And then conceded that the intent behind the expression is as I described. I’m not proposing a neurological theory here, I’m saying what the intent behind the expression “the apple is red” is — khaled

The intent is that the apple corresponds to the public meaning of 'red'. Anything less and the expression is useless.

there's no phenomenological evidence for it — Isaac

How so? I definitely see something when looking at a red apple. And I do not know if you see the same thing. Maybe what you’re seeing I would describe as “blue”.

The intent is that the apple corresponds to the public meaning of 'red' — Isaac

Correct. That is exactly what I said.

When I tell you “the apple is red” I am saying “the apple produces the experience we all dubbed red”. — khaled

Does the apple produce some sort of experience (sight, taste, etc). Yes. So when you describe an apple as red you are saying that it produces the experience we all chose to call red right? That is the public meaning.

Does this imply that we are experiencing the same thing when looking at the apple?

I definitely see something when looking at a red apple. — khaled

Yes. A red apple.

I do not know if you see the same thing. — khaled

If you ask people to pass you the red apple, do you generally find they pass you the one you were expecting?

Maybe what you’re seeing I would describe as “blue”. — khaled

How? We're you taught to use the word 'blue' incorrectly?

Correct. Does this imply that we are experiencing the same thing when looking at the apple? — khaled

Yes. We're experiencing the apple. As I said, our response to the colour of the apple will be different, but this is what our experience actually consists of, it's not the subject matter of our experience (that's the apple) it is the constitution of it.

That's rather the point at issue.

Smells and tastes are words that point to certain qualia. “Red” points to a certain experience. When I tell you “the apple is red” I am saying “the apple produces the experience we all dubbed red”. — khaled

"Red" doesn't point to the experience of red. If it did, we wouldn't need to write "red" differently from "the experience of red"; they would mean exactly the same thing. But further, there is no one thing that the word "red" might point to; it's one of the classic examples that seem to show that words do not always point to something.

This experience itself is very real, yet incomparable. — khaled

There's something a bit odd going on here. If "red" points to the experience of red, and they are incomparable, then what you call "red" is different to what I call"red"...

Are you familiar with Wittgenstein's, or Austin's, or any, of the large numebr of arguents form the middle of last century that laid to rest the notion that the meaning of a word is the thing to which it points?

...do you know what a homomorphism is? — khaled

I'm not sure. I'm aware that it is a term used in maths, but you seem to want to use it in a novel fashion. I'm cautious about using technical terms out of context, so I didn't share your use of the term.

Yes. A red apple. — Isaac

More accurately “what we all call a red apple”. Public meaning and all that.

If you ask people to pass you the red apple, do you generally find they pass you the one you were expecting? — Isaac

Correct. That is no evidence to indicate they have the same experience when holding the red apple as I do when I hold it.

How? We're you taught to use the word 'blue' incorrectly? — Isaac

No. I would be using it correctly even in that case. Again, if your red is my blue, we would have no issues of communication. We would both call the apple red despite having different perceptions of it.

Here is a simple example: Say I was wearing glasses that inverted all the color going into my eye. And at the same time, I had a device attached to my mouth that would change any utterance of color I make to an utterance of the inverse color. So if I was about to say “red” it would immediately and seamlessly translate that to “blue”

Now assume we both looked at a red apple and couldn’t see each other (so you don’t know I have those devices on). We are asked to describe the color of said apple. We both say “red”

There you go, an example of having different perceptions of the object but still being able to communicate.

Yes. We're experiencing the apple. As I said, our response to the colour of the apple will be different, but this is what our experience actually consists of, it's not the subject matter of our experience (that's the apple) it is the constitution of it. — Isaac

So in this previous example am I still seeing a red apple with those devices on? Even though the light coming into my eye is inverted? That’s really the point at issue here


If red was truly only public meaning and did not have anything to do with the experience itself then yes, I would be seeing red despite the fact that the color going into my eye is blue (not very technical but you know what I mean). Doesn’t seem plausible to me.

then what you call "red" is different to what I call"red"... — Banno

Not necessarily but it could be different. To say that they are different would mean you compared them and found that they are.

I'm not sure. I'm aware that it is a term used in maths — Banno

It’s something in set theory. It’s not about numbers. So using it here is fine since we’re not talking about numbers. I’d recommend you watch even a short 10 min video on it or something it’s not a difficult concept.

