Ahhh now I see what you did there >:O ....

I humiliated myself ... what should I do now? >:O

How does this follow? What does being determinate or objective have to do with (1) being finite, and (2) being immanent? — Agustino

Being determinate or objective means it is a phenomenon that be intersubjectively determined to be this or that. Phenomana which can be determined to be this or that are finite, and they are also immanent to sensory experience.

But in what sense is this the case? Hearing for example is also another dimension of experience compared to seeing. Why isn't one of these transcendent then? — Agustino

Because both hearing and seeing generally involve determinate phenomena of the immanent kind, as explained above. Even hallucinations are generally understood to have their cause in the brain, and if this is so, then the causes of hallucinations are immanent. If a vision is caused by God though, for example, then the cause of the vision is not of this world, that is, it is a transcendent, not an immanent cause. Of course if there is no God then there are no transcendent causes.

Okay so if the transcendent doesn't refer to something that is ontologically separate, in what way, again, is it transcendent? And what notion of transcendence are you employing? The Cartesian one, or? — Agustino

If this world is an expression of spirit, of God, then God is within everything, and everything is within God. There is no separation, but God does not appear in the world, and hence is not a finite, determinate, objective, immanent phenomenon.

Wayfarer apparently couldn't handle it, so it seems he has decided to leave the forums. Let's see if your philosophy is weak coal or strong diamond! — Agustino

BTW, Agustino, you are soooo full of shit.

:-}


.

Being determinate or objective means it is a phenomenon that be intersubjectively determined to be this or that. — John

Okay so you mean it has crisp, as opposed to vague existence. Definite and stable properties can be determined about it right?

Phenomana which can be determined to be this or that are finite — John

So finitude has to do with whether something is crisp instead of vague?

they are also immanent to sensory experience. — John

So I take it that transcendent experiences don't involve the senses?

If a vision is caused by God though, for example, then the cause of the vision is not of this world, that is, it is a transcendent, not an immanent cause. Of course if there is no God then there are no transcendent causes. — John

But what if the vision is caused by God through worldly means such as altering the activity of the brain?

If this world is an expression of spirit, of God, then God is within everything, and everything is within God. There is no separation, but God does not appear in the world, and hence is not a finite, determinate, objective, immanent phenomenon. — John

Well obviously because God is the world in this case isn't He? If so, then God is reality, and everything is immanent in God - God isn't in anyway transcendent.

BTW, Agustino, you are soooo full of shit.

:-}


. — John

Why mate, it's true, he said it himself! >:O

Well obviously because God is the world in this case isn't He? — Agustino

No, God is not the world. The world is in God. God is not exhausted by the world. So, in a sense God is both immanent and transcendent, as you would expect. It is not the case that there is no transcendence, but it is the case that there is no (ultimately real) separation. In different ways this idea of immanence/transcendence is also captured by the Buddhist conception that samsara is nirvana, and the Hindu notion that atman is brahman.

No, God is not the world. The world is in God. God is not exhausted by the world. So, in a sense God is both immanent and transcendent, as you would expect. It is not the case that there is no transcendence, but it is the case that there is no (ultimately real) separation. — John

(Y)

The world is in God. — John

Nothing is in God? If God is being in itself, how come it can have an essence of nothing?

How do get from "The world is in God" to "Nothing is in God"?

The world is nothing.

You have it backwards, Shyster Eggfart; the world is everything.

How's that?

By virtue of the accepted meanings of the words 'nothung' and 'everythung'

:-x

But what if the vision is caused by God through worldly means such as altering the activity of the brain? — Agustino

What if it is?

God is not transcendent. Such a God is a worldy actor. Indeed, any vision can only be wordly because the caused state (the vision) is someone's experience. Without worldly mechanism (the experience which is the vision), there are no visions.

It's the nature of God which discounts the transcendent. If God does something to the world, God is worldly. On the other hand if God eshews the finite, then God is nothing, an infinite that does not exist or act-- an immanent substance only.

The twin nature of being both worldy and beyond the world is a contradiction and incohrent. God's needs as a finite or infinite preculde the transcendent. To suggest a transcendent God is to tell falsehoods about God.

