But hey, it's my thread, so keep adding to it. — Banno

Do I need your permission?

Tell us exactly what it is that is missing.

And if your answer is "the qualia", then...

...all you have done is engage in the circular argument that the biological machinery cannot tell us about the qualia, and the qualia are what the biological machinery cannot tell us about. — Banno

Or I've simply stated a matter of fact. Like if someone says "A triangle has 3 sides and the sum of its internal angles are 180, and the shape which consists of 3 sides with a sum of internal angles adding up to 180 is a triangle"

You think there must be something more; you need there to be something more. Otherwise it's all just physics, and you think this would make it all pointless, meaningless. — Banno

I really don't appretiate when people turn a debate into psychoanalysis. Don't be presumptuous. At least for me I'm here because all the quiners have successfully convinced me of so far is that qualia are mostly useless to talk about. But you all still admit "experiences" which you admit are uncomparabe when pressured. You spend the whole thread arguing that "Inverted vision means nothing" but when actually questioned concede that "Inverted vision is untestable for, but I can imagine it, and it makes no difference to talk about". The first statement is not the latter. But then you immediately go back to saying "Inverted vision means nothing"

You start with:
"Inverted vision makes no sense"

And end with:

I ask you to pass me the red apple. It doesn't matter if you have the same experiences as I, or if they are isomorphic, or anything at all about them, provided that you pass me the red apple. — Banno

Which is clear recognition that there may be experiences, just that they're useless to talk about outside of a sci-fi show. Then go back to the starting point. It's tiring.

Ockham's razor applies. — creativesoul

I don't think it does. How do you explain the phenomenology otherwise?

You can't tell us what qualia are, because they are ineffable.

And you cannot show them to us what they are, because they are private. — Banno

I can tell you what the category means but not its memebers. As in I can't describe red to you but I can tell you what Qualia are. And no I can't show you what they are but I'm pretty sure I don't need to. They are what you refer to as "experiences".

I really don't appretiate when people turn a debate into psychoanalysis. — khaled

The "you" was generic; if you took it to be a reference to you, that's your issue.

The "you" was generic; if you took it to be a reference to you, that's your issue. — Banno

Generic implies that it applies to all the people advocating for qualia. I wasn't offended by it, but it's still psychonalaysing that doesn't add to the discussion. Also congrats for 10k posts

I can tell you what the category means but not its memebers. — khaled

Sense with no reference. That'll work.

As in I can't describe red to you but I can tell you what Qualia are. And no I can't show you what they are but I'm pretty sure I don't need to. They are what you refer to as "experiences". — khaled

There's that moving goal post, that ambiguity back to which you have repeatedly withdrawn.

You can't tell us what qualia are, because they are ineffable.

And you cannot show them to us, because they are private.

but it's still psychonalaysing that doesn't add to the discussion. — khaled

Rubbish. Understanding why the issue is important enough to take up over sixty pages is directly relevant.

(and since you keep going back over the same arguments, it's one way to keep the thread moving on to new territory.)

You can't tell us what qualia are, because they are ineffable.

And you cannot show them to us what they are, because they are private. — Banno

But we have a large number of people reporting to have them. How did that happen?
And, again, I can tell you what qualia are. The experience of pain is ineffable. "Qualia" the word isn't. Or else we wouldn't have been able to say anything about them.

This sounds to me like theMadFool's post about how the concept of nothing is a paradox.

Understanding why the issue is important enough to take up over sixty pagrs is directly relevant. — Banno

How does understanding why people are responding for 60 pages affect whether or not qualia exist?

But we have a large number of people reporting to have them. — khaled

No we havn't. We have a small group of philosophers pretending that something which is the subject of ubiquitous conversation is actually ineffable. It's laughable, and sad. It's almost as absurd as claiming that we can't speak about pain - which you just did.

(Retracted tired, grumpy part of post)

we can't speak about pain - which you just did. — Banno

Ineffable =/= We can't speak about. And I already gave you a model where we can have ineffable experiences and still have meaningful conversations.

Ineffable means not fully describable. And I bet you if you asked any layman whether or not they can describe what color is like to a blind person they would say no. And I also bet you that if you asked them whether or not they can imagine what "inverted vision" would be like they would say yes. And if you explained to them what a p-zombie is they would probably say it makes sense.

The small group of philosophers is the one claiming otherwise.

