For a start, the coffee would undoubtedly signal one response to maybe' sweetness' in one part of the olfactory system, and another to maybe 'sourness' in the occipital system in response to say labelling (the label 'Bitter Coffee' for example). so which one would be 'the way it tasted to me''? — Isaac

Both bitter and sweet, obviously...

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taste

You said:

Consciousness is just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity and it's caused by the neurons which produce language, movement and other awareness-mediated responses being stimulated by the neurons constituting the processing of sensory inputs to which that awareness relates.

That's a terrible definition of consciousness. Consciousness is more than "just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity". You're conflating being conscious with reports of consciousness. They're not the same thing. Not even remotely.

You said "Reporting on mental activity isn't even a necessary condition for consciousness, let alone a sufficient one."

That claim is self-evident. Again, reporting consciousness is not the same thing as BEING conscious. Do you think it is??? What an absurdity.

To make such a claim requires (as far as I can tell) an empirical data-set which includes people being conscious but without any reporting activity going on.

Are you ever conscious when you're not doing any reporting activity? Are you ever in pain without telling anyone about it? Yes, you are.

In order to acquire that data-set you'd need a measure of consciousness so that you can tell the people with no reporting activity are nonetheless conscious. I just wanted to get clear what that measure is you're using, otherwise I can't have any real understanding of what you're saying.

You need a data-set to tell you that people are conscious even if they're not reporting it? No, you don't. That's silly.

I don't really know what 'first-person subjective experience' is in this context.

Lame.

You're conflating being conscious with reports of consciousness. They're not the same thing. Not even remotely — RogueAI

That claim is self-evident. — RogueAI

Lame — RogueAI

You responded to a series of reasoned posts with an insult, an appeal to self evidence (self evident to you) and a bare assertion. Make an argument engaging with posts or the source material.

@Isaac
If I give you a paralytic agent, you'll be conscious, but your reporting function will be off-line.

The two are not identical.

OK, let's start with this one. I said:

You're conflating being conscious with reports of consciousness. They're not the same thing. Not even remotely

Do you think reports of consciousness are the same thing as consciousness itself? That's absurd. What more needs to be said against that? Obviously, you can be conscious without reporting about it. Do you disagree with this?

Yes. It is obviously true that reports of consciousness and consciousness itself are different things. In fact, this is so obviously true, I suspect that people who conflate the two aren't arguing in good faith, and it's frustrating.

I think he means that a person must be able to report or have access to a report, not that they're only conscious when they are reporting.

We're way off the rails of the article, though.

Dennett's goal was not to slam dunk, but to just shift the burden regarding qualia.

What would it take, in your mind, to do that? What evidence would convince you?

I was listening to a philosopher (I think it was Searle) who said (paraphrasing), "Imagine scientists come out with a report that says, "You know how you thought you were conscious? Turns out you're not. Here's the proof." You wouldn't believe it, no matter how good the evidence is".

That's where I'm at. There's no argument or evidence that is going to get me to think, 'Hmmm...maybe I don't have qualia after all..." Consciousness/qualia deniers are like flat-earthers. They even argue the same way, retreating into stuff like "well, I don't know what that means" when they get pressed into a corner. As I said, it's frustrating talking to such people. I probably shouldn't.

:lol: I probably shouldnt either.
Over and out :up:

:lol: I probably shouldnt either. — frank

There's no argument or evidence that is going to get me to think, 'Hmmm...maybe I don't have qualia after all..." — RogueAI

I guess I'll take you both at your word that you're not prepared to discuss it seriously and leave it at that. I wish you would've saved us some time and not engaged.

fdrake, referencing an authority like Searle IS taking the discussion seriously (I can't find the exact quote-I think it was a Ted Talk). The point is germane: no matter what anyone says to you, no matter what arguments they give or evidence they show, you're not going to conclude you're unconscious. That would be absurd. Do you agree? Or could you be persuaded into thinking you're a zombie? No, you couldn't! You know you're conscious. How can you not know that? This is why these discussions are frustrating. You know you're not a zombie. You know nothing anyone can say to you will convince you you're a zombie. That was my entire point in paraphrasing Searle.

And I also tried to discuss this with you seriously. I'll repost:

OK, let's start with this one. I said:

" You're conflating being conscious with reports of consciousness. They're not the same thing. Not even remotely"

Do you think reports of consciousness are the same thing as consciousness itself? That's absurd. What more needs to be said against that? Obviously, you can be conscious without reporting about it. Do you disagree with this?

Would you care to comment on this? Are reports of consciousness the same thing as consciousness itself? Obviously not, so Isaac's claim:

Consciousness is just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity

is wrong, isn't it? There's more to consciousness than "just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity".