Sorry, Willow, I really haven't a clue what you are talking about; so it would be pointless to respond.

the world is everything. — John

God is not the world — John

Therefore God is nothing or doesn't exist ;) ;) ;)

QED By yours truly and very humble John

P.S: "You're sooooo full of shit Agustino" ;)

Sorry, Willow, I really haven't a clue what you are talking about; so it would be pointless to respond. — John

What, more precisely, don't you understand about Willow's remarks? You have to be precise, otherwise nothing can be clarified.

What if it is? — John

If it is, then the "transcendent experience" is actually not transcendent at all but immanent, taking place in the world the same way sight, or hearing or any other experience takes place, simple.

This actually makes a bit of sense, damn...*scribbles down in diary*

By virtue of the accepted meanings of the words 'nothung' and 'everythung' — John

Stop being obscurantist.

Subtlety Agustino, is obviously not your forte: the world is everything and God is not a thing.

I'm full of shit as you very well noted! :D

I cannot understand any of what she is trying to say other than her assertions.

How do you know Willow is a she? :s

Okay let's take it sentence by sentence Dirty John >:)

Such a God is a worldy actor. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This means that God acts in the world, has effects in the world. Okay?

Indeed, any vision can only be wordly because the caused state (the vision) is someone's experience. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This means that even someone who is having a beatific vision, even that person is just having an experience. It is true that it is a different kind of experience, but it occurs via the mechanisms that exist in the world - his brain and senses, and is thus part of his more general experience.

Without worldly mechanism (the experience which is the vision), there are no visions. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Without the persons brain, eyes, etc. there is no such vision possible.

It's the nature of God which discounts the transcendent. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The nature of God was mentioned before. God acts in the world.

If God does something to the world, God is worldly — TheWillowOfDarkness

As Spinoza showed, for two things to be able to affect each other, they must be of the same Substance, and hence are part of the same existence - and necessarily so.

On the other hand if God eshews the finite, then God is nothing, an infinite that does not exist or act-- an immanent substance only. — TheWillowOfDarkness

If God does not act in the world, then there is no God - because what sense would it have to say something exists if it can never be encountered or related with in the world?

The twin nature of being both worldy and beyond the world is a contradiction and incohrent. — TheWillowOfDarkness

So God either acts in the world (in which case God is IN the world) or God doesn't act in the world (in which case God isn't in the world, and therefore doesn't exist)

To suggest a transcendent God is to tell falsehoods about God. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The notion of transcendence as you use it is incoherent for the above reasons. Happy?

To say that an experience "takes place in the world" is just a way of speaking. You can say that events take place in the world and have some idea about what you mean, but the idea that experiences of those events take place in the world is assumed to be correct just because the experience is of the events and the events are in the world. We don't really know it is true or even what it really means to say this; it is superficial 'reasoning by definition'. This is the kind of reasoning Willow usually presents. It is telling that she often claims that things are "defined in themselves". I have no idea what this could even mean.

No, I am not happy. All of this incoherent and not worth the effort to respond to.
The crux seems to be the claim that if God acts in the world ( which is itself questionable, and needs to be precisely explained as to what it could mean) then God must be "worldly". Even if the notion that God acts in the world were accepted what does it mean to say that God is "worldly"? We know what it means to say that events and things are worldly.

And again, even if it were accepted that God is worldly if God acts in the world, what is the actual argument for that conclusion? It is nothing more than another 'argument from definition'. Otherwise show why it would be impossible for an agent who is not 'in the world' in the sense that objects and events are, to effect changes in the world. If the entire world is an expression of God how would that entail that God is a 'worldly' entity?

I refer to Willow's as a woman, because I have come to believe due to comments she has made and her avatar that she is a woman.
I have noticed that you have several times referred to Willow's as "he". What makes you think Willow is a man?

but the idea that experiences of those events take place in the world is assumed to be correct just because the experience is of the events and the events are in the world. — John

Where else do you think they could be taking place? :s

We know what it means to say that events and things are worldly. — John

What does this mean?