Banno-inspired perception-related debates used to go 100+ pages. And it often included talk of apples. — Marchesk

Have we come to any sort of consensus as to what color is? Or pain?

If it's not qualia, is it ... a model? A language game? A private beetle we can't talk about? — Marchesk

:rofl:
60+ pages so far and you still don't have any sort of consensus as to what color or pain is? Colors and pain are information! Duh!

Is information physical?

What is "physical"? I'm sure I asked that question in this thread before.

Stuff that doesn't shiver qualia.

More seriously, the fundamental stuff of physics like fields, energy, matter, forces, spacetime and all the stuff that's logically entailed by that.

If Banno at the start of the Big Bang could simulate the rest of the history of the universe, apparently colors, pains and dreams would be part of the outcome. As would these non-terminating philosophical discussions.

Banno-inspired perception-related debates used to go 100+ pages. And it often included talk of apples. — Marchesk

Because its difficult to derive meaning from anything Banno says. It probably has to do with how he uses words.

More seriously, the fundamental stuff of physics like fields, energy, matter, forces, spacetime and all the stuff that's logically entailed by that. — Marchesk

This is all just more information. All causal relations, which include logical entailments, is information.

This is all just more information. — Harry Hindu

It's shivering all the way down.

No. That's what I asked bongo many pages back. Its information/causal relations all the way down.

I don't know what that means any more than Tegmark's mathematical universe. But then who knows what the hell fundamental reality is. I'm partial to quantum fields.

I don't know what that means any more than Tegmark's mathematical universe. But then who knows what the hell fundamental reality is. — Marchesk

It means that everything is a causal relationship.

I'm partial to quantum fields. — Marchesk

That's information too.

I never said that my "position" was obvious. I said that qualia are obvious. — Luke

Right. And your position is that qualia exist (are a coherent ontological commitment), so saying their existence is 'obvious' is exactly the same as saying that your position is obvious. It's no different to arguing that 'Elan Vitale' is obvious, or that 'Aether' is obvious.

Qualia are - according to Dennett - "the way things seem to us" — Luke

...before showing how such a notion is incoherent.

It doesn't matter what weird expression you use, they all end up empty. "What it's like...", "the way it seems...", "how it feels"...none of these expressions have any coherent meaning beyond behaviours and interoception of physiological states. There's nothing they describe that the aforementioned don't.

But the patient didn't examine nerve endings. So how come he was able to distinguish? — khaled

What part of the path between the signals sent by nerve endings and signals sent to the voicebox to produce "it feels like a stabbing pain" is it that you think is broken?

Experiences are the way things seem to you. Those can't be fake. If it seems to you one way then that is the experience you're having. For you to have a fake experience would mean something seems to you one way, but actually doesn't seem to you that way, instead, seems to you another way. — khaled

Yes, but such a notion of experience when applied to "it seems like I have an experience of redness" is utterly useless. What do we then do with that? I'd want to know why, but evidently you're not much interested in that question. I'd want to know how I came to learn to use such expressions, but evidently you're not much interested in that either.

If all you want to do is say "the world seems like X to me" and don't want to ask any questions of that, then I don't know what you're doing here.

There's just no evidence of this — Isaac


I am having experiences. That's evidence. Which you recognize here: — khaled

How is you having an experience evidence of "stimuli cause experiences and also responses"?
All you've shown is that one side of the relationship exists. Your claim was about the cause, not the mere existence.

Seriously though which is it? Am I or am I not having experiences? — khaled

I've never claimed you are not having experiences tout court.

I'll repeat it again. It goes stimuli>experience+response. What's weird here? — khaled

The inclusion of an aparrently direct route from stimuli to experience for which there is absolutely no evidence. Not to mention the things you then want to claim of these experiences...

Present me the neurological evidence that says that our brain activities cannot coincide with an experience. What theory breaks if I propose that at the same time my brain is processing color, I am having an experience of red? — khaled

I've cited several papers which you've declined to read.

Yes. I'm sensing that. It's a good job some people prefer to investigate matters in a more productive way than just avoiding what they find repulsive and pursuing only that which seems nice. We'd have never left the dark ages. You recall the reaction to Darwin's suggestion that we were descended from apes? — Isaac

Darwin was very warmly received.. I think you'll find your view is absent in scientific communities and the world in general. Dennett doesn't even take it as far as you do and he's as close to it as you'd find it in philosophy of mind.

I'd want to know why, but evidently you're not much interested in that question. — Isaac

That would be the hard problem. Which I am interested in.

