Confusing things is your specialty here, I guess.

Well, I suppose that's one way to deal with the confusion of the subject/object distinction. — Banno

It is one way to connect a subject and his objects, yes. It’s called perception. The subject perceives the object through a symbolic representation. The symbols used in this representation include qualitatively different tastes, colors, sounds, etc. which are generically called qualia. They can evoke emotions and memories, thus engaging the subject fully.

What is a “pretheoretical condition”? — khaled

If you're advocating for qualia, this is pivotal.

It is the requirement that something be able to exist in it's entirety prior to any theoretical considerations, and it serves as the standard to meet in our assessments. For example, most everyone would agree that some conscious experience existed in it's entirety prior to being named and described. Since all theoretical considerations about conscious experience consist of descriptions thereof(in large part at least), and all pretheoretical conscious experiences exist in their entirety prior to theoretical considerations, pre-theoretical conscious experience cannot consist of descriptions thereof.

Proponents of qualia invoked the "pretheoretical" standard. The source concept of subjective conscious experience that "qualia" are supposed to be refinements of(properties thereof), is claimed to have this "pretheoretical" status. In order to qualify(pun intended) as being pre-theoretical, qualia must exist in it's(their) entirety within pretheoretical conscious experience prior to being named and subsequently described. The burden to meet that explicit criterion belongs to those who advocate for it's use. It's quite common to see that burden be shifted to opponents or just simply neglected altogether during debates such as the ones within this thread. In fact, this thread is nearing fifty pages, and I challenge any and all proponents of qualia to clearly set out some conscious experience which actually meets that standard, and requires invoking the idea/notion/conception of "qualia" for doing so.

This is where qualia claims run into very serious problems. It's a 'hard problem'(again pun intended) to sell to someone like me that some property of 'subjective' conscious experience, say the color of the cup, is private, ineffable, and intrinsic if the experience itself consists of, or is existentially dependent upon - in any way - external things like red cups. Our conscious experience of red cups is most certainly existentially dependent upon red cups. In addition, the frequencies of visible light that we've recently discovered to have named "red" long ago were being emitted/reflected by certain external things long before we ever named and described them in color terms, and long before our becoming aware of the role that light and biological machinery plays in conscious experience of red cups.

We need not discuss the role that light and biological machinery plays in conscious experience of red cups in order to have conscious experience of red cups. However, we most certainly need to discuss such things in order to immediately apprehend that conscious experience of red cups comes in different varieties, some of which do indeed satisfy the pretheoretical criterion, but none of those require the idea/notion/concept of "qualia".

What does this mean “talk about experience as a subject matter in its own right”? Does it mean understanding words such as “red” or “bitter” etc? — khaled

"Talk(ing) about experience as a subject matter in it's own right" is not equivalent to understanding words such as "red" or "bitter". Understanding words such as "red" or "bitter" is a necessary prerequisite for subsequently talking about any conscious experience thereof as a subject matter in it's own right, but just using "red" or "bitter" is inadequate for doing so.

Understanding the words is not necessary for seeing red things or tasting bitter red apples. That is because some red things are pretheoretical. Red apples are such things, and the ability to eat them and experience the involuntary autonomous response that bitter apples induce in biological machinery is also pretheoretical. So, conscious experience of eating bitter red apples can happen pretheoretically. That said...

One can also learn how to use the terms "red" and "bitter" to talk about the pretheoretical conscious experience of eating bitter red apples. The learning process itself also counts as pretheoretical conscious experience. Once that process begins to turn inward on itself, and we begin discussing seeing and tasting bitter red apples in terms of our "conscious experience" thereof, we've begun to talk about experience as a subject matter in it's own right.

This thread is a prima facie example of talking about experience as a subject matter in it's own right, whereas a first grader's use of the terms "green" and "red" to pick out different colored apples is not. The grade school experience is a conscious experience of red and green apples that is not talking about the experience itself as a subject matter in it's own right. Rather, it's a conscious experience of talking about the apples. To tease the nuance out, it's a conscious experience of red and green apples that includes language use, but is prior to any theoretical considerations. Thus, some conscious experience of red and green apples consisting of language use counts as pretheoretical as well as all language less conscious experience thereof.

So, I'm asking any of the proponents of Qualia...

What meets these standards? Better yet what could?
— creativesoul

My question would rather be: who gives a flying rat’s ass, and why? — Olivier5

Well, given that it's the proponents of "qualia" who set it, they ought give several rats' asses.