The crux seems to be the claim that if God acts in the world ( which is itself questionable, and needs to be precisely explained as to what it could mean) then God must be "worldly". Even if the notion that God acts in the world were accepted what does it mean to say that God is "worldly"? We know what it means to say that events and things are worldly. — John

Okay. Think by analogy. For me to touch you, I need to be physical, made of atoms just as you are, correct? If I'm not physical, how can I touch or interact with you? We need to be of the same substance to interact. So if God acts in the world, he must be of the same substance as the world. This substance is what we frequently use the word "world" for, and so God must be in this substance.

And again, even if it were accepted that God is worldly if God acts in the world, what is the actual argument for that conclusion? It is nothing more than another 'argument from definition'. Otherwise show why it would be impossible for an agent who is not 'in the world' in the sense that objects and events are to effect changes int world. — John

I'm not saying it would be impossible, I'm saying it is incoherent. How would we make sense of that? I can make sense of touching you for example, because we're both physical and made of the same substance - atoms - hence we can interact. That's what it means to be of the same substance - being capable of interacting. So if God isn't of the same substance, and is thus incapable of interacting with us, in what sense does he even exist? If I tell you that there exists this teapot, but you can't find it anywhere in the universe, and you can't ever interact with it in any way, shape or form, what's the difference between this teapot, and a non-existant one?

I refer to Willow's as a woman, because I have come to believe due to comments she has made — John

What comments made you believe this?

her avatar that she is a woman. — John

But for a very long time at the other forum he or she never had an avatar.

I have noticed that you have several times referred to Willow's as "he". What makes you think Willow is a man? — John

I'm not sure if Willow is either a man or a woman. I refer to Willow as a him more often than otherwise because he/she never indicated otherwise, and because that's the first term that comes to mind when I speak with someone whom I don't know more about on the internet.

Where else do you think they could be taking place? :s — Agustino

I didn't say that experiences "take place" any where else, did I? Events take place, do experiences of events take place (in the sense of 'have a precise location')? Or is it not rather that events take place within experience. Can you explain what it would mean for an event to take place "outside experience"? What if the world just is experience, including let's say, God's experience. Then events would take place in experience and the world would be within experience. Experience is not an object or an event 'in the world'.

What does this mean? — Agustino

It means that things and events are spatially and temporally related to one another in the world. We also generally believe that they may be causally related to one another as well.

Okay. Think by analogy. For me to touch you, I need to be physical, made of atoms just as you are, correct? If I'm not physical, how can I touch or interact with you? We need to be of the same substance to interact. So if God acts in the world, he must be of the same substance as the world. This substance is what we frequently use the word "world" for, and so God must be in this substance. — Agustino

To say that we are "made of atoms" is just one among many other ways of thinking about our constitutions. We don't actually understand touching in terms of atoms at all, I can touch you because we both experience ourselves as embodied, material beings, whatever our "ultimate constitutions" might be. The every notion of embodiment and materiality comes from our experience, and so do all the scientific understandings of physicality.

'The world' is not a term that denotes 'substance', but 'totality'. The notion of substance itself is highly ambiguous, even incoherent.

I'm not saying it would be impossible, I'm saying it is incoherent. How would we make sense of that? I can make sense of touching you for example, because we're both physical and made of the same substance - atoms - hence we can interact. That's what it means to be of the same substance - being capable of interacting. So if God isn't of the same substance, and is thus incapable of interacting with us, in what sense does he even exist? — Agustino

So, you are saying God is "made of atoms"? :s

If the world with all its objects and events is an expression of God, does it follow that God must have the same constitution as the world? If I am in your thoughts does that mean that the atoms that purportedly constitute me must be in the atoms that purportedly constitute your thoughts? Or more simply, if you see me does that mean that my atoms must be in your brain? You seem to be stuck in some Newtonian engineer's nightmare world. :-O

I'm not sure if Willow is either a man or a woman. I refer to Willow as a him more often than otherwise because he/she never indicated otherwise, and because that's the first term that comes to mind when I speak with someone whom I don't know more about on the internet. — Agustino

That says more about you than about Willow. Who cares, anyway? It seems you like to argue just for the sake of it. Maybe you are trying to artificially resuscitate your thread?

If Willow cares enough to, then Willow can correct either you or me; if not, what does it matter?

Typically, you still have provided any of the arguments I asked for....