Dennett has his own schematic for sensory processing in the brain. Are you familiar with it? What's your assessment of it? — frank

I'm passing familiar, but only in that it's been brought up as being compatible with a Bayesian inference model (which is my preferred model). If you have any sources, they might be relevant here?

You're conflating being conscious with reports of consciousness. They're not the same thing. Not even remotely. — RogueAI

I said 'reports of mental activity', not 'reports of consciousness'.

Are you ever conscious when you're not doing any reporting activity? — RogueAI

No, it doesn't seem so. Look at the memory studies of dream states, there seems to be an extremely strong connection between reporting activities and consciousness. I can't actually think of a contemporary model of consciousness in cognitive sciences which doesn't include reporting. I expect there is one, it's a very wide field, but the inclusion of reporting activity is certainly a common view. When you're conscious, some process is switched on which allows reporting of mental activity to working memory, activities which are not thus reported are those we're not 'conscious' of.

I think he means that a person must be able to report or have access to a report, not that they're only conscious when they are reporting. — frank

Sorry everyone. 'Reporting' means logging to working memory. I should have made that clear.

On second thoughts, though, less sorry because I don't think I've written anything so stupid as to warrant an assumption that I'd mean something like "we're only conscious when we're talking". A little charity (or inquiry) might help, in addition to me being more clear about my terms.

I said 'reports of mental activity', not 'reports of consciousness'.

OK, you're conflating mental activity with reports of mental activity. The point is the same: consciousness/mental activity is different than reports of same. Agreed?

"Are you ever conscious when you're not doing any reporting activity?"

"No, it doesn't seem so."

That is logically equivalent to: you are not conscious when you are not doing reporting activities. Is that the claim you're making?

I guess I'll take you both at your word that you're not prepared to discuss it seriously and leave it at that. I wish you would've saved us some time and not engaged. — fdrake

In what field other than the whole consciousness/qualia field is this...

no matter what arguments they give or evidence they show, you're not going to conclude you're unconscious. That would be absurd. Do you agree? Or could you be persuaded into thinking you're a zombie? No, you couldn't! You know you're conscious. How can you not know that? This is why these discussions are frustrating. You know you're not a zombie. You know nothing anyone can say to you will convince you you're a zombie. — RogueAI

...considered an argument?

There's something I find so odd about all this. The counter-arguments to any questioning of what's going on is "but we know X, you can't deny it", and yet it's apparently the 'hard' problem? We both unquestionably know it and simultaneously find it the hardest problem in philosophy. Is God messing with us?

OK, you're conflating mental activity with reports of mental activity. The point is the same: consciousness/mental activity is different than reports of same. — RogueAI

I don't see how. Are you suggesting that logging to working memory is not a 'mental activity'?

That is logically equivalent to: you are not conscious when you are not doing reporting activities. Is that the claim you're making? — RogueAI

Yes. That's right. You have read my explaination of what I mean by 'reporting activities'?

I guess I'll take you both at your word that you're not prepared to discuss it seriously and leave it at that. I wish you would've saved us some time and not engaged.
— fdrake

In what field other than the whole consciousness/qualia field is this...

no matter what arguments they give or evidence they show, you're not going to conclude you're unconscious. That would be absurd. Do you agree? Or could you be persuaded into thinking you're a zombie? No, you couldn't! You know you're conscious. How can you not know that? This is why these discussions are frustrating. You know you're not a zombie. You know nothing anyone can say to you will convince you you're a zombie.
— RogueAI

...considered an argument?

There's something I find so odd about all this. The counter-arguments to any questioning of what's going on is "but we know X, you can't deny it", and yet it's apparently the 'hard' problem? We both unquestionably know it and simultaneously find it the hardest problem in philosophy. Is God messing with us?

Isaac, do you believe it's possible you're not really conscious right now, as you're reading this? Do you think you can be talked into the belief "I am not conscious right now"? If no, then I guess what I was saying about Searle makes sense, doesn't it? There's just no evidence or argument that can persuade someone they're unconscious, is there?

If yes, and you really think it might be possible you're a p-zombie, all I can do is say, wtf? And you wouldn't be the first (self-described) p-zombie I've run into in philosophical forums. The things some people talk themselves into believing...

I don't see how. Are you suggesting that logging to working memory is not a 'mental activity'?

That is logically equivalent to: you are not conscious when you are not doing reporting activities. Is that the claim you're making?
— RogueAI

Yes. That's right. You have read my explaination of what I mean by 'reporting activities'?

Of course you have an explanation of reporting activities. Reporting activities can't possibly mean reporting activities. We're talking about "reporting activities". I'll pass on that rabbit hole.