Are you familiar with Wittgenstein's, or Austin's, or any, of the large numebr of arguents form the middle of last century that laid to rest the notion that the meaning of a word is the thing to which it points? — Banno

I would be most familiar with Wittgenstein but even then not very.

Also I’m curious about how you respond to my example to Isaac so I’d appreciate it if you took a look. The question is: Am I still seeing red with both of those devices on?

Yes. A red apple. — Isaac


More accurately “what we all call a red apple”. Public meaning and all that. — khaled

That's what 'a red apple' means. adding 'what we call...' to it implies that there might actually be a red apple other than what we call one.

If you ask people to pass you the red apple, do you generally find they pass you the one you were expecting? — Isaac


Correct. That is no evidence to indicate they have the same experience when holding the red apple as I do when I hold it. — khaled

I doubt they do. As I said, people's response to the red apple will vary. Their response to the colour is not the colour.

Say I was wearing glasses that inverted all the color going into my eye. — khaled

Colour doesn't go into your eye. Photons go into your eye. Colour is a public concept.

So in this previous example I just said, am I still seeing a red apple with those devices on? Even though the light coming into my eye is inverted? — khaled

Yes.

Not necessarily but it could be different. To say that they are different would mean you compared them and found that they are. — khaled

Think on that a bit. If the meaning of "red" is the experience it points to, then what you call red and what I call red are different - because your experiences are not mine.

But overwhelmingly, we do get by talking about red things.

Hence, the meaning of "red" cannot be the experience it points to.

That's what 'a red apple' means. adding 'what we call...' to it implies that there might actually be a red apple other than what we call one. — Isaac

Not necessarily. If there wasn’t such a notion then both “red apple” and “what we call red apple” is identical

Colour doesn't go into your eye. Photons go into your eye. Colour is a public concept. — Isaac

I knew you were gonna nitpick but I just couldn’t edit it fast enough

Yes — Isaac

I don’t think many would answer that but if that’s your answer then I see why you’d say qualia don’t exist. Seems nonsensical to me to say that if I’m literally forced to lie about the color I’m seeing that I’m actually seeing the color that is the lie. If the speech transforming device was removed I’d call the apple “blue”

Am I still seeing red with both of those devices on? — khaled

Isaac's answer seems cogent and accurate.

I don’t think many would answer that but if that’s your answer then I see why you’d say qualia don’t exist. Seems nonsensical to me to say that if I’m literally forced to lie about the color I’m seeing that I’m actually seeing the color that is the lie. — khaled

You don't see a colour in your brain. Why Am I having to repeat this? You do not see a colour. There's no part of your brain which represents a particular colour. It doesn't happen, not there, absent, not present, unrepresented, lacking, missing, devoid.

That's rather the point at issue. — Banno

Anyways the main contention seems to really be this:

That's what 'a red apple' means. adding 'what we call...' to it implies that there might actually be a red apple other than what we call one. — Isaac

Care to argue for why there is not such a thing?

↪Isaac

That's rather the point at issue. — Banno — khaled

It's not at issue. We don't just make up neuroscience to have a discussion about it. There is no part of your brain which shows you a colour, it cannot happen, brains are made up of neurons, not colours.

anyways

That's what 'a red apple' means. adding 'what we call...' to it implies that there might actually be a red apple other than what we call one.
— Isaac

Care to argue for why there is not such a thing? — khaled

The apple has a taste - two ontological commitments, that there is an apple, and that it has a taste. Why the third, that in addition to there being an apple and there being it's taste, there is also 'the way' it tastes? — Isaac

I would surmise that it is because the taste exists as an experience, and it does not exist unless it is experienced by someone. Therefore, it's the way it tastes for someone, or when someone experiences it. That is, the way it tastes is the taste experience.

The sensation of taste cannot have those properties to me because those are public words, those properties have public meanings. — Isaac

You mean that the sensation of taste cannot have those properties only to you. That doesn't mean that it cannot have those properties to you. But neither does it mean that it has those properties to everyone.

I can't possibly think one thing is 'sweet' whilst other people think a different thing is 'sweet' — Isaac

Then what of intuition pump #10? Perhaps perceptual norms affect linguistic norms?

I might be able to detect sweetness in something that other people cannot, but what sweetness is must be public. — Isaac

If it's not sweet/bitter for everybody, then maybe it's only public for some people but not for others?