:brow:

Personally I would rather obliterate any and all philosophical notions that lead to widespread confusion and false belief given the sheer power that belief wields in this shared world of ours.

The subject perceives the object through a symbolic representation... — Olivier5

And here I thought it was via physiological sensory perception apparatus. Who knew it was through symbols and signs. No perception of objects for those poor language less beasts...

When we ask “is this dress blue and black or gold and white” we ask what experience you are having. It is a fact that some people saw a white and gold dress, even though the dress was blue and black. It is furthermore a fact that you cannot tell if someone is actually seeing gold and white or only lying about it. That’s what it means that you can’t “read minds”. — khaled

People's experiences sometimes differ in certain situations (reflecting differences either in the environment or in their physical characteristics). And that's a valid question to investigate. But in many situations we can predict what other people's experience will be like. I assume you and other readers would agree that the dress color looks blue and black in the image I posted. We learn which situations are like that and which aren't.

I don’t understand how there can be no intermediary layer, but there can be an experience. Isn’t the experience the intermediary layer? Or else what does “experience” mean. — khaled

From Lexico, experience is "practical contact with and observation of facts or events." Note that there is nothing there about intermediary layers, phenomenalism, or minds. Watching a sunset is an experience. And so is kicking around a football with your kids.

Also what is imagination without the intermediary phenomenological layer? — khaled

It's a separate issue. To perceive things is not at all the same as to imagine things. They are different kinds of activities.

Part of the Cartesian error is to categorize unlike things together based on superficial similarities instead of making natural and functional distinctions. So visualizing, dreaming, imagining, hallucinating, etc., are considered by the Cartesian to be a kind of seeing and perception, when they are not.

The Cartesian dualist conceptualizes the world very differently to the way people ordinarily conceptualize things. Discussions like this help to bring those philosophical premises to the surface where they can be analyzed and compared.

To perceive things is not at all the same as to imagine things. They are different kinds of activities. — Andrew M

I didn’t say they were. But what is imagination without a phenomenological layer, still? Because without a phenomenological layer I don’t see how you can describe what imagination is like.

From Lexico, experience is "practical contact with and observation of facts or events." Note that there is nothing there about intermediary layers, phenomenalism, or minds. — Andrew M

But they’re not incompatible. This “observation” is taking place in an intermediary layer.

People's experiences sometimes differ in certain situations (reflecting differences either in the environment or in their physical characteristics). And that's a valid question to investigate. But in many situations we can predict what other people's experience will be like. I assume you and other readers would agree that the dress color looks blue and black in the image I posted. We learn which situations are like that and which aren't. — Andrew M

Cool but I’m not sure how that relates to what I said.

It’s really weird to me that y’all are fine with “experience” but not fine with “Qualia”

So first off everyone here (except Isaac) has said that people experience things. Moreover everyone here has said that you cannot understand words such as “red” or “pain” without seeing a red object or being in pain. This indicates to me that this “experience” is ineffable (or else we would be able to just tell someone what red is without having to show them something red).

The fact that someone only needs to experience pain once to understand what pain means also indicates that these “experiences” are intrinsic.

Furthermore, at least Banno (and I suspect all of you share this opinion) said that the contents of our experience themselves are unimportant. However no one has been able to expressly deny the claim that they are private. Instead everyone has said that if they were private, that would be useless to talk about as there is no way of accessing them, so we should instead focus on the words we use to describe the experience rather than the “how things seem to us” itself. Something like this:

The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (p.100)

But then again, no one is talking about the thing in the box (Qualia), no one is trying to “eff” Qualia. What everyone here advocating for Qualia is trying to do is say that there is something in the box, labeled “Qualia”

I don’t know about immediate apprehension, haven’t seen anyone talking about it recently because it’s probably the most boring property

Personally I would rather obliterate any and all philosophical notions that lead to widespread confusion and false belie — creativesoul

Given that everyone here quining Qualia talks about experiences (except Isaac), what exactly is so problematic about Qualia that is not problematic about experiences?

say the color of the cup, is private, ineffable, and intrinsic if the experience itself consists of, or is existentially dependent upon - in any way - external things like red cups. — creativesoul

Private: I do not know what you’re experiencing when seeing a red cup. As long as we both call it red that’s fine. Again:

The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (p.100)

Private would mean: I do not know what’s in your box. Doesn’t seem to contradict the quote above. Nor the dependence on red cups.