Isaac, do you believe it's possible you're not really conscious right now, as you're reading this? Do you think you can be talked into the belief "I am not conscious right now"? If no, then I guess what I was saying about Searle makes sense, doesn't it? — RogueAI

I don't see how my ability to judge whether or not I'm conscious has anything to do with either the neurological basis of consciousness you originally raised, nor whether the set 'qualia' under consideration has any proper members as we're here discussing.

This kind of talk is exactly what I meant by my comment you've quoted above. Any and all discussion about the complexity and neurological underpinnings (together with the philosophical implications of such) are assumed to have been properly addressed by nothing more than an outraged cry of incredulity.

Of course you have an explanation of reporting activities. Reporting activities can't possibly mean reporting activities. We're talking about "reporting activities". I'll pass on that rabbit hole. — RogueAI

Can't make any sense of this.

Sorry everyone. 'Reporting' means logging to working memory. I should have made that clear.

On second thoughts, though, less sorry because I don't think I've written anything so stupid as to warrant an assumption that I'd mean something like "we're only conscious when we're talking". A little charity (or inquiry) might help, in addition to me being more clear about my terms. — Isaac

Versed would inhibit memory formation, but I see what you're getting at. It just seems that you're defining consciousness as "when you're conscious."

Versed would inhibit memory formation — frank

? - Typo, possibly.

It just seems that you're defining consciousness as "when you're conscious." — frank

Well, at least I'd be right then! Any explanation has an element of tautology, no? 'Tides' are the action of the Moon's gravity on the oceans - "sounds like you're just saying 'tides' are tides"

- Typo, possibly. — Isaac

Versed? The generic is midazolam.

Well, at least I'd be right then! — Isaac

True.

Versed? The generic is midazolam. — frank

Oh! The benzodiazepine. My mind went straight to versed as in 'well-versed' and got stuck there.

Yes, but the effect of benzodiazepines is not on the primary working memory, it affects the formation of new stored memories.

Now if you mixed it with Fentanyl...but then you would indeed be unconscious.

Gotcha. :up:

...a Bayesian inference model (which is my preferred model). — Isaac

Brains doing statistical analysis?

Isn't it rather that what neural networks learn using feedback, Bayesian models use feedback, and hence neural networks can be described in Bayesian terms?

That is, the architecture of the brain is connectionist rather than Bayesian.

I'm not disagreeing with you, but rather asking for clarification.

The reason why we feel like we're living some story is because we're constantly scenario-planning and to do that we have to integrate our current environment into the 'the story so far...' section of the film. — Isaac

I agree with this as a phenomenon, but that seems a rather anthropocentric idea of consciousness. When speaking of objects and properties of awareness, I would expect a lower order to have something in common with other animals. My chihuahua can see what's before her, recognise other dogs, and let the poor bastards have it like the walking fiery female Latino cliche she is. Frogs are pretty adept at recognising flies and firing their insane tongues flyward. We're presumably not accusing all animals of compulsive narrative-building, although I agree that does describe humans well.

The point is that there's no reason to think that 'identifying the object' is an event in any singular manner. — Isaac

I don't think that matters. If I've suggested that recognition must be a singular event, it was merely an artefact of speaking approximately about things I'm hazy about.

Another fascinating (to me) aside, but I must stop getting sidetracked. Have a look at this paper, if you fancy, it's really interesting. — Isaac

Thanks, reading now (when not typing this).

I could almost get behind that but would have to add that consciousness may not be the kind of thing that has the kind of properties we're talking about. Consciousness seems to be a set of processes, story building... — Isaac

I assume consciousness is, at root, a set of processes. But there are also unconscious processes, and they seem to feed into each other such that those unconscious processes provide data to the consciousness set.

Kenosha Kid. It looks like fdrake has already said what I just answered to you - I should really read the whole thread before replying. — Isaac

I find the feedback aspect perfectly reasonable, and I would expect consciousness to be some higher-order set of processes. I don't think either really speak to the impossibility of outputs of unconscious processing being made available for conscious awareness. I don't really have a strong idea of the case against this...

My feeling is that there is some crossed wires about what we're talking about. For instance, I did not intend to suggest any particular structure for conscious or unconscious processes, nor that consciousness is some intended terminus for unconscious processes, but these appear to have come across as vital to my point for both yourself and fdrake, so mea culpa.

Perhaps it would be a good idea to turn this around. We could dismiss qualia on the basis that:

a) there is no conscious/unconscious distinction at all: that everything that might constitute a conscious object or property is either already found in the raw input to our senses (to which the brain does nothing at all) or, if the brain does some things, it always does so in a way that we could be conscious of;

b) there may be a conscious/unconscious distinction, but there's no actual content to consciousness; it is one thing or no thing.