We learn what 'sweet' means by experiencing the use of the word in our shared world, not our private one. — Isaac

Yes, but "if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, then the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." So our spectra could very well be inverted without either of us noticing.

You don't see a colour. Why Am I having to repeat this? You do not see a colour. There's no part of your brain which represents a particular colour. It doesn't happen, not there, absent, not present, unrepresented, lacking, missing , devoid. — Isaac

Then how do we distinguish colours? How is it that I am able to fetch a red object upon request?

I’d recommend you watch even a short 10 min video on it or something it’s not a difficult concept. — khaled

I read a bit of Wiki and Wolfram and so on - the Britannica article was the best - but so what?

That's what 'a red apple' means. adding 'what we call...' to it implies that there might actually be a red apple other than what we call one. — khaled

I've written extensively here about model-dependant realism. I don't think there's anyone wants to go through all that again.

If the meaning of "red" is the experience it points to, then what you call red and what I call red are different - because your experiences are not mine. — Banno

That I own a car and you own a car does not eliminate the possibility that we own identical cars. But if you want to say that one car being “yours” and the other being “mine” makes them different cars then yes, we cannot be referring to the same thing when saying red

But overwhelmingly, we do get by talking about red things. — Banno

That we are referring to different things does not imply that we won’t get by talking about red things. It would seriously help if you knew what an isomorphism is.

It doesn’t matter what I am referring to when I say red and when you say red as long as the relationship is the same. I’ll call my experience that red refers to X and I’ll call yours Y. As I was saying, X could equal Y. But even if they’re not, we will have no issues of communication if:

Everything that produces X for me produces Y for you. That’s roughly what an isomorphism is. That’s what I mean by “the relationship is the same”

If that is the case and I see blood for example, that would produce the experience X, and I would promptly call it “red”. If when you see blood you get the experience Y you will ALSO promptly call it “red”. Therefore there is no issue of communication see?

However if grass produces Y for you you’re likely colorblind. And it is no longer an isomorphism

could you link it so I don’t have to rummage through 44 pages?

It would seriously help if you knew what a homomorphism is. — khaled

It would seriously help if you would explain its relevance. Just using the word does not help.

Meh. Time for dinner. This is not interesting.

my entire comment could have been summed up as “We will have no issues of communication if our table of “experiences to words” was an isomorphism” that’s the relevance. But I explained without using the word so no worries

I would surmise that it is because the taste exists as an experience, and it does not exist unless it is experienced by someone. Therefore, it's the way it tastes for someone, or when someone experiences it. That is, the way it tastes is the taste experience. — Luke

But this is not true. The taste doesn't exist as an experience for someone. The taste is a public concept. The experience is a unique set of memories, emotions, desires, sematic associations etc resulting from the taste.

You mean that the sensation of taste cannot have those properties only to you. That doesn't mean that it cannot have those properties to you. But neither does it mean that it has those properties to everyone. — Luke

It does have those properties to everyone who knows what taste is. The learning of those properties is what constitutes learning what taste is.

I can't possibly think one thing is 'sweet' whilst other people think a different thing is 'sweet' — Isaac


Then what of intuition pump #10? Perhaps perceptual norms affect linguistic norms? — Luke

How could they? I don't understand the process you're suggesting here.

I might be able to detect sweetness in something that other people cannot, but what sweetness is must be public. — Isaac


If it's not sweet/bitter for everybody, then maybe it's only public for some people but not for others? — Luke

It's 'sweet'/'bitter' that are public. I might think the coffee is bitter, you might think it less so, but 'bitter' is a public concept, we're both talking about the same thing. What's different is our ability to detect it in the coffee.

We learn what 'sweet' means by experiencing the use of the word in our shared world, not our private one. — Isaac


Yes, but "if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, then the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." So our spectra could very well be inverted without either of us noticing. — Luke

No, our spectra could not possibly be inverted. There is no neurological way this could happen. Neurons cannot represent particular colours.