Ineffable: If it were effable you would be able to understand what “red” means without seeing anything red in your life as long as you’re given sufficient explanation. I don’t think either of us thinks that’s possible. There is some new knowledge added when you actually see a red thing for the first time (ask Amy). Again, doesn’t seem to contradict the dependence on red cups.

Intrinsic: The reason I cannot explain red to you without showing you something red is because there is nothing much to describe. You just have to see it. Again, doesn’t seem to contradict the dependence on red cups.

And I assume the “immediate apprehensibility” property is either clear or too boring to discuss so you didn’t mention it.

So which one of those properties is unconvincing? Which ones, in other words, are properties of “Qualia” but not properties of “Experience of red apples”? Because I would argue that the latter falls under the former.

Private: I do not know what you’re experiencing when seeing a red cup. — khaled

I'm sorry, but I'm not sure I understand...

We all know what red cups look like. We know that each and every experience of seeing a red cup always involves seeing red cups. It only follows that we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup for we know that the experience - most definitely - includes red cups. Since we know that that much is true, we also know that what you've said here above is not.

It only follows that we do sometimes know what others are experiencing — creativesoul

Not necessarily. Check my discussion with Banno about this. It is possible for us to be having a different experience and to still have no communication problems.

It is possible for us to be having a different experience and to still have no communication problems. — khaled

Indeed; hence, "one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is".

We're talking about pretheoretical conscious experience...

"Ineffable" denotes that which is unable to be said; that which cannot be spoken. When pretheoretical conscious experience is ineffable, it is unable to be spoken and/or otherwise expressed by the creature having the conscious experience. This makes perfect sense. Some creatures cannot talk about past experience; all the language less ones. A language less creature cannot say anything about their own conscious experience of red cups, for doing so requires talking about what happened and/or is happening, and they've no such ability. Such conscious experience of red cups is ineffable in the sense that it belongs to a creature incapable of speaking.

It only follows that we do sometimes know what others are experiencing
— creativesoul

Not necessarily. Check my discussion with Banno about this. It is possible for us to be having a different experience and to still have no communication problems. — khaled

Irrelevant.

We know that all conscious experience of red cups includes red cups. If you cannot agree, there's not much more to say.

Indeed; hence, "one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is". — Banno

But to say “I do not know what’s in your box” (private) also makes sense. One can divide through by the thing in the box. One can also not. It makes sense not to divide by the thing in the box sometimes. Because we can easily imagine what the world would be like if there were different things in the box. So to be unable to communicate what we’re imagining seems to be a waste to me. You still haven’t given me a good reason why we must divide by the thing in the box.

But also to say “I do not know what’s in your box” (private) also makes sense. — khaled

Now apply the context...

You do not know what another's conscious experience of red cups consists of. Why do you keep saying that?

You do know that another's conscious experience of red cups consists - in part at least - of red cups. There are red cups in the box.

You do not know what another's conscious experience of red cups is. — creativesoul

Right. I know they call it red. That’s it.

With such an admission comes the sudden realization that one has just conceded the argument, because you do know that another's conscious experience of red cups consists - in part at least -of red cups. — creativesoul

I don’t see how that’s the case. I know that their experience consists of what they call red cups. That’s good enough to communicate. But I don’t understand how that’s conceding the argument. Care to explain?

We know that all conscious experience of red cups includes red cups — creativesoul

I’ll only give that we know they call it red. That’s it. Seems to contradict what you literally just said above though. Unless by “we know you are seeing a red cup” you mean “we know that you are seeing what you call a red cup”. Which is fine in my book, but not necessary.

Ineffable" denotes that which is unable to be said; that which cannot be spoken. When pretheoretical conscious experience is ineffable, it is unable to be spoken and/or otherwise expressed by the creature having the conscious experience. This makes perfect sense. Some creatures cannot talk about past experience; all the language less ones — creativesoul

It also makes sense in the case of creatures who can talk about past experience. As long as those creatures cannot just express the experience to someone else such that they don’t need to have it. Again, you cannot explain what “red” is to someone who’s never seen a red object. So the experience is ineffable. You need to see a red object to understand what “red” is

Part of the Cartesian error is to categorize unlike things together based on superficial similarities instead of making natural and functional distinctions. So visualizing, dreaming, imagining, hallucinating, etc., are considered by the Cartesian to be a kind of seeing and perception, when they are not. — Andrew M

But they are kinds of conscious experiences. And the thing about them is you can't just dismiss dreams, hallucinations, etc. as properties in relation to the objects being perceived, since there are no objects, and thus no such relations. But there are still experiences.