I'd want to know how I came to learn to use such expressions, but evidently you're not much interested in that either. — Isaac

Yea I'm not really interested in that one.

If all you want to do is say "the world seems like X to me" — Isaac

I want to emphasize that the statement "the world seems like X to me" is not negated by any neurological evidence you can throw at it. The world still seems the way it seems. The statement "qualia does not exist" implies "the world doesn't seem like anything, there is no X", which is absurd.

How is you having an experience evidence of "stimuli cause experiences and also responses"? — Isaac

I don't think I need to present to you evidence that stimuli cause responses.

Your claim was about the cause, not the mere existence. — Isaac

Oh that's easy. When I close my eyes I do not have the experience of color. Additionally I know there are certain ways the biological machinery can malfunction to make me colorblind. Therefore the stimuli and biological machinery must be causing that experience.

The inclusion of an aparrently direct route from stimuli to experience — Isaac

I'd say the experience is a side-product of whatever our brain is doing. As in this:

Photons hit the retina, they fire a chain of neurons in the V1, these (depending on previously cemented pathways) fire a chain of other neurons (with the important backward-acting filters). Some of these neurons represent things like the word 'red', images of other things which caused the same initial V! pattern, emotions attached to either the current image, or remembered ones... All this is held in working memory, which is then re-fired (selectively) by the hippocampus. It's this re-firing which we are aware of when we introspect, not the original chain. — Isaac

Causes the experience as well. Is there a problem now?

I've cited several papers which you've declined to read. — Isaac

All of those papers attack the model stimuli>qualia>response or stimuli>response>qualia.

Ockham's razor applies.
— creativesoul

I don't think it does. How do you explain the phenomenology otherwise? — khaled

Conscious experience of red cups is what was in need of explanation... not an explanation of an explanation.

I think you'll find your view is absent in scientific communities and the world in general. Dennett doesn't even take it as far as you do and he's as close to it as you'd find it in philosophy of mind. — frank

Then I think you've either had little experience of the scientific community in my field or you've misunderstood my position. It's quite the most common view among my colleagues and those whose work I generally follow.

Then I think you've either had little experience of the scientific community in my field or you've misunderstood my position. It's quite the most common view among my colleagues and those whose work I generally follow. — Isaac

That color and pain are models?

I'd want to know why, but evidently you're not much interested in that question. — Isaac


That would be the hard problem. Which I am interested in. — khaled

Ah, so you're another one for whom 'why?' apparently means something completely different with regards to consciousness than it does in every other field of inquiry.

I want to emphasize that the statement "the world seems like X to me" is not negated by any neurological evidence you can throw at it. The world still seems the way it seems. The statement "qualia does not exist" implies "the world doesn't seem like anything, there is no X", which is absurd. — khaled

Replace 'qualia' with God...unicorns, fairies, fate, Valhalla... What use is just saying that the way things seem to you right now is completely impervious to any evidence to the contrary? Seems like a self-defeatingly dogmatic position to hold.

I don't think I need to present to you evidence that stimuli cause responses. — khaled

Why are you dodging the only bit of your claim which is relevant? The significant bit of your claim is that stimuli directly cause experiences.

Oh that's easy. When I close my eyes I do not have the experience of color. Additionally I know there are certain ways the biological machinery can malfunction to make me colorblind. Therefore the stimuli and biological machinery must be causing that experience. — khaled

None of which demonstrates that it does so directly (ie, that you are experiencing the stimuli and not your culturally-embedded response to the stimuli).

I'd say the experience is a side-product of whatever our brain is doing. As in this:

Photons hit the retina, they fire a chain of neurons in the V1, these (depending on previously cemented pathways) fire a chain of other neurons (with the important backward-acting filters). Some of these neurons represent things like the word 'red', images of other things which caused the same initial V! pattern, emotions attached to either the current image, or remembered ones... All this is held in working memory, which is then re-fired (selectively) by the hippocampus. It's this re-firing which we are aware of when we introspect, not the original chain. — Isaac


Causes the experience as well. Is there a problem now?

I've cited several papers which you've declined to read. — Isaac


All of those papers attack the model stimuli>qualia>response or stimuli>response>qualia. — khaled

That's not what is demonstrated in those studies. They show how prior models (mostly socially mediated) filter stimuli to place modified predictive models in the working memory which then provides data we associate with 'experience' (ie, the tendency to say things like "that tasted bitter").