Darwinian advantage — Olivier5

The important thing would be the habitual response of consuming or not consuming. But to get there, you claim we store particular qualia as memories. Really? Like, the whole thing, the exact smell of the rancid bacon? I'm skeptical. You picked up on a characteristic, an aspect of the smell you were experiencing, one that you were already familiar with and had a prepared response to, but it was hard to pick out at first because of all the other aspects and factors in play.

It's still just not clear to me what this proves. You assume that for the response to kick in, at some point the current "input" must get compared to an exemplar you've stored in memory. That might be how you'd program a robot (although I guess connectionists would say no) but I don't see any reason to believe that our bodies work that way.

So you would agree that explaining function doesnt explain qualia. That's a pretty common view. — frank

Yes, but one could suppose, like Chalmers has, that qualia is tied to function, or rich information streams, via some non physical scientific law.

think qualia are functional. If they exists, they exist for a reason. — Olivier5

Even if so, we can’t communicate what it’s like, so we can’t know that from the functioning of a bat or robot. Unless it’s the same as ours. Bat sonar might be like vision as Dawkins has suggested, or it might be like a blind persons use of a walking stick, which the functioning of their nervous system could tell us. But if not, then we’re in the dark.

But to get there, you claim we store particular qualia as memories. Really? Like, the whole thing, the exact smell of the rancid bacon? I'm skeptical. — Srap Tasmaner

I make no guesses about how memory works either. I've read a few books. It's complicated alright, so let's perhaps not go into how it works. What I can say in confidence is that I (and any animal with a sense of smell) can connect a present sensation, a current smell, to another one perceived in the past. I did once ate rancid walnuts (I meant walnuts not chestnuts). This smell... I can recognise it when it happens, describe it somehow (bitter in a dirty way), but I cannot summon it on my tongue, so to speak, I cannot recreate it at will. So our memory (or perhaps our imagination, as well as our language) has certain limits.

The important functional point is to be able to recognise a smell, to be able to connect it to another perceptive event(s) that happened in the past, because the whole point is to learn from past experience when interpreting new ones... Without this ability, a sense of smell would be useless to the animal, and to me as well. Every smell would be an entirely new smell.

Seems like it’s doing violence to ordinary language to deny there’s something it’s like to taste coffee. — Marchesk

Actually, that phrase: "something it is like to..." is what does violence to the language. It's a recent invention found almost only in philosophical discourse, and so is inherently fraught.

Coffee has a taste.

iIts inherent in the subjective differences between individuals. Thus why we recognize that people have different tastes. “Oh, so coffee tastes good for you? I can’t stand that bitter taste!”

Also, I’m sure you recall the various debates with The Great Whatever, and how he liked to bring up the ancient Cyreneac school of philosophy, and their focus on individual sensation given the widely recognized problems of perception. So not entirely an invention of modern philosophers abusing language.

we can’t communicate what it’s like — Marchesk

I guess that was not part of the initial Darwinian advantage. The system evolved over eons to provide each individual its own capacity to make important, effective dietary and other choices. Affability was never part of the deal.

Language was invented by human beings, it's not a biological thing. It's symbolic in nature. This means it uses symbols of real life stuff, like a stone, a horse or in this case an olfactive sensation, it gives them names. It does so by building sets and tagging them with a word or other symbol. A horse is an animal of the species equus equus. If two people know what the sets and the tags are, they can communicate somehow about those stuff, relating one symbol with another. They can say: "I rode a horse today" or, more likely in my country, "I ate horse meat today", and this helps them coordinate and learn and all that jazz. But the symbol is generally arbitrary and does not express fully all the existential content of horse riding (or eating). It just tags it.

Words are just tokens for the real deal. The map cannot be the territory. Symbols by themselves are always ontologically hollow.

The important functional point is to be able to recognise a smell, to be able to connect it to another perceptive event(s) that happened in the past, because the whole point is to learn from past experience when interpreting new ones. — Olivier5

Of course.

I'm just not sure the original perceptual event should be characterized as a thing we could file away and then check new things against. Maybe the research shows it's exactly like that, but I don't see grounds for assuming it must be like that. The argument given, that there has to be a smell that we smell, is not convincing.

So let's look to the use...

" ...there’s something it’s like to taste coffee"

OK, let's call it Albert.

Albert isn't the taste of coffee; it's how this coffee tastes to me, here, now... right?

So with my next sip of coffee, I won't become reacquainted with Albert. That will be a new, different something it’s like to taste coffee.

Then Albert is not what the Cyreneac school had in mind.

Or is your next sip Albert? The only thing you have to go on in your memory of Albert. Is this next sip slightly sweeter? Is there a difference that remains unrecognised? Is you second sip Albert or Alberta?

SO Albert has to be the taste here, now.

Nor is Albert your memory of the taste - your memory of Albert is not Albert.

