrinsic to the physics of the machine.

Your disagreement isn't a valid argument against anything I've said. — Harry Hindu

Obviously not.

Then semantics/meaning is a fiction?
Wouldn't that mean that syntax is non-fiction? — Harry Hindu

Haha yes, potentially. When implemented as automation. Then the reference of each symbol token becomes a matter of mechanical fact. As when a machine translates a phonetic symbol into a sound. When considered apart from such automation, the syntactic connections may well be made semantically, so that we acknowledge a pretended connection between, say, a written letter and a phoneme, or between one written token of the letter and another.

Most semantics, though, even where plausibly construed as literal and factual, is far too complex and disputable to reduce to syntax. As the Chinese Room reminded us. So, whether or not it is fictional in the important sense that crucial grammatical subjects fail to straight-forwardly refer, any semantics is indeed all fictional in the sense that the alleged referential connections are all pretended.

Most semantics, though, even where plausibly construed as literal and factual, is far too complex and disputable to reduce to syntax. — bongo fury

It's been said that a machine translation is like a jar of cookies, only 5 percent of which are poisoned.