You don't see a colour. Why Am I having to repeat this? You do not see a colour. There's no part of your brain which represents a particular colour. It doesn't happen, not there, absent, not present, unrepresented, lacking, missing , devoid. — Isaac


Then how do we distinguish colours? How is it that I am able to fetch a red object upon request? — Luke

Receptors in the retina send trichromous signals to the retinal basal ganglia. These are combined in the V1 area of the occipital cortex to form signals responsive to combinations of wavelengths, different combinations will (normally) fire different neurons (or fuzzy combinations fire clusters of neurons - we're not sure yet). These start two chain reaction processes - one along the dorsal pathway, and one along the ventral pathway. The former leads toward responses, the latter toward recall. All along the signals are suppressed by regions higher in the chain to minimise surprise signals. Eventually such chains will reach a response (fetching the red apple) and a recall (other things which are red apples from your memory), as well as emotions, desires etc.

could you link it so I don’t have to rummage through 44 pages? — khaled

I meant on this site in general, not on this thread. It's mostly in the 'What's it like' discussion. We also had one on direct vs indirect realism.

Time for dinner. This is not interesting. — Banno

Yep, time to go to work. But you're having dinner at eight o'clock in the morning! You Australians are weird.

You have to remember we live about twelve hours in your future. It's already Friday night here, and the 'roo is currying.

The taste is a public concept. The experience is a unique set of memories, emotions, desires, sematic associations etc resulting from the taste. — Isaac

Wow - all that results from a public concept?

I don't understand the process you're suggesting here. — Isaac

You said: "I can't possibly think one thing is 'sweet' whilst other people think a different thing is 'sweet'"

Intuition pump #10 says: "phenol-thio-urea., a substance which tastes very bitter to three-fourths of humanity, and as tasteless as water to the rest. Is it bitter?"

I might think the coffee is bitter, you might think it less so, but 'bitter' is a public concept, we're both talking about the same thing. What's different is our ability to detect it in the coffee. — Isaac

Why must it come down to a matter of ability?

No, our spectra could not possibly be inverted. — Isaac

Sure, not if we don't see colours.

Receptors in the retina sens trichromous signals to the retinal basal ganglia. These are combined in the V1 area of the occipital cortex to form signals responsive to combinations of wavelengths, different combinations will (normally) fire different neurons (or fuzzy combination fire clusters of neurons - we're not sure yet). These start two chain reaction processes - one along the dorsal pathway, and one along the ventral pathway. The former leads toward responses, the latter toward recall. All along the signals are suppressed by regions higher in the chain to minimise surprise signals. Eventually such chains will reach a response (fetching the red apple) and a recall (other things which are red apples from your memory), as well as emotions, desires etc. — Isaac

So why does it seem like we see colours?

You have to remember we live about twelve hours in your future. It's already Friday night here, and the 'roo is currying. — Banno

Cool. Can you give me Saturday's lottery numbers as soon as you get them? I'm going to make a fortune...

Not a problem. Because your technology is so far behind, it usually takes about twelve hours before your news gets to us... So should be able to send them to you Saturday arvo.

The taste doesn't exist as an experience for someone. The taste is a public concept. — Isaac

The experience is a unique set of memories, emotions, desires, sematic associations etc resulting from the taste. — Isaac

So if someone doesn’t understand the public concept they do not have an experience? What about children then, do they have experiences?

And could you elaborate on what the “public meaning” of red exactly is? Because I would argue that the public meaning is a reference to an experience.

Anyways I just went to the "What is it like to experience X" thread and the first thing thing I find is this:

If I have experience X and I want to get another person to understand what it was for me to go through experience X, I have only two imperfect methods. Put them through experience Y which I think is similar enough to experience X to invoke the same feelings, or describe experience X in terms of experiences A, B and C which they've already had and recall. Neither are really any better than the other, they each have their merits in different situations, neither actually communicate what experience X was, for me. — Isaac

Do you still hold this position? Because it seems exactly like something I would say. Here you recognise that there is an experience X that cannot be communicated 100% accurately. Smells like Qualia to me. And you are not making up neuroscience, you're speaking on a phenomenological level.

It's not at issue. We don't just make up neuroscience to have a discussion about it. There is no part of your brain which shows you a colour, it cannot happen, brains are made up of neurons, not colours. — Isaac

I wasn't making up neuroscience, I was reporting phenomonological evidence for qualia. We certainly feel like we have some experience of "redness" when looking at a red screen (or else we would have never come up with the word "qualia"). I am not then saying "Thus this chunk of my brain has 'red' in it". You can talk about mental life without implying anything about the brain.

Also I don't see how model dependent realism would do away with qualia anyways. We can create a model that incorporates it. See the example I gave to Banno.