I dream of a red apple, and that red apple is a visual experience.

Ineffable" denotes that which is unable to be said; that which cannot be spoken. When pretheoretical conscious experience is ineffable, it is unable to be spoken and/or otherwise expressed by the creature having the conscious experience. This makes perfect sense. Some creatures cannot talk about past experience; all the language less ones
— creativesoul

It also makes perfect sense in the case of creatures who can talk about past experience — khaled

I would agree, but when it comes to people who are supposed to be describing their own conscious experience of red cups, saying that that conscious experience is ineffable is considered a flaw, not a defining feature like it is with language less conscious experience of red cups.

Again, you cannot explain what “red” is to someone who’s never seen a red object. — khaled

I do not see why not...

There are names and descriptions for and/or of unobservables.

Personally I would rather obliterate any and all philosophical notions that lead to widespread confusion and false belief given the sheer power that belief wields in this shared world of ours. — creativesoul

If only you could get everyone else to agree with you.

That is not a wish of mine.

I've found myself unexpectedly surprised on more than one occasion.

here are names and descriptions for and/or of unobservables. — creativesoul

Those unobservables aren't red, nor do they communicate redness.

here are names and descriptions for and/or of unobservables.
— creativesoul

Those unobservables aren't red. — Marchesk

Red is unobservable to the candidate under consideration in that particular example. Being cute/coy by feigning ignorance is nice though.

Slogans with global appeal.

Red, like pain and bitter, is experienced. You can't communicate that to someone who has never had that experience. At best you can tell them there are such experiences, but they won't know what it's like until they experience it themselves.

Unobservables aren't experienced. But they can be described. That's why we don't have words for sonar sensations, but we do for sonar.

I do not see why not...

There are names and descriptions for and/or of unobservables. — creativesoul

Because there is something extra that they will always be missing with those explanations. Which is why when colorblind people see color for the first time they are surprised. Same with deaf people. You can’t describe the thing in the box. Just ask Amy about it.

I would agree, but when it comes to people who are supposed to be describing their own conscious experience of red cups, saying that that conscious experience is ineffable is considered a flaw, not a defining feature like it is with language less conscious experience of red cups. — creativesoul

People label certain experiences with certain words. And then use those words to tell which experience is occurring. But they mostly don’t attempt to describe the experiences (the thing in the box). They can estimate the thing in the box in terms of other things in other boxes (for example: coffee is bitter and sweet) but some cannot be explained in simpler terms. For example “pain” and “red”. There are no words that break down “pain” as an aggregate of multiple experiences

You try to say that all that exists is a box and that nothing more needs to be said about the thing in the box. But ignoring the things in the box results in problems. Such as not being able to explain why people are surprised when they see color for the first time. They knew the word “red” and knew which objects were “red” roughly. But they got something extra when they actually saw the color that surprised them. Your model fails to account for that. And so should be rejected.

There's a huge difference between our reports of conscious experience and conscious experience. No one is saying otherwise. Sure, someone who has never seen a red cup before is going to be surprised by first doing so, especially if they've already learned that there are colors that they cannot see. My model cannot account for that???

Pfft.

Sure, someone who has never seen a red cup before is going to be surprised by first doing so — creativesoul

Why? I have a ready explanation: Because he’d never had that experience before. The experience being that thing in the box. And no amount of describing the color red would have had the same effect as seeing it (ineffable)

In your view, where there are only boxes and no need to talk of what’s in them, how can you explain why that person was surprised?

A better example: Assume for instance that there was a colorblind person so good at distinguishing shades of gray that no one knew he was colorblind.

You could put 100s of colored cups in front of him and he would be able to tell you the colors perfectly.

Why is he still surprised after undergoing surgery that allows him to see colors?

Unobservables aren't experienced. But they can be described. — Marchesk

Red is unobservable to those who cannot see it. The description counts as the totality of the conscious experience of red regarding such people.

In your view, where there are only boxes and no need to talk of what’s in them... — khaled

Never a good sign...

That's not even remotely close to anything I've written here. It's closer to the exact opposite.

Be well .