So, you are saying God is "made of atoms"? :s — John

... No

I'm saying what whatever the basic stuff of the world is - whether this is a material substance or a spiritual substance - then everything is made of that. If the world doesn't include just atoms and void, then obviously there needs to be a substance formed of both atoms and void and whatever other spiritual things exist. The idea is that there is only one substance, a world formed of multiple substances cannot be conceived. Read Part I of Spinoza's Ethics - this is made abundantly clear by him.

Can you explain what it would mean for an event to take place "outside experience"? — John

We are always already outside of experience. We're thrown into the world, as Heidegger says.

To say that we are "made of atoms" is just one among many other ways of thinking about our constitutions. We don't actually understand touching in terms of atoms at all, I can touch you because we both experience ourselves as embodied, material beings, whatever our "ultimate constitutions" might be. The every notion of embodiment and materiality comes from our experience, and so do all the scientific understandings of physicality. — John

No - you can touch me because we're made of the same substance - whatever that substance is, whether it is material or not.

I didn't say that experiences "take place" any where else, did I? Events take place, do experiences of events take place (in the sense of 'have a precise location')? Or is it not rather that events take place within experience. Can you explain what it would mean for an event to take place "outside experience"? What if the world just is experience, including let's say, God's experience. Then events would take place in experience and the world would be within experience. Experience is not an object or an event 'in the world'. — John

I am starting to find this Kantian/Hegelian view more and more incoherent day by day. It seems to me that thought (and hence experience) presupposes an external world to even get started.

This notion that there can only be one substance is an unfounded assumption. God may be constituted of a multitude of substances, one of which is in our case the same substance as that of which the world and or our being is constituted. While God also partakes of a multitude of other substances, or unknowns elsewhere in existence.

So the most you can say is that the world or our being is of one substance and God partakes of this substance, but is not necessarily constituted of it.

Read Part I of Spinoza's Ethics - this is made abundantly clear by him. — Agustino

I have read it. I studied Spinoza for years. I eventually came to the conclusion that Spinozism is deeply and fundamentally confused. I engaged in a discussion along these lines many years ago with a poster, a self-styled expert Spinozist and "entropist", on the old forum. He claimed that God as nature (Deus sive natura) meant that God is radically immanent (which is the same as to say non-existent in the sense of 'unreal'). I pointed out that Spinoza makes a distinction between natura naturans (the self-causing priniciple) and natura naturata (the causal nexus that is the natural world) and asserts that God is the former but not the latter (to which the other poster agreed) thus saving himself from pantheism.

When I pointed out that the self-causing principle cannot be anything in the world by Spinoza's own arguments concerning the difference between necessary and contingent beings, and that from this it followed that God must be transcendent (as well as immanent, mind) the other poster became all huffy and accused me of 'refusing to learn', and would not, or more likely could not, explain himself further. What a cop out!

We are always already outside of experience. We're thrown into the world, as Heidegger says. — Agustino

This misrepresents Heidegger. He was a phenomenologist; for Heidegger phemonenology is ontology; being is experience. Heidegger was an idealist, he was one of the "correlationists" Meillassoux so desperately wanted to (and so woefully failed to) refute with his After Finitude.

No - you can touch me because we're made of the same substance - whatever that substance is, whether it is material or not. — Agustino

I think the very notion of substance is deeply flawed. But you obviously support it, so please explain to me exactly what a material substance is, and if you can successfully achieve that, then explain to me what an immaterial substance could be.

I am starting to find this Kantian/Hegelian view more and more incoherent day by day. It seems to me that thought (and hence experience) presupposes an external world to even get started. — Agustino

If I thought there were no God then I would agree with you. Think about Berkeley. He is generally considered to be a subjective idealist. And yet he explained the seemingly very obvious independent-of-human-experience persistence of objects and invariances by positing that they are held within God's mind. So sure, on that view, there is an external (external to, or transcendent of, human experience) world. But the being of it is Gods' thought. God is not physical and God's thought is not physical, physicality is merely an idea that evolves out of embodied experience; it is not fundamental, it is not a "substance". Subjective idealism is utterly incoherent without God. The only cogent alternative is materialistic realism (although it is certainly arguable that the independent reality of things cannot be truly coherently thought); but there is really no room for God on that picture.