(a) would rid us of the idea that we become conscious of the results of unconscious processing of sense data, i.e. the immediacy of qualia, but begs the question why I am conscious of some of these processes but not others, e.g. irrespective of how I learned to invert my view of the world, why I am not conscious of doing it now.

(b) would get rid of properties of consciousness, which would beg the question of how I can be conscious of 'car' or 'Halle Berry's face' or distance or colour or anything else at all.

As far as I can see atm there are unconscious processes, whatever their structure, that act on sensory input, and we have consciousness of the results of those actions, whatever the structure of consciousness. The unintended implications that e.g. there is some teleological submission process, or some terminus at consciousness, or some implied specific structure to consciousness, aren't really what my argument is about. It is simply that we are conscious of results of unconscious processing.

Brains doing statistical analysis?

Isn't it rather that what neural networks learn using feedback, Bayesian models use feedback, and hence neural networks can be described in Bayesian terms?

That is, the architecture of the brain is connectionist rather than Bayesian.

I'm not disagreeing with you, but rather asking for clarification. — Banno

In a broad sense, yes, the term Bayesian Inference, Bayesian Brain, Active inference... all pretty much interchangeable and broadly refer to the same model - that the brain is organised into hierarchical areas which suppress signals from areas beneath them on the basis of prior assumptions about the nature of the signal they're expecting, but updating those expectations in accordance with the function of the combined signals - just like Bayes theorem.

In literal terms, there have been a number of experiments done where (for example the dissonance between expected distance and actual distance between ridges in a ridged pattern) have been calculated using Bayes theorem and the function of the results from human subjects also plotted. The two functions ('Bayes by maths' and 'estimates by humans') are almost identical to the millimetre, so in at least a few stripped down, (overly?) simplistic cases the brain is somehow doing Bayesian statistics, yes. It's not as far fetched as it originally might sound, a fairly simple neural network can be designed computationally to carry out Bayesian calculations. Neurons could quite feasibly do it.

Thanks. I could be pedantic and ask if the brain is calculating Bayesian stats as opposed to doing something that can be described in Bayesian terms... but that might be the same as asking if a neural network trained to add two numbers is actually doing addition... I'm not sure the question can be made coherent.

When speaking of objects and properties of awareness, I would expect a lower order to have something in common with other animals. My chihuahua can see what's before her, recognise other dogs, and let the poor bastards have it like the walking fiery female Latino cliche she is. Frogs are pretty adept at recognising flies and firing their insane tongues flyward. We're presumably not accusing all animals of compulsive narrative-building, although I agree that does describe humans well. — Kenosha Kid

Your dog probably forms stories to integrate dissonant information too. The frog maybe not so much, but then the frog probably doesn't have much by way of object identification either. The two seem to go together. Have you seen the experiment where the baby birds will beg at any yellow diamond. they don't get the point of piecing together all the parts of the mother bird, just two angles and the colour. there may still, however, be a proto-story developed, just a very limited one, but here's a lot of people think that's what the neocortex does. anything without one can't do it, anything with can.

My feeling is that there is some crossed wires about what we're talking about. For instance, I did not intend to suggest any particular structure for conscious or unconscious processes, nor that consciousness is some intended terminus for unconscious processes, but these appear to have come across as vital to my point for both yourself and fdrake, so mea culpa. — Kenosha Kid

Ah, that sounds likely then, it's not an easy topic to have clarity of expression in, one really needs to start from some agreed basis and proceed from there. One of the most compelling take-aways from Dennet here is the way in which talk of Qualia throws us in at the middle without having any clear idea of how we got there.

As far as I can see atm there are unconscious processes, whatever their structure, that act on sensory input, and we have consciousness of the results of those actions, whatever the structure of consciousness. The unintended implications that e.g. there is some teleological submission process, or some terminus at consciousness, or some implied specific structure to consciousness, aren't really what my argument is about. It is simply that we are conscious of results of unconscious processing. — Kenosha Kid

I see. It seems then that our disagreement (small such as it is) is only over whether dismissal of Qualia in their entirety puts this idea at risk (throws the baby out with the bathwater, as you put it). My feeling is that the idea here is so generalised and applicable to a field much wider than qualia, that dismissing all talk of qualia maintains the conscious awareness of the results of unconscious processing completely intact. There are plenty of cognitive psychologists and neuroscientist working under the former assumption without ever mentioning qualia or anything like them, so I think it can work. (there are, of course also plenty who do - much to their shame!).