Nor is the name "Albert" a tag for something we share. By definition, Albert is only yours. You can talk about Albert, but like the beetle, what role can Albert possibly play in a language game? You can't order Albert at a coffee shop.

Albert's sole use seems to be in philosophical threads such as this.

So why bother?

The argument is that Albert demonstrates something special about consciousness. The idea that something as obvious as consciousness could be in need of the ephemeral, indistinct assistance of Albert is laughable.

I'm somewhat astonished that otherwise coherent and sound thinkers as your good selves have a place for such a notion.

Intuition pump #1: watching you eat cauliflower.
There is a way this cauliflower tastes to you right now. Well, no. the taste changes even as you eat it, even as the texture changes as you chew. — Banno

Is Albert the taste as the coffee hits the tip of your tongue? Is Albert the taste as you swirl it around your mouth? Is Albert the taste as you breath out through your nose, registering the fragrance? Is Albert all of these?

How exactly do you individuate Albert?

The argument given, that there has to be a smell that we smell, is not convincing. — Srap Tasmaner

Consider that you can reliably identify the actual chemistry of your food by tasting it, at least for those chemicals that have a taste. You can decide: "there is too little salt in this soups to my taste", knowing reliably that with a pinch of salt or two your soup will taste just fine. A cook can adjust the level of his ingredients throughout the process, add more ginger or paprica if need be.

If I prepare three coffees, one with no sugar, one with much sugar, and one average, anyone who tastes them can tell which is which.

So there is such a phenomenon as "too much sugar in my coffee" or "too little salt in your soup". You can measure the actual chemistry of soups and coffees, and compare this objective scientific data with your own sense of how much or little salt or sugar you taste, and the two will map to each other pretty well.

Tastes work. Quantitatively, objectively, they measure important stuff, like the content of sugar and salts in our food. Such a system cannot logically work without some ID system for tastes, some qualitative perceptual signal, a signature, recognisable somehow from the perceptual signals of other chemicals. Memorizable somehow. And then this individual perceptual signature for say, sugar, can also code for solution dosage by way of modulating the intensity of the signal.

Now we can ask ourselves how our senses work, a scientific question, or wonder what is the ontology of tastes, a philosophical question. But let's be clear that everyone can taste the difference between sugar and hot pepper. Especially at high dosage.

Therefore qualitative differences in perception exist.

Enter the little qualia, dancing in circles... I mean the modest, phenomenological qualia: mere qualitative coding for generally quantitative signals that make up our robust, biological, life-afirming senses.

Our senses honed by evolution, the source of all our experiences, they need some way of tagging, identifying qualitatively the signal of certain significant chemicals, or wavelengths, or sound signatures. It's literally "color coding".

So why bother? — Banno

Chalmers said we might one day have a theory of consciousness that allows us to predict the phenomenal consciousness of a bee, or

What
It's
Like
To
Be
A
Bee.

Dennett says there's no such thing. Maybe, but its too early to judge that. And Chalmers notion is exciting and fascinating.

You know it is.

0

Nor is the name "Albert" a tag for something we share. By definition, Albert is only yours. You can talk about Albert, but like the beetle, what role can Albert possibly play in a language game? You can't order Albert at a coffee shop.

Albert's sole use seems to be in philosophical threads such as this.

So why bother? — Banno

Because we are really talking about the qualia of consciousness, which in your case is the experience of Albert. I agree with you that it would be a more meaningful conversation if we were directly discussing the qualia of consciousness - which are experiences.

Re Albert though, to a P.Zombie, every sip would be identical, as would every experience - neither painful, or pleasant.

Albert isn't the taste of coffee; it's how this coffee tastes to me, here, now... right?

So with my next sip of coffee, I won't become reacquainted with Albert. That will be a new, different something it’s like to taste coffee. — Banno

A cup of coffee usually tastes pretty much the same throughout for me, unless I forget to stir it, then it tastes sweeter at the end of the cup than at the start (I have mine with sugar).

By definition, Albert is only yours. You can talk about Albert, but like the beetle, what role can Albert possibly play in a language game? — Banno

What difference does it make? My conscious experience is not a language game. How things seem to me is not a language game. And if Albert is ineffable, then I can't talk about Albert - at least not in great detail.

How exactly do you individuate Albert? — Banno

The same way you individuate any of your tastes - unless you think there are none?

Chalmers said we might one day have a theory of consciousness that allows us to predict the phenomenal consciousness of a bee, — frank

"...predict the phenomenal consciousness of a bee..."

I hope you miswrote. What could that possibly mean? I gather it's different to predicting what the bee will do next? Are you suggesting that we might be able to predict hat the bee would enjoy a bit of Borage flower?

Try to make some sense. It will help the thread considerably.

which in your case is the experience of Albert. — Pop

More poor language skills. No, it's Albert. Not the experience of Albert.

And to those reading over Pop's shoulder - this nonsense is why qualia are unhelpful.

A cup of coffee usually tastes pretty much the same throughout for me, unless I forget to stir it, then it tastes sweeter at the end of the cup than at the start (I have mine with sugar). — Luke

Yes. So identifying Albert fails.

And if Albert is ineffable, then I can't talk about Albert - at least not in great detail. — Luke

I agree. So, to be consistent you should stop posting to this thread.

Such a system cannot logically work without some ID system for tastes, some qualitative perceptual signal, recognisable somehow from the perceptual signals of other chemicals. — Olivier5

I have no expertise in biochemistry, but I would assume what we're talking about is a chemical we ingest or smell binding to a chemical within our bodies, and that binding triggering some other effects that eventuate in various bodily responses. Some of the biochemical interactions could naturally enough be characterized in terms of "information", and if the pathways of response are developed through experience, you could think of that as "encoding" that information. I don't see any reason to be suspicious of such a story, but I have no idea really. What I would find unlikely is that there is anything like a copy of the "input" filed away somewhere. There's our previous response, which is probably strengthened by repetition, but again I don't know. And I'm still not sure how you expect to point at something somewhere in a human interacting with their environment and say, "Right there! That's the quale."

I guess part of my resistance is that I assume the whole point of any encyclopedia compiling we do is to develop of repertoire of responses and options to consider as a response. That's pretty crudely put, but the point is I'm not sure you need the encyclopedia as a separate thing at all, when you could just have the responses.

More poor language skills. No, it's Albert. Not the experience of Albert. — Banno

You know Albert, but not through experience? :chin:

Consider that you can reliably identify the actual chemistry of your food by tasting it, at least for those chemicals who have a taste. You can decide: "there is too little salt in this soups to my taste", knowing reliably that with a pinch of salt or two your soup will taste just fine. A cook can adjust the level of his ingredients throughout the process, add more ginger or paprica if need be. — Olivier5

Note the vacillation between qualia being just the commonplace of how something tastes and the ineffable how-it-seems-to-me?

And somehow qualia are not nonsense.

You know Albert, — Pop

Not I. The defenders of qualia claim to know him.

Have a read of the SEP article.

Yes. So identifying Albert fails. — Banno

No, the point is that, even in one cup of coffee, the taste can change from start to finish. But it still tastes like coffee, overall. Just like I can distinguish between two different brands of coffee, but can't explain that difference in flavour.

And if Albert is ineffable, then I can't talk about Albert - at least not in great detail.
— Luke

I agree. So, to be consistent you should stop posting to this thread. — Banno

I shouldn't defend the claim that qualia are ineffable, because qualia are ineffable? Interesting argument. :brow:

No, the point is that, even in one cup of coffee, the taste can change from start to finish. — Luke

Indeed - so which is Albert?

SO much bad philosophy comes from folk 'effing the ineffable. Keep going - you are making my point better than I could.

If @Isaac can know that he is conscious, then he is capable of reporting on his mental activity, no?

Indeed - so which is Albert?

SO much bad philosophy comes form folk 'effing the ineffable. Keep going - you are making my point better than I could. — Banno

You've already defined it: "how this coffee tastes to me, here, now", at one point in time. I'm saying that the taste of a cup of coffee can change from the first sip to the last. How is this making your point? What is your point?

You've already defined it: "how this coffee tastes to me, here, now", at one point in time. — Luke

Not my definition. I borrowed it in order to show that it is a nonsense - literally, it has no sense; except in extending philosophical threads beyond endurance.

It's on a par with the little man who wasn't there.

I guess part of my resistance is that I assume the whole point of any encyclopedia compiling we do is to develop of repertoire of responses and options to consider as a response. That's pretty crudely put, but the point is I'm not sure you need the encyclopedia as a separate thing at all, when you could just have the responses. — Srap Tasmaner

If that works for you, why not? It doesn't work for me. I see the subjective experience as the font of all knowledge.

It's on a par with the little man who wasn't there. — Banno

Can you taste your coffee and find it too strong, with not enough sugar or milk?

Not my definition. I borrowed it in order to show that it is a nonsense - literally, it has no sense; except in extending philosophical threads beyond endurance. — Banno

If the nature of conscious experience is not amenable to philosophical discussion, then so be it.

Since you're invoking Wittgenstein, what do you make of his remark that I quoted earlier?:

78. Compare knowing and saying:

how many metres high Mont Blanc is —
how the word “game” is used —
how a clarinet sounds.

Someone who is surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it is perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third.

I see the subjective experience as the font of all knowledge. — Olivier5

:up: It was put very well by somebody on another thread, but I can not remember who. It went something like; every experience creates a note, in sequence the notes create a tune - this is what we dance to! I love it :smile:

In the case of the coffee. Every sip is a note, but the whole cup is a tune. Some tunes are better then others. How would